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Abstract
This qualitative study comprised an in-depth investigation into the subjective - the explicitly
human - experience of those suffering from Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME). I was, firstly,
concerned with the nature and meaning of the social side of illness, that is, the sufferer's
encounters with doctor, family member, friend and acquaintance alike. I was, secondly, set
to develop greater insight into the essentially personal experience of being ill. I was able to
conclude that, even amidst the inhumane presence of utter ignorance that permeate the very
experience of ME, no ME sufferer is inevitably doomed a victim. They can always make a
deliberate decision to have a say in their situation, in their own experience of their
circumstances. They have the power of personal choice. Recommendations are, therefore,
directed at expanding the potential extent and magnitude of this dynamic power.
The substantive focus of my study was enriched by a deliberate concern with the
methodological implications of my own intimate involvement within the research process. I
was here primarily concerned with my personal contribution to the research process as well
as the influence thereof on the research relationships developed and the research strategies
chosen and applied. I could not but conclude that the understanding I explicate is, as all
social science theory, essentially a human construction, developed by me, in my distinctly
human capacity. Recommendations are, therefore, geared to sensitise all social researchers
to their own contribution to the construction of that which is eventually presented (and taken)
as truthful knowl~dge.
In conclusion, I am thoroughly convinced that the experience of both illness and research is
fundamentally human. This "humanness" cannot and should not be denied. Instead, I
advocate a more deliberate focus on the human dimension of illness and research. Without
such a focus, a more comprehensive understanding of either realm will continue to linger as
but an elusive ideal.
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Opsomming
Hierdie kwalitatiewe studie is gebaseer op 'n in-diepte ondersoek gerig op die subjektiewe -
die onteenseglik menslike - ervaring van diegene wat ly aan Myaligië Enkefalomiëlitis
(ME). Ek was, eerstens, geïnteresseerd in die aard en betekenis van die sosiale dimensie van
siekte, dit wil sê, die lyer se ervaring van sosiale kontak met dokters, gesinslede, vriende en
kennisse. Ek was, tweedens, gerig op die ontwikkeling van 'n grondige insig in die uiters
persoonlike ervaring van siek-wees. Ek het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat, selfs te midde
van die onmenslike teenwoordigheid van blatante onkunde wat die ganse ervaring van ME
kenmerk, geen ME lyer noodwendig tot 'n slagoffer-status gedoem is nie. Hulle kan altyd 'n
doelbewuste besluit neem om 'n sê te hê in hul eie situasie, in hul eie ervaring van hul
omstandighede. Hulle het die mag van persoonlike keuse. Aanbevelings is dus daarop gerig
om die potentiële trefwydte en impak van hierdie dinamiese mag uit te brei.
Die substantiewe dimensie van my studie is verryk deur 'n doelbewuste fokus op die
metodologiese implikasies van my eie intieme betrokkenheid in die navorsingsproses. Ek
was hoofsaaklik gemoeid met my persoonlike bydrae tot die navorsingsproses en die invloed
daarvan op die ontwikkel van navorsingsverhoudings en die toepassing van gekose
navorsingstrategieë. Hierdie fokus het gelei tot die besef dat die beskrywing wat ek aanbied,
soos inderdaad alle sosiale teorie, essensieël 'n menslike konstruksie is, soos ontwikkel deur
my, in my uitdruklik menslike kapasiteit. Aanbevelings is dus daarop gerig om alle sosiale
navorsers te sensitiseer ten opsigte van hul eie bydrae tot die konstruksie van dit wat
uiteindelik voorgestel (en geag) word as die waarheidsgetroue kennis.
In slotsom, is ek oortuig dat die ervaring van beide siekte en navorsing fundamenteel menslik
is. Hierdie "mensheid" kan en behoort nie ontken te word nie. Inteendeel, ek bepleit 'n
doelbewuste fokus op die menslike dimensie van siekte en navorsing. Sonder só 'n fokus sal
'n meer diepgaande begrip van iedere area bloot 'n onbereikbare ideaal bly.
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IChapter 1
Introduction
It should be clear from the start: this study is all about stories. So, it seems appropriate to start
with one ...
One lovely summer evening we joined a party of eight for dinner. The company was well
educated and all but one involved at the university in one capacity or another. We were
affably mingling and getting to know each other better, exchanging stories both trivial and
profound. In response to one of the many questions around the table, I explained to the host
that my research was about the deeply personal experiences of people who suffer from yuppie
flu. Abruptly, the tranquil and serene mood of our company turned frenetic. Suddenly
everyone around the table had something to say, to ask, to add.
"Don't I know of someone suffering from it?" "Aren't these people just tired?" "How do you
know that they actually have yuppie flu?" "Are they really, really ill?" "Isn't it just
depression?" "What? Are there actually official criteria for diagnosing this illness?" "But
aren't people just pretending to be ill?" And, "Oh", interjected the host quite authoritatively,
"I heard it was just a terrible bout of diarrhoea".
Somewhere during the conversation one of the guests belatedly joined in. Not quite aware of
the origin of this discussion, he assumed that because I was responding to all the questions, I
must be the one with yuppie flu. And so he asked, quite innocently, "And you, do you use
medication or is it just a matter of the right diet?" Anxiously, I struggled to think of a quick
answer. What could I possibly say? Unexpectedly, and perhaps slightly ironically, the by now
obviously ignorant host came to the rescue, explaining that it wasn't I who suffered from the
disease; that it was merely the subject of my research. "Look", he even added, "she's in
brilliantly good health; of course she's not ill".
And there I sat, dumb-founded, stunned into silence.
This story, which so vividly illustrates the ignorance and misunderstanding that surround ME,
introduces and supports the very purpose of this study.
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2A story about illness
This study is about the subjective experience of those who suffer from the illness that is often
so cruelly dismissed as "yuppie flu". Actually, "yuppie flu" refers to an illness widely known
as ME (Myalgic Encephalomyelitis) and in certain circles also as CFS (Chronic Fatigue
Syndrome).
It is an illness that, despite its broad incidence, is poorly understood, easily misconceived, and
severely stigmatised. What is more, ME is an illness which inflicts serious incapacity and
disability upon the sufferer. There is yet no cure. There is not even a sure way of treatment to
soothe the symptoms and alleviate the disability. Medical practitioners appear to be as much
in the dark about this illness as the sufferers themselves. With a medical solution thus
seemingly a long way off, there is a dire need for a more immediate social solution to this
illness.
A social solution demands greater understanding, recognition and support, both in medical
circles as well as amongst the general public, that ME is a very real illness. Many ME
sufferers feel that such understanding is of far greater importance than endless scientific
debates about the aetiology and pathology of ME. These debates do not help them to cope on
a daily basis. These debates do not help their family and friends to understand the illness any
better. These debates do not even help their medical practitioners to treat them more
efficiently. To ME sufferers these debates are, indeed, of very little (if any) use as they
struggle through their immediate experience of pain and fatigue. This is clearly evident from
sufferers' frustration with "always (being) treated like a collection of atoms instead of real,
thinking, and feeling human beings" (Hennessy 1999). They are human beings with human
needs reaching far beyond the simple (and currently often wholly inadequate) address of their
physical disorder. It follows, then, that this study is specifically geared towards reaching a
better understanding of the human suffering involved in the experience of ME. I earnestly
wish that once this has been achieved, this understanding could be brought to the attention not
only of the social science community, but even more importantly, to the attention of society
itself.
To develop such a forceful understanding of the illness experience of those who have ME, I
depended on the assistance of a selection of ME sufferers who were willing to share their
experience of illness. These ME sufferers told me their stories about what it is like for them to
have ME; about the ways in which this illness shapes their situations, their relationships and
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3their actions. And they told me about the meanings they give to the experience of living their
lives with ME. Through the stories so constructed through our conversations, I wanted their
voices - the voices of ME sufferers - to be heard.
A story about the research(er)
The story with which I introduced this study also accentuates the fact that I too have this
illness, this "yuppie flu", this ME.
What does this mean for this study: what does it mean when the chosen research field hits so
close to home? To find an answer to this question is exactly where the methodological focus
of the present study comes into play. In other words, given my undeniable involvement in the
field of ME, in the very experience thereof, what was my experience of the research? Did I
find that I had expected too much of myself to become involved in a study that lay so close to
my own being? Did I find that my own involvement, far from closing my research eyes,
opened them to new possibilities? What did I find?
The remainder of the document will hint at and introduce possible answers to these questions.
But there is one more thing to be said and done before I can proceed. In following the advice
of Pallia et al. (1997: 48) in this matter, I now explain, at least as a prelude to the study, "my
stake" in the research I had undertaken.
My stake is my illness, and my illness is now eight years old. It started while I was, like any
other teenager, living a vibrantly active life filled with school, sport and friends. Yet, by the
end of my third year at high school, my life had deteriorated to. .. well, to something that could
hardly be called a life at all. I was most ofthe time unable to attend school, I could not enjoy
participation in any kind of sport, and I hardly had any energy to spend with my family, let
alone with my friends. During this stage, I found it difficult to do just about anything,
brushing my teeth, combing my hair, getting dressed, everything seemed to demand so much
energy. It felt as though I was completely and utterly depleted of all energy. It seemed that
this drastic change was caused by a bout of infectious mononucleosis from which I just did not
seem to recover.
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4Since falling ill I have had my share of good days and bad days. Indeed, my illness has gone
through many ups and downs. During relapses, the sensation of acute illness still haunts me in
the form of intense exhaustion, crippling muscular pains and weakness, problems with
concentration and memory, and those pounding headaches. These features not only played
havoc with the latter part of my high school career, but also turned my tertiary academic years
into an arduous affair. For me, each relapse seemed to have been provoked by a variety of
different factors, factors that I find difficult to single out and clarify. Some were related to
mental, emotional or physical exertion; others simply to a pleasant outing which turned out to
be just too much to bear. For me, these factors remain a closely interwoven mystery that has
thus far proven too difficult to untangle and make sense of. In contrast to those grim patches
of serious illness I, of course, also enjoyed better times during which I seemed to be gradually
improving. Generally I am indeed quite a lot better now than I was at times before. Yet, I still
cannot attempt any form of exertion without suffering the often severe repercussions. And I
still wake up every single morning feeling utterly unrefreshed, as though I have not slept at all
for days, for months.
During the course of the illness, and especially since the commencement of this study, I have
also become more aware of an array of often lurking feelings that are either a product of or
have been exacerbated by the illness. These feelings include a kind of loneliness brought on
by being ill for weeks on end, despair of ever getting well again, detesting my dependency
upon others, feeling marginal to other people's lives, loss at inevitably having to give up so
much, and distress about people who have disappeared out of my life, even those that could
have been friends. I became aware of, and had to face the negative and often intensely painful
feelings the illness has wrought in my life.
These new perceptions changed me, my sense of Self, my perspective on life itself - but
getting in touch with who I am, with my own responses, reactions and feelings, has helped me
to understand myself better. Because I am now aware of these issues, I can adjust them and
adjust to them. Perhaps this new sense of control, of being responsible for myself, has made
the illness even a little easier to bear. And perhaps it has re-ignited a ray hope which was so
easily dimmed by the onset of such an overwhelmingly disruptive illness.
This account of my own stake is not an attempt to offer an early answer to the research
question which led to this study. After all, why ask a question to which you already know the
answer? Instead, my account of Self adds to the sense and direction of the research question; it
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5provides the context in which the question was asked and, thus, the direction from which to
look for meaningful answers to it (cf. Gadamer in Maso 1995: 12-13). In short, it is only when
I am clear about where I am looking from, that I can understand what to look for and know
when I have found it.
What is more, explaining my own stake certainly is not an attempt to be or become a more
"objective" researcher. Indeed, far from making me more objective, it represents a way of
becoming more sensitive to my own experiences that have undoubtedly served to shape and
mould my presence and influence throughout the research process (cf. Pollio et al. 1997: 48).
In this sense, my account of Self represents a description of my own way of seeing, my own
distinctly human (and therefore inevitably limited) way of looking at and coming to know the
human world I chose to set my gaze upon. It is, after all, only when I am clear about the
contribution of my Self that the human world under study can assert itself - in my eyes - in all
its unique complexity.
Thus, through my account of Self, I recognise that my suffering from ME may have influenced
my conduct of this research. This in turn means that the story I was eventually able to tell
about this world of illness experience was directly related to my Self, to the researching I
responsible for the study. Taken more broadly to apply within the realm of social science
research, this recognition means that the stories we as social researchers construct about a
particular world of human experience is as much a function of the ways in which we look at
and interact with this world as it is of the world itself(cf. Morgan 1983a: 13).
Telling a stOry
In looking at and interacting with the human world being studied we operate from - and so
almost inadvertently reveal - a particular way of defining and forming knowledge. Kvale
(1996: 3-5) explains, at the hand of two metaphors, that researchers here tend to operate from
one of two primary positions.
In the metaphor of the miner knowledge is seen as buried metal and the researcher as a miner
who unearths the valuable metal. Some miners seek objective facts to be quantified; others
seek nuggets of essential meaning. In both conceptions, knowledge is simply waiting to be
uncovered, to be mined out of the participant's pure experiences, wholly uncontaminated and
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knowledge are placed on a conveyor belt where it is transformed, though not changed in
essence, from oral to written state. Once these nuggets reach the end of the transformation
process, the objective facts and essential meanings that they contain are filtered out and
extracted by means of various analytic techniques. Finally, they are moulded into their pure,
definitive form, the final product of the mining process (Kvale 1996: 3-4).
The value of the miner's product lies in its purity. Here, the degree of purity is measured by
the extent to which it corresponds to objective reality, the purest knowledge of all (Kvale
1996: 3-4). This suggests that the research product is valued most highly when the researcher
has or is at least able to convincingly show that a nugget of knowledge has been produced in a
wholly uncontaminated form and is now justifiably represented as a mirror image of objective
reality. In other words, when the researcher as a miner produces a research account, he or she
is not really telling a story at all. It is rather a question of reflecting in the pages of written
research text the human world as it was "discovered" in as pure a form as possible.
Inthe metaphor of the traveller the researcher is portrayed as a traveller on a journey that leads
to a tale to be told upon returning home. The traveller explores the many domains of the
country, either as unknown territory or with maps pointing to specific sites of interest. As the
traveller wanders through the landscape, he or she engages with the inhabitants of the world
through which he travels, and through their conversations the inhabitants tell their own stories
of their lived world. Here, then, the traveller engages in "conversation" in the original Latin
meaning of the word as "wandering together with". What the traveller so hears and sees is
described qualitatively as he or she reconstructs it. The meanings in the original stories are
separated and unfolded through the traveller's own interpretations. And they are remoulded
into a new story to be told upon the traveller's return to his or her home country (Kvale 1996:
4).
The value of the traveller's tale lies in the insight it brings. Through his or her relationship
with the inhabitants of the world being studied, the researcher's own understandings are both
challenged and changed. Upon the traveller's return home, he or she is then able to lead others
to new understandings and insights that may similarly challenge their taken-for-granted
assumptions about the country in which the traveller had wandered (Kvale 1996: 4). Thus, the
travel report produced by the researcher as a traveller is a story that gives evidence of the
insight that has been co-constructed between the researcher and the researched.
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show important similarities to established schools of thought. The metaphor of the miner
illustrates a common understanding in modem social sciences, very much reminiscent of
nineteenth-century positivism, of knowledge as "given". That is, knowledge is simply waiting
there to be discovered by the competent researcher. Nothing is required but care not to
contaminate this pure metal. The metaphor of the traveller, on the other hand, is free from the
tatters and remnants of nineteenth-century positivism and constitutes a slightly more post-
modern understanding of knowledge and knowledge formation. In accordance with this
understanding, human knowledge is constructed through and within human interaction and
relationship. What is required here, then, is the sensitive formation of a human relationship
through which stories about human life and living can be told.
Despite its promise of uncovering precious nuggets of pure knowledge, the miner metaphor
did not reflect my perception of knowledge and knowledge formation. Instead, it is the
traveller metaphor, with its strong emphasis on the human element of relationship, which more
closely captures my way of thinking about knowledge, research and research relationships.
Thus, the metaphor of the traveller became my chosen approach: my way of looking at the
world under study and telling my story about it. It also, in a sense, became my way of (re-)
locating knowledge construction specifically, and social research in general, more firmly
within the realm of human practice.
Following a story
For the benefit of those who wish to follow my journey into the little known world of the ME
sufferer, I now present an outline of the road taken - a travel itinerary, so to speak - through
which the reader will be able to easily keep track of my journey and even, where deemed
necessary, to retrace my footsteps.
The following two Parts introduce and explore the existing body of relevant knowledge I
consulted to familiarise myself with the world being studied. In Part I the world of ME as the
biological disease and as the subjectively experienced illness is surveyed. In Part II those
works which explore the researcher's own contribution to the research process are reviewed. It
is here, in the pages of old and new literature, that the central themes of this study are inserted
into a larger body of developing knowledge and theory.
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systematic methodological planning. It shows that this path was firmly guided by the aim to
do justice to the human world being studied and to do so in a manner both appropriate and
sensitive to its very nature.
What I learned through my journey into the little known country of ME is described in Part IV.
In this section, I recount my conversations with the inhabitants of this human world: the ME
sufferers themselves. I tell my story - my rendition - of this world of human suffering and
endurance, of ignorance and triumph. And it is a wonderfully human story, full of twists and
turns, heartache and celebration. Through it, you will come to know the human sufferers who
every day face, fail, and conquer their illness. You will come to know the human side of
illness.
Having presented my story of the world of ME I then, in Part V, reveal more about my own
experiences of and within this little known country. Here, I give an account of the adventures,
the failings and the victories that marked my research journey. I reflect upon how these served
to shape the story I was able to tell. And I consider the value of my story as I lay it open to the
scrutiny of others. In the process, I bear my Self so that you will come to know me - the
researching human I - as I was involved throughout the course of this study. As you do so,
you will come to know the human side of research ..
In the last Chapter, I reveal the final leg of my journey - returning home. Here, as I near my
home country, I reflect upon what had transpired through the course of my journey. Was my
journey indeed a path to understanding? Am I able to give any indication of ways to better
understand and deal with the human world I wandered? And can I give any advice to
travellers still to follow? As I responded to these questions, I could not but acknowledge that
my journey into the uniquely human world of illness and research indeed both challenged and
changed me. Perhaps, then, if I tell it well, this journey will similarly touch your life.
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Introduction
"ME is a serious debilitating illness that disrupts families, destroys lives and has
immeasurable cost to the economy. Those whose lives are affected by ME need the support
and understanding of our global village" (Editor, ME.A.S.A. News 1999: 1).
In order to contribute towards increased support for and understanding of ME sufferers this
study will, as described in Chapter 1, focus on the subjective experience of those who suffer
from this disease.
A comprehensive understanding of this experience demands a thorough background of the
history and present status of ME. Hence, in Part IL I present an overview of the history and
definition of ME as well as a detailed description of the nature of this disease. In addition, I
will also reflect upon some of the most commonly held misconceptions surrounding ME.
Against this background, I will then attempt to gain greater insight into the devastating impact
of this disease upon the sufferer.
However, before commencing with this discussion, I would like to clarify the use of the name,
"Myalgic Encephalomyelitis" (ME). Such a clarification is necessary in the light of the
current lack of agreement concerning the proper terminology by which to refer to this disease
(Acheson 1992: 154; Henderson &Shelokov 1992: 173).
In recent history, a number afnames have been suggested to describe this illness. Some of the
names used prior to the conception of the term "Myalgic Encephalomyelitis" (ME) include
Iceland Disease, Akureyri's Disease and Epidemic Neuromyasthenia (Ramsay & Dowsett
1992: 83).
Acheson (J 992: 154) argues that a term such as "Iceland Disease" has the clear disadvantage
of not giving the lay person any idea of the nature of the disease. It is also incorrect on
historical grounds because the Los Angeles outbreak described by Gilliam represents the
original account of ME in medical literature. The same disadvantages (with the added
difficulty of pronunciation) apply to "Akureyri 's Disease".
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Henderson and Shelokov (1992: 174) prefer the name "Epidemic Neuromyasthenia".
However, Acheson (1992: 155) argues that the first term is misleading because it suggests that
this disease is confined to epidemics. The second term, translated as "nerve-muscle-
weakness ", has little meaning and suggests a disorder of the muscle end-plate, which runs
contrary to recent electromyographic evidence. The verbal similarity with "neurasthenia ",
which means psychoneurosis, is also particularly unfortunate.
Some of the names invented subsequent to the conception of ME include Post-viral Fatigue
Syndrome, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS), and Chronic Fatigue and Immune Dysfunction
Syndrome (CFIDS) (Ramsay & Dowsett 1992: 83).
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, the most widely used among these terms, was first described in
1988 by Dr Holmes and his associates who developed a working definition for research
purposes (Levine 1992: 198). However, this term places sole emphasis on "fatigue" - a
condition that is not only immeasurable and largely indefinable, but is also associated with
both normal daily life as well as with almost all chronic disease states. The emphasis on
'fatigue" belittles those who study this serious debilitating illness as well as those who suffer
from it (Hyde 1992a: x).
Hence, many patients suffering from this disease loathe the name "Chronic Fatigue
Syndrome ''. "Fatigue" is totally inadequate to describe the experience of the illness,
"trivialising the severity of ME in some patients and not always reflecting what may be for
some sufferers a different and much more disabling symptom" (Macintyre 1998: 27). In
addition, Macintyre (1998: 27) also notes that the term "Chronic Fatigue Syndrome" has
induced a certain "psychologisation'' of the illness, accompanied by a belief by some doctors
that this is a disease of mainly psychiatric origin.
In contrast, Ramsay and Dowsett (1992: 83) argue that the term "Myalgic Encephalomyelitis"
(ME) does not trivialise the clinical severity of this illness.
Acheson (1992: 155) explains that when this term was first introduced in 1956 as "Benign
Myalgic Encephalomyelitis" it was hoped that it would emphasise the absence of mortality, the
severe muscular pains, the evidence of parenchymal damage to the nervous system, and the
presumed inflammatory nature of the disease.
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Yet, this term has been criticised by some who argue that the disease is certainly not always
benign, not invariably myalgic, and possibly never encephalomyelitic (Henderson and
Shelokov 1992: 173).
However, Acheson (1992: 155) defends the term "Benign Myalgic Encephalomyelitis" with
regard to all three meanings. Firstly, benignity is relative; "benign" is probably justified by
the fact that there is no other recorded infective disease of the central nervous system without
mortality. In addition, the pain in this disease, although not invariably present, appears to be
devastating and is perhaps the feature that impresses itself most forcefully upon the observer.
As far as the final meaning is concerned, Acheson (1992: 155) states that in the present state
of ignorance, "encephalomyelitis" seems preferable because it conveys the suggestion that the
disease is infective in origin, which is almost certainly the case.
In the light of these arguments, as well as in consideration of the fact that it is unlikely that an
adequate term will be found until more conclusive evidence is available, I have decided to use
the term "Myalgic Encephalomyelitis" (ME), thereby avoiding any contention concerning the
benignity of the illness, while simultaneously acknowledging the severely debilitating nature of
the disease.
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Chapter 2
What is ME?
In this chapter I present an overview of the history and definition of ME as well as a detailed
description of the nature of this disease.
Historical perspective
Historical routes
The origins of ME are ancient. Hyde (1992c: 111) shows that a disease complex that may
have been ME was described as early as 1900 B.C. although the origins of this text were
considerably older. Much of the mythology of ME was incorporated into western medicine at
the time of Hippocrates in the fourth century B.C. and later taken up by Galen in the second
century AD. According to Hyde (1992c: 111) Galen was in fact one of the first to suggest that
the disease complex known today as ME was related to physical disease and not hysteria. This
view was not heeded.
For most of the next 2000 years very few physicians believed that ME, or any other disease for
that matter, had an infectious cause. Instead, the concept dating from early Egyptian
mythology that any unexplained illness was simply due to the gods, or hysteria, never died out,
but was simply clothed in the pseudoscientific terminology of the day, and persisted with little
criticism for most of this period (Hyde 1992c: 111).
In 1881 this stance towards infectious disease was challenged by the first recorded epidemic of
paralytic poliomyelitis. However, blind to the increasing information pointing to an infectious
process as the cause for poliomyelitis, some physicians still insisted as late as 1901 that
paralytic poliomyelitis was the result of a psychological predisposition (Hyde (1992c: 112-
113). Even today there are still physicians who hold this view of ME.
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Epidemic ME
It was not until a full-blown poliomyelitis epidemic swept California in the summer of 1934
that ME was actually recognised as a separate epidemic disease. During this poliomyelitis
epidemic another and different type of epidemic occurred among the staff of the Los Angeles
County General Hospital. While 1301 cases of paralytic poliomyelitis were treated in this
hospital alone, a further 1198 cases were diagnosed as not having poliomyelitis. What did they
have? It is quite probable, as both Hyde (1992c: 113) and Steincamp (1988: 17) argue, that
many of these patients had indeed contracted ME.
The symptoms of this epidemic were those of ME. The patients developed relapsing muscle
weakness, unusual pain syndromes, personality changes, and memory loss - all indeed typical
ME symptoms. Many of the staff doctors, although still very young at the time, never returned
to full employment, while the nurses in particular were all treated for hysteria (Hyde 1992c:
113). This first carefully recorded ME epidemic, which came to be called atypical
poliomyelitis, was the first of no less than 52 recorded outbreaks of ME from various parts of
the world up to the present time (Macintyre 1998: 11).
According to Steincamp's (1988: 17-19) review of these epidemics, several ME outbreaks, and
in particular the 1984 epidemic at the Nevada resort town near Lake Tahoe, stimulated major
medical breakthroughs into the nature of ME. It also inspired leading virologists and medical
researchers, such as Dr Tobert Gallo, a co-discoverer of the AIDS virus, to become involved in
the quest towards a greater understanding of this disabling disease.
Interestingly, many of these outbreaks were closely associated with an outbreak of paralytic
poliomyelitis. This was indeed the case in the 1948-1949 epidemic in Iceland that started as a
poliomyelitis epidemic but ended as a major ME epidemic involving 1116 patients. This
pattern was repeated in various parts of the United States, in Australia and in South Africa
(Acheson 1992: 132-139; Hyde 1992c: 114-115; Steincamp 1988: 17-19). There thus appears
to be numerous events in history that point directly towards a constant poliomyelitis-ME
association.
Sporadic ME
Since 1979 there has been a substantial (though poorly documented) increase in sporadic cases
of ME amongst the general public. These increases compounded slowly until the late summer
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of 1984 when it appeared, as Hyde et al. (1992: 29) explain, that a critical mass was reached
and a veritable explosion of ME occurred. Contrary to what may have been commonly
expected, the numbers of those falling ill with ME did not drop after this period but have
instead continued to rise.
With reference to this sporadic form of ME, Hyde et al (1992: 29) and Levine (1992: 203)
report that, in terms of age, race and sex, this illness has apparently been diagnosed more often
in young white females than in any other group. It has a particularly wide age spectrum, being
increasingly documented in the paediatric population as well as in patients above age 50, with
females representing as many as 65-75% of all cases. Racial predisposition is, however,
currently uncertain as there continues to be the possibility of referral bias.
With regard to socio-economic status, Levine (1992: 203) observes that many media articles,
particularly in the popular press, state that ME is a disease primarily of people in the
upper/middle socio-economic groups. Levine (1992: 203) however argues that the apparent
predominance of patients in upper socio-economic strata is more a matter of referral patterns
than incidence. In addition, Steincamp (1988: 4) also remarks that it is perhaps the better
educated who, in the face of malaise and medical indifference, have the necessary resources to
search for a more precise diagnosis for their mysterious illness.
Hyde et al. (1992: 29) have found a definite occupational bias with teachers, health care
workers and social workers most significantly affected. In addition, they have also observed
that, within the health profession, those who work in psychiatric institutions or are directly
involved in nursing seem to be particularly singled out. In the teaching profession, teachers
who work in schools for the disabled appear to be particularly at risk.
In this regard, it has been suggested that these individuals represent a group of high contact
with a potentially ill public and are thus exposed to more infectious illnesses. Although this
may be true, Hyde et al. (1992: 29) argue that these very groups also tend to keep their
immunisations up to date because of their line of work. Thus a potential relationship between
inoculations and some infectious diseases seem to be suggested. It has, for instance, been
observed that there is an increased risk of poliomyelitis occurring after prophylactic
inoculation against smallpox.
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It thus appears as though the disease ME has been known to occur epidemically since the
earliest of times and, more recently, also sporadically. In both these forms, ME has affected
individuals across a broad spectrum of age, race, sex, class and profession.
Definitions of ME
The first attempt to systematise ME into a useful working definition was made in 1988 by Dr.
Holmes, a United States Government researcher, and his team. In the absence of a diagnostic
test for this illness, the 1988 definition (cf. Table 2.1) was based on a complex of potentially
related symptoms and signs that tend to occur together (Holmes et al. in Hyde 1992b: 9).
Although this definition represented a worthy start, Hyde (1992b: 7) points out that the very
basis of this definition was haunted by these researchers' belief that it was the Epstein-Barr
virus which caused what they named the "Chronic Epstein-Barr Syndrome". Holmes et al. (in
Hyde 1992b: 9) did, however, acknowledge that it was inappropriate to use a name for the
perceived syndrome that implied a specific causal agent when consensus about such an agent
was still lacking. Hence, these researchers proposed a new name: Chronic Fatigue Syndrome
(CFS).
Table 2.1 The 1988 Holmes CFS working case definition
(Holmes et al. in Hyde 1992b: 9-11)
The 1988 Holmes working case definition of CFS
A case of CFS must fulfil the following two major criteria:
New onset of persistent or relapsing debilitating fatigue or easy fatigability in a person
who has no previous history of similar symptoms. This fatigue does no resolve with bed
rest and is severe enough to reduce or impair average daily activity below 50% of the
patient's pre-morbid activity level for a period of at least 6 months.
Other clinical conditions that may produce similar symptoms must be excluded by
thorough evaluation based on history, physical examination and appropriate laboratory
findings. These conditions include, among others, psychiatric disease and drug abuse.
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In addition, a case of CFS must fulfil at least six of the following minor criteria as well as
two physical findings (e.g. sore throat, fever and tender glands). If no physical findings
are present a case must fulfil at least eight of these criteria:
1. Mild fever
2. Sore throat
3. Painful lymph nodes
4. Unexplained generalised muscle weakness
5. Muscle discomfort or myalgia
6. Prolonged post-exertional fatigue
7. Headaches of a new type, severity, or pattern
8. Joint pain without joint swelling or redness
9. Neuropsychological complaints (e.g. forgetfulness, confusion, inability to
concentrate)
10. Sleep disturbances
A symptom included as a minor criterion must have begun at or after the onset of
increased fatigability and must have persisted or recurred over a period of at least 6
months.
However, Hyde (1992b: 11-12) argues that through this name the particular group of
researchers took one symptom of the disease - fatigue - and elevated it to an unrealistic
importance. Yet, fatigue is neither specific, definable nor scientifically measurable. In
addition, fatigue is not only a normal and a pathological feature of everyday life, but also an
integral part of many illnesses. By making fatigue the primary characteristic of this disease,
the authors necessitated the elimination of hundreds of other diseases. Hence, to truly follow
the criteria set out by this definition probably makes ME the most expensive illness to
investigate of any known disease (Hyde 1992b: Il).
In addition, making fatigue the flagship symptom of this disease clouds the fact that the
majority of ME symptoms are indeed central nervous system symptoms. Interestingly, as
Hyde (1992b: 12) observes, central nervous system dysfunction was not part of the Holmes
definition.
Jason et al. (1997: 973-974) identified another problem with the Holmes case definition of
ME, namely that it requires six to eight minor symptoms which involve many unexplained
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somatic complaints. However, the requirement of such a high number of unexplained somatic
complaints can inadvertently lead to a selection of individuals with psychiatric problems.
Hence, the use of this definition in research has produced erroneous estimates of the extent of
ME co-morbidity with psychiatric disorders. Such estimates have led some to conclude that
ME is purely a psychiatric disorder. The criteria prescribed by the original case definition,
therefore, introduced an unfortunate bias into the realm of ME research.
In addition to these problems, researchers have applied the 1988 working case definition
inconsistently. In practice, this case definition has indeed been frequently modified, especially
since some ofthe criteria are difficult to interpret while others are difficult to comply with. In
addition, opinions also differ with regard to the classification of chronic fatigue cases preceded
by a history of psychiatric illnesses (Fukuda et al. 1994: 954).
Partly in response to the problems associated with the Holmes case definition of ME, the
Oxford Guidelines, as presented in Table 2.2, were developed in 1991 by a British group of
clinical and scientific researchers chaired by Dr Sharpe. This paper represents a further
attempt to develop consensus on a case definition of ME as well as the methods of assessment
to be employed (Hyde 1992b: 12-17).
Table 2.2: The 1991 Oxford Guidelines
(Sharpe et al. in Hyde 1992b: 12-17)
The 1991 Oxford Guidelines
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS)
1. A syndrome characterised by fatigue as the principal symptom.
2. A syndrome of definite onset that is not life long.
3. The fatigue is severe, disabling, and affects physical and mental functioning.
4. The symptoms of fatigue should have been present for a minimum of six months
during which it was present for more than 50% of the time.
5. Other symptoms may be present, particularly myalgia, mood and sleep disturbances.
Certain patients should be excluded from the definition. They include:
1. Patients with established medical conditions known to produce chronic fatigue.
2. Patients with a current diagnosis of schizophrenia, manic-depressive illness,
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substance abuse, eating disorder or proven organic brain disease. Other psychiatric
disorders (including depression, anxiety disorders, and hyperventilation syndrome)
are not necessarily reasons for exclusion.
Post-Infectious Fatigue Syndrome (PIPS)
As a subtype of CFS, the patient should fulfil the criteria specified for CFS as defined
above. The patient should also fulfil the following criteria:
1. There is definite evidence of infection at onset or presentation.
2. The syndrome is present for a minimum of six months after onset of infection.
3. The infection has been corroborated by laboratory evidence.
Hyde (1992b: 18) however comments that the Oxford Guidelines appear to serve the single
purpose of introducing the term "Post-infectious Fatigue Syndrome" as an acceptable term
under which to publish. In this way the authors of this paper merely added confusion to the
already overly complicated definition proposed by Holmes et al in 1988.
This view is supported by Macintyre (1998: 91-92) who points out that the Oxford Guidelines
for ME do not require the person diagnosed with ME to suffer from abnormal muscle fatigue
or pain, to experience fatigue made worse by exercise, or to have symptoms that vary from day
to day. Yet, the Oxford Guidelines can include people with fatigue due to depression or stress
caused, for instance, by "burn-out" from overwork. The Oxford Guidelines indeed added to
the confusion surrounding ME.
Thus, because of the problems experienced with the case definition of ME as proposed by
Holmes et aI., as well as by the Oxford group, a need arose for revised criteria to define ME
more clearly. Hence, in 1994, Drs Fukuda and others (Fukuda et al. 1994: 953-959) published
a refined and modified working case definition of what they referred to as CFS. This
definition is summarised in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: The 1994 Fukuda CFS working case definition
(Fukuda et al. 1994: 956)
The 1994 Fukuda working case definition of CFS
A case of CFS must fulfil the following major criteria:
1. Unexplained, persistent, or relapsing chronic fatigue that is of a new or definite onset
(not lifelong).
2. Fatigue is not due to ongoing exertion.
3. Fatigue is not substantially alleviated by rest.
4. The fatigue results in substantial reduction in occupational, educational, social or
personal activities.
A case of CFS must fulfil four or more of the following minor criteria:
l. Self-reported impairment in short-term memory or concentration severe enough to
cause substantial reduction in occupational, educational, social or personal activities.
2. Sore throat.
3. Tender lymph nodes.
4. Muscle pain.
5. Multi-joint pain without joint swelling or redness.
6. Headaches of a new type, pattern or severity.
7. Unrefreshing sleep
8. Post-exertional malaise lasting more than 24 hours.
Each minor criterion must have persisted or recurred during six or more consecutive
months of illness and must not have predated the fatigue.
The 1994 case definition clearly discarded all physical signs as major inclusion criteria.
Fukuda et al. (1994: 957) explained that this exclusion was based on the fact that the presence
of such signs had been unreliably documented in the past. In addition, the required number of
symptoms was decreased from eight to four and the list of symptoms was reduced from eleven
to eight. Fukuda et al. (1994: 957) remarked that, in modifying the 1988 criteria, the decision
to retain any symptom criteria other than chronic fatigue generated the most disagreement
among the authors.
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This disagreement occurred between those who favoured a more restrictive approach (using
several symptom criteria) as was done in the 1988 ME working case definition, and those who
favoured a broader definition of ME (using fewer symptom criteria). Those favouring a more
restrictive approach argued that the use of multiple symptom criteria best reflected the clinical
sense of ME as a distinct entity. The other side argued that no symptoms have been shown to
be specific for ME and that some studies suggested that a requirement for multiple symptoms
biased the selection of cases toward those with psychiatric disorders. Disagreement over this
particular issue underscored the need to establish specific features of ME and thus the need for
further in-depth research into this illness (Fukuda 1994: 957).
A further very important difference between the ME criteria of 1988 and 1994 highlighted by
Macintyre (1998: 92) is that minor psychiatric disorders - anxiety, non-psychotic depression
and somatization - are not excluded when diagnosing ME. The resulting major differences in
the description of the illness imply that studies of ME patients who were diagnosed at the hand
of either the Oxford Guidelines or the 1994 Fukuda Criteria may include people who have
various psychosocial or psychiatric reasons for being very fatigued.
In this regard, Fukuda et al. (1994: 957) defend their decision not to use specific psychiatric
disorders as a basis for exclusion by pointing out that psychiatric conditions tend to be highly
prevalent in persons with chronic fatigue and chronic fatigue syndrome. The exclusion of
persons with these conditions would substantially hinder efforts to clarify the role of
psychiatric disorders in fatiguing illnesses. Nevertheless, Jason et al. (1997: 976-977)
emphasise that it remains crucial to ensure that those patients with solely a psychiatric disorder
are not erroneously included within the ME rubric. Such inclusion will, after all, seriously
complicate the interpretation of epidemiological and treatment studies.
Although they are of considerable importance, the guidelines contained in each of the above
case definitions should be regarded as strictly tentative. It remains necessary to acknowledge,
as Fukuda et al. (1994: 957) as well as Hyde (1992b: 18) dearly do, that until there is a better
understanding of the aetiology and pathophysiology of ME, a perfect definition of this
complex disease will elude even the most knowledgeable.
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What isME?
Theories concerning the aetiology and pathophysiology of ME abound (e.g., Cowley et al.
1990: 62-70; Levine 2000: 4-8; Steyn 1993: 1-6). One such theory implies the involvement of
the central nervous system as the primary culprit. As this theory is the most prominent and
apparently the most accepted of the available array of existing explanations (cf. Wessely et al.
1998: 239-242), it is the one that will henceforth be considered.
ME as a dysfunction of the central nervous system
According to Hyde (1992b: 18), the majority of symptoms given in each of the definitions
discussed above strongly point towards the central nervous system as the primary system
involved in ME. This is supported by Chabursky et al.'s (1992: 19-20) assertion that ME
represents a major acquired central nervous system dysfunction in which the brain function
undergoes a metabolic alteration. This persisting multi-level central nervous system
dysfunction defines the nature of the disease and the disease process.
Hyde and Jain (1992: 38-39) explained this more clearly by stating that ME represents an
acutely acquired, chronic change in the ability of the central nervous system to process, with
any dependability, the functions of reception, interpretation, storage and recovery of
information and to programme dependable, normal, smooth end-organ responses. Depending
upon the patient, a physiological encephalopathy exists in one, but usually several, of the
cortical areas responsible for motor, sensory, cognitive and emotional function. Those deeper
levels of central nervous system function that are responsible for the co-ordination of motor,
sensory, cognitive, emotional and hormonal functions and at times for rational value
judgement may also be physiologically injured.
Inparticular, Hyde & Jain (1992: 38-39) are of the opinion that there is evidence of subcortical
injury to the hypothalamic-pituitary-end organ axis and also to the limbic system, as that area
is responsible for the co-ordination of so many central nervous system functions. This view is
largely endorsed by Goldstein (1992: 400-402).
Causes of ME
According to Hyde and Jain (1992: 63) the dysfunction of the central nervous system, as
explained above, may result from a chronic viral infection. Hyde (1992a: xi) propose that such
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infection may provoke reactive changes in neuropeptide messengers which, in turn, stimulate
compensating immune reactions to rid the body of this infectious stressor and to return the
body to normal homeostasis. By definition, chronic infections have however managed to
escape these initial compensatory immune mechanisms. Yet, the neurochemical homeostatic
events continue to be employed uselessly and to the detriment of the organism.
Such chronic infection, which defies the protection offered by the immune system, has been
linked to two theories of viral cause.
The first of these concerns the retrovirus concept. Inthis respect Hyde (1992a: xi) refers to the
work of Dr Paul Cheney who believes that ME represents a new disease process caused by the
emergence of an entirely new retroviral infection. Hyde (1992a: xi) suggests that this view
should be taken seriously for, if Dr Cheney is correct, the new retrovirus may be pivotal to the
understanding of the disease.
The second theory of viral cause, which is considered by both Edwards (1992: 223) and Hyde
(1992c: 113-115), revolves around the enterovirus concept. This theory specifically concerns
the possible link between ME and the poliomyelitis-enterovirus family. Hyde (l992c: 113)
argues that up until 1956, when general poliomyelitis immunisation was introduced, many if
not most of the ME epidemics occurred concurrently with or followed just after epidemics of
paralytic poliomyelitis. Yet, after the introduction of immunisation, paralytic poliomyelitis
virtually stopped, but ME persisted.
In addition, the introduction of poliomyelitis immunisation brought about a dramatic change in
the nature of ME itself. Hyde (1992c: 114) explains that many patients who were affected by
ME prior to 1956 suffered a paralytic association along with the typical symptom picture of
ME. Yet post-1956 ME patients have been spared overt paralysis.
It is also interesting to note that, although paralytic poliomyelitis has been around since 1881,
post-polio syndrome only began to surface around 1979 and only received its name during the
same period when ME catapulted into public attention. There is also no notable difference in
the clinical picture between these two disease syndromes except that in post-polio syndrome
there has been a clear observation of an earlier paralytic poliomyelitis illness. This leads Hyde
(1992a: xii) to question how well physicians truly understand poliomyelitis, not to mention
ME.
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Thus, while either a retrovirus or an enterovirus may attack the central nervous system and so
cause ME, further research is needed to substantiate these theories. Such research is also
demanded because it is still not clearly known if a triggering disease, such as an infecting
virus, is in fact the cause of ME, or if the triggering disease is a convenient non-specific
destabilising virus that provides the ultimate injury to a pre-existing destabilised, overly
stimulated immune system (Hyde et al. 1992: 27).
The apparently inadequate immune response to an infecting agent noted in ME sufferers by
both Edwards (1992: 223) and Komaroff (1992: 232) hint at such a destabilised immune
system. Such immunological disturbance, which allows the reactivation of latent or
ineradicable infectious agents, particularly viruses, may contribute to the morbidity of ME -
directly, by damaging certain tissue, and indirectly, by eliciting an on-going immunological
response. In particular, the elaboration of various cytokines as part of this on-going
immunological war may produce various ME symptoms such as fatigue, myalgia and fever
(Jones 1992: 269; Komaroff 1992: 232).
It is, however, still unclear what triggers such immune dysfunction in the first place.
Komaroff (1992: 232) suggests that many factors could do so on both the central and the
peripheral level of immune function. Such factors may, for instance, include exogenous
infectious agents, environmental toxins, stress, emotional strain, or even the biology of an
underlying affective disorder (cf. Ader et al. 1995: 100-101; Esterling et al. 1994: 291-297;
O'Leary 1990: 366-371). Komaroff (1992: 232) concludes that it is extremely unlikely that
any single explanation will serve to adequately define this extremely complex illness.
The complexity of ME has undoubtedly contributed towards the current unsatisfactory state of
knowledge of the exact causal agents involved in the illness. Although available data permit
many interpretations, it provides strong support for none (Komaroff 1992: 232). Hence, the
true aetiology and pathophysiology of ME remains a mystery despite the intensive efforts by
competent researchers in a number of different fields.
ME symptoms
Hyde and Jain (1992: 42-43) clearly state that central nervous system dysfunction and, in
particular, inconsistent central nervous system dysfunction is undoubtedly the chief cause of
both mental and physical disability in ME.
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The symptoms commonly associated with such disability are briefly reviewed below in
random order. This review will provide a useful background against which a thorough
understanding can be developed of the experience of those who suffer from this disease.
Fatigue
Fatigue is a universal daily life experience and has probably evolved as a safety mechanism to
force humans to rest at the right times. At times the sensation of fatigue is therefore
appropriate and does not necessarily indicate illness. In the case of ME it is the nature of the
fatigue and the post-exertional feeling of illness, accompanied by the rapid onset of brain
fatigue, that differentiates it from the symptom of "feeling tired all the time". The majority of
people with ME do not, in fact, feel fatigued "all the time"; sometimes they may even feel as
though they have normal energy, but their energy simply runs out very quickly (Macintyre
1998: 30-31).
It is thus clear that the nature of the fatigue experienced by ME sufferers has both physical and
mental dimensions. Lane (1992: 395-396) observes that patients may try to distinguish these
dimensions by reporting physical fatigue as tiredness, lack of strength, and inability to perform
physically at their previous level (or at what they perceive that level to have been), while
mental fatigue may be described as vague drowsiness and disinterest.
It is also clear that fatigability and post-exertional fatigue represent very prominent features of
ME. Hence, patients may complain that mental or physical activity increases their fatigue
disproportionately and indeed exerts a "cost" in terms of an exacerbation of the symptoms
associated with ME (Lane 1992: 396).
Macintyre (1998: 145-146) explains that it seems to be specifically the concept of "post-
exertional fatigue" that is generally very poorly understood. There appears to be confusion
between the fatigue felt by a normal person after a game of tennis and that felt by someone
with ME after minor exercise. The former is described as "healthy tiredness"; it refreshes the
mind, improves appetite and leads to a good night's sleep. The muscles may ache, but this is
generally relieved by a hot bath and sleep. In contrast, the post-exertional fatigue typical of
ME needs to be experienced to be understood. It is not just tiredness - it is feeling horribly ill,
collapsed as though poisoned, with visible muscle twitching, intense pains in the muscles and
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maybe in the joints, nausea, sweating, insomnia and nightmares, maybe elevated temperature
and recurrence of sore throat and tender, enlarged glands. This fatigue (which word is an
understatement of the condition) is certainly not relieved by a good night's sleep.
Pain syndromes
Pain syndromes in ME can vary from totally disabling, to occurring only after exercise, to non-
existent. When they do occur, and that is in over 60% of ME patients, the variety of pain
syndromes can be legion. Hyde and Jain (1992: 58) explain that the very number of them can
cause grave anxiety to the patient and help create scepticism on the part of the physician who
may believe that no one in their right mind could have this many symptoms. Physicians have
been trained to associate pain with local or referred pathology and, hence, almost never
associate or ascribe pain as a central dysfunction. Once they have scrupulously investigated
pain for its possible cardiac, surgical or malignant origins they tend to feel impugned if their
search reveals no local pathology. They then tend to blame the patient for the pain syndrome
by terming it hysteria or somatization (see Chapter 3). However, it is more likely that the
majority of these pain syndromes are manifestations of central pain receptor deregulation or
mjury.
One of the most important ME pain syndromes identified by Hyde and Jain (1992: 58) is
malaise. Malaise is accentuated in the initial stage and it recurs for as long as the disease
process exists. Malaise is almost impossible to describe. It is often described as the pain and
discomfort that one has during the acute phase of influenza although it is not always the same.
The patient feels terrible, as though he/she is about to die. There is no fever as in influenza or
dimming of consciousness that, mercifully, usually occurs in the malaise of a febrile influenza
attack. The malaise tends to wander, to wax and wane. It particularly injures the sensory and
dulls the cognitive abilities of the brain. During such attacks the rapid muscle and brain fatigue
that is normal in ME becomes accentuated.
This malaise is often exaggerated or cumulative in association with specific events. As a rule
it occurs after any physical exercise that goes beyond the normal everyday work output.
Malaise may occur often in place of what would have been an infectious illness. Many patients
will thus inform the physician that since they fell ill with ME they have never once had a
typical cold or external sign of an upper respiratory infection. Instead, they most likely have
had many "crashes" (Hyde & Jain 1992: 58).
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According to Hyde and Jain (1992: 59) another very common pam syndrome closely
associated with ME involves dull, persistent, moderate to severe bilateral pain in the area
"behind the eyes". Patients sometimes describe this pain as a feeling of having been clubbed.
ME patients may sometimes also experience a total head pain that can be described as feeling
"as though one's head was expanding and blowing up".
A further common pain syndrome, which has given rise to the common French name for ME,
"Spasmophilie", involves muscle spasm. Localised spasmodic or tetanic muscle spasm is very
common is the illness. Both single muscle and muscle groups may be involved (Hyde & Jain
1992: 60).
Hyde and Jain (1992: 61) furthermore also observe that the most common abdominal pain
occurs in the lower abdomen and particularly in the urogenital system. This symptom is
definitely worse in post-pubertal females, who may suffer excruciating pain that is often
associated with any and every form of menstrual irregularity and cessation. Within this pain
syndrome the principle element is again most likely to be severe muscle spasm. The muscle
sphincters are particularly prone to persistent pain of this type.
Hyde and Jain (1992: 62) identified muscle pain as a closely related pain syndrome central to
ME. The patient may complain of feeling "as though he/she has been beaten with an axe
handle". In other words, the patient feels bruised and hurt. This pain lingers for several hours
and then departs, usually only after the patient has slept. It is sometimes associated with a dull
generalised headache as well as increased inability to concentrate. At other times, the patient
may experience severe pain in a main muscle mass feeling "as though a knife or arrow had
been stuck into the muscle". Muscle pain may often be related to the use of a particular muscle
group that goes beyond the normal everyday activity.
Cognitive dysfunction
Cognitive dysfunction is certainly one of the most disabling of the ME symptoms. "When this
simple fact is understood, it becomes immediately apparent why this is such a devastating
disease for children, students and adults" (Hyde & Jain 1992: 42). Patients can return to work
or school with pain, with muscles spasm, with fatigue, with motor dysfunction, but when they
have consistent difficulty in making new memories, recalling old memories and co-ordinating
new and old information, they are of little use to the modem work force. "It is the combination
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of the chronicity, the dysfunctions, the instability, and the lack of dependability of these
dysfunctions, that creates 'the most chronic of chronic disabilities'" (Hyde & Jain 1992: 43).
Some of the neurological dysfunctions of ME, as highlighted by Hyde and Jain (1992: 43-45)
as well as by Macintyre (1998: 6-9, 22-23), include loss of verbal and performance intelligence
quotient, dysfunction in simultaneous processing, receptive and expressive dysphasia, reading
comprehension dysfunction, and dyscalculia.
Loss of verbal and performance intelligence quotient
Admission of a significant verbal and performance I.Q. loss represents a threat to sufferers'
work and social abilities as well as to their own sense of identity. This may be particularly
significant in the light of recent research findings, cited by Hyde and Jain (1992: 43), which
estimate that the average ME patient may lose approximately 20% of his/her estimated pre-
illness I.Q.
Bastien (1992: 459) found that while most of the patients included in her study were high
functioning and successful individuals prior to their illness, they now had I.Q. scores in the
average range. Performance I.Q. is significantly lower than Verbal I.Q. in most of these
patients, probably indicating greater right hemisphere dysfunction.
Dysfunction in simultaneous processing
Early in the disease process patients may be distracted and unable to concentrate, simply
because of the severe headaches that are frequently associated with the onset. Others have
"noise" in their head that is often described as buzzing, or the crackling and hissing of a short-
wave receiver slightly off the frequency channel. The symptom storms, the myalgias, and the
anxieties also make it difficult to concentrate. However, as Hyde and Jain (1992: 43-44)
explain, there comes a period in the disease process when these symptom storms settle down
and the patient becomes acquainted with his or her new internal environment. When that
occurs, primary lack of concentration becomes obvious.
Within this context, an ME patient may understand a single person speaking directly to him or
her, but may be quite unable to understand the same conversation from the same person when
it occurs telephonically. In the latter instance, the patient experiences more difficulty in
concentrating and following the conversation than in a face-to-face conversation. Visual and
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multi-sensorial cues, therefore, appear to be very important to ME sufferers (Hyde & Jain
1992: 44).
Hyde and Jain (1992: 44) also explain that an ME patient may have no difficulty at a dinner
party with two or three persons and one table conversation, yet, with multiple persons and
conversations, the same patient may be unable to understand a word that is said. In addition,
such a patient may not even be able to recall the guests and, in extreme cases, not even the
dinner party itself the next day.
Hyde and Jain (1992: 44) illustrate the dysfunction in simultaneous processing by explaining
that although an ME patient may have no difficulty or anxiety walking in the country, this
same patient may experience panic in crowds and even more so in a busy shopping centre
where he or she is deluged with multiple discordant sensory information.
While it is true that all individuals tend to concentrate better when the input of information is
specific and simple, a normal individual has the ability to block out extraneous and unwanted
information or noise. However, ME patients seem to lose the ability to distinguish noise from
required information and tend to shut down all intake after simple fatigue sets in. Hyde and
Jain (1992: 44) note that this receptive shutdown has alarming implications for making
memones.
Receptive and expressive dysphasia
Closely allied to concentration is the difficulty in understanding speech and in speaking.
Patients may complain that while they are able to hear spoken words clearly, the words make
absolutely no sense to them. These patients have lost the ability to interpret normal language
(Hyde & Jain 1992: 44).
In addition, Hyde and Jain (1992: 44) note that when ME patients speak, important elements
may be left out of the sentence or the syntax may be askew. Patients are usually aware of
these structural faults in their own conversation and at times become overly conscious of this.
Reading comprehension dysfunction
A patient who suffers from this dysfunction can still read, but can neither comprehend what is
read nor compare it with known information that has previously been stored. This dysfunction
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is one of the primary cognitive problems encountered by ME patients and it plays havoc with
the patient's ability to perform tasks, let alone to learn new ones (Hyde & Jain 1992: 44).
In addition, this dysfunction is also closely related to sequencing dysfunction which adversely
influences patients' ability, for instance, to look up telephone numbers in a telephone
directory. This dysfunction is also illustrated by the confusion experienced by patients when
attempting to make simple decisions (Hyde & Jain 1992: 44).
While these skills do tend to improve during the recuperation stage of the disease, Hyde and
Jain (1994: 44) state that much may be lost.
Dyscalculia
Hyde and Jain (1992: 45) contend that perhaps the one overriding cognitive dysfunction
observed in almost all ME patients, irrespective of their prior mathematical abilities, is the
development of dyscalculia. Patients for instance have difficulty in or cannot make change or
add up columns. ME patients frequently cannot remember telephone numbers very well. In
addition, confusion with timetables is also common. Patients may, therefore, routinely show
up at the wrong time or on the wrong day.
Auditory dysfunction
Many different forms of central auditory dysfunction are recognised In ME patients.
According to Hyde and Jain (1992: 47) these include:
•
An inability to comprehend in the presence of multiple auditory signals
Loss of tone perception
Discomfort, pain and "noise" associated with hearing a sound signal of even a modest
decibel level
A sudden loss of appreciated sound
•
•
•
Yet, perhaps the greatest hearing problem is associated with the difficulty and at times inability
to interpret spoken or auditory information. This is confirmed by the results of Bastien's
(1992: 455) study of ME patients which suggest serious left temporal lobe dysfunction that is
directly associated with a decreased ability to process, encode, and retrieve auditory
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information. According to Hyde and Jain (1992: 47) this dysfunction represents one of the
most central problems of ME.
Visual dysfunction
ME patients will frequently complain of a sluggish or decreased range of accommodation,
often compared to a slow zoom lens. Patients with previous normal accommodation will, with
the onset of ME, relate that when changing focus from near to far objects, their
accommodation adjustment is unusually slow to react. In addition, patients frequently
complain of double or blurred vision, especially when tired. Patients also frequently suffer
from a loss of night vision (Hyde & Jain 1992: 48-49).
Yet, the primary central visual dysfunction is equivalent to the auditory dysfunction mentioned
above. The patient fails to integrate and store visual information in a meaningful way. Hyde
and Jain (1992: 49-50) point to the following problems provoked by this particular
dysfunction:
• Reading: Patients may temporarily lose their ability to easily comprehend what they read.
For most patients, this disability occurs significantly during the first 6 months of the onset
of ME. Their reading ability then improves to reach a new plateau, subjectively below
their previous level (Hyde & Jain 1992: 49).
• Writing: To write, one must not only have the ability to recall, but also to read and
comprehend what one has written. ME patients can make ridiculous spelling and grammar
errors and may even fail to notice these omissions (Hyde & Jain 1992: 49-50).
• Distance and spacial dysfunction: The human brain interprets distance not only by parallax
but by the complex ability to recall, associate and compare appropriate visual and visual
memory cues. People's depth and speed perception work in tandem to interpret motion,
speed, and vector. Hyde and Jain (1992: 50) correctly point out that these functions
protect people as much in crossing a road as they protect a teacup when it is placed upon a
shelf. The following problems related to these functions are generally reported by ME
patients (Hyde & Jain 1992: 50):
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• Jay walking: Patients cannot jay walk or cross streets in the absence of a traffic light
due to the loss of the ability to judge speed, distance, deceleration and vector.
• Traffic motion: Patients, as drivers as well as passengers, experience an inability to
judge the speed and position of cars approaching from the side.
Seizure activity
Hyde and Jain (1992: 51) are of the opinion that ME patients experience seizure activity. It is
their observation that all seizure activity is greater in the initial stage (0-6 months) of ME and
decreases considerably in the recuperation stage (2-12 months). In the chronic stages,
occasional bursts of increased activity may persist. According to these authors, the most
common seizure activity observed in ME patients is absence (petit mal) seizures. These
seizures usually consist of simple episodes which normally last less than 10 seconds.
Hyde and Jain (1992: 52) proceed to distinguish between simple partial seizures and complex
partial seizures.
Simple partial seizures, such as the following, may suggest important areas of central nervous
system dysfunction (Hyde & Jain 1992: 52):
• Somatosensory seizures: The patient complains of tingling or pins and needles in the
extremities and face.
• Autonomic seizures: During such seizures the patient experiences flushing of the face, a
rise in blood pressure, sweating, dilatation and contraction of the pupils, and retardation of
the respiratory rate.
• Focal motor seizures: This can involve involuntary movement of both a single muscle
and/or muscle groups.
• Auditory seizures: The patient has ringing or hissing in the head and may also have
associated pain.
Complex partial seizures, as listed below, tend to be episodic, very short-term and frequently
have dramatic responses (Hyde & Jain 1992: 52):
• Olfactory hallucinations: The patient frequently complains of intense and unusual smells
that are not apparent to others. This doubtlessly represents a limbic system derangement.
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• Episodic dysphasia: The patient experiences episodic difficulty in maintaining volume of
speech. The patient may have spasmodic difficulties of the larynx and upper oesophagus
with or without activation by swallowing.
Hyde and Jain (1992: 53) furthermore also mention a number of uncategorised seizures:
• Tremulous attacks: The patient has subjective attacks of tremulousness. These may last up
to one minute and are common even in chronic cases.
• Psychomotor attacks: The patient does not lose consciousness but may be confused and
anxrous.
• Episodic affective disorders: Abrupt changes in emotional response frequently triggered by
fatigue or multiple sensory input barrages and may consist of inappropriate fear, anxiety,
pleasure or happiness.
Sleep dysfunction
Hyde and Jain (1992: 54) clearly state that few if any ME patients in a full-blown state of the
disease escape sleep dysfunction. During the initial stage in the disease process, the ME
patient commonly suffers from hypersomnia. During this hypersomnia state the patient's sleep
resembles that of normal sleep. While patients can always be aroused to some extent, they will
usually tend to fall back to sleep as soon as they are left alone.
However, in contrast with the initial stage of the disease process, the recuperation and chronic
stages of ME are characterised by insomnia as a primary central dysfunction. While the exact
reasons underlying such insomnia are not yet clear, Hyde and Jain (1992: 54-56) mention a
number of possible causes. These include night temperature variation, night extremity
hypothermia, urine output, malodorous sweats, vivid and often frightening dreams, fear of
dying due to the initial frightening symptom picture of ME, pain on movement, night
headaches, hypersensitivity to sound and reactions to medication.
Hyde and Jain (1992: 56-57) furthermore also point to the occurrence of dream disorders. This
is commonly characterised by a change in content, colour, and violence of the dreamscapes of
ME patients. Patients will often mention the intense brightness and colour of their dreams, as
well as the violence and the frequent aggressive nature of their dreams.
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Emotional dysfunction
Macintyre's (1998: 80) discussion reveals that emotional disturbance is very common III
patients with ME. Such disturbance may manifest itself in the form of emotional lability.
Macintyre (1998: 176) explains that those ME patients who do suffer such emotional lability
may experience black despair, non-stop weeping, and suicidal feelings for a few days, then
wake up one morning feeling fine. On another day they may be irrationally happy, laughing
and excited, perhaps about nothing more than waking up without pain. Unfortunately such
euphoria usually leads to delusions of ability and too much activity, resulting in an
exacerbation of symptoms, followed in turn by a state of sheer exhaustion and despondency.
Hyde and Jain (1992: 63) says that this abrupt change from a person with normal emotional
control to one of pathological emotional dysfunction is noted in every epidemic and is indeed
very common in sporadic cases. Such dysfunction is related to anatomical and physiological
damage to certain centres of the brain that affect emotion control. Injuries to those areas of the
brain that affect emotion are of the same nature as injuries to brain areas that affect physical
function.
It is important to note that, besides the fact that ME tends to become chronic, there is also an
unpredictable variation in the nature and severity of symptoms from week to week, day to day,
even hour to hour (Macintyre 1998: 7).
According to Hyde et al. (1992: 26), the variable expression of the symptom pattern as
indicated above can be explained by injury to different functional areas of the central nervous
system. This symptom variability is quite comprehensible if one realises that ME, like
paralytic poliomyelitis, can injure certain areas of the central nervous system while missing
others. This, once again, points to the primary involvement of the central nervous system in
the clinical presentation of ME.
The disease process of ME
The dysfunction of the central nervous system defines the entire disease process of ME (Hyde
& Jain 1992: 42-43). This process, specifically where ME is marked by an acute onset, is
arbitrarily divided by Hyde et al. (1992: 33-35) into four overlapping stages, namely the initial
stage, the recuperation stage, the early chronic stage, and the late chronic stage.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
37
The initial stage
During the initial stage, which may last up to six months, the illness frequently declares itself
by a dramatic barrage of symptoms following one of several prodromal symptom pictures.
There is usually a significant degree of malaise or total body discomfort such as one is likely to
encounter in an acute attack of influenza. This malaise is accompanied by severe exhaustion
and an alarming fluctuation and variability of symptoms (Hyde et al. 1992: 32-33).
Hyde et al. (1992: 32-33) also points to a tendency for these multiple symptoms and signs to
come in "storms". In this initial stage, these storms seem to have a life of their own without
any apparent triggering mechanism. In the recuperation and later stages, the storms may be
provoked more clearly by unusual but not necessarily excessive activity or association with
infectious disease.
In the light of the great number and inexplicable nature of these symptoms, patients also
frequently suffer from severe anxiety or panic attacks (Hyde et al. 1992: 32-33).
The recuperation stage
The initial stage is followed by what Hyde et al. (1992: 33) call the recuperation stage which
usually lasts between one and twelve months. This stage is characterised by a decrease in the
number and severity of symptoms and symptom storms while there tends to be an uneven
return of abilities. Some patients may recover most or all of their physical but not their
cognitive abilities. Others again may recover their mental abilities but not their physical
strengths. Those functions commonly associated with brain function, for instance memory,
emotional control, reading comprehension, and sensory perception, will particularly vary
according to the degree or completeness of recovery. According to Hyde et al. (1992: 33) this
suggests an unequal level of damage, variable location of injury, and variable recovery of both
mental and physical functions.
Such "recovery", irrespective of its variability, may however seduce some patients into
thinking that they have completely recovered. Yet, on closer scrutiny many of these patients
will have returned to work and social activity simply at a reduced level of mental and physical
ability. Unfortunately, physicians who observe such "recovery" in one ME patient may tend to
generalise this recovery into the expectation that all ME patients will recover and that those
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who do not somehow have something psychologically (or worse yet, morally) wrong with
them (Hyde et al. 1992: 33).
The early chronic stage
Hyde et al. (1992: 33-34) describes the next stage in the ME disease process as the early
chronic stage which may persist from one to six years. This stage is characterised by utter
exhaustion of muscle and central nervous system functions as the patient attempts to return to
normal activity. The typical ME symptoms as described above still exist, perhaps in a more
diffuse but not necessarily in a less disabling pattem. Hyde et al. (1992: 33) note that those
ME cases which are marked by a more insidious onset have a clinical and symptom spectrum
that resembles this early chronic stage.
During the early chronic stage most patients continue to show a very slow and uneven period
of recovery and adaptation to the altered state of their central nervous system, muscle and
social function. Some patients will adapt to their altered internal environmental circumstances
while others will not be able to make this transition. However, the difference in those who
adapt and those who do not is not simple. Hyde et al. (1992: 34) suggest that this process of
rehabilitation may be influenced by a number of factors including the patient's pre-ME
intellectual assets, the level and type of pre-ME education, the degree and area of central
nervous system injury, the availability and quality of social and economic support facilities,
and the patient's access to appropriate re-education programs.
Unfortunately, many patients in this stage of illness will not recover sufficiently to enjoy either
work or social activities at the far higher level they enjoyed before, and thus may see their
hopes and expectations shattered and destroyed. As a result, patients are most likely to commit
suicide during this period (Hyde et al. 1992: 34).
The late chronic stage
The last stage in the ME disease process is the late chronic stage which lasts from six years
onwards. During this stage it appears that patients who do not enjoy adequate recovery and
support increasingly tend to become hermits (Hyde et al. 1992: 35).
It is these patients who tend to be forgotten. They have adjusted their lives to their altered
abilities and may even show some minor improvements in function. Yet, according to Hyde
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and his colleagues (1992: 35), this is largely due to their accepting their altered abilities.
Physicians do not generally see these individuals since they have given up all hope that the
medical profession can be of any service to them. Hence, these individuals tend no longer to
be recognised as suffering from a very real and severely disabling disease.
Furthermore, despite their previous relatively high earning ability, many of these ME patients
are likely to become impoverished, being left with no appreciable disability insurance (Hyde
et al. 1992: 35). Ramsay and Dowsett's (1992: 83-84) study among 420 ME patients who
have been ill for more than 10 years confirm this tragic economic outcome of ME. According
to these authors, over 80% of professional and technical workers suffering from ME have been
obliged to retire early or work only part time. The resulting loss in earnings is truly
tremendous, not to mention the loss of skills and education to the work market.
Hyde et al. (1992: 35) observes that despite such dismal research findings this stage of the ME
disease process is almost totally devoid of any significant research funding. Hence studies
such as the ones mentioned above cannot be replicated and verified. As a result, the late
chronic phase of ME will remain replete with all the mythologies that occur when scientific
scrutiny is absent.
Treatment
Because of the large measure of variability inherent to the clinical presentation and course of
ME, the treatment of this disease represents an extremely difficult task. This also explains
why no specific treatment protocol for ME has been developed yet. Hence, professional
assistance is largely directed at the relief of symptoms as well as at the reintegration of the
patient into society at a level consistent with his or her illness (Vorster 1996: 19-20).
Goldstein (1990: 150-156), Steincamp (1988: 141-190) and Vorster (1996: 20) explain that the
management of ME generally revolves around the conservation of the precious amount of
energy available to the patient through abundant rest and sleep. This is usually balanced
against a program of graded exercise, and supplemented by a healthy individualised diet that is
likely to include vitamin and mineral supplements. This regime can also be enhanced through
specific individualised symptomatic medical treatment. In addition, patients may also choose
to manage their illness through less orthodox means including acupuncture, aromatherapy,
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
40
homeopathy, massage, naturopathy and reflexology as well as through meditation, relaxation
and yoga techniques (Macintyre 1998: 193-285; Shepherd 1998: 252-296).
For many patients such an approach should be combined with individual or group
psychotherapy (cf. Prins & Bleijenberg 1999: 325-339). Vorster (1996: 20-21) explains that
psychotherapy can offer ME patients instruction in coping skills, direction in identifying
important activity limits, and guidance during major life changes. Psychotherapy can thus
facilitate adjustment to and acceptance of the illness, while simultaneously providing guidance
towards improvement.
Yet, while psychotherapy may have a potentially important role to play within the context of
ME and ME treatment, it cannot be seen as a cure for this illness. Its greatest value lies
instead, as Vorster (1996: 21) concludes, in the effective management of ME.
In this section it has become clear that ME, as a disease of the central nervous system, has an
uncertain cause and an even less clear clinical presentation and disease process. This disease
is clearly characterised not only by immense complexity, unpredictability and variability, but
also by severe and pervasive suffering and discomfort.
Conclusion
Leading ME researcher, Dr. Jay Goldstein (1990: 17) describes ME as "a
psychoneuroimmunologic disorder meaning it has elements of psychological, neurological and
immunological dysfunction". The information presented in this chapter bears out Dr
Goldstein's acute summary.
It is clear that this little understood illness affects the patient's mental processes and emotions,
the brain itself, and the body's immune system. As a result, the ME sufferer is likely to
experience the severe yet extremely variable physical and mental impact of ME as
encompassing virtually every aspect of his or her functioning.
The impact of this experience on the person of the ME suffer will constitute the focus of Part
IV.
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Chapter 3
Common misconceptions surrounding ME
The presence of so many medically unexplained symptoms have led some to conclude that ME
is a psychiatric disorder rather than one with a clear physiological base. This is clearly
reflected in the opinion of the noted American nutritionist and medical lawyer, Dr Victor
Herbert, who has in recent times described ME as "an imaginary disease" (in Steincamp 1988:
5).
According to Macintyre (1998: 29) and Weinberg et al. (1994: 21) the ongm of such a
misconception of this disease can be traced back to the 1970s when two British psychiatrists,
McEvedy and Beard, who took no account of the clinical features of ME, nevertheless
described it as a serious psychological disorder. Despite obvious flaws in their reasoning, not
to mention the fact that neither of them had interviewed or examined a single person afflicted
with this disease, their psychiatric hypothesis was taken up by the media and has,
unfortunately, been accepted without question by many members of the medical profession
ever since.
In recent years, it has become apparent that this misconception generally results in ME being
diagnosed either as hysteria or as depression.
The epithet of hysteria
The epithet of "mass hysteria", as first used by McEvedy and Beard, has been applied to
several epidemic and sporadic cases of ME. Acheson (1992: 151) argues that in an illness in
which there has been a selectivity for young women, no mortality, and few positive laboratory
findings, it is important to examine the possibility that hysteria may indeed have accounted for
part or all of the clinical picture presented by ME.
This author points out that a majority of cases may even constitute a hysterical reaction to a
small number of cases of, for example, poliomyelitis. Thus, it will be readily admitted that an
epidemic of poliomyelitis would produce overwork and emotional strain in the nursing staff of
the hospital concerned. Many of the nurses wou1d naturally feel apprehensive about
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contracting the disease and may be inclined to misunderstand the minor aches and pains of
everyday life. With the development of a few genuine cases of poliomyelitis among the staff
and the resulting increased tension, it is possible to envisage an epidemic of hysterical
paralysis (Acheson (1992: 151).
As Acheson (1992: 152) shows, an attractive case can indeed be made for such a hypothesis.
The high attack rates in the most suggestible groups of the community, the predilection for
hospital staff, and the association with preceding or concurrent outbreaks of poliomyelitis,
might thus be explained. Clinically, the absence of or insignificant fever, the prominence of
sensory phenomena which are admittedly often of bizarre distribution and content, the
fluctuation of symptoms and signs from day to day, and the high incidence of negative
cerebrospinal fluid findings would also fit in with this hypothesis.
On the other hand there are strong arguments against the idea that ME simply constitutes a
mass hysterical reaction to a few cases of poliomyelitis. It does after all present a clinical
picture characterised by physical signs that are quite unlike poliomyelitis. In addition, the
relationship to poliomyelitis is not constant. Acheson (1992: 152), for instance, points to the
Royal Free Hospital in 1955 where no patient with poliomyelitis had been admitted prior to an
ME outbreak, nor was the diagnosis of ME entertained in the initial cases. There was thus no
due apprehension about poliomyelitis among the hospital staff, but rather about infectious
mononucleosis, which was the early diagnosis. Also, in the Coventry outbreak of the 1950's,
six of the twelve patients had been nursing poliomyelitis cases for several years. It is therefore
difficult to imagine why such experienced persons should suddenly manifest a hysterical
reaction to poliomyelitis.
Acheson (1992: 152) further argues that the mental symptoms that appear to be a constant
feature of all ME outbreaks and sporadic cases are not typical of hysteria. Disorders of
consciousness and convulsions as may be seen in hysteria have been extremely rare.
Shallowness of affect has also not been observed. On the contrary, depression and undue
emotional lability have been the rule. In the acute stage terrifying dreams, states of panic,
uncontrollable weeping and hypersomnia occur. During the convalescent stage the prominent
features are impairment of memory, difficulty in concentrating, and depression. These
symptoms are certainly more consistent with cerebral damage than with hysteria.
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As a final point against the case for mass hysteria Acheson (1992: 153) points to the
consistency of the course of the illness and to the similarities in the symptoms described,
despite a wide variation in the type of community affected.
It is therefore clear that the clinical picture presented by ME in more than one respect strongly
opposes any meaningful, let alone identical, comparison with the typical manifestation of
hysteria.
ME as depression
Dutton (1992: 493) suggests that it is perhaps not only the complex clinical presentation of
ME, but also the evasive nature of evidence in support of a viral cause for this disease, that has
increased the tendency among medical practitioners to emphasise the role of depression in ME.
According to Goldstein (1992: 401) these practitioners put ME "into the 'black box' of
depression as a way of explaining the inexplicable".
As Dutton (1992: 504) remarks it is easy to see how the notion that ME is somehow caused by
depression is seductive to medical practitioners. Such practitioners are after all mindful of the
fact that somatization is one of the commonest and most troublesome problems encountered
within the primary care practice. Hence, it becomes understandable why a disease that shows
considerable symptom overlap with depression but has no clear physiological base, has often
been misconceived as nothing more than a manifestation of depression.
The supposed connection between ME and depression is commonly investigated through
studies which look for inflated prevalence rates of premorbid psychiatric problems in ME
patients. According to Dutton (1992: 493) the presumed aetiologic implications of this search
are that patients with premorbid depression have immunosuppression as a result of that
depression, or have a constitutional neurologic weakness from which both the depression and
ME arise, or have a tendency to somatize psychological problems with ME as yet another
manifestation of that somatization.
However, according to Dutton's (1992: 468) review of recent literature, the case for depression
consistently producing immunosuppression is weak, even when the immunosuppression is
measured during the depression. Therefore, while some studies imply that depression
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occurring at any time prior to the onset of ME may be serving some immunosuppressive
function, research on depression and immune suppression does not support such a claim.
Furthermore, when depression occurs prior to ME onset, an alternative interpretation of
immunosuppression is that both the depression and the ME are produced by constitutional
neurological weaknesses. According to this argument, as conveyed by Dutton (1992: 499),
ME reflects the interplay between organic and psychological factors in psychologically
vulnerable individuals with a depressive diathesis. In other words, there is an inherited or
constitutional tendency to react to illness with depression, and the depression prolongs the
recovery period. However, Dutton (1992: 499) also indicates that evidence in support of this
argument is weak.
The third premise of the search for inflated prevalence rates for premorbid depression is the
assumption that ME represents a type of somatization. Dutton (1992: 500) however clearly
shows that the characteristics of somatization disorder do not correspond with the clinical
picture of ME. There is thus no strong evidence in support of an interpretation of ME as
somatized depression.
In support of his argument, Dutton (1992: 493) point to a number of problems that arise in
studies designed to examine the role of depression in ME. Dutton (1992: 493) firstly notes that
chronic fatigue patients are not distinguished from ME patients although the theoretical
overlap of depression with chronic fatigue (which has one symptom) is greater than the
overlap of depression with the entire constellation of specific symptoms constituting ME.
What is more, for patients with depression, their symptoms often appear to them to fall into a
familiar (repetitive) pattern. This is not the case in ME. ME patients indeed experience their
symptoms as wholly foreign, strange, bizarre, almost terrifying. In addition, the psychological
problems that are sequelae of ME are very rarely clearly differentiated from premorbid
problems. Also, the temporal relationship of depression to ME is not clearly specified. As
such, psychological events that proximally preceded ME onset and more distant psychological
events are inappropriately lumped together, even though they may have quite different
theoretical significance in determining the aetiology of ME. To aggravate these problems, the
findings that result from such studies are typically linked to evidence of immunologic
suppression by depression, based on research that measured such suppression at the time of the
depression, not years after the depression. Hence, the net effect is to convey the impression
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that depression may playa greater causal (presumably immunosuppressive) role in ME than is
warranted by the data.
In addition, the validity of research findings that imply such a causal link between ME and
depression may be further jeopardised by the modes of scoring on psychiatric instruments.
Jason et al. (1997: 974-975) explain this problem with reference to the Diagnostic Interview
Schedule (DIS) which, although not designed for use with medically ill populations, has
frequently been used to assess psychiatric comorbidity in ME samples.
Within this context, if a respondent mentions that a symptom on the DIS (e.g. pain in arms or
legs) is due to a medical problem that was diagnosed by a physician, DIS rules indicate that
this problem should not be counted as a psychiatric problem. If the physician attributed the
patient's symptoms to nerves or a psychiatric disorder, the patient automatically receives a
score counting towards a psychiatric diagnosis, regardless of whether the patient agrees with
the physician. In addition, if several physicians diagnosed a patient as having a medical
disorder but only one physician attributed the symptom to a psychiatric disorder, the item
would be scored to count towards a psychiatric diagnosis (Jason et al. 1997: 974).
Since many physicians still do not accept ME as a legitimate medical disorder it is possible
that many patients would have had at least one physician who diagnosed their medical
complaints as being a psychiatric disorder, thus increasing the likelihood that people with ME
would receive a psychiatric diagnoses. This clearly suggests, as Jason et al. (1997: 975)
recognise, that high or low psychiatric rates in ME samples may be a function of whether
symptoms are attributed to psychiatric or non-psychiatric causation.
In addition to such pertinent research problems, the supposed connection between ME and
depression is also questioned by the symptom picture typical of ME. In this regard, Dutton
(1992: 502) indicates that ME symptoms have indeed been reported that appear to differ from
the symptoms of depression or somatization. One of these symptoms is muscle weakness
specifically in response to exercise (as opposed to general lethargy associated with
depression). Typically, the ME patient tolerates the physical exertion reasonably well and may
even feel energised during and immediately after the exertion. However, 6-24 hours later the
patients feel ill, the involved muscle group feels sore and weak, and patients experience
marked worsening of their fatigue, cognitive function, and fever. It appears as though this
pattern of post-exertional malaise, followed by a striking exacerbation of symptoms, is unusual
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
50
in healthy individuals and in those with diseases that have some clinical similarity to ME,
including depression.
According to Dutton (1992: 502), a further distinct symptom of ME concerns information
processing deficits. ME patients, for instance, report being unable to function socially because
of a sense of information overload in social groups, leading many to the reclusive existence
that frequently accompanies this disease. In addition, unlike depressed patients, ME patients
can handle dyadic interaction but not group interaction that requires constant switching of
attention. ME thus arises as a discrete illness with symptoms not typically found in depression
or somatization.
However, this assertion does not deny the existence of ME comorbidity with depression.
In this regard, Dutton (1992: 502) points to the work of Derogatis and Wise (1989) in which
these authors argue that depression accompanying a prolonged debilitating illness might be
more appropriately conceptualised as demoralisation or despondency, rather than as a discrete
psychiatric disorder. This may be particularly true, as Jason et al. (1997: 980) note, in the case
of an ambiguous illness such as ME in which patients have difficulty gaining recognition that
they are suffering from a legitimate non-psychiatric illness. This view is strongly supported by
Macintyre (1998: 173-174).
More support for this view is also offered by Dutton (1992: 501) and Steincamp (1988: 128)
who argue that ME patients' grave apprehension about their illness is not unfounded. After all,
ME can be a highly incapacitating disease that renders their occupational, educational, social
and personal life difficult, if not impossible. It has an uncertain duration and prognosis, it
recurs cyclically and unpredictably, and is often met with scepticism by physicians and others.
Such effects would seem sufficient to explain the episodes of depression that ME patients
might experience.
Conclusion
Despite ongoing (and, it appears, at times unsubstantiated) debates, the discussion above
makes it possible to conclude that ME is neither a manifestation of hysteria nor a result of
depression. Instead, it is much more likely that ME will follow a path similar to that of a
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variety of other medical disorders, including multiple sclerosis, which was initially conceived
in terms of a psychological model, but was eventually found to stem from a clear organic cause
(Dutton 1992: 503). For this reason, we should heed Dutton's (1992: 504) caution against
assigning a causal role to psychological variables in the aetiology of ME. If we do not, a better
understanding of this illness - and of the suffering that accompanies it - may very well remain
elusive.
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Chapter 4
The social impact of ME
Besides investigating the nature of the disease itself, it is equally important to understand the
individual's personal experience of ME.
It is therefore important to reflect upon the ME sufferer's encounters in the social sphere - with
the medical profession, with family and friends, and with society at large - as these are
explicitly shaped by the illness. The discussion will then turn its focus on how these
encounters provoke and amplify the Self's experience of this illness.
Encounters with the medical profession
The ME sufferer's personal experience of this illness IS closely related to the medical
profession's response to it.
Fennell (1995: 163-164) notes that medical problems or illnesses that do not have a distinct
beginning, middle and end, and are not easily treatable, upset a growing view in the health care
system that real problems are uni-causal and will respond to a magic bullet approach. Illnesses
such as ME with its unclear aetiology, course and outcome are thus frustrating, potentially
expensive and consequently disparaged.
The frustration experienced in dealing with ME largely stems from the duality in the approach
to patient care by medical practitioners. The Cartesian split has created an elevation of that
which is physiologic, observable and organic, above that which is psychological, non-
observable and inorganic. Organic processes are viewed as "real" or legitimate, while
inorganic processes are seen as "unreal" and illegitimate. Consequently, in assessment
situations, patients' problems that do no meet the criteria of organicity (i.e. genuine) are
relegated to psychological, inorganic sources (i.e. not genuine or unreal). This view has been
expressed many times in the clinical expression, "I could not find anything wrong with him; it
must be in his head". This division of psyche and soma unintentionally becomes particularly
problematic for ME patients who suffer physically, cognitively, and psychologically (Fennell
1995: 165-166).
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As Fennell (1995: 166-167) observes, ME as a disease involving both psyche and soma, can
prove to be an often unmanageable problem for the medical practitioner working within a split
mechanistic approach. Without a specific aetiology, a technologically-based diagnostic
marker, or a proven treatment protocol, treating ME patients can thus be a truly frustrating
experience for the medical practitioner - one that does not allow him or her to perform
"competently". This frustration is easily communicated to the patient; indeed, it often leaves
the patient feeling inadequate, dejected and helpless (Vorster 1996: 49).
The incompetence of the medical profession in dealing with ME is particularly reflected in the
lack of adequate treatment models. Fennell (1995: 164) illustrates this by pointing out that
many psychological methods for coping with grief and loss, implicitly or explicitly, infer an
end point in the loss experience beyond which an individual can experience resolution or
acceptance. However, for ME patients the experience of this illness teaches them that even
though they may valiantly struggle through the stages of loss, they may have their hard-won
acceptance shattered at the onset of yet another relapse cycle.
Aside from the dire state of incompetence and frustration encountered within the medical
practitioner's office, ME sufferers may also be confronted with a perception that they are not
suffering from a real, organically based disease. As Fennell (1995: 166-167) and Weinberg et
al. (1994: 21) show, the medical community is after all still very sceptical of this disease and
may, by not reaching a medical diagnosis in some instances, refuse to bestow recognition and
legitimacy on those who suffer from ME.
These difficulties with the recognition, assessment and treatment of ME may eventually
convey the impression that the medical practitioner suspects that the patient is suffering from a
flawed character. What may begin as a suspicion of a psychological or somatization disorder
may thus become an allegation of deliberate malingering (Fennell 1995: 167).
In response patients are, according to Fennell (1995: 167), likely to experience confusion
regarding their identity and about what is "real": "Am I sick?" "Am I well?" "Am I crazy?"
Indeed, their struggle with the moral implications raised by a medical consultation, augmented
by the intensity of the diagnostic controversy and the lack of appropriate approaches to
treatment, begins to erode the patients' ability to determine what is helpful and what is not,
who is trustworthy and who is not.
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After all, in their encounters with medical practitioners, patients seek healing and relief from
the burden of illness. Yet such healing cannot occur where the practitioner fails to recognise
that the patient is ill (Murdoch 1992: 97). Hence, instead of finding healing or, at the very
least, solace, patients are far more likely to come away feeling confused, blamed, frightened,
or even vaguely immoral or "bad".
In addition, when faced with a medical world that insists that ME sufferers are not sick or that
they suffer from some psychological disorder, patients may be prone to experience
overwhelming feelings of guilt. Sufferers sense that they themselves are somehow responsible
for becoming and being so ill (Rubenstein 1992: 101-103). As Fennell (1995: 164-165)points
out, this experience of guilt is compounded by the financial sacrifices demanded for the care
and management of their seemingly non-existent illness.
Such "ambiguity of medical status" (Weinberg 1994:21) can clearly be expected to engender a
devastating level of psychological stress that simply serves to complicate the ME sufferer's
condition even further. Hence, because of these potentially traumatising experiences, many
patients decide to avoid medical practitioners entirely.
Within the circle of family and friends
Because of the lack of knowledge and understanding of ME prevalent within the medical
world, the ME sufferer is likely to turn to his or her circle of family and friends for support.
However, even here ME may prove to represent a significant source of stress. Macintyre
(1998: 350-356) explains that the illness of any member of a family inevitably adds to the
strain on relationships. If a family member has an acute illness, an injury or has had an
operation there is an expectation that he or she will get better after a predicted period of
convalescence and will return to a more or less normal life. However, suffering from ME is a
sentence of unknown duration. The unknown, combined with the variability and
unpredictability of this disease, is thus likely to have a disruptive influence on relationships
within the family and particularly within the marital unit. According to Vorster (1996: 46),
this disruption is also apparent within the friendly relationships that constitute the ME
sufferer's broader base of social support.
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Fennell (1995: 164-165) reports that family and friends often put pressure on ME sufferers not
to talk about their illness or any ME-related topics. Family and friends may indeed change the
subject, avoid asking the patient how he or she feels, or censor how patients describe their
illness experience. For example, a family member may only allow the patient to describe how
he or she has improved physically over time or how the illness has changed his or her life for
the better.
The patient's communication with family and friends is thus likely to change as it becomes
less open and less frequent. Vorster (1996: 45-46) illustrates that the patient may, for instance,
develop a reluctance to express strong feelings such as anger or depression for fear of
alienation, leading to even more unexpressed frustration and despair.
These feelings are intensified by the pressure put on sufferers to avoid appropriate measures of
self-care, such as limiting physical exertion and conserving energy in order to heal. Instead,
sufferers are likely to be urged by family and friends to "get back to normal" and to engage in
activities that will only exacerbate their condition (Fennell 1995: 164-165).
Fennell (1995: 164-165) argues that such pressure for non-disclosure and the encouragement
of inappropriate measures of self-care, though often veiled as concern for the patient, usually
stem from fear and anxiety produced in family members and friends who observe the ill
person. This is confirmed by Vorster (1996: 45 & 54) who points out that family members and
friends are, in addition to fear and anxiety, very likely to experience feelings of inadequacy
and uncertainty in performing ·treatment, preventing complications or meeting daily needs.
Unfortunately these feelings are easily transferred to the patient.
In response patients often begin to avoid intimacy and start attempting to "pass" for a healthy
person. The ill person feels forced to construct a "normal" public persona, while the more
genuine persona is only shared with a few individuals, if any. Fennell (1995: 165) explains
that sufferers may "stay in the closet", much in the same manner as many gays and lesbians
did, in an effort to protect themselves from stigmatisation. The pressure of living a dual
existence with its concomitant rejection of Self, loss of esteem and depression frequently leads
to further avoidance of intimacy and increased isolation.
However, as Vorster (1996: 40 & 58) repeatedly points out, the effect of support by family and
friends on the ill person's ability to cope with this disease can indeed be impressive. Such
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social support can, after all, provide a buffer that protects the patient from the effects of other
sources of stress. Social support can thus be invaluable to the ME sufferer.
Facing society's response
Although the sufferer's personal experience of ME may clearly be traumatic, aggravated as it
is by the response to it by the medical world, family and friends, society's response to the
illness may precipitate a secondary trauma with even more far-reaching and long-term
consequences (Fennell 1995: 160-161).
Fennell (1995: 161) places this social response into context by explaining that the socio-
cultural factors that influence ME patients converge within the cultural framework of society
and create a social context and discourse which dictate social beliefs and attitudes toward
illness and the treatment thereof.
Engulfed within this framework, persons with ME are likely to encounter beliefs and attitudes
that are stigmatising and sometimes traumatising.
According to Fennell (1995: 161-162) these beliefs and attitudes toward ME arose within an
inhospitable environment ravaged by the fear of AIDS. Society was therefore primed to
dismiss yet another disease with an unknown aetiology and was quick to negatively label the
supposedly affluent minority who contracted it. This response clearly reflects society's
intolerance of what is not understood.
Fennell (1995: 162) explains, "A contributing factor to this cultural intolerance has been the
elevation of ... quantitative systems of knowing, combined with the devaluation of qualitative
or experimentally guided systems of knowing. In this conceptualisation, all that is true or real
is observable, measurable and ultimately knowable. Anything that does not yield to these
criteria is suspect. This cultural elevation of the quantitative and allegedly objective, above the
qualitative and subjective, has contributed to the view that ambiguous situations or problems
are somehow dangerous and possibly immoral, and therefore should be avoided".
Fennell (1995: 162-163) highlights the "just world" notion as a common manifestation of this
intolerance to the yet unknown. In accordance with this notion members of society
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automatically distance themselves from someone they meet or read about in the media who has
suffered much. By specifying how they would have avoided the situation, solved it or
responded to it differently, they create a comforting belief that personal tragedy can be avoided
by utilising far-sighted protective action. This rationalisation creates a false sense of calm and
control over the uncertainty of living, and makes it easier to blame the victim.
This closely relates to suspicion, which represents one of the most immediate negative
attitudes encountered by ME sufferers. This ill-defined, negative emotional tone of wariness
and prejudgement is often reinforced by researchers such as Abbey and Garfinkel (1991: 1644)
who claim that the diagnosis of ME merely provides a legitimate "medical" reason for
sufferers' collection of psychophysiological symptoms, and allows them to withdraw from
situations they find intolerable on the basis of illness, rather than by their own volition.
"Illness and the sick role are thus the only socially legitimate excuse for abandoning the
workplace and the pursuit of achievement" (Abbey & Garfinkel 1991: 1644).
In addition, it is also often claimed that those who suffer from ME have some unconscious
need to be passive and dependent which is fulfilled and sanctioned by illness. For instance, ME
may "legitimise" changes in family systems that enable patients to avoid stressful situations
like work and to fulfil their need for dependency by becoming passive recipients of care by
others (Dutton 1992: 500-501).
However, Apfelbaum (1992: 1754) and Saltzstein et al. (1992: 1755) strongly contest such
assertions which imply that ME is somehow both attractive to and has social value for those
who suffer from it. "This is simply absurd. We have rarely seen secondary gain or social
value associated with chronic fatigue syndrome. The price of chronic fatigue syndrome, as
with other chronic illnesses, is loss and estrangement from 'normal' life" (Saltzstein 1992:
1755). These authors argue that ME is, instead, far more likely to engender an experience of
shame, frustration and stress because of the inability to function at pre-illness levels.
This is confirmed by Macintyre (1998: 29-36) who asserts that, contrary to popular belief,
those who struggle with this disease are generally highly motivated individuals who are
immensely frustrated by not being physically and mentally able to do things as before. The
loss of an ability to function in nearly every aspect of life cannot by any stretch of the
imagination cause people to lead happier lives than they could do otherwise. The actual illness
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expenence associated with ME may, as Dutton (1992: 501) concludes, indeed greatly
outweigh any vague possibility of secondary gain.
The damage done to those who suffer from ME through such false presentations of the disease
within society has been incalculable (Macintyre 1988: 29). According to Fennell (1995: 162-
163), sufferers are likely to experience a sense of shame as their esteem begins to erode under
the pressure of the suspicions about ME that prevail in society. Sufferers may also, as is the
case with exposure to the medical profession, experience a sense of guilt as they internalise
society's message that they have caused this problem by some personal action and therefore
deserve to be ill. Under such circumstances the sufferer's sense of control is clearly likely to
dwindle, leaving them to feel increasingly powerless.
Unfortunately, this experience is intensified by the media which functions as a vehicle that
powerfully reinforces societal prejudices·and stereotypes (cf. Burns 1999; Editor 1998: A14;
Wessely et al. 1998: 310-312). Such negative media coverage of their suffering is likely to
amplify ME sufferers' emotional distress, with attendant feelings of shame, grief and a loss of
worth (cf. McLaughlin 1999: All). It therefore becomes clear why so many ME sufferers take
refuge from society's response to their illness by increased social isolation (Fennell 1995:
168).
The Self and ME
Very often, as Macintyre (1998: 8) explains, the ME patient "cannot believe that this pathetic
creature whose muscles don't work, whose brain is like porridge, who cries from pain and
exhaustion from doing nearly nothing can be the same fit and active individual he or she was
before". ME sufferers, as well as their family and friends, clearly experience great difficulty
in reconciling this new awareness of Self with what was expected of the former "normal,
healthy Self'.
Vorster (1996: 45 & 55) correctly observes that when the self-image and self-esteem of the
ME sufferer change during the course of this illness, this in itself can develop into a source of
stress. Macintyre (1998: 130-131) speculates that such change may not only be related to the
illness itself, but indeed also to the achievement-oriented culture of modern society in which
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"having boundless energy" has almost become morally desirable - something which lS
however beyond the reach of many ME sufferers.
Furthermore, changes in the self-image of the ME sufferer may also be strongly influenced by
the media's designation of ME as "yuppie flu". By characterising sufferers as "yuppiefied"
upper middle class women who were greedily trying to "have it all" and, as a result, just got
what they deserved, the media in effect relegate this disease to a level of travesty in the
popular mind (Weinberg et al. 1994: 21). Sadly, such repeated media characterisation has
paved the way for a stigmatisation and stereotyping of the ME population which has found its
way into the public mind (FennellI995: 167).
Weinberg et al.' s (1994: 23) report suggests that ME sufferers unfortunately tend to identify
very closely with these negative public stereotypes. This identification may be related to the
possibility that ME sufferers constitute a unique social grouping which they are unable to leave
because of their illness. Until they recover they are thus forced to remain within their "group"
and to live with the negative connotations involved in their public stereotype.
Weinberg et al. (1994: 23) found that ME sufferers generally attach such weight to their public
stereotype that medical diagnosis alone does not seem to improve their respondents' self-
image. It thus appears as if the medical controversy surrounding ME has, as Weinberg et al.
(1994: 25) explain, eroded the potentially positive impact a diagnosis may have on self-image.
The reason is that other doctors as well as lay-people may regard a ME diagnosis as a "quirk"
of a particular doctor, or a term attributed to a host of symptoms to which a doctor cannot
assign a definite diagnosis, or even a label attached to satisfy a hypochondriacal patient. It is,
therefore, rather the public perception of ME and of ME sufferers which is considered to be
more important. This leads Weinberg et al. (1994: 23) to conclude that it is the "public
acceptance of ME which has the legitimising effect, not the diagnosis; medical diagnosis
merely acts to facilitate the process of public acceptance".
Conclusion
It is evident that the personal experience of ME does not leave any aspect of the sufferer's life
untouched. The sufferer's experience of an "ill Self' is directly exposed to (and augmented
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by) the complex and interwoven influence exerted by the medical world, by the sufferer's
family and friends, as well as by society and the media.
It appears that the nature of the sufferer's experience of the social world and of the Self is
largely determined by the prevailing lack of knowledge surrounding ME. This deficiency
leaves a vacuum too easily filled by suspicion and prejudice.
This situation can clearly be to the detriment of all sufferers - and should hence be rectified.
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Summary
The most pertinent concern throughout the discussion presented in Part I is the appalling lack
of knowledge surrounding virtually every aspect of ME. This lack of knowledge has stimulated
tremendous controversy and confusion, specifically with regard to the aetiology and
pathophysiology of ME.
This lack of knowledge, the inability to deal with the unknown, and the almost unlimited
variability and unpredictability of ME, have also led to insinuations that this disease is purely
imaginary or that it can simply be ascribed to a psychiatric origin. ME is thus still often
denied the right to claim a legitimate place within the medical and social worlds.
These misconceptions, which give rise to unfounded suspicion and prejudice, have apparently
permeated every dimension of society and have certainly been strongly reinforced by the
media.
Unfortunately these misconceptions have also been transferred to ME sufferers who may, as a
result, feel virtually deserted in their struggle to deal with the incapacitating severity of this
disease. Indeed, instead of much needed support and understanding, they are more likely to be
left to feel confused, blamed, powerless and even immoral.
Hyde (1992d: 694) states that, "until now, patients with ME./CFS ... have been largely
forgotten". This situation clearly needs to be addressed through sensitive research directed at
developing greater insight into the deeply personal experience of those who suffer from this
debilitating disease. As discussed in Chapter 4, such research should encompass a focus not
only on sufferers' own experience of the illness, but also on their encounters with the medical
profession, with family and friends, and with the media and society, because such encounters
directly shape the nature of that experience. Such a comprehensive study will provide a firm
basis for increased supportfor and greater understanding of ME sufferers worldwide.
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Introduction
In their pursuit of doing justice to the particular social reality being studied, social
researchers offer an understanding - a theory - based on the situations, actions and meanings
of the actors, the participants, themselves. It is a theory directed at offering a new way of
looking at or even of improving participants' reality. In following this tradition, I will present
in Part IVa description, a theory, of the experiences related by those ME sufferers who had
chosen to disclose their social reality to me. But wherein lies the value of this theory, of my
theory?
Is the value of a theory based in the respect it pays to the procedures of scientific practice? As
Blum (1979: 303-304) traces the origin of "theory", it appears that this is but a small part of
the answer. Indeed, "theory" or "theoria" by far supersedes our various practical
conceptions of science and scientific procedures. "Theoria", as Aristotle used the term,
described a "kind of mental activity in which we engage for its own sake, as contemplative: to
theorize meant to inspect or to keep one's gaze fixed on. To theorize was to turn one's mind in
a certain direction, or to look at the world under the auspices of a certain interest... Even
before this usage, however, theoria referred to the envoy sent to consult an oracle and was the
title of the collection of state ambassadors that a city-state delegated to attend the sacral
festivals of another city-state. According to some sources, since these festivals were usually
connected with games, theory came to mean spectator and, more particularly, a traveller who
visits foreign places to learn something about their customs and laws. Because the witnessed
events were usually connected with divine things, theory came to be seen as a particularly
sublime way of life ... Theoretical lifo meant more than science because it was not conceived
as arising from mere curiosity or from practical necessity, but out of wonder, as an attempt to
escape from ignorance ". As a process originating in wonderment and encapsulating the ideas
of spectator, search and Self theorising was (and still is) a far more inclusive and powerful
notion than scientific practice itself. The value of a theory (and of my theory) therefore, does
not only lie in the homage it pays to scientific procedures as we currently understand it, but in
the attempt to broaden understanding, to offer an alternative way of knowing a social reality.
If we accept that to theorise is to present a particular way of appreciating a social reality, how
then do we ensure that a theory, far from "escaping ignorance ", is not simply inventing
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another realm of the same kind? Stated differently, how can I be sure that my theory, as my
story of their experiences, carries any truth-value?
Until recently, and for many years before that, social researchers have answered this question
by relying on the concept of "objectivity". Objectivity was used with reference to their
research procedures andfindings to imply, as Bittner (1973: 109-110) shows, that "what they
did was altogether true, important, interesting, rigorous, lucid, useful, and whatever else could
conceivably matter in their favor... In the then prevailing opinion, strict compliance with
certain canons of objectivity alone guaranteed the attainment of all the objectives of rational
inquiry". The value of my theory - and of any research-based theory for that matter - would
therefore depend upon how "objective" it was judged (or could be presented) to be.
But, as I will show in the chapters to follow, this view of theory as solely of value when
pronounced "objective ", omitted a central component already identified by the Greek
theoretical masters: the Self of the theoriser in the theory. As a result of this oversight,
"objectivity" has in some quarters of the sociological discipline (fallen into ill repute and is
explicitly denounced; in many parts of the discipline the problem of objectivity is treated as
insignificant and uninteresting; and even where the criteria of objectivity are adhered to in the
inherited sense much less is made ofit than used to be the case" (Bittner 1973: 109-110). Yet,
neither contempt for nor neglect of objectivity adequately addresses the still lingering question
concerning the actual truth-value of a theory - of my theory. Moreover, a reaction that
renounces the failures of "objectivity" does not exempt researchers from the responsibility of
openly recognising (and dealing with) the contribution of the Self in the process of theory
development.
The very fact that I- the researcher and theoriser - and the fellow ME sufferer - is directly
involved in the entire research process - in each encounter with participants, in the
interpretation of each word, in the construction of each paragraph - means that my
contribution to the theory I develop in Part IV cannot be ignored or omitted. The in-depth
study of the personal and social experiences of those who suffer from ME could not, after all,
have been conducted without consideration of my personal stake in such a study. I never was,
nor pretended to be, a researcher conducting a study from a completely detached and
uninvolved point of view (if such a view would indeed be possible). Instead, I was a
researcher conducting a study from the perspective of suffering from ME myself.
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This fact - that I am a ME sufferer and have been so for the past eight years -immediately
questioned the degree to which I would be able to conduct an "objective" study that could
possibly result in valid findings concerning the personal and social experiences of other ME
sufferers. Would my own subjectivity as a ME sufferer not cloud my judgement and impair my
ability to achieve an unbiased account of other ME sufferers' experiences? Du Bois (1983:
105) does after all remark that "the closer our subject matter to our own life and experience,
the more we can probably expect our own beliefs about the world to enter into and shape our
work - to influence the very questions we pose, our conception of how to approach those
questions, and the interpretations we generate from our findings".
With this possibility in mind, a number of pertinent questions now demanded to be answered:
Does my description, my interpretation (or is it transformationr) of my participants' reality,
reflect their actual experience of ME? Is it an understanding of their words as such,
independent of the circumstances of their conception? Is it purely a mirror of their reality as
related to me? Or is it an understanding reconstructed within the framework of a particular
conceptual theory? Is it a construction more of my own doing than of theirs? In short, is it a
story that holds any truth?
For me, to answer these questions and so to determine the truth-value of my story is difficult. I
was, after all, just as present and involved in the interview and interpretation process as I am
now in composing the present description. Yet, far from offering any escape, this difficulty
simply serves to re-emphasise the need for me to find adequate answers to the questions posed
above. And as a first step in taking up this challenge, I present a discussion in Part II
directed at developing a clearer notion of the concept of "truth" or "truth-value". Once we
have a better idea about what we mean when we use this concept, we will be able to more
competently evaluate the "truth-value" of my story - as well as the influence on it of the "I"
who researched it - in Part V
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Chapter 5
What counts as truth?
Potter (1996: 53) refers to the work of Melvin Pollner (1987) and in particular to Pollner's
notion of "mundane reason". The principle idea behind this concept is that "when we are
discussing features of our world with others - what went on, who did what and so on - we
make a fundamental assumption. We assume that we all have at least potential access to the
same underlying reality. Any neutral, competent observer, placed in the same position, will
see the same thing". At first sight we may consider it odd to talk of this as a form of reason
for, surely, we might think that this is just the way things are; it is just the simple truth.
However, "Pollner puts quite a lot of work into convincing us that this is indeed a form of
reasoning, a specific method for understanding; and, moreover, that it is one which is
fundamental because it is at the centre of a web of beliefs about reality, Self and other people"
(Potter 1996: 53-54).
Mundane reason lies at the very foundation of our everyday lives - and at the heart of virtually
all social research coveting "the truth". Very importantly, it reflects our quest for reality, for a
true, reliable, authentic world. It is "the quest for a final assurance of absolute truth on which
we can base our lives and our society" (Clarke 1996: 19). But what exactly is this concept of
"truth" that is constantly on our lips and on which we stake so much? Through the exploration
of this concept presented below, I hope to offer insight into a possible answer to this question.
A reflecting mirror ... or a constructive construction?
Potter (1996: 97) speaks of "the clash between two metaphors". By this he refers to two
opposing conceptions of what we might count as truth and reality. In this clash the "mirror
metaphor" comes up head to head against the "metaphor of construction".
The mirror metaphor
The mirror metaphor states that "there are a set of things in the world which are reflected onto
a smooth surface, but in this case the surface is not glass but language. Language reflects how
things are in its descriptions, representations and accounts. And as these are circulated in the
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world of human affairs they may be treated as accounts which are reliable, factual or literal, or,
alternatively, the mirror may blur or distort as in the case of confusion or lies" (Potter 1996:
97). In other words there is only one true and complete description of "the way the world
really is". It is this description - the absolute truth - which language more or less successfully
reflects. Consequently, scientific theorising is intent on providing a statement which most
truthfully "copies" or "corresponds with" the ultimate description of reality.
The mirror metaphor appears to be backed up by an extensive history of thought in both
society and science. Here, one of the most dominating influences has been "objectivity" - a
notion closely associated with the positivist view of social reality as "objectively constituted"
(Stanley &Wise 1983: 193). According to this view, there is only one true "real" reality which
can come into focus and be reflected accurately - that is, objectively - only if the researcher
removes him- or herself from any involvement in what is being investigated. In fact the
researcher needs to "epitomize neutrality and impartiality" by becoming "the emotional,
cognitive, and moral equivalent of a blank slate" (Rosaldo 1993: 168). This points to the
central assumption underlying objectivity: that "research can only be valued and reliable if all
subjective 'variables' - all presuppositions, preconceived notions and valued - are suspended
or bracketed" (Mouton 1999: 286).
Mouton (1987: 2-3) traces this notion to the view shared by Bacon and Descartes that the
researcher should deliberately rid him- or herself from all human subjectivity, specifically in
the form of prejudices and preconceived notions. He shows that this view was ultimately
developed and elaborated into a major "offensive" against all forms of subjectivity, which
include not only prejudices and preconceived notions, but also the researcher's values,
interests and emotions. According to Mouton this "offensive" was soon to be followed by the
definition of objectivity as the "emancipation" of all subjective variables.
The presumably hazardous nature of subjective variables can be related to Bacon's argument
concerning the "Idol of the Cave" as one particular source of false opinion. According to
Merton (1972: 30-31), Bacon suggests that the immediate social world in which researchers
live seriously limits what they are prepared to perceive and how they perceive it. Dominated
by the customs of their group, they maintain preconceived opinions, distort their perceptions to
make them agree with these opinions, are hence held in ignorance and are so led into errors
which they parochially mistake for "the truth". Therefore, access to "authentic truth" is only
made possible once researchers "escape from the cave" and so extend their vision. By
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
74
implication it is only through the "iconoclasm that comes with changing group affiliations that
we can destroy the Idol of the Cave, abandon delusory doctrines of our own group, and enlarge
our prospects for reaching the truth" (Merton 1972: 31).
Apparently in close association with and "oddly reminiscent" (Merton 1972: 23) of the
Baconian doctrine, Simmel developed and promoted the thesis of the researcher as "the
stranger who moves on". The "stranger", who is not caught up in commitments to the group
and who is therefore "freer, practically and theoretically" (Simmel in Merton 1972: 32), can
more readily acquire the strategic role of the relatively objective investigator. Indeed, it is
argued that the researcher as stranger "surveys conditions with less prejudice... he is not tied
down in his action by habit, piety, and precedent" (Simmel in Merton 1972: 33). Such a
researcher would then epitomise the "ideal of objectivity" (Acker et al. 1983: 427) by
removing the point of view of the observer from the research process so that the results - that
is, the image reflected in the mirror of language - will not be biased in any way by the
researcher's own subjectivity.
Science in the modern world has majestically (and with astounding credibility) lived up to this
task. In the process it has created an impersonal world that is "really" largely indifferent to us,
"going its own mechanical way, its blind and random consequences only labelled as weal and
woe in our own eyes. We can neither propitiate nor befriend the real world. It goes its way
entirely unaffected by our pleas and cries" (Clarke 1996: 22). Still, Clarke (1996: 22-23)
points out, "we need to go back only a few hundred years, or move only a little to a different
culture, to see how distinctive this view is. In the majority of cultures, for the majority of
history, humanity has thought quite differently, holding that the world was essentially animate,
as open to influence by me as is another person. It was either pervaded by spirits, or it was
under the control of the divine providence of God in all its details. The change from the old
animistic or theistic view to the modern view was very much the result of the rise of science in
the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries... Science proposed a picture of the universe as a
vast machine, built up from tiny atoms in the way a clock is built up from cogs". Driven by
this view, science systematically set out to develop a picture - a mirror image - of reality. It
was an image from which "frivolous" human elements, such as human emotion, human sway,
and human motive - in short, all "humanness" - were firmly excluded. The single reality
reflected in the mirror of science was objectively situated "out there", independent of all
human import.
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In this respect the mirror metaphor again aligns with the notion of objectivity by specifically
insisting on a 'separation between the knower from what he knows' (Stanley & Wise 1993:
163). This suggests thai the mirror metaphor has come to rely on a "subject"/"object"
dichotomy. According to this dichotomy, what is studied is described as the "object" - the
"other" who is "out there". The "object" is "irrational, incapable of scientific thought or use of
scientific techniques, and instead have 'commonsense understanding' (read
'misunderstanding')" (Stanley & Wise 1993: 114). In contrast, the "subject" is the researcher
who stands back from the object and does research "on" the object in an objective and
dispassionate fashion. The "subject" represents the true scientist, the one who sets goals,
devises rational means of achieving these, and investigates social reality by using scientific
techniques and modes of thought in order to uncover "the" truth (Stanley &Wise 1993: 114).
The distance implied by this dichotomy between the researcher and what is researched needs
to be maintained at all times "since any involvement or interaction between 'subject' and
'object' could lead to biased and prejudiced research" (Mouton 1999: 286). Therefore, a
position of non-involvement or at least of very little involvement is understood to enable the
researcher to remain in control of the quality of the research data. As a result, the detached
researcher is expected to be able to offer an objective and scientifically verifiable account - a
perfect mirror image - of the social world being studied; an account devoid of the bias that
may stem from subjective involvement within the research context (Oakley 1981: 31-41).
Central to the mirror metaphor of modern science is the view that there is only one reality to be
reflected in the mirror. Science represents one progressive extension of knowledge into the
darkness of the "not-yet-reflected". In other words, science is regarded as working away at
"the coal-face of knowledge, making hypothesis and testing them in order to cut into each new
seam of phenomena that emerged. Sometimes progress was gradual, sometimes it came in a
sudden spurt, but all the time it was a cumulative effort, each worker systematically extending
the work done in the past. Once part of the darkness had been claimed for knowledge, then
that area oftruth stood valid for all time" (Clarke 1996: 27). In other words, for reality to be
truthfully revealed, it merely has to come under the gaze of a competent scientist obligingly
looking into the mirror. As the theories developed by such a scientist "mirrors" the objective
ordering of reality independently of all humanness they are, in a word, "true", or assumed to be
true.
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Thus, as Clarke (1991: 21) observes, our society (that is, modern society) has for a very, very
long time been founded on "the view that there is a single solid reality, that truth is a matter of
agreement with reality, and that science is a procedure for determining the nature of reality and
for judging the truth of factual statement". In other words, when the truth is reflected in a
mirror, science is appointed as both the sculptor of the ideal mirror image as well as the judge
presiding over the truthful clarity of each image reflected.
After only a brief review of the mirror metaphor a number of potential areas of dispute and
controversy immediately springs to mind. But I postpone a consideration of these until I have
established the qualifications of the opponent challenging the mirror metaphor. I now turn to
the "metaphor of construction".
The metaphor of construction
The metaphor of construction described by Potter (1996: 97-98) operates on two levels when
applied to descriptions of the world, or of reality. Such descriptions may be treated either as
constructive or as constructions themselves.
On the first level, the idea is that descriptions and accounts construct the world, or at least
versions of the world. The strongest version of the construction metaphor in this form would
have the world literally springing into existence as it is talked or written about. Ridiculous,
surely! How can we simply "invent" the world through the spoken or written word?
Ridiculous perhaps but, like Potter, I want to opt for something similar though not quite as
strong. Reality (and what counts as "truth") "enters into human practices by way of the
categories and descriptions that are part of those practices. The world is not ready categorized
by God or nature in a way that we are all forced to accept. It is constituted in one way or
another as people talk it, write it and argue it" (Potter 1996: 98). That is, through describing
our world as we do, we are giving life to a particular version of it.
In terms of the construction metaphor, the material world (which it acknowledges as "real") is
constantly shaped and interpreted through human actions and consciousness. As such, this
approach insists that there is room for a variety of interpretations and meanings, that behind
what is taken as "knowledge" lies social processes, and that such processes involve constant
negotiation and renegotiation (cf. Jordanova 1995: 368). Hacking (1999: 2) maintains that this
notion of the social construction of knowledge can be "wonderfully liberating". It reminds us
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that concepts such as, say, "motherhood" and its meanings are "not fixed and inevitable". This
recognition allows mothers to discover that "the ways they are supposed to feel and act are not
ordained by human nature or the biology of reproduction" (Hacking 1999: 2). This renders
them liberated from the obligation to obey the rules of "motherhood" and "family" prevalent at
the time. Thus, by regarding descriptions and accounts as but human constructions, we
become able to recognise the possibility of different versions of the same world. That is, the
metaphor of construction helps us to recognise that there might be, and most likely are,
different ways of seeing and understanding the social reality under our gaze.
In raising our consciousness about the status of specific claims to the truth, the approach
offered by social construction typically becomes inherently critical of the status quo. Hacking
(1999: 6) explains that social constructionists tend to hold that X (or more accurately, the idea
of X) need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. That is, "X, or X as it is at present, is
not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable". Very often they would go further,
and urge that "X is quite bad as it is", and even that we would be much better off if X were
eliminated or at least "radically transformed". Here, the argument clearly departs from the
assumption that X was brought into being or shaped by social events, forces, and history, all of
which could have been different. While X, although recognised as inevitable need not be bad,
Hacking (1999: 7) holds that those who use the social construction idea enthusiastically and
typically do want to criticize or change X. Thus, a recognition of the world - and of claims to
the truth specifically - as not simply given but rather as constructed by us, helps us to
recognise that there are different - and even better - ways of seeing. Yet, this recognition is
only of value if, "in the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted", that is, if "X appears to
be inevitable" (Hacking 1999: 12). If everyone already recognises that X is a result of social
events, there would hardly be any point in even talking about social construction. In other
words, to be employed meaningfully, the construction metaphor requires, as a "precondition",
that X appears to be inevitable. Where this is the case, the construction metaphor will enable
us to change the ways we see and to advance understandings that do not necessarily
correspond with the status quo.
To be clear, when we speak here of the world - or specific claims to the truth - as socially
constructed, we do not mean that we literally create or bring into existence the world when we
describe it. Hacking (1999: 10) rather says that we mean that through social construction, we
create an idea of the world. And these "ideas do not exist in a vacuum" (Hacking 1999: 10).
Instead, they inhabit what Hacking (1999: 10) calls a "matrix" - a context in which the "idea
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of' is formed, including the individuals falling under the idea, the interaction between the idea
and the people, and the manifold social practices and institutions that these interactions
involve. So, for instance, as Hacking shows, the matrix in which the "idea of a woman
refugee" is constructed is a complex of institutions, advocates, newspaper articles, lawyers,
court decisions, and immigration proceedings. Not to mention the material infrastructure,
barriers, passports, uniforms, counters at airports, detention centres, and courthouses. These
elements are indeed very much material because in their "sheer materiality" they do make a
difference to people, to women refugees. Yet, they also constitute the matrix in which the idea
of a woman refugee, not as one specific individual, but as a certain kind of person, is
constituted. And "ideas, thus understood, do matter". In this case, the idea of women refugees
constituted within this matrix can after all mean the difference between immigration and
deportation. Thus, our theories or descriptions construct experience, not in the sense of
bringing it into existence, but by generating a particular idea or understanding of that type of
experience. And for Hacking (1999: 11) such an idea, and the matrix within which it is
embedded, will influence (even change) the very experience of that experience.
On the second level of the construction metaphor, descriptions and accounts of the world are
themselves constructed. As Schutz (1962: 5) explains, "all our knowledge of the world, in
common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, i.e., a set of abstractions,
generalizations, formalizations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought
organization". Strictly speaking there is, then, no such thing as "truth", pure and simple. What
counts as "truth" is from the outset selected from a universal context by the activities of our
mind. It is always constructed, interpreted. Hence, the era of excessive respect for the truths
passed off as "fact" by science has passed. Moreover, in science, "truth" always refers to and
is founded upon those constructs already made by the actors within the social reality under
study. It is in this sense that Schutz (1962: 6) talks about the thought objects developed by
scientists as "constructs of the second degree". The descriptions constructed and used by
scientists are, in other words, "constructs of constructs", created upon the creations of actors in
the social setting being investigated.
Descriptions of the second degree are constructed by scientists who are real human beings
working in real human communities. They are not perfect representations of the external
world based on the data automatically turned up by scientists. Instead, descriptions - or
theories - are developed by interacting, co-operating scientists influenced by those ideas
currently in force. The origin of these ideas that critically modify what scientists see (or are
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able to see) is certainly not limited to the conventional realm of science. Ideas can indeed
come from any area of human life into science and there prove fruitful in some form or other.
As Feyerabend (in Clarke 1996: 32) puts it, ''there is no idea, however ancient or absurd, that
is not capable of improving our knowledge. The whole history of thought is absorbed into
science and is used for improving every single theory". Science as an activity is hereby firmly
located as part of the whole matrix of human thought and life.
Indeed, scientific practice is as much about the external world as it is about the human world.
Moreover, this human world, as Clarke (1996: 27-32) is quick to point out, delivers a crucial
input into the entire scientific process. After all, science does involve a great deal of
imaginative research in the human world. And such research always stands in a two-way
interactional relation with the development of theory. Theories determine our world view and
the focus in our research. In turn, the results of research stimulate the growth of theory,
creating the soil in which theories either thrive or wither, but in a far more complex manner
than depicted by the mirror metaphor. There is, in fact, no single cumulative effort to uncover
the truth. In other words, science cannot be described as the systematic discovery of neatly
structured facts that exist "in the world". This is but a myth - an ideal view of what scientists
have been taught that science ought to be, bearing little relation to the way science is actually
practised. Scientific revolutions do not simply build on the work of the past. There is rivalry.
Different procedures and theories compete. Some are rejected, others not. Some are helpful,
others less so. There is a tearing down as well as a building up. And the upshot of this
process, the new paradigm or space of possibilities, is not necessarily predetermined by reason
or wisdom (cf. Hacking 1999: 98). What is more, once scientists have identified a particular
finding, their work is not complete. While standing by the result, they continue to modify its
initial appearance and relationships to other results. This process of continuous self-correction
is a quality often missed by accounts of research and science that emphasise the first
appearance of "a scientific fact" as though science gets to a result once and for all. Scientists
are rather constantly involved in reconstructing and remodelling results, apparatus,'
methodology, even phenomenology. Thus, far from representing a clearly predictable process
of discovery, science (and scientific progress) is in its very essence a human affair, a social
process of interaction between scientists and the world they seek to understand.
Scientific theory, then, is not the sole repository of a corpus of absolute truth that is gradually
being perfected. It is, rather, a particular product of history, of human thought and interaction.
There is no way in which the development of scientific theory (and, hence, the establishment
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of what counts as "truth") can be separated from the very human fabric of which it is a part.
As a result, the theory propounded by scientists is not something dreamed up like a fairy tale
with no reference to anything external. Nor is it (as apparently elevated in the mirror
metaphor) a simple observation of a single, objectively structured reality independent of all
humanness. Instead, scientific theory (as a truth) lives (read: is constructed) in the relationship
between humanity and the external world (Clarke 1996: 32).
Weighing my options
We are faced with two opposing views on the way in which we come to know the truth - any
truth. On the one hand, the mirror metaphor holds that there is one single reality reflected onto
a mirror gazed upon by all scientists who then cumulatively produce theories to copy the
reflected reality. In the process it is the scientists who, stripped from all subjective elements,
determine what reality is "really" like and what can count as truthful statements about this
reality. Conversely, the construction metaphor argues that any statement about reality is both
constructing reality and in itself a construction of reality. In other words, by formulating a
theory about reality, about what is true, scientists are not only bringing a version of reality into
being and thereby adding to reality, but are also at the same time developing constructions
influenced by that reality. In this sense, science is part and parcel of human world of the
scientists themselves. This does not mean that scientists remain forever unable to grasp the
external world. It does mean that what we do grasp is constructed in and through the
relationship between the external world and our own (inevitable) humanity.
I agree with Potter (1996: 98) that there is no sense in trying to decide (on a purely scientific
level) whether one of these metaphors is true and the other false. How could such a judgement
be made? Potter (1996: 98) says that the difficulty lies in formulating the question. That is,
''to judge whether a description was mirroring or constructing reality requires the description
to be compared to the reality. Yet reality (or "reality") cannot enter this debate except as
another description, which would beg the question of whether this new description is itself
descriptive or constructive". Therefore a choice between the mirror and construction
metaphors must be based on different considerations. I chose the construction metaphor, based
on the following two considerations.
Firstly, I reject the mirror metaphor because of its insistence on eliminating the human (read:
subjective) content of scientific practice, which approach is based on its reliance on a flawed
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conception of "objectivity". The mirror metaphor polarises objectivity and subjectivity as
mutually exclusive properties of the research endeavour, assuming that an "objective mode of
inquiry" will necessarily result in the casting of a "truer" image of reality. According to Du
Bois (1983: Ill), this assumption is strongly reflected in the ways in which "our society has
embraced and reified the values of objective knowledge, expertise, neutrality and separateness,
and opposed them to the values of subjective knowledge, understanding, art, communion, craft
and experience". The dichotomies implied by the opposition highlighted by Du Bois are not
only endorsed by "our society", but are also commonly upheld within the social research
community and the literature it produces.
Yet, according to Mouton (1999: 287), the clash between objectivity and subjectivity rests
upon a central mistake incorporated into the mirror metaphor, namely its assertion that
"objectivity" refers to a certain state of mind on the part of the researcher. After all, this
metaphor holds that "objectivity" can only be achieved once researchers rid themselves of all
the notions and ideas which might come between them and a truthful interpretation of the data.
Stated differently, "objectivity" in the mirror metaphor, implies "a certain mental or cognitive
approach to the 'object' of study" (Mouton 1999: 287). In contrast to this view of objectivity,
Mouton (1999: 287) contends that "objectivity" is best understood as a feature not of the
researcher, but of the research process. "Objective research" therefore means that a study is
designed and executed through the application of objective research procedures and techniques
in such a way as to maximise validity. Although objective research methods can never
guarantee "truth", Mouton (1987: 13-15) maintains that they can lead to closer approximations
of truth; that is, to more valid research findings. Thus, as a distinctly methodological value,
objectivity refers to a quality of the research process and do not, as implied by the mirror
metaphor, demand the eradication of the human influence ofthe researcher.
Unlike the mirror metaphor and its somewhat flawed perception of objectivity, the
construction metaphor recognises the humanness of scientific practice. It is a practice by
human scientists, about human actors, in a world that can never be entirely external to all
human import. There is no way to avoid this fact. Hence, there can be no reason to omit it
from a consideration of the process of truth production or, perhaps more appropriately, truth
construction. Taking the human nature of science and truth making seriously may very well
afford greater insight, reflected both in and through the theory that is eventually developed.
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Secondly, in addition to considerations of a human/humane kind, I opt for the construction
metaphor on pragmatic grounds. Here I agree with Potter (1996: 98) that the latter metaphor is
likely to be far more productive since it allows a set of questions to be asked that would not
make sense had I chosen the mirror metaphor. There is not much that can be done about the
reflection in the mirror - the mirror may be cleaned to make sure it is flat and smooth, but this
only relates to its passive ability to reflect an image (propounded to be "the truth").
But when I select the construction metaphor and treat descriptions as constructive and
constructions, this allows me to visualise such descriptions as houses. Houses are built by
people. Some have three chimneys and many windows; others might have no chimneys and a
set of French doors. They might be built with concrete, mud, bricks, or glass. They might be
very strong or rather delicate. Thus, my "house-like" descriptions would permit me to ask who
constructed them, how they were put together, what materials were used, what sorts of things
or events were produced by them, and so on.
Having opted for the construction metaphor, I am now in a position to consider a number of
questions to clarify the construction of truth: If truth is developed within the relationship
between the human scientist and the human world, what can be said about this relationship?
What is the nature of the context in which truth is occasioned and situated? And if truth is
developed by a human scientist, what are the implications of his or her particular perspective
on the construction presented? Can a truth, once constructed, be changed? Moreover, if there
is no single reality to be described, is there a limit to the number of different truths that can be
constructed? I now turn to an investigation of these questions.
The truth in a relationship
The construction metaphor says that "truth" is no longer located in the external world, in an
external concept outside the human Self. It is, instead, to be found within relationships of
commitment between the Self and its world. Clarke (1996: 41-42) contends that it is
extremely important for us to grasp this relational dynamic, "not as denial of the real presence
of the world, but as the means whereby we can continually and creatively engage with that
presence" and perhaps come to know it more intimately.
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Clarke (1996: 106) supports the emphasis on the importance of gaining greater insight into the
essence of a relationship in which truth is constructed by offering an appropriate starting point
from which such an inquiry might be directed. He states that the world appears to have been
given first and foremost to "my own awareness". The "me" element of this, "my own
awareness", introduces the realm of personal consciousness.
To foster a sense of what "consciousness" means, Clarke (1996: 127) encourages the reader to
follow an exercise in focused perception or meditation: "Choose an object that you are going
to study - a flower or a stone is good, but it should be something that is fairly neutral
emotionally. Sit in a comfortable position; with your feet firmly planted on the ground and the
object in front of you... In a relaxed state, gently look at your object for ten minutes or so.
Don't stare at it, but simply be with it, passively. Don't speculate about it or try to describe it,
but be empty and receptive to the object itself'.
Clarke (1996: 127-128) then comments: "Most people, when they do this, easily realize that,
although there are all sorts of words running through their minds while they look at the object,
the words are separate from the awareness of the object... Examining the experience more
closely, many people realize that the focus of awareness, so to speak, can be anywhere
between the object and the Self. .. Most importantly, the conscious perception of the flower is,
for most of us most of the time, neither rooted purely in the internal conscious mind ... nor
existing totally independently of our minds... Neither extreme actually reflects our
experience, in which there is a mobile focus of awareness involving to different degrees both
the external and the internal. Consequently, the conscious perception belongs neither to the
Self, nor to the external world independently of Self, but to the relationship between them".
Consciousness, then; does not exist in the internal (clearly demarcated) Self somehow hooked
up by wires to receive messages from the "real" world. It cannot be located in the
"unreachable interior of a thinking subject" (Pollio et al. 1997: 4). It does not constitute the
"private contents of an introspective awareness" (Natanson 1970: 111). Instead, consciousness
exists in a relationship, described by Natanson (1970: 112) as a "unity in which the
'subjective' is already in direct connection with the objects of its intentional concern because
those 'objects' are parts of the unified structure of the stream of consciousness". In other
words, when we meditate on a flower, and observe a variety of types of focus in the
experience, we can analyse that variety into a spectrum extending between the two poles of
"the Self' and "the flower". But "the Self' and "the flower" are things we abstract from the
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expenence. The Self and the flower are not given first, and then enter into a relationship.
Rather, the experience comes first, the analysis second. The relationship precedes the terms it
is relating (Clarke 1996: 129-130).
It is thus clear that consciousness exists in a relationship. This understanding appears to
introduce two important implications. The consciousness vibrating within a relationship is not
only destined to be the consciousness of something, but also to be the consciousness of
someone.
Firstly, Merleau-Ponty (1962: xvii) maintains that "all consciousness lS consciousness of
something". In other words, conscious experience always - necessarily - refer to the object
experienced. There is no such thing as "pure" thought, "pure" fear, or "pure" remembrance.
Every thought is thought of, every fear is fear of, and every remembrance is remembrance of
the object that is thought, feared, or remembered (Schutz 1962: 103). That is, every
experience in our stream of consciousness has its reference or direction toward that which is
experienced. This recognition, often termed the intentional character of all human experience,
reveals our fundamental relatedness to the world in which we live, our basic "being-in-the-
world" (Pollio et al. 1997: 7).
Secondly, consciousness is always - inevitably - somebody's consciousness. There is always
an I who experiences, whose consciousness must be taken into account. Still, our experience
of the I cannot precede our experience of something. Pollio et al. (1997: 8) explain that it
appears that we learn and relearn who we are on the basis of our encounters - our relationships
- with objects, ideas, and people - in short, with every kind of "otherness". Thus, through our
relationships with "otherness", we experience not only the object to which our consciousness
is directed, but also the I sitting at the helm of such direction.
So, within the relationship in which consciousness resides there are (at least) two partners
involved. On the one hand, there is the very object of experience toward which consciousness
is directed, and on the other, there is the I who does the experiencing. The result of this
relationship is a co-constituted conscious experience. It is specifically "co-constituted",
because the character of this experience is acquired neither in the external realm of the "to-be-
known" nor in the internal realm of the "knower", but in the animate space between them.
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Clarke (1996: 144-146) offers notable insight into the process of co-constitution (or co-
construction) through reference to "relational wholeness", a concept borrowed from quantum
theory, which denotes the ability of quantum systems to unite into wholes. Thus, "if I am a
quantum entity, then when I and another such interact, there is a sense in which, at some level,
we are not two but one" (Clarke 1996: 146). Stated differently, when I perceive a flower, this
observation constitutes an act of entering into interaction with that flower (or, more accurately,
with a part of it). Through this coupling, we become interacting quantum entities that can no
longer be regarded as two single (separable) systems. By forming a whole with an aspect of
something external, I venture into a system whose inner nature is my consciousness, extended
to include the external part. Thus, it is my consciousness that becomes the internal side of a
union of part of me and part of the object. I am taking into myself, and experiencing from the
inside, an aspect of the external world (Clarke 1996: 146-147).
The process that manifests as "relational wholeness" clearly does not constitute an intellectual
episode connecting a thinking subject with a world outside its ken. It is not a passive process
of grasping onto something that exists in a given world independent of us. It is a dynamic
process of knowing, a quantum event, through which the reality (the truth) of the (previously)
external object is to some extent actively created. Its reality now lies in the relational space
between us, not in the world independent of us. Clarke (1996: 147-148) also explains that this
encounter between me and the object of my experience is heavily weighted in my favour.
After all, I bring a powerful filtering system, consisting of all my past memories, concepts and
expectations, to bear on the encounter. Consequently, what I experience represents an
amalgam of the internal being of that which is experienced (from my inside) and the beings of
countless past things experienced that have patterned my consciousness (my hefty filtering
system). It is in this way- through relationship - that the external context of the "to-be-
known" and the internal context of the "knower" mutually determine (read: construct) the
conscious experience.
In this section I sought to explain exactly what I mean when I say that truth is constructed in a
relationship between a human Self and its world. Following Clarke's guidelines this inquiry
set out to consider the notion of "consciousness" which refer to the experience that enters our
own awareness through the active engagement between the Self of an I who seeks to know and
the object of experience to-be-known. The reality (or truth) of this experience is co-
operatively constructed in and through this dynamic relationship. Reality, then; exists in a
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relationship. In fact, like Clarke (1996: 128), we might even venture to say that 'reality is
relationship' .
The ground, the context, the occasion
The truth of an experience is constructed through and exists in relationship. Such knowing, as
a human event, does not and cannot take place in a void. It is unavoidably and irremediably
tied to the social setting in which it is situated. It is forever fundamentally rooted (Bittner
1973: 115-116).
Pollio et al. (1997: 13) describes the rootedness of truth construction, of all human experience,
in terms of "figure/ground". They contend that "all objects of experience are experienced only
in relation to some less clear part of the total situation serving to situate the focal objects.
There are no figures by themselves". All figural aspects of an experience emerge against some
ground that serves to delineate its specific experiential form (its truth). For this reason, "it is
never experientially valid to talk of an isolated figure of experience ... we must always talk
about the figure/ground structure of experience (note the slash) to emphasize that human
experience is a patterned event defined by focal and background aspects" (Pollio et al. 1997:
13).
A different way of saying that "human experience is a patterned event defined by focal and
background aspects" is to talk about the "indexicality" (Potter 1996: 43) or "contextual
determination" (Douglas 1970: 37) of human experience; more specifically, of the meaning of
such experience. The contextual determination of meaning suggests that the reality or "truth"
of a human experience, albeit a description, an action, an encounter or whatever, is
fundamentally tied to and dependent upon its context. The context is the (only) ground against
which a specific human experience can become figural; that is obtain "its specific experiential
form" or its truth. An experience can, consequently, only be understood in terms of the
context or situation in which it occurs. Potter (1996: 43-44) stresses that "context", as used in
this regard, should be understood as more than the gross institutional features of the setting of
experience. In fact "context" encompasses all the specifics of the situation in which an
experience is occasioned; that is, where it fits into and becomes part of a broader social setting
and continuity.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
87
If an experience derives its sensibility and warrant from its context (or matrix), the specifics of
that context become salient in any attempt to develop a sufficient understanding of the
experience. Douglas (1970: 38) considers a number of features that ordains a context with a
particular character. For instance these include elements of language, time, space, culture and
the like. More importantly, it also includes the knowledge that is taken for granted in the
specific setting. And this is where a peculiar problem creeps in. Very often the ground that
constructs a specific experiential figure is wholly taken for granted by those involved. Its
existence is never doubted or questioned. It is the world where we have our existence, carry
on our activities, pursue all our goals. We always take our bearings in this world. We have a
certain familiarity with it. And we readily accept it as simply there. Of course, in a sense, this
is an essential precondition of all human experience and activity (Gurwitsch 1962: 51-52).
The unquestioned and unchallenged certainty concerning the world in general underlies,
supports, and enters into every particular experience. But there it remains - unheeded,
unformulated, unnoted. Consequently, when we explore the meaning of this context, of the
ground of a figural experience, we are doomed to both find and rely on the taken-for-granted.
Thus, a crucial determinant of our exploration into the in-context-meaning-construction of
experience is so general that it is virtually unidentifiable. While it is always simply there, it
remains beyond concrete reach.
Douglas (1970: 30-31) recognises that the ever-elusive taken-for-granted component of a
context in which meaning is constructed makes it impossible to do anything more than develop
more than a partial understanding of a particular experience. Still, this is an understanding not
to be discarded. After all, it does represent a huge improvement on the classic "building-block
theory", whereby the meaning of an experience is regarded as entirely independent of the
context in which it occurs. Hence, bits of meaning as self-contained wholes (blocks) can be
put together (cemented) in accord with certain rules to produce the whole meaning imputed to
a concrete (now isolated) expenence (Douglas 1970: 37-39). It is assumed, then, that
contextual factors can be eliminated without destroying the possibility of scientifically
understanding or explaining an experience. Clearly, this approach stands in sharp contrast
with one in which the analysis of the contextual determinations of meaning is acknowledged
and practised - albeit but partially.
A recognition of the importance of contextual features in the construction of meaning is
extremely important, but should never be applied in excess, for then a different danger of
distortion looms. While it is crucial to understand the situational nature of human existence,
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Douglas (1970: 42) warns that "an overconcentration of the contextual effects to the relative
exclusion of trans-situational meanings leads, however inadvertently, to a failure to consider
adequately the most crucial aspect of man", which is, "his awesome capacity to transcend
himself and his immediate situation". This "crucial aspect of man" means that those involved
in a particular context can bring a vast realm of previous experience to bear in constructing
meaning within their immediate situation, they can coordinate (or order) their immediate
situation with those of many others beyond their immediate grasp, and they can project
themselves into an as yet unrealised future. Hence, a consideration of the contextual features
that comes into play in constructing meaning should always be complemented by an analysis
of the complex relations and interdependencies that exist between contexts and contextual
aspects.
Thus, put simply, the "truth" or figural identity of an experience derives from the combination
of that experience with the specific context or ground in which it is rooted. Accordingly, to
understand what an experience means is to have (at least some) insight into the situation in
which it occasioned. The development of such insight is seriously complicated by the large
portion of taken-far-granted knowledge on which it is built, as well as by the influence of
contexts which transcend the immediate. When the significance of these factors is sufficiently
appraised, a contextually authentic understanding of (the truth of) an experience becomes
possible.
From a perspective
In the beginning of his classic monograph, "A stroll through the worlds of animals and men",
the European naturalist Jakob von Uexkull (in Pollio et al. 1997: 3) invited his readers to
"blow, in fancy, a soap bubble around each creature to represent its own world, filled with the
perceptions it alone knows... Through the bubble we see ... the world as it appears to the
animal (itself), not as it appears to us. This we may call the phenomenal world or the Self
world of the animal". Von Uexkull went on to suggest that for many scientists these worlds
will be invisible because of a prior commitment to conceptualising animal life in purely
mechanical terms. He advises us to regard all animals, the human being included, not as
machinelike objects, but as subjects who live in their unique worlds that are as "manifold as
the animals themselves".
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For each of us, our unique world revolves around the Self. In the "Self world", I am "the
absolute source" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: viii), for I alone bring into being for myself the world
as I see and experience it. Indeed, from the very outset the world - my world - exists for me
and forms itself around me. The character (the ''truth'') of what I see and experience in this
world follows from this unique perspective. Stated differently, "all my knowledge of the
world, even my scientific knowledge, is gained from my own particular point of view"
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: viii). Weber (in Bittner 1973: 118) clearly echoes this notion when he
says that "all knowledge ... is always knowledge from particular points of view" (Weber's
italics).
As Schutz (1962: 207) suggests, such a point of view - my own point of view - constitutes an
essentially subjective position. Its focus is shaped by whatever excites and stimulates my
interest. So, when I focus on something and discern its character (its truth) in a particular way,
it means that that "something" stands in a particular relation to me, to my Self. It also means
that my perspective is always a significant aspect to the character of what is perceived. That
is, I am very much part of the ground against which an experience becomes figural - to and for
me, and me alone (cf. Pollio et al. 1997: 15).
Taken more broadly, the contention that my perspective is the origin of the reality I discern
implies that a person's unique world assumes a particular identity because someone is seeing it
so (Bittner 1973: 121-122). What is more, the world (and its particular meaning) "could be
and probably is altogether different for someone else, because whatever necessity there is in a
thing being what it seems to be is wholly contained in the mind of the perceiving subject"
(Bittner 1973: 122). Bittner (1973: 123) rightly points out that this does not mean that
variously occasioned impressions of the world must be - or even can be - uncritically accepted
as the last word concerning the meaning structures (or truth) of the social reality in question. It
simply means that what is confronted and related should always be clearly recognised as
"someone's social reality". It is affirmed again: "the origin of all reality is subjective" (Schutz
1962: 207).
As true as this contention is for every human being, so it is for the scientist. In the research
field the scientist "always sees things from a freely chosen vantage point - chosen, to be sure,
from among actually taken vantage points" (Bittner 1973: 122). This vantage point exerts an
eminent influence on what the scientist does (or is able to) discern and relate. A recognition of
this influence has had one particular ramification worthy of mention here.
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Some authors ofa notably feminist persuasion (cf. Hartsock 1997: 285-303; Hirschmann 1997:
77-78) urge scientists to assume a specific perspective - not one of bias, but one of deliberate
engagement. For them this perspective, called a "standpoint", will produce a more complete
and less perverse understanding of the reality being studied. This reality is regarded in terms
of a duality. In this duality there is a surface level (or appearance) and a deeper level of
reality. The surface level is dominated by privileged perspectives. The degree of privilege
granted to such perspectives does not lie so much in their internal criteria of truth, than in the
power of the groups in making their standpoint prevail over other equally plausible
perspectives. It therefore becomes clear that standpoints (or perspectives) should be judged
not only in terms of their epistemological contributions, but also in terms of their position
within hierarchical power relations (Collins 1997: 377; Hartsock 1997: 373).
One is reminded that ideas of what knowledge is involve "profoundly important political
stakes" (Hartsock 1997: 373). Given this, feminist scientists such as Hundleby (1997: 41)
argue that the social research community should consider the influence of dominant
perspectives on the type of understanding that is available and should compensate for any such
influence by attending to perspectives on the periphery. In accounting for the influence of
power differentials on the process of knowledge production, the research community should
work to counteract those episternic roadblocks that prevent politically marginalised
perspectives from being articulated and from being heard. Some would even argue that
researchers should not merely attend to marginal perspectives - they should indeed assume
such a perspective from the subjugated position (from the deeper level). This point of
departure would give these researchers an episternic advantage since they would be able to
reveal the inhumanity of the surface level and work to change it (cf. Hartsock 1997: 285-303).
It is in this sense that assuming a standpoint becomes a way of knowing - and, for certain
feminists, a way of knowing better .
. Still, as Harding (1986: 148-154) and others (cf. O'Leary 1997: 57; Welton 1997: 15) are
quick to point out, there can (never) be one perspective, a standpoint, from which to launch a
challenge on other positions which are presumably more partial and perverse. Even if all
perspectives arise from the same level of reality, they are bound to differ because reality (and
its construction) is as diverse as the people who populate it. No single standpoint can claim to
represent a particular level of reality as a whole. At best, a single position can illuminate
certain aspects of the social totality. It will always remain but a partial glimpse. There is no
one truth, no Archimedean point, no complete position. Indeed, instead of one single totality,
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social reality is given to us, to scientist and novice alike, in "complex systems of perspectives"
(Schutz 1967: 8).
Once the Archimedean system of knowledge is deconstructed into a shifting, wavenng
plurality, "a world that can be understood and navigated with the assistance of Archimedes'
map of perfect perspectives also disappears" (Harraway in Harding 1986: 193). Perhaps, as
Flax (in Harding 1986: 193) puts it, '''reality' can have 'a' structure only from the falsely
universalizing perspective of the master. That is, only to the extent that one person or group
can dominate the whole, can 'reality' appear to be governed by one set of rules or be
constituted by one privileged set of social relationships" or, for that matter, be known from one
set of perfectly complete perspectives.
Thus, as long as we refrain from assigning a master over our own experience, or worse yet,
from appointing ourselves as masters over the experience of others, our reality, our own soap
bubble, will remain bound to the point of view from which it is known. What we know and
count as truth from the inside of this bubble - that is, all our knowledge - will emanate from a
perspective, from our own perspective - not in singular form, but in abundant plurality. It is
against this background that we can conclude with Pollio et al. (1997: 88) that, indeed, "all
truth is perspectival".
Openness to change
At this stage of my discussion I have established that the odds are quite slim of arriving at one
single, absolute truth, just waiting "out there" for us. I have also established that every truth
(or truth claim) is actively constructed (not passively mirrored) in and through a relationship.
Within a relationship, the experience that becomes figural for someone from a unique point of
view is grounded in a specific context. Now, once constructed, is such a truth static? Should
we regard it as forever resting in stationary mode? Or does it show mobility? Is there
potential for modification? In short, can a truth (a truthful understanding) change?
Let us consider an example based on the world of fantasy offered by Schutz (1962: 340): "the
play world of a little girl, as long as it is undisturbed, is her reality. She is indeed the mother,
and her doll her child". Similarly, "in the world of art, that is ... of pictorial imagination,
knight, death, and devil have 'real' existence as entities within the realm of artistic fantasy.
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While the play lasts, Hamlet is to us really Hamlet and not Laurence Olivier 'acting the part
of or 'representing' Hamlet". For little children as for the audience of the Shakespearean
play, the world which at that moment in time constitutes the focus of their attention is real and
true. This is what James (in Schutz 1962: 340) meant when he argued that "each world whilst
it is attended to is real after its own fashion; only the reality lapses with attention". For James,
then, what constitutes a truth at any moment in time is a function of attention.
James (in Pollio et al. 1997: 16-17) regarded a change in our focus of attention as a change in
our consciousness. He described this process as "the successive mutations of our field of
consciousness". This is a process of more or less gradual change or alteration. Sometimes, the
focus alters, and the margin stays. At other times, the focus and margin are modified. At yet
different times, abrupt alterations of the whole field may occur. To capture this process of
change, movement, fluctuation, and flow, James referred to the "stream of consciousness".
In James' conception the experiences we choose to construct as figural (at any point in time)
come and go in a changing, flowing way. As our attention shifts and moves, so too does the
experiences to which we ascribe reality. Indeed, our experiences are constantly flowing, "with
some parts clear and with other parts serving to provide momentary contexts to support and
define the clear central focus" (Pollio et al. 1997: 26). Change, then, is a primary
characteristic of our experience - and of our construction of truth.
In addition to change, James' conception of the "stream of consciousness" serves to highlight
another distinctive characteristic of our experience and our construction of truth, namely the
characteristic of continuity. Continuity means that, while the central events of our experience
regularly change, we never loose track of the unity provided by the flow between successive
figural events (Pollio et al. 1997: 26-27). Thus, while the stream of consciousness perpetually
changes as it encounters different "rock-and-stump-experiences", it remains one stream,
unified in and through the single origin from which it flows.
Schutz (1962: 229) wished to emphasise the characteristic of unity and continuity when he
spoke of the "finite provinces of meaning" - a term deliberately devised to substitute James'
original notion of the "sub-universes" of reality. Through this substitution Schutz (1962: 257)
managed to emphasise that the truth of our experiences are not "ontological static entities,
objectively existing outside the stream of individual consciousness within which they
originate". Indeed, very much unlike "sub-universes", our experiences on which we bestow an
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accent of truth - our finite provinces of meaning - are not separated states of mental life. They
do not require some strange transmigration of soul and consciousness alike. They simply
denote different tensions (or foci of attention) of one and the same consciousness. In other
words, the "finite provinces of meaning" represent one conscious life, flowing uninterruptedly
from birth to death, but attended to in different modifications.
The continuously shifting, movmg nature of our conSCIOUSattention to expenence as it
transcends from one province of meaning to another holds one important implication for
science and scientific description of truth. Schutz (1962: 258-259) hints at this implication
when he states that "what formerly seemed to be a reality while attended to may now be
measured by another yardstick and prove to be non-real or quasi-real". Note however that this
is so only under the specific form of a present non-reality, whose reality may at a later stage be
restored. So, what I now regard as the truth of an experience may under a different state of
affairs be regarded as a quasi-truth of even a complete non-truth. Obviously, all of this makes
experience and the peculiar meaning ascribed to it at this moment in time extremely difficult to
describe scientifically. The profound mobility and changability of our moment-to-moment
experiences indeed fills our descriptions with ambiguity and uncertainty, sometimes almost
intolerably so. This leads Pollio et al. (1997: 27) to conclude wisely that "although we may
strive for clarity, we should never be disappointed that our descriptions are more ambiguous
than we might hope. Describing the human world on its own terms is at least as demanding as
living it in the first place".
Thus, we can conclude that a truth, once constructed, is open to change. In fact, one may even
go so far as to regard a truth as but a particular accent assigned to an experience that at a
particular moment falls under the gaze of our attention. As the focus of our attention changes,
so too does the truthful claim we construct. The potential of such change clearly introduces
immense complexity and variability to the process of truth construction. This complexity and
variability is only tamed (to some extent, at least) by the unified nature of the stream of
individual consciousness. It is one consciousness, one I (or eye) who sees what is finally
designated (for that I) as a truth. A truth, then, lies in the eye (or I) of the attentive beholder.
Conclusion
What counts as truth, as a truthful claim to understanding?
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The mirror metaphor offers one way of answering this question. This metaphor states that the
guiding aim of any study worthy of the name of science should be to see the world of social
facts with an unbiased eye. Accordingly, the task of social science can be defined as the
simple and accurate description (that is, reflection in language) of life in society. Thus, for a
social theory to be regarded as "true", as "worthy of the name of science", it would have to
correspond with a simple and accurate description of the social facts of the reality being
studied as discerned through an unbiased eye.
A different way of understanding truth is offered by the construction metaphor. In opting for
this metaphor, I reject the concept of truth as simply a matter of "accurate" description, of
merely reflecting the "reality" as it "really" is by means of the right choice of words and
phrases. I think that the sum of all social science theory (including the story which developed
as part of this study) does not manage to represent the "closest approximation to the truth", let
alone a direct disclosure of it. This would after all presume the existence of an absolute point
to which all theory could be compared - an absolute notion of truth I reject.
I therefore believe that all social science theory should be viewed through the perspective of
the construction metaphor - as a human construction - as a human tale told by one human,
about other humans, within a human world. The distinct human presence - and in particular of
the researcher's human Self - lends an undeniably human quality to the entire affair of truth
construction.
It thus becomes possible to see that the truth which we so eagerly seek to pin down by means
of our scientific practices is the product of a dynamic interplay. It is an interplay between two
parties, the "to-be-known" and the "knower". The to-be-known is occasioned within a context
which supports it in becoming figural to and for the knower. The knower, in turn, discerns the
to-be-known from a particular perspective and thus becomes part of the ground that bestows
upon the to-be-know its particular figural identity. Together they co-construct and perpetually
re-construct not only each other but more importantly, also what eventually becomes "known"
as (a) truth.
While this conception of truth construction is not necessarily profoundly novel in itself, the
emphasis it places on the human quality of this construction process is significant. The
process of truth construction described above indeed reflects a human presence and influence
seldom acknowledged openly in the world of science and scientific discovery. Stated more
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directly, this concept permits an understanding of the truth (or truthfulness) of every
construction, of every story told, as truly lying in the I of the beholder.
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Chapter 6
How is truth developed between two people?
We live in a world in which we are directly involved. Gurwitsch (1970: 39) maintains that our
involvement takes shape through our encounters with Others. We live with Others and for
Others, orienting our lives to them. We make decisions considering Others, we assume
responsibilities affecting them, and we enter commitments embracing them. We join them in
common activity and work. We influence them and are, in turn, influenced by them. Schutz
(1967: 9) suggests that, in doing all these things, we experience them as Others and understand
them as we assume they understand us. In developing such mutual understanding we build a
meaningful social world that is as much our world (strictly speaking, my world) as it is the
world of Others.
Once again our construction of a meaningful social world - all our social construction of truth
- is based on a profound assumption: we readily believe that Others experience their actions as
meaningful in quite the same way as we would if we were in their place. We also believe that
our interpretations of the meanings of the actions of Others are mostly correct. But Schutz
(1967: 9) warns that when such seemingly "common-sense assumptions are uncritically
admitted into the apparatus of a science, they have a way of taking their revenge". This danger
is particularly acute in the social sciences, because in these sciences we are primarily
concerned with the study and the understanding of social phenomena. Hence, an investigation
into the construction of meaning or truth between a Self and an Other is clearly of prime
importance.
In the intersubjective world ...
We have established that for the individual, the Me, the world in which I was born and am
living in revolves around Me. I am the centre, the null point, toward which the world is
oriented. That is to say, this world has significance and meaning first of all by Me and for Me.
But I share this world with Others. How, then, to understand this world which we share with
Others and which we assume they share in much the same way with us?
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Schutz (1962: 133; 1967: 8-10) describes this world as an "intersubjective" one. It is the
public world with which we are very familiar, irrespective of what science may teach us. It is
the world within which "we pursue all our goals and carry on all our activities, including
scientific ones. As the universal scene of our life, the soil, so to speak, upon which all human
activities, productions, and creations take place, the world of common experience provides the
foundation of the latter as well as of whatever might result from them" (Gurwitsch 1970: 35).
But why should this common world be called 'intersubjective' and what does it mean for the
construction of truth - one of the human products - that takes place within its confines?
... a world of encountering
From the very outset the everyday world is "intersubjective" because it is the locus of every
encounter with an Other, with "Thou" (Natanson 1970: 103). In Schutz's words (1962: 133),
it is the world "we live in... as men among other men, bound to them through common
influence and work, understanding Others and being an object of understanding for Others".
Through every encounter with an Other the intersubjective world is revealed in its very
essence; not as "mine" but as "ours"; not as private, but as public (Natanson 1970: 103-104).
In our intersubjective world we engage and interact. We live in what Schutz calls a 'We-
relationship" (1962: 15). This relationship, which involves a mutual interplay of
communicative action and reaction, is based on the co-presence of two parties - Schutz (1962:
16) calls them "consociates" - who in the vivid present share a community of time and space.
To share a community of time means that "each partner participates in the on-rolling life of the
other, can grasp in a vivid present the other's thoughts as they are built up step by step"
(Schutz 1962: 16-17). To share a community of space implies that 'a certain sector of the
outer world is equally within the reach of each partner, and contains objects of common
interest and relevance (Schutz 1962: 16-17). So, as long as the We-relationship lasts and their
biographies intertwine, consociates partake in one another's lives and understands one
another's thoughts, fears, plans, and hopes. "Here and here alone," Gurwitsch (1962: 65)
maintains, "do the partners grasp one another in their unique individuality; do the Selves of the
consociates mutually reveal themselves ... according to the lesser or greater degree of intimacy
in their relation". No other social relationship exhibits these distinctive features through which
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the We-relationship acquires the quality of a meeting in the intersubjective world of unique
individuals as complete totalities.
Thus, in the intersubjective world, I encounter you, as the Other. Here I am able to grasp your
subjective experiences. I can do so only to the extent that we are mutually involved in an
existing We-relationship, for it is only in this face-to-face relationship that I can concretely
experience you at a particular moment in your life. In Schutz's (1967: 167) words, "I live in
your subjective meaning-contexts only to the extent that I directly experience you within an
actualized context-filled We-relationship". My experiences of you and my resulting
understanding of your subjective experiences are directly related to the nature (the intimacy,
the actuality) of the relationship we share in the vivid present.
But although our relationship has content and is real, it is never complete. Although your
unique individuality is revealed to some extent, it is never fully accessible to me. Our
biographies, although intertwined, never become one. Our involvement, although genuine,
never allows our lives to be lived by one another. While the total continuum of all the
experiences I have lived through is, at least in principle, at all times open to me, the same is
nottrue for your, the Other's, continuum of experiences. As Schutz (1967: 105-106) explains,
"your stream of lived experiences is also a continuum, but I catch sight of only disconnected
segments of it... If I could be aware of your whole experience, you and I would be the same
person". But now I know only part, certain aspects, of you, the Other. Natanson (1970: 110)
puts it more eloquently, 'although the Thou is given as a person, the mode of givenness is
essentially adumbrated. Some aspects of the Other are manifest; Others are presented in
shadowy form or are completely opaque".
Thus, my experience of you falls far short of your whole experience of you. Your experience
can never be entirely open nor directly revealed to me. This is simply not possible as we are
two persons, not one. Hence, what is given to me is something which I must interpret .
... a world of understanding
The intersubjective world that we share with Others is unequivocally a world of meaning and
understanding. It is, Schutz (1962: 133) maintains, "a universe of significations to us, i.e., a
framework of meaning ... which we have to interpret". In this world that we share I not only
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engage with you, the Other, in a face-to-face relationship, but also attempt to understand you
and your experiences.
Through every act of understanding I develop a context or configuration of meaning to which
my lived experiences of you belong. That is, I arrange what I experience of you within my
own meaning-contexts. But my contexts do not necessarily agree with yours. As Schutz
(1967: 105-106) explains, "you and I differ from each other not merely with respect to how
much of each other's lived experiences we can observe. We also differ in this: When Ibecome
aware of a segment of your lived experience, I arrange what I see within my own meaning-
context. But meanwhile you have arranged it in yours. Thus, I am always interpreting your
lived experiences from my own standpoint. Even if I had ideal knowledge of all your
meaning-contexts at a given moment and so were able to arrange your whole supply of
experience, I should still not be able to determine whether the particular meaning-contexts of
yours in which I arranged your lived experiences were the same as those which you were
using. This is because your manner of attending to your experiences would be different from
my manner of attending to them". So, how I interpret my experiences of you do not
necessarily correspond with your interpretation of your experiences - because we differ and
because we do not look at it from the same point of view.
More specifically our interpretations do not correspond because the contexts of meaning I
develop of your experiences are heavily weighted in my favour. The reason is that when I
interpret my lived experiences of you into particular contexts of meaning, I bring a highly
structured background of meaning to bear (Schutz 1967: 23-34). In fact, I bring a whole
baggage of Self along as Ienter into every encounter with an Other - including specifically my
stock of knowledge, my biographical situation, and my choice of interests.
My stock of knowledge at hand
To every We-relationship in which I enter with an Other, I bring what Schutz (1962: 7) calls
my "stock of knowledge at hand". The latter consists of all the acquisitions of knowledge and
experience I possess at anyone moment. More specifically, Schutz's conception of the "stock
of knowledge at hand" includes "the language, the multiple typifications embodied in
language, the recipes of all sorts, the rules for handling and manipulating things, the modes of
conduct, behavior and actions in typical situations" (Gurwitsch 1962: 56-57) - in fact, all my
knowledge of the world in which I live, to which I respond and which responds to me.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
103
My stock of knowledge at hand is largely socially derived. In other words, it comprises what
has been passed on to me by those who taught me and whose teaching I accepted on the
strength of their authority as well as what I have acquired through intercourse with my fellow
Others (Gurwitsch 1970: 49-50). As the bulk of my stock of knowledge at hand is handed
down to me through society, only a very small part of it originates within my personal
experience. Gurwitsch (1962: 57) goes so far as to argue that "all my personal acquisitions
presuppose some socially derived 'stock of knowledge at hand' inasmuch as they are inserted
into and have to find their place within this socially derived setting". According to this view
no personal acquisition, however it is arrived at, can ever be regarded as an isolated event.
My stock of knowledge at hand is not only predominantly socially derived; it is also largely
socially approved. Gurwitsch (1970: 49-50) explains that this does not imply any "explicit
promulgation, nor any kind of legal or formal sanction, but rather the fact that in a given
society certain modes of conduct are tacitly and as a matter of course accepted and taken for
granted as behavior appropriate ... in typical situations". To a very significant extent my stock
of knowledge at hand will therefore reflect the nature of the particular society in and through
which it has been acquired. It is in this respect that Flick (1994: 180) speaks of the
"conventionalization of knowledge and thinking".
My stock of knowledge at hand can never be a completed entity in itself. As long as my life
goes on, so too will my stock of knowledge grow and enlarge (Gurwitsch 1962: 56-57). As it
does so, it forever serves to shape my interaction and acts of understanding within the
intersubjective world. Schutz (1962: 7) indeed maintains that all interpretation in this world is
based on a stock of previous experiences of it, with these experiences in the form of
"knowledge at hand" functioning as a scheme of reference for me. My stock of knowledge at
hand becomes, then, the "conceptual eyes" (Natanson 1970: 120) through which I see,
interpret, and come to understand my world.
Thus, within the bounds of a face-to-face relationship with an Other, my stock of knowledge at
hand encompasses both the general (socially derived) knowledge I have of what another
person is, as well as any specific (personally acquired) knowledge I may have of that particular
Other. As our relationship unfolds from moment to moment, so too my knowledge of the
Other and his or her experiences will be questioned and confirmed, advanced and sedimented.
Throughout this process of understanding, my stock of knowledge at hand will direct the
development of my interpretation (my ''truth'') of the Other and his or her experiences.
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My biographical situation
Along with my stock of knowledge at hand, I bring to every We-relationship I enter my own
"biographical situation" (Schutz 1962: 312). This situation, in which I find myself at every
moment of my existence, is unique to me. It is "given to me, and to me alone" (Gurwitsch
1962: 60). Ido not - cannot - share it with anyone.
Schutz (1962: 312) argues that by its very nature this unique situation is "biographically
determined". That is to say, it has its own history. On the one hand, its history derives from
the sedimentation of all my previous experiences and, like my stock of knowledge at hand,
develops in continuity with these experiences of my past as long as I live. On the other hand,
my personal history constitutes only a small part of my biographical situation. My situation is
part of and defined by the broader historically given world which existed before my birth and
which will continue to exist after my death. In and through this historically given world my
fellow Others become elements of my own situation, and I of theirs.
Schutz (1962: 312) goes on to explain that my biographical situation is centred around the
actual "Here and Now". The latter denotes the full concreteness of my existence in my
particular environment. The nature of this environment is largely defmed by the specific
cultural group, the society, and the period of history into which I was born and now find
myself. Gurwitsch (1970: 39-40) rightly stresses that what is important here is not the mere
cultural, social, and historical facts of my existence as they might viewed by some impartial
observer, but how these elements appear, enter and define my situation. For my situation
directly influences the outlook I have and the understanding I (am able to) develop of those
Others whom I encounter in this environment.
Furthermore, I do not simply belong to my particular environment, but occupy a certain place
and position within the actual Here and Now of my biographical situation. Schutz (1962: 9)
explains that this is not merely a position in terms of physical space and outer time or of status
and role within the social system, but also a moral and ideological position. According to
Gurwitsch (1962: 60) the fact that I occupy my present position is "the result of the whole
history of my life. It is due to the circumstances ... which in the course of my personal history
have contributed toward making me become what I am". From the unique vantage point that
my biographical situation offers me, I perceive and reach understanding of my world.
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Thus, through the historical world we share, every Other I meet in a face-to-face relationship
enters into and becomes part of my unique biographical situation. The unique environment of
my biographical situation, together with the integral position I occupy within it, presents me
with a particular way of perceiving the Other. Thus, as does my stock of knowledge at hand,
my unique biographical situation turns into a pair of conceptual eyes, a pair of lenses I put on
whenever I meet an Other. In this way, my unique biographical situation in its totality defines
the understanding (the "truth") I am able to develop of the particular Other.
My choice of interest
Schutz (1962: 9,208,283,284) highlights one last feature that I bring along with me as I enter
any face-to-face relationship with an Other. He variously refers to this feature as my "interest"
or "relevance", my "purpose at hand" or "pragmatic motive".
He uses each of these terms to emphasise that, in any face-to-face encounter with an Other, I
select from the multitudinous characteristics present in that experience only certain peculiar
ones that appeal to me. For one reason or another, the selected characteristics seem to me to
be relevant to the sum total of my situation in a given experience. Schutz (1962: 283-284)
contends that this process of selection is chiefly governed by my interest. This "interest" is
never an isolated instance, but rather exists within a loosely organised system of interests that
is always open to change from encounter to encounter.
Elaborating on Schutz's concept of interest, Heeren (1970: 47-48) stresses that in selecting
certain features as of more interest than others in a particular encounter, I am making a
personal choice. I choose among the disparate array of actual and potential features only those
that are important to my own interest. As I make this choice I accentuate certain issues, I
highlight what is significant for me, I identify what I regard as problematic, I indicate what I
assume may be taken for granted. This structure, created by my "interest", organises my
understanding. My understanding, then, does not stand independently of my interest. On the
contrary, my understanding ofthe Other and his or her experiences is (at least to me) a matter
of decidedly practical importance (Bittner 1973: 110). Indeed, as Schutz (1962: 208) puts it,
my encounter with an Other is very much subject to the governance of my "pragmatic motive",
to the rule of my interest. Consequently the structure and content of my understanding must be
assumed to be determined by my interest at hand, at least to a very important extent.
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Thus, my experience within a face-to-face relationship with an Other closely matches the
interest I deem of relevance in such an encounter. This means that the understanding or the
"truth" of the Other that I may develop - based on what I attend to in detail, what I identify as
worthy of further pursuit, or what I simply take for granted - will very much reflect my choice
of interest at hand. In a word, what I see and understand will be what my interest prompts me
to see and understand.
The difference between my understanding of your experiences and your understanding of your
experiences is no longer limited' to the disparate degree to which your lived experiences are
available for both of us to see. It is no longer just what we see that makes the difference; it is
also how we see. That is to say, the difference between the understandings we develop is,
aside from what we see, also fundamentally related to the ways in which we see. And we see
differently. The entirety of your lived experiences is open to you and so too the interpretation
of their meaning for you. But for me there is no way to simply intuit the subj ective meaning of
your experiences. Hence, I am left to interpret my lived experiences of you. And when I do
so, I bring my entire Self - my stock of knowledge at hand, my biographical situation, my
choice of interest - to bear on every aspect of that interpretation. So my entire Selfleads me to
see and understand you in a different way than you might do yourself.
What is more, I see (and understand) differently than you do, without even noticing it. This is
possible because "in the living intentionality" of the We-relationship that we share, "I
'understand' you without necessarily paying any attention to the acts of understanding
themselves. This is because, since I live in the same world as you, I live in the acts of
understanding you. You and your subjective experiences are not only ... open to my
interpretation, but are taken for granted by me together with your existence and personal
characteristics". Thus, "while I am directly experiencing you and talking with you, the whole
complicated substructure of my own interpretation of you escapes my attention" (Schutz 1967:
140-141). Living in the We-relationship I do not attend to nor reflect upon my own
experiences or awarenesses. I simply live through the relationship. The result is that I am
incomparably better attuned to you, the Other, than I am to myself.
The contribution of the Self to understanding an Other, while it usually lurks beyond conscious
awareness and is only accessible in retrospect, may be forced into the realm of consciousness
if I should choose to do so. I can bring my process of interpretation, all my acts of
understanding, within the focus of my gaze at any moment. For instance, I may choose to
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check my interpretations and ask, 'Have I understood you correctly?" "Don't you mean
something else?" "What do you mean by such and such action?" These are, as Schutz (1967:
141) recognises, typical of the questions I ask and am indeed forced to ask every day in my
relations with other people. The moment I raise such questions, "I have abandoned my simple
and direct awareness of the other person, my immediate grasp of him in his subjective
particularity. I have abandoned the living intentionality of our confrontation. The light in
which I am looking at him is now a different one: my attention has shifted to those deeper
layers that up to now had been unobserved and taken for granted. I no longer experience my
fellow man in the sense of sharing his life with him; instead I 'think about him"'. It is only
within the We-relationship that such questions are possible and make sense because it is only
within this relationship that I and the Other share an actual concrete co-presence. Furthermore,
in the process of verifying, clarifying and correcting my interpretation of the Other's
subjective experiences, I have the valuable opportunity to expand and enrich my understanding
of the Other. In fact, Schutz (1967: 171) posits that "this becoming-aware of the correctness or
incorrectness of my understanding of you is a higher level of the We-relationship. On this
level, I enrich not only my experience of you but of other people generally". So it is that in
becoming aware of how I - the Self - understand, I substantially improve and promote a better
understanding of the Other, both specifically and generally.
Thus, in the intersubjective world of meaning, I am forever seeking to understand you, the
Other. In the process, I develop meaning-contexts to which my lived experiences of you
belong. These meaning-contexts of your experiences can never wholly correspond with the
meaning-contexts that your develop of your own lived experiences exactly because we see
differently. We see differently because my way of seeing, of interpreting and understanding,
falls under the direct influence of my entire Self. Although my Self can at any moment be
brought under the spotlight and be opened to verification, its contribution can never be erased.
Rather, a closer look into the ways I see will allow me to see even better.
My claim to understanding?
Bearing in mind all that has now been said, what can I claim about the understanding (the
'truth') I develop within a We-relationship with an Other about his or her experiences?
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Far from claiming anything, I must rather confess that my understanding of the Other is
incomplete. This is because the understanding that I am able to develop of you and your
experiences is largely based on my own subjective experience of you as the specific Other I
encounter in the concrete, unfolding face-to-face relationship we share. Hence, I cannot but
agree with Schutz (1967: 106) that "everything I know about your conscious life is really
based on my knowledge of my own lived experiences".
If I accept that everything I understand about you is based on my experience of you (and not
your experience directly related to me), what does this mean for the social research context?
The conception of how I come to understand the experiences of an Other within a face-to-face
encounter implies that the researcher cannot, under any circumstances, seize the living
actuality of the Other's experience, Your Here and Now is completely unique to you. Your
stock of knowledge is built up and utilised from your unique biographical position and through
your choice of interest alone. As a researcher, I can share a great deal with you in the We-
relationship. I can share a certain dimension of time and space with you in the vivid present.
Nevertheless, even in the immediacy of the We-relationship, I do not "become" you nor do I
mysteriously enter your lived experience. As Natanson (1970: 113) puts it, "sharing is not
invading". Therefore the researcher can never claim to enter directly into the actuality of an
Other's world.
Furthermore, as the researcher, I interpret. This alone suggests that all interpretive
understanding transpires through my mind and that all such understanding is transposed in the
process. This fact can only not matter if we assume that the researcher's mind, my mind, is
completely purged of all subjective interests, preconceptions, values, and the like. But this is
of course simply impossible. There can be no complete detachment from all local
circumstances in order to discover some "objective" meaning. There is no "mental tabula
rasa" (Arbib & Hesse 1986: 176) through which I can approach a human situation. The Self of
the researcher cannot be eliminated from his or her perspective of the Other. To assume that
this might be possible would be to assume that a "neutral" perspective on the side of the
researcher is a feasible epistemological goal. Yet, the attainment of this goal would in effect
require the researcher to view the Other from a "perspective that is no perspective at all"
(Gadamer in Pollio et al. 1997: 45). Thus, to understand does not produce some elevated
(prejudice-free, Self-free) understanding of an Other, but rather remains (perhaps notoriously
so) dependent on the researcher's own circumstances (Arbib& Hesse 1976: 176).
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Within the research context, this critical point implies that the "truth" - that is, the
understanding - that I construct is significantly influenced by my experience and interpretation
of the occurrences which constitute it. As Stanley and Wise (1993: 159 - 160) state, "it isn't
possible to do research ... in such a way that we can separate ourselves from experiencing what
we experience as people (as researchers) involved in the situation". This appears to closely
correspond to Morgan's (1983a: 13; 1983b: 369) view that what is observed and discovered
about a particular research field is as much a function of the ways in which the researcher
engages with the particular phenomenon of interest as it is of the phenomenon itself. Thus, my
construction of an understanding cannot be separated from the potentially significant influence
of my personal involvement within and experience of the research context.
A recognition of the researcher's personal contribution to the construction of social theory
represents a cornerstone of the feminist tradition. Within this tradition, it is asserted that "all
research necessarily comes to us through the active and central involvement of researchers"
(Stanley & Wise 1983: 196). To argue otherwise would merely perpetuate the misleading
image of the social researcher "as the objective observer of fixed reality, the neutral seeker
after an external and objectifiable truth" (Du Bois 1983: 112). Stanley and Wise (1993: 114)
trace the origin of this conception of the researcher to "the mythology of 'hygienic research'"
in which the researcher can be "there" without having any greater involvement than simple
presence.
In contrast with the "hygienic research" approach, feminism regards the researcher as "the
medium" (Stanley & Wise 1993: 157) through which all research occurs. It strongly rejects
the notion of "'the researcher' as a god-like creature who is able to leave behind subjective
involvements while conducting research" (Stanley & Wise 1993; 113). Feminism thus firmly
embraces the researcher's subjectivity and renounces any attempt by a researcher to withdraw
from the social reality under investigation to a position of attempted neutrality and objectivity.
I, the researcher, am instead urged to acknowledge that the entire process of social inquiry is
rooted in and expressive of my Self and my subjectivity (Du Bois 1983: 112).
In this context subjectivity refers to Schutz's conception of the highly structured background
of meaning that a researcher brings to bear when interpreting the lived experiences of an
Other. In other words, when I interpret my experiences of you, I bring a whole baggage of
Self along, including my stock of knowledge, my biographical situation and my choice of
interest. Adler and Adler (1987: 84-86) contend that those researchers who learn to draw more
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directly and consciously on this complex and multifaceted Self may achieve the closest
possible understanding of the phenomenon being studied. Indeed, Duelli Klein (1983: 95)
writes that such researchers may be able to "produce a kind of scholarship that encompasses
the complexity of reality better than the usual fragmented approach to knowledge".
This argument, as proposed by both Adler and Adler and Duelli Klein, appears to be supported
by the research experiences reported by some researchers. Referring to his study on
loneliness, Moustakas (1981: 210-213) explains how he had immersed himself into this
phenomenon in order to gain a truly comprehensive understanding of loneliness: "I was
certainly not studying loneliness simply as an intellectual or academic question, in a detached
manner, but rather in an integrative, living form; becoming part of the lonely experiences of
others; being within lonely moments in living; being involved, committed, interested,
concerned, while at the same time aware of an emerging pattern and relatedness... I steeped
myself in a world of loneliness, letting my life take root and unfold in it, letting its dimensions
and meanings and forms evolve its own timetable and dynamics" (Moustakas 1981: 212-213).
Moustakas' powerful research experience - and in particular his use of the Self - supports
Polanyi's (in Moustakas 1981: 211) claim that "into every act of knowing there enters a
passionate contribution of the person knowing what is known," and that "this coefficient is no
mere imperfection but a vital component of his knowledge". This again places my Self central
within the research process and, according to Collins (1986: S29-S30), legitimates my
subjective experience of this process as an important and valid way of knowing.
As a way of knowing, my complex subjectivity guides me throughout the process of social
inquiry. Peshkin (1984: 277) argues that although my subjectivity does not blind me to
perspectives other than those following naturally from my subjectivity, these other
perspectives are not reinforced by my personal dispositions and, hence, fail to get the same
attention as those that are. The discarded perspectives are therefore neither explained and
connected to other aspects of the phenomenon being studied, nor expanded so that the promise
of each perspective is most fully exploited.
As a result, the researcher feels drawn to tell a particular "story"; that is, to present a particular
construction of the social reality under investigation. This story - as "the gift of my
subjectivity" (Peshkin 1984: 278) - is borne out of facts that are potentially available to any
other researcher. The researcher does not therefore practice an "untamed subjectivity"
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(Peshkin 1988: 21) as this would contain the potential of easily degenerating into subjectivism.
Such a practice would, as Peshkin (1984: 280) shows, also leave no scope for verifying the
researcher's perceptions and interpretations by the generally accessible experience of other
investigators. Founded in my particular perception and ordering of the facts, I relate the story
that best follows my construction of the research setting. Peshkin (1984: 278) asserts that this
neither implies a rejection of other possible stories or competing accounts of reality nor an
assertion that the chosen story is somehow the best or "truest" story to be told. Instead, it
simply lends support to Morgan's (1983b: 369) view that the same research field is capable of
yielding many different "kinds of know ledges" or stories (cf. Heaphy 1998: 26-27 for a similar
view).
The failure to exploit fully themes other than the one the researcher has chosen may be seen as
a shortcoming, but Peshkin (1984: 278) sees it as "the reality of social research conducted in
complex settings". Peshkin explains this view by noting that complex research settings
"support many stories, so to speak, not all of which can be told - or told most effectively - by
anyone researcher". Morgan (1983b: 369) indeed shows that a single researcher is often only
able to realise one possible story within a much wider set of possibilities. In the light of this,
Peshkin regards the researcher's subjectivity as simultaneously enabling and disabling as it
impels the researcher to entertain and develop some research possibilities while it restrains and
delimits the researcher from developing others. The researcher's subjective involvement
therefore exerts a substantial influence on both the process and the product of a particular
study.
In my role as social researcher I must therefore recognise that there is no privileged way of
understanding the experiences of the Other. I cannot enter and relive the Other's experiences,
because I am not the Other. I cannot adopt the Other's perspective, because my perspective is
firmly rooted in my own being. To do away with my own perspective would be to do away
with myself. This would not allow any insight at all because my only way of knowing and
understanding anything about the Other is through my own Self.
Conclusion
Indulge with me, for a moment, in a simple fantasy ...
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Picture in your mind that, in the intersubjective world we share, you and I are now entering a
face-to-face relationship. You are the Other whom I, the researcher, long to understand. As
you are speaking to me, you are building up the experiencethat you want to convey to me, step
by step, adding word to word, sentence to sentence. As you speak, I am listening to what you
are saying to me. Both of us experience the ongoingprocess in a vivid present. I literally see
you in front of me. I hear your words. I watch your face and gestures and listen to the tone of
your voice. As I do, I become aware of much more than what is directly communicated to me
through your words alone. I am in pace with you and my interpretative actions follow every
moment of my lived experience of you as it transpires through our relationship. To the extent
that you and I mutually experience this simultaneity, growing older together during this period
of time, sharing this particular space, living in it together, to that extent alone can I develop
someunderstanding of the subjective meaning of your experiences.
In our immediate relationship I will never grasp your lived experiences in their entirety. My
insight and understanding will forever be limited as I, a human being, cannot relive your
experiences nor adopt your unique perspective, the contexts of meaning to which your
experiences belong. What does fall within my human reach is to interpret what is revealed to
me. That is, I can develop my own contexts of meaning into which I can then fit my lived
experiences of you. These contexts reflect my experience of you, not your experiences of
yourself. They reflect the way in which I see you, not how you see yourself. In essence, then,
what transpires for me, what I come to understand about you and your subjective experiences,
reflects me and the substantial contribution of my Self to my experience of you in and through
our relationship.
Thus, the researcher's Self and the relationship into which that Self enters in order to
understand the Other must undoubtedly be recognised as one of the most - if not the most -
significant horizons by which the human construction of "truth" is to be understood. It thus
becomes imperative to "force" the researcher's acts of understanding into the realm of
conscious awareness and reflection. This will not only expose the deeper (previously taken-
for-granted) layers of understanding where the researcher's Self and subjectivity makes its
most direct contribution, but is also likely to enrich the understanding (the "truth") that the
researcher is able to construct of the Other.
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Chapter 7
How can truth be evaluated?
Thus far we have established that ''truth'' is, in its very essence, a human construction, by a
human researcher, working within a human world. Having said this, we cannot but
immediately wonder about the actual truth-value of any human understanding of an Other's
experiences. What is the truth-value of our knowledge claims about an Other's experiences?
Does not such a categorical recognition of the central standing of humanness and, more
specifically, of the contribution of the researcher's Self, suggest that all human understanding
is inevitably doomed to be nothing but wholly subjective (read: biased), only to be reached
through some esoteric, haphazard method of intuition (Natanson 1970: 112-114)? Moreover,
does this recognition not directly invite the danger of only finding in the Other what we
already expect to be there? Every interpreter does, after all, have a set of knowledge, a set of
concepts at his or her fingertips. Such a conceptual system may be entirely necessary if we are
to go about our work scientifically. But, as May (in Pollio et al. 1997: 44) asks, "how can we
be certain that our system, admirable and beautifully wrought as it may be, has anything to do
with a specific Mr. Jones, a living, immediate reality sitting opposite ... us in the consulting
room? May not this particular person require another system, another quite different frame of
reference?"
Clearly, the danger here is that the concrete human being sitting opposite me will be replaced
by some artificial creation of my system of thought, that a meaningful understanding of this
Mr. Jones will slip through my fingertips exactly to the extent that it displays but my own
fingerprints. In short, does the recognition that an understanding of the Other is a human
product bearing the imprints of its human producer require, as Harding (1986: 137) asks, "the
exaltation of relativist subjectivity"? Are we now left to assume that all forms of human
understanding are equally justifiable, and equally deficient?
This serious concern points to the fact that the social construction is often accompanied by (or
at least placed in the company of) "a great fear of relativism" (Hacking 1999: 4). This fear
stems from the use of the metaphor of construction as a means of arguing that scientific results,
even in fundamental physics, are "social constructs". For instance, a book entitled "The social
construction of anorexia" might appear as a work which argues that the suffering of these
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patients are exaggerated and their symptoms but mere fictions. No one would want the notion
of relativism to dictate to us that such a work will, as far as it concerns "truth", be on par with
all others.
Hence, it becomes critical to evaluate the truth claims of the different understandings that we
as researchers develop of an Other's experiences. The remainder ofthis chapter is devoted to
finding ways of making such an evaluation both credible and practical within the social
research context.
Freeing our knowledge
The truth-value of different understandings can (and do!) differ. What we must do is find a
way of discerning the truth-value of a particular understanding. To do so, we must make the
human producer - the Self - and its particular human production - an understanding, a truth -
more accessible to the scrutiny of anyone who cares to make the effort. We must, in a word,
free our knowledge (Douglas 1970: 28).
As I use the term here a freeing of our knowledge is not equivalent to following the road once
so forcefully decreed by objectivity. According to the discussion by Bittner (1973: 111) and
Douglas (1970: 25), objectivity demanded that for knowledge to be truly free, it must be free
of the knowing subjeet, the human mind. Hence, it required a set of formalised procedures that
was supposedly able to externalise and eliminate all effects of that knowing mind on the
understanding gained. The knowing mind was after all, so it was believed, capable of grasping
the "thing in itself'. If the "thing it itself' was then placed within a pure realm of universal co-
ordinates any knowing mind would be able to grasp or know it independently of the concrete
situation in which it was originally known or in which the knower grasped it at a particular
time. Such understanding or knowledge was absolute - "it was absolutely objective" (Douglas
1970:25).
In accordance with the objectivist theory of knowledge, all subjective experience of social
meanings should be transformed into objective (absolute), externally perceivable events.
Douglas (1970: 26) suggests that many scientists realised that this ad hoc construction of
evidence, "this treatment of objective (hard) measurements as if they were independent of
common-sense understandings of everyday life", was just that: as if. Still, they recoiled from
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this conclusion and continued to insist upon the merit of the objectivist theory. They became
what Douglas (1970: 24) calls "insincere" scientists who constructed ad hoc theories and acted
as if they were true, absolute and objective.
Clearly, any recognition that knowledge of Others is grounded in the human world and
produced by human scientists, cannot but refute even the slightest possibility of such an
absolutist, objectivist conception of human understanding that will turn social science into an
"as if science" (Douglas 1970: 26). For Bittner (1973: 114-117), the ideal of absolute
objectivity is now exposed as unattainable, not to mention entirely inappropriate to the study of
infinitely complex social realities.
If it is agreed that the bright promise of a formalistically regulated objectivity is not to be, how
else can we free our knowledge and thereby make our Selves and our understanding more
accessible to outside scrutiny?
A more meaningful alternative to objectivity should be based on a forthright recognition of
research as a process that occurs through the medium of a person - the researcher - who is
always and inevitably present in the research context. Based on such a recognition,
researchers could then be encouraged to "come out", thereby making the centrality of the
researcher in all research processes explicit (Stanley & Wise 1983: 197).
Stanley and Wise (1983: 197) note that it has been suggested that an approach which
encourages researchers to "open up" and "come out" and which makes them "vulnerable" to
scrutiny is nothing more than "mere self-indulgence" and will, as Rosaldo (in Barbour & Huby
1998: 5) suggests, only result in the menace of "essays laced with trendy amalgams of
continental philosophy and autobiographical snippets". In their reaction to this suggestion,
Stanley and Wise argue that it may indeed be "self-indulgent" to do anything other than what
they propose. They maintain that "most social science research ... has been riddled with the
self-indulgences of people who have refused to face up squarely to their own active
involvement within the central processes of constructing research" (Stanley & Wise 1983:
197). In contrast, the alternative which Stanley and Wise (1983: 197) advance, and to which I
will refer to as the practice of critical reflection, represents "no easy, sloppy or self-involved
exercise in relating inner thoughts, feelings and fantasies. It involves us in a disciplinary,
scholarly and rigorous explication of the bases of our knowledge by tying in such an
explication to a detailed analysis of the contexts in which such knowledge is generated".
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In support of Stanley and Wise's approach, Morgan (1983b: 374) contends that such an open
and critical explication and analysis of the research process, will ideally "reorient the role of
the researcher from that of a technical functionary pursuing a pre-specified form of
knowledge ... and place responsibility for the ... research directly with the researcher. Each
researcher would carry an obligation to reflect on the nature of his or her activity as a means of
choosing an appropriate path of action". Morgan strongly encourages and indeed expects each
researcher to assume responsibility for critically reflecting upon the particular context within
which and activities through which the research process passes. It is only when this approach
has been adopted that researchers will be able to truly come to grips with the historical and
social nature of their own intellectual products.
However, in advocating the practice of critical reflection as a means of freeing our knowledge
we should be wary of not making the same mistake as the absolutist scientists. They see this
"freeing" as an absolute freeing and then act as if they had achieved this goal (Douglas 1970:
28). It is clear that it is impossible to ever completely rationalise, let alone to eliminate, the
infinite number of possible contingencies within a social (read: human) research setting. Thus,
freeing our knowledge can only be relative - progressive yes, but still relative.
Practical steps - towards critical reflection
Based on the contributions of both Morgan (1983b: 374-375) and Stanley and Wise (1993:
159-166), the practice advocated here requires researchers to critically reflect, firstly, on their
own contribution within the research context; secondly, on the dynamic nature of their
relationship with the researched; and thirdly, on the nature and implications of the strategies
they employ within the research process.
The researcher's contribution
I have established that the specific understanding or "truth" that a researcher constructs is
directly influenced by the highly structured background of meaning which he or she brings to
the research context. Freeing our knowledge through the practice of critical reflection first and
foremost encourages researchers to develop a greater awareness of their own contribution
within the research process.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
120
This implies a continuous consideration of the ways in which the researcher's Self and
subjectivity affect the data that is gathered and the picture of the social world that is produced
(Reay 1996: 60; Bittner 1973: 118). After all, behind the researcher's Self lies a multiple
personal disposition - the result, as Peshkin (1984: 270) explains, of the amalgam of the
researcher's class, race, status, gender, and value orientations, that may in numerous ways be
engaged by the realities of the research situation. Researchers should therefore remain
meaningfully attentive to the nature and implications of their own contribution throughout the
course of a particular study and, that is, "not retrospectively when the data have been collected
and the analysis is complete, but while their research is actively in progress" (Peshkin 1988:
17). According to Berg (1984: 227) and Peshkin (1988: 17), such a practice of critical
reflection is likely to promote a greater understanding of the phenomenon of interest by
providing additional kinds of data which may, in turn, suggest supplementary avenues of
mquiry.
Bordieu (in Reay 1996: 61) importantly notes that this ideal is not achieved simply by the use
of the first person or by the expedient of constructing a text which situates the researcher in the
act of research. Instead, Bloom (1997: 112) and Harding (1986: 157-158) confirm that it is
achieved by placing the researcher on the same critical plane of analysis as the researched. In
other words, researchers are urged to be aware of and disclose their own perspectives,
preconceptions, values, interests, and assumptions with which they enter the research process.
The researcher's particular assembly of such qualities is not inherently wrong. What is wrong
is the failure to critically reflect upon their nature and influence within the research context.
Indeed, as Harding (in Bloom 1997: 112) points out, the researcher should never appear as "an
invisible, anonymous voice of authority, but as a real, historical individual with concrete,
specific desires and interests". The researcher and his or her personal contribution should, in
other words, occupy a central, explicit and identifiable position in any report or description of
the research process and its findings.
Thus, since I am undeniably part of the social world I study - and importantly, of the social
theory I construct - I am urged to remain critically reflective of and render open to scrutiny the
ways in which my Self and my subjectivity enter and influence the research process. This
practice is likely to decrease any expectation that I am or can be a neutral or "objective"
observer. More importantly, it should simultaneously increase my awareness of how the
construction of social reality is produced through the specific dynamics of the research
context.
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The research relationship
The practice of critical reflection is marked by "a concern for recognizing that constructing is a
social process, rooted in language, not located inside one's head" (Heaphy 1998: 26). This
orientation allows us to see that the researcher's Self is a social Self that interacts with the
researched in order to co-construct a product - a social theory - through their engagement.
Hence, to free our knowledge, researchers are encouraged to reflect critically upon the nature
and implications of the research relationship.
The merit of attempting to subject the nature of the research relationship to close scrutiny is
substantiated by Reinharz (1983: 180) who contends that the data provided by participants and,
hence, also the research results, are likely to be coloured by the position participants assume or
are allowed to assume in relation to the researcher. In other words, where participants are
perceived and treated as objects "on whom research operations are performed" (Reinharz
1983: 180), the nature and content of the data they provide are likely to be influenced by their
objectified state. Conversely, where research participants are encouraged to become more
actively involved in the research process, their contribution to the body of research data may
very likely be affected by their perception of the research process as a collaborative enterprise.
In the light of this, Rosaida (1993: 169) recommends that researchers should ask of both
themselves and their participants such questions as: "What are the complexities of the
speaker's identity? What life experiences have shaped it? Does the person speak from a
position of relative dominance or relative subordination?" Through seeking answers to
questions such as these, it becomes possible to shift away from focusing only on "what was
said" to also inquiring into "who was speaking to whom under what circumstances" (Rosaldo
1993: 214).
This shift in attention will support the freeing of our knowledge by critically reflecting on the
positionality of both the researcher and the researched, as well as on the implications thereof.
It will also encourage a focus on the minutiae of research relationships. This is in line with
Herzfeldt's (in Barbour & Huby 1998: 4) suggestion that it is only through a detailed
examination of the minutiae of such relationships that we can aspire to move beyond the
categories and classifications of the day. He postulates that "sensitivity to immediate
context. .. helps shift the focus away from perspectives that are already, to some extent,
determined by the structures they were set up to examine" (Herzfeldt in Barbour & Huby
1998: 4). This approach may be applied to research and to the relationships it engenders and
through which it works. In other words, the practice of critical reflection is extended to
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include a focus on the apparently "trivial" qualities of the research relationship as a rich source
of data on the ways in which we construct an understanding, a truth, in and through this
relationship.
Critical reflection upon the relationships that evolve within the research context should
therefore attune researchers to the ways in which the nature of these relationships affected the
data obtained and, consequently, also shaped the particular construction of social reality
advanced. Berg (1984: 228) contends that such a consideration of the nature and implications
of the researcher's relationship with participants needs to be included in any report of the
research results. Through this practice the researcher will grant access not only to the specific
human context in which the research was conducted, but also to an essential piece of the
framework necessary to interpret the research results.
Thus, given that my social theory (as a "truth") was cooperatively constructed in and through a
dynamic relationship between my Self and the ME sufferers who participated in my study, I
am encouraged to subject this relationship to critical reflection. In this way, I will recognise
and make available (read: free or lay open) for scrutiny the distinctively human context in
which my research was embedded.
Research strategies
The practice of freeing our knowledge furthermore encourages researchers to critically reflect
upon the nature and claims of different research strategies (Morgan 1983b: 375). Within the
research context, these strategies in effect shape the ground against which specific human
experiences can become figural. In this sense, the strategies that the researcher chooses and
implements significantly influence the understanding that he or she will (be able to) develop
about the Other.
Morgan (l983b: 375) emphasises that any reflection on the research strategies employed
within a particular study should take place in a way that will facilitate exploration rather than
constraint In other words it should encourage researchers to gain a measure of detachment
from their usual presuppositions through reflection on the nature and implications of what they
and others do in their research. This means that the researcher should not simply assume that a
practice favoured in many a textbook can be applied uncritically. Rather, the researcher
should ask (and explore possible responses to) questions such as: What will the influence of
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this course of action be on the research participant? Will it allow further openness or will it
provoke reticence? How will it impact on the balance of power in this relationship? Will it
allow me to probe deeper or only cause unnecessary hurt? Will I be able to deal with the
possible outcomes of this course of action? Will this be ethically permissible? And under
what circumstances will it become unethical? How does this course of action support my own
interests? And how will it shape the story I will be able to tell?
Raising pertinent questions such as these will serve to emphasise the infinite importance of
critical reflection upon the nature and potential consequences of research strategies. Morgan
(l983b: 374-375) contends that such reflection should enable the researcher to view different
research strategies as offering different interpretations of a situation or different arguments in
favour of understanding a phenomenon in a particular way. This again confirms that claims
which construct social reality in a particular way should be treated as claims, rather than as
statements that purport to be absolute or foundational in some way. By bearing this in mind
researchers will become able to render their strategies - and their claims - tentative and open
to critical discussion.
Thus, to free my knowledge, it is recommended that I extend the practice of critical reflection
to include a consideration of the nature and implications of the research strategies I employ.
Such a consideration should sensitise me to the taken-for-granted legitimacy of different
research strategies as well as to the potential implications of such strategies for the
construction of social reality I produce.
Conclusion
In seeking to evaluate the "truth" of the understanding we as researchers construct of an
Other's experience, I submit that we must intentionally strive to free our knowledge.
However, such "freeing" is no longer to be pursued through inevitably futile efforts to
eliminate the human quality that permeates the social research process. On the contrary,
"freeing" is now explicitly directed towards this human quality by striving to lay bare the
centrality of the researcher and his or her contribution in all research processes.
I furthermore submit that such a freeing of our knowledge can be executed in concrete terms
through the practice of critical reflection. The latter demands a rigorous investigation into the
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nature and implications of my own contribution, of my relationship with the research
participants, and of the research strategies I employ. Adopting this approach should ideally
become a way of "unconcealing" my own tacit world, including the constraints I might have
imposed on myself. The insight gained in the process should be included as an integral part of
any account of the research that has been conducted. I should, in other words, appear in
person not only within the research itself, but also within the presentation thereof. In the
process of doing so I will lay open to scrutiny the foundation - the very acts of understanding
- that support the specific construction of the social reality I am able to develop. I will, in
short, free my knowledge.
Freeing my knowledge through such a practice of critical reflection will ideally make it
possible to carry out what Douglas (1970: 30) calls the crucial test of "partial reproducibility".
The success of such a test within the context of this study would rest on the ability of an
outsider to (re-)construct a more or less similar understanding as the one I advance based on
the properties of the research process that I lay open to scrutiny. Where I then present a
rigorous explication of my way of knowing, I in effect translate my understanding into
reproducible terms. Yet, it should be noted that such a translation can never be complete or
absolute. Freeing, in the context of social research, will always remain relative.
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Summary
When we, as social researchers, attempt to do justice to a social reality we study, we offer a
particular way of understanding that reality; we develop and present a theory or a "truth ".
Given my status as an ME sufferer, I had to contemplate my own potential impact on the
specific truth (or truths) I would develop and present about the realities of suffering caused by
ME. Would it be imbued with my own personal interests and preconceptions, or would it
present an authentic - truthful - picture of the illness experience of ME sufferers? Could it
ever be both? And how would I evaluate it? Finding answers to these questions demanded -
as a prerequisite - a better understanding of what we mean by "truth" - and specifically, how
it is developed, and how it can be evaluated
One way of understanding the development of truth in science is by reference to the mirror
metaphor. According to this view I have to suspend all subjective involvement within the
research context because such involvement would inevitably prejudice, if not entirely
invalidate, the image in the mirror, namely my research findings. This approach rests upon a
specific concept of objectivity - and specifically upon the assumption that objectivity is
positioned in absolute opposition to subjectivity. However, this perceived opposition is based
upon a basic misconception within the framework of the mirror metaphor, namely that
objectivity and subjectivity are regarded as properties of the researcher. Yet, while
subjectivity is indeed a quality of the researcher, objectivity is not. Instead, objectivity is a
feature of the research process. "Objective research" implies the use of objective research
methods geared towards the achievement of valid research results and not necessarily geared
towards the exclusion of all subjective involvement on the part of the researcher. In the light
of this insight, the significance of the mirror metaphor on my understanding of the
development of truth - and the researcher's subjective involvement in this - declined
dramatically.
However, renouncing the mirror metaphor - and specifically the failures of "objectivity" - did
not leave me stranded because there is an alternative means of understanding the development
of truth within social research, namely social construction. According to this concept, truth as
an understanding is something that is co-constructed within an intricate relationship between
the person who knows - the knower - and the-to-be-known. The knower brings a substantial
part of the Self-his or her subjectivity - to this relationship. The construction of the truths
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that L the researcher, advance can therefore no longer be separated from my own subjective
experience of the occurrences which constitute my experiences within the process of research.
This view clearly implies a recognition of the researcher's central involvement within the very
act of knowing.
The fact that the "I" of the researcher is ever present and involved in the development - or
rather construction - of social theory holds critical implications for the evaluation of the truth-
value of the social theory developed through social research. I submit that the most practical
and productive means of evaluating the truth-value of such a theory is by freeing our
knowledge - not by eliminating the researcher's contribution in the name of "objectivity" -
but by rendering it entirely open to the scrutiny of others. We can achieve this through the
practice of critical reflection, which is the researcher's responsibility to render an explicit
account of the Self in the process of theory development. I will show in Part V that without
such an account the truth-value of a theory, of any understanding, is likely to remain
concealed behind unexposed areas of fusion between the researcher and the researched.
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Introduction
Research begins with a question.
My research question in this study was directed at the development of a greater understanding
of the illness experiences of those who suffer from ME. At the same time, my personal history
called for a strong methodological concern with my own experiences within and contributions
to the research process and its final product. Taken together, the guiding research focus of the
present study therefore demanded a deliberate and all-embracing interest in the world of
human experience.
In accordance with Pollio et al's. (1997: 28) view, this primary concern with a realm of
human experience introduces "a situation appropriate to the original meaning of the word
method, a meaning that combines the word hodos, a path or way, with the word meta, across
or beyond. Under this rendering, method is not an algorithmic procedure to be followed
mechanically if useful results are to be achieved, rather, method is a way or path toward
understanding that is as sensitive to its phenomenon as to its own orderly and self-correcting
aspects". The present study, then, required a method not only appropriate to the investigation
of the human world I had sought to understand, but also highly sensitive in its application
within this world.
With this in mind, I set out to select the most appropriate and sensitive methodological
approach through which to steer this study towards a progressive understanding of human
experience. This methodological approach is described in Part III.
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Chapter 8
First steps: Setting the stage for data collection
In preparation for the process of investigation and analysis it was necessary to achieve two
objectives. The first was to define the stance that would guide my methodological approach
throughout this study. My choice in this respect would directly influence the extent to which I
would be able to apply the epistemological perspective adopted in Part II. Secondly, I had to
familiarise myself with the specific field of study. I considered this of great importance in
making me sufficiently sensitive to the pertinent issues that permeate the field. The steps I
took to achieve these objectives are described in Chapter 8.
My stance; my choice of method
Through the work of Douglas (1970: 13) I was able to recognise that my choice of method for
investigation and analysis would be significantly influenced by the stance I chose to adopt
toward the social (human) reality I wished to study. That is, my stance toward the social world
in question would determine the method I chose - not the method my stance.
My decision to. let my stance determine my choice of method is the exact opposite of the
classical scientific approach to investigating the social world. The classical approach is to
assume that there is only one general set of criteria for scientific "truth", and that it is
embedded in the classical works of the natural sciences. Thus, the early social scientists
adopted a conscious policy of studying the social world in the same way one would study any
physical object. Having so presupposed these methods, they adopted the stance most in accord
with them. They adopted what Douglas (1970: 14) calls the objectivist stance toward the
social world. Accordingly, the early social scientists assumed, as Douglas (1970: 13-14) goes
on to explain, that the phenomena of the social world could and should be studied only in
terms of clear, distinct and formal ("scientific") categories that they would define in advance
of their studies. They even assumed that decisions about how one would determine whether
the results of a study were "true" or "false" could and should be made in advance of the study.
In a very significant (and very disconcerting) sense, these assumptions as the classical ideals of
the early social scientists still closely correspond with many of the "methodological ideals"
often espoused in modem day social research textbooks.
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However, in choosing a stance to guide my methodological design, there was an alternative to
the objectivist perspective. In fact, there was an entirely opposite extreme which Douglas
(1970: 14) labels the natural stance. This is a stance "in which the everyday world is taken for
granted as it is experienced in everyday life. It is that stance taken by the individual within the
stream of everyday life. It is a stance that does not raise serious and persistent questions
concerning the nature of the everyday experience but, instead, takes that experience as a fact".
The natural stance, then, is supposed to be the one taken by the individual in everyday human
life, though whether or not individuals in fact do take this stance is certainly a matter open to
debate. However, I could not adopt the natural stance because in my research I do ask
questions, I do long for understanding, and I do not simply accept everything as "fact". Thus,
like the objectivist stance, the natural stance did not present to me a desirable choice of stance
through which to direct my investigation.
Douglas (1970: 25) identifies still a further alternative, namely the theoretic stance which
occupies the middle ground between extremes. To take this stance toward the social reality
that is being studied means, for Douglas, "to stand back from, reflect upon, to re-view the
experience taken for granted in the natural stance. To take the theoretic stance is to treat the
everyday world as a phenomenon". At its most basic level, this stance involves what Husserl
(in Douglas 1970: 25) called "phenomenological suspension" or "reduction". According to the
latter the researcher places that which is taken for granted into "phenomenological doubt",
thereby making explicit to consciousness the general thesis which unconsciously underlies
every individual judgement made within ordinary life, about ordinary life. However, there is a
problem with this approach because complete "suspension", as Pollio et al. (1997: 47) point
out, is simply impossible to achieve. Thus, adherence to the theoretic stance would place
unnecessarily onerous demands on the researcher. I would simply not measure up. What is
more, I did not want to measure up because to suspend my very way of knowing would deny
my presence within the study - and I most certainly was present.
Thus, I did not choose the extreme objectivist stance for I did not wish my method to
artificially determine the stance. Nor did I choose the extreme natural stance for I could not
blindly accept everything perceived a matter of fact. And I did not opt for the middle-road
theoretic stance, because suspending my way of being and knowing did not present an
acceptable or even feasible option to me.
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In finally defining my guiding stance I chose to agree with Pollio et al. (1997: 28) that, in
seeking to understand human experience, it is necessary to recognise the "perspectival nature
of human experience". Participants' world of experience would not be given to me in any
direct fashion. I could not share the exact point of view from which they bestowed (and was
still bestowing) meaning onto their lived experiences. We were looking at these experiences
from different points of view; our perspectives differed. Consequently, what they would
describe would reflect their own perspective. Similarly, what I would see would not only be
partial; but also very much tainted by my own peculiar perspective. In each case, the
description of human experience would bear the mark of the knowing mind at work. Thus, in
choosing a stance from which to launch this study of human experience, I had the option of
acknowledging the influence of personal perspective and so to remain sensitive to the
influence of the knower on both the research process and the product thereof. In short, I had
the option of adopting the perspectival stance, and this I did.
The process
Like Maso (1995: 17-18) I believe that to be able to appreciate the descriptions of human
experience presented in the following two chapters, it is necessary to recapitulate what had
been done in order to construct them. I will now, therefore, briefly outline the research process
that I followed, and discuss its constituent elements inmore detail in subsequent sections.
The research process most closely resembled the (multiple) case study design as described by
Yin (1984: 14-52). I selected this distinctly qualitative research design as the guiding
methodological beacon because, as Yin explains, it is explicitly geared towards the attainment
of a comprehensive understanding of particularly complex social phenomena. Moreover, the
case study design acknowledges the importance of context and perspective in the development
of such an in-depth understanding. To this end, it also allows for the use of multiple sources of
data. In this way the case study design carried the promise of being both appropriate for and
sensitive to the concept of an intimate description of human experience.
I followed the advice of Rubin and Rubin (1995: 43-48) by seeking to both support and
enhance the case study design through a firm emphasis on the flexible, continuous and iterative
nature of the research process as a whole. I had therefore deliberately set out to conduct a
study flexible enough not only to explore unanticipated areas of interest, but also to
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
135
accommodate the participants in terms of what they knew best. The continuous nature of the
research process similarly allowed me to rethink and adjust the research design so as to pursue
emerging themes. In addition, it helped me to remain steadily on course toward reaching a
satisfying conclusion to the study. To ensure that such a conclusion would be thoroughly
founded upon the descriptions and understandings of the participants themselves, the iterative
process of gathering data, subjecting it to preliminarily analysis and finally filtering it
characterised the entire course of the study. I was thus able to pursue both the foreseeable and
the unforeseen not only in an organised manner and in a way that was sensitive to the world of
human experience, but was also unwavering in its commitment to develop a comprehensive
understanding of the reality being studied.
One can develop better insight into the remarkably dynamic research process employed in this
study by looking at its constitutive elements or phases as shown schematically in Figure 4.1.
They will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections.
The diagram in Figure 4.1 highlights the fact that, perhaps more than in any other type of
research, the "phases of work in qualitative research overlap and are intermeshed" (Weiss
1994: 14). Why then present the "phases" of the research process as a logical sequence in
Figure 4.1 if in practice they are so fused and intertwined? Perhaps ultimately the most
important reason is that my account of the research process has been constrained by the use of
text as the only medium through which I could present it. Text imposes a linear and sequential
mode of explanation that is not always appropriate to what is being explained (cf. Dey 1993:
38), but nevertheless permits a good insight into what was accomplished. Thus, although
Figure 4.1 does help to create a multi-dimensional space in which to present the multiple facets
of my research, I still depend on text (such as in the subsequent sections) to add the necessary
depth, density and clarity to what I wish to say.
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Figure 4.1 A schematic representation of the research process
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Initiating steps; continuous conduct
At the start of this study I took three steps concurrently: I became familiar with the relevant
literature, I became notably more aware of my own experiences, and I became involved in
sensitising encounters with specific others. Although at first thought of as merely representing
the inaugural stage of the research endeavour, these maiden steps soon proved to be of a
continuous nature, indeed lasting throughout the course of the research process.
Literature
As so many researchers before me (Lee 1993: 73; Snow et al. 1986: 401, Strauss & Corbin
1990:42), I regarded the use ofliterature of great importance in this study.
In following the example set by Strauss and Corbin (1990: 48) I was able to distinguish
between two types of literature. The first, academic or technical literature, included reports of
pertinent research studies as well as theoretical and philosophical papers characteristic of
professional and disciplinary writing. The second was popular or non-technical literature
which included a wide variety of documents such as articles in popular magazines and
newspapers, newsletters from the South African ME support organisation (MESA), and the
communications of relevant newsgroups on the Internet.
Each of these sources of information was purposefully mined for the data they contained.
Throughout the research process the often extensive, and at times even surprising, information
gathered in the process was directed at complementing not only other sources of data but also
different procedures and findings. Moreover, through providing a rich background of
information, a thorough acquaintance with the relevant literature also served to enhance my
ability to develop insight into and understanding of the human world being studied. As Strauss
and Corbin (1990: 42) predicted, it "sensitised" me to the chosen field of research.
As a final word on the use of literature I must add that although I was very much aware of the
importance of incorporating and using different types of literature throughout the course of the
study, I also consciously tried to "guard against becoming captive of any of them" (Strauss &
Corbin 1990: 56). In other words, while all literature I consulted certainly contributed to the
development of a greater understanding of the subject, I did not wish this understanding to be
co-opted by and made into a devoted disciple of any one of them.
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Field diary
Edwards (1993: 184-185) says that, far from being a simple recording instrument through
which participants are able to voice their personal experiences, the researcher is a central part
of - or as Dey (1993: 37) asserts, a participant in - the research process. While this
recognition is pertinent to all social research, it is evenmore so in this study, given the focus of
its inquiry.
As an inevitable participant in the research process the researcher is, as Adler and Adler (1987:
84-86) show, very often compelled to draw upon the complex and multifaceted experience of
his or her human Self. Such an employment of personal experience assists the researcher in
achieving the most intimate understanding of the social world being studied. Perhaps one
reason why this is so true is that the research process is such an interactive one (cf. Edwards
1993: 185-195). In other words, the understanding that the researcher eventually reaches in
the course of the study depends not only on what participants had actually experienced, but
also largely on how they constructed these experiences in and through their relationship with
the researcher. The researcher needs to be aware of his or her Selfand its contribution to the
research relationship in order to be as open and responsive as possible to participants and their
constructions (Dey 1993: 239-240). In this way, the researcher can attend in a personal,
disciplined, and sensitive manner to what is being constructed. In fact, when the researcher's
own thoughts and feelings no longer loom unexamined, they become an important source of
insight, which leads to a better understanding of the human world of the participants.
Since the researcher's own contribution is of such profound significance it constitutes a very
legitimate and pertinent object of analysis. In fact, as many authors (Devault 1990: 104; Dey
1993: 37; Edwards 1993: 184; Lee 1993: 105) assert, the researcher's own actions,
interpretations and experiences must be analysed as an integral part of the research process
itself. Such analysis would then serve to render the researcher's own contribution open to
scrutiny by others.
A vital source of such an analysis of the researcher's own contribution is, as Dey (1993: 37,
239-240) points out, is the researcher's own field diary. With this in mind, I set out from the
beginning of this study to document my own contribution in a field diary. In this diary I
attempted to disclose my Self - my very being - as a significant source of both insight and
knowing. I explained the reasoning behind procedures I had employed and reflected upon the
multitude of encounters I had experienced. I noted and examined my social characteristics as
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well as my assumptions, beliefs, and presuppositions in terms of their effects upon the research
itself as well as upon the final understanding which was to be constructed. In fact, I detailed
my very personal experience of every instant of the research endeavour. In the process I was
able to trace my journey through the entire research process, from the very first steps where I
identified an appropriate conceptual focus for the study, right through to the final efforts to
produce an integrated account.
As a result, my field diary produced a wealth of material on which I was able to. draw
throughout the research and in particular during a more detailed explanation of my own
research experience (as presented in Part V). Indeed, through my field diary, I could
consciously draw upon my own experiences and use it to offer new ways of looking at the
reality of others. What is more, I could do so in a manner that was not only sensitive and
disciplined, but also explicitly open to the scrutiny of those who cared to make the effort.
Sensitising encounters
Throughout the research process I have been involved in conversations with people, both
locally and abroad, who have knowledge of and/or experience within the research field in
question (cf. Lee 1993: 73). These have included communications with medical practitioners
who care for ME sufferers, with leaders who champion ME and ME-related support
organisations, with relatives of sufferers, with sufferers who have "recovered", and with
sufferers who are still ill but who fell outside the selection criteria for this study. Each of these
encounters served not only to shape and sharpen my awareness, but also to mould the
understanding of the illness experiences of ME sufferers that I was eventually able to
construct.
Thus, throughout the course of this study, I have studied the relevant literature, documented
my own contribution, and learned from those in the know. All in all, I had sought to be as
sensitive to and informed of the governing area of interest as I could possibly be. For me, this
area of interest did, after all, represent an area of uncertainty which I longed to expunge.
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Conclusion
I had undertaken a number of preliminary steps to set the stage for a study which was geared to
develop a comprehensive description of human experience as it is lived and described by
selected individuals. These steps not only informed and sensitised me to the particular field of
study, but also clearly agreed with the epistemological approach which I adopted in Part II.
The perspectival approach that I adopted as a guiding stance in this study echoes the essential
elements of the metaphor of construction. It acknowledges that "truth" - my description ofthe
field of study - is produced within a relationship in which those aspects that do become figural
will be directly influenced by the perspective adopted by the knower.
As I showed in Part II, such a recognition of the knower's contribution to the research process
demands an explanation of the nature of this contribution - not only to stimulate a greater
awareness of and sensitivity to it, but also to render it accessible to the scrutiny of others. To
achieve this end the field diary was very deliberately employed in this study. This instrument
has allowed me to explore my contribution throughout the research process - and, importantly,
to explain its essence in Part v.
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Chapter 9
Getting through the door - and to the data
Chapter 9 outlines the process I followed to enter the human world of ME. Once "inside", it
became possible to work with the research participants in developing (or constructing) a better
understanding of the subjective illness experience of ME sufferers. In depicting the ways in
which I set out to do this, Chapter 9 will resonate key elements of the epistemological
approach adopted in Part II. This means that it will be possible to identify traces of concepts
such as relationship, context and perspective throughout the text.
Contact: Getting in touch
At the outset of the study it was envisaged that a limited number of ME sufferers would be
selected for participation.
Selection criteria
ME sufferers had to comply with a number of specified criteria to qualify for participation in
this study.
In order to limit the number of confounding variables, I decided to select participants who
would share a similar demographic profile, specifically regarding gender, age, location, and
medical status. I therefore sought to select only female participants, who fell within the age
group 20-50, and who were living in the Western Cape region at the time of the study. I also
selected only those sufferers who had been medically diagnosed as suffering from ME. I do
recognise, however, that as both the 1988and 1994 case definitions of ME used in the medical
profession to diagnose ME are beset by severe problems (cf. Chapter 2 as well as Jason et al.
1997), this dire state of affairs might have introduced a certain degree of bias into the present
study, either by possibly excluding legitimate cases or including illegitimate cases.
In addition, in following the recommendation of Rubin and Rubin (1995: 66), I selected
participants who were particularly knowledgeable about the proposed research question. This
criterion correspond with what Spradley (1979: 47-49) describes as participants who are both
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thoroughly encultured and currently involved. Participants therefore had to be fully acquainted
with the experience of ME and had to use this knowledge to guide their actions on a regular
basis. Furthermore, participants had to be willing to openly participate in the proposed
research enterprise and so fully share their experience of ME. According to Rubin and
Rubin's (1995: 66-67) discussion, adherence to this criterion would assist me directly in
avoiding idealised or fictionalised answers. Lastly, research participants had to be able to
grant sufficient time (and energy) to engage in the proposed study (Spradley 1979: 51-52).
Eventually, four ME sufferers who met all of the above stated criteria were selected to
participate in the study. Although I hesitate to declare that this group of participants is wholly
representative of all the different aspects concerning the particular research question, I do
believe that this particular selection of participants allowed me to develop a well-balanced and
in-depth understanding of the ME illness experience (cf. Rubin & Rubin 1995: 69-70).
Recruitment strategies
Like Lee and Renzetti (1993: 30) I soon realised that the problems deriving from the
recruitment of research participants in a study about a sensitive topic among a sensitive
population were particularly acute. To clarify this statement I will describe how I located and
selected the participants for this study.
In following the example of Martin and Dean (1993: 86), I had adopted a combination of
recruitment strategies. The rationale behind this approach was that recruitment from a variety
of sources would help to ensure diversity in the selection of participants. In the process, I had
employed the help of the medical profession, made use of lists, placed advertisements, used
personal referral and, to a limited extent, attempted my hand at network sampling.
In every case, when a potential participant was located, the initial contact was promptly
followed up by a friendly letter which introduced me as the researcher, set out a preliminary
outline of the proposed study, and contained a statement conveying the official endorsement of
the proposed study from the University (cf. Appendix A).
Physician referral
Jason et al. (1997: 976) recommend the medical profession as an important source for finding
ME sufferers. Since medical records are confidential, a physician closely involved in the
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present study offered to contact ME patients on my behalf and to explain the nature of the
proposed study to them. This line of recruitment produced one participant.
Heeding the advice of Jason et al. (1997: 981) I was wary of relying solely on physician
referral. I recognised that if I did so, I could introduce a significant degree of bias into the
selection of participants through an emphasis on help-seeking behaviour as well as through
assuming access to the health care system.
The use of lists
I had contacted the ME Association of South Africa (MESA) in the hope of obtaining a list of
their members or at least of their newsletter's subscription list. I was aware that such a list
would inevitably be incomplete and could therefore introduce a measure of bias into the study.
Still, I reasoned that should the list contain a large percentage of the specific population of ME
sufferers, the cost of locating ME sufferers who are not on the list would by far outweigh the
possible bias in using the list (cf. Sudman & Kalton 1986: 403).
However, almost predictably, MESA considered their membership list too confidential to
share. I therefore had to follow a different route.
Advertising
To secure access to the readership of the MESA newsletter I placed a carefully worded letter in
the AprillMay 1999 edition of the quarterly MESA newsletter. I explained the essence of the
proposed study, emphasised its importance, and set out its selection criteria. Throughout I
attempted to convey my sincere respect for ME sufferers and their illness experience. In doing
so, I wished not only to broaden the coverage enjoyed by the research, but also to present it in
a positive and non-threatening manner so as to encourage ME sufferers to come forward and
contact me (cf. Biernacki &Waldorf 1981: 149; Lee 1993: 71-72).
The letter placed in the April/May 1999 edition of the quarterly MESA newsletter elicited a
total of five responses which eventually led to the selection of two participants.
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Personal referral
In every encounter with an ME sufferer or anyone knowledgeable in this regard, I attempted to
foster additional contacts within the ME community. I deliberately (and frequently) inquired
whether they knew of any acquaintances who might be interested in the proposed study. The
process of personal referral was clearly a matter of "a friend of a friend of a friend knowing
someone ... who perhaps, just perhaps might be interested". In this process, where I had relied
so strongly on those "intermediaries" spreading the word, it was inevitable that chance would
play an indispensable role (cf. Biernacki &Waldorf 1981: 150-155).
Still, despite its somewhat haphazard nature, this approach produced a number of significant
contacts and ultimately led to the selection of one participant.
Network sampling
Initially I had reasoned that each of the recruitment strategies discussed above would, even if it
did not yield suitable participants in itself, at the very least sow the seeds for further network
sampling (cf. Lee 1993: 63). This recruitment strategy, also known as snowball sampling, is
an approach that "yields a study sample through referrals made among people who have or
know others who possess some characteristics that are of research interest" (Biernacki &
Waldorf 1981: 141). It is regarded as a strategy particularly well-suited for the recruitment of
rare or sensitive populations and relies very heavily on the assumption that members of such
populations often know each other (Biernacki &Waldorf 1981: 141; Lee 1993: 65-67; Sudman
& Kalton 1986: 413).
For the purpose of effective network sampling, Biernacki and Waldorf (1981: 146) recommend
that the researcher should start referral chains among members of the special population using
relevant available knowledge concerning the specific population and its members' possible
location. I tried this with little or no result. Biernacki and Waldorf (1981: 147) also points out
that such chains of referral tend to develop and diverge as the researcher becomes more
sensitive and attentive to the particular field of research. However, even when I became
deeply steeped in the research area neither spontaneous nor deliberately elicited contacts were
forthcoming. In fact, almost every effort to initiate or develop referral chains failed. Despite
its name, snowball sampling did not evoke a growing mass of contacts. In fact, it did not yield
a single participant for this study.
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Thus my efforts to locate and recruit potentially suitable participants for this study were often
frustrated. The tremendous difficulty I encountered in this process is very likely related to the
fact that the ME community constitute, as Biernacki and Waldorfs (1981: 144) describe it, a
"target population" with "low social visibility". In other words this community is surrounded
by and enmeshed within the moral, legal, social and medical dilemmas and sensitivities evoked
by the illness that distinguishes it. This state of affairs has rendered this community
stigmatised and isolated - and quite possibly wary of yet another (derogatory) study which
would prove to be nothing but a waste of time and energy.
What is more, the members of the Western Cape ME community clearly do not necessarily
know or are aware of one another. This might have something to do with the fact that support
groups within this region were only operative for a short time during the late 1980's and early
1990's and were even then scattered over a large area. ME sufferers in the area therefore did
not have any organised opportunity to meet with other sufferers. Hence, my struggle to make
use of any type of referral.
Biernacki and Waldorf (1981: 144-145) explain that the ideal method for locating people who
maintain such low visibility and who share very little contact would be to draw a
representative sample of, say, all adults in the Western Cape population. Then, assuming the
honesty of respondents, the researcher would screen the sample to locate those cases identified
as members of the specific target population. However, the considerable costs involved in
drawing a large enough sample in order to locate a sufficient number of such members ruled
out this approach. In addition, the aim of a particular study that focuses on such a sensitive
population may not necessarily be to test a series of predetermined hypotheses on a
representative sample which would allow for extrapolation to the whole population. On the
contrary, such studies are very often more explicitly directed at developing an in-depth
understanding (not a compilation of statistical findings!) of the particular human experience in
question. For this, such studies do not need a representative sample based upon the principles
of probability. Here, as in my study, the aim is not generalisation; it is understanding and
insight.
To summarise: in order to develop an intimate understanding of the illness experience of ME I
used a combination of recruitment strategies to select four ME sufferers who complied with
the selection criteria. This process encountered various degrees of difficulty and testified to the
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critical necessity of taking the greatest care when dealing with such a highly sensitive
population.
The in-depth interview
Like Oakley (1981: 32) I believe that an interview is essentially a way of finding out about
people. Asking questions is indeed the main source of social scientific understanding of
human experience, of human life. Thus the interview, then, represents an important instrument
of data collection in general and particularly for this study.
The rationale: Why in-depth interviewing?
Authors such as Lee (1993: 104) as well as Rubin and Rubin (1995: 51-52) are convinced that
the in-depth or qualitative research interview represents an exceptionally sensitive and well-
suited means of developing an intimate understanding of experiences best communicated
through rich narratives and detailed examples (Lee 1993: 104; Rubin & Rubin 1995: 51-52).
Thus, based on its established reputation, the in-depth interview stands virtually alone as an
instrument through which to develop thorough descriptions of human experience that might be
difficult to attain otherwise.
Closer inspection ofthis instrument reveals that it has hidden strengths. Indeed, when I turn to
Kvale's (1996: 36-37) discussion of qualitative interviewing, it becomes clear that the in-depth
interview actually has three dimensions. For Kvale the research interview is, firstly, "a
specific professional form of conversational technique in which knowledge is constructed
through the interaction of interviewer and interviewee". Secondly, the research interview is "a
basic mode of knowing' in accordance with which the certainty of our knowing becomes 'a
matter of conversation between persons, rather than a matter of interaction with a non-human
reality". Thirdly, the research interview is "constitutive" of those involved as well as of their
world. In this sense, the human world of experience becomes a 'conversational reality'. Thus,
the research interview represents much more than an empirical method of study. It also
represents a basic mode of constituting knowledge through an interactive process of
conversation.
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Throughout Kvale's consideration of the research interview he strongly stresses its essentially
"inter-active" nature. Accordingly, the researcher is no longer simply concerned with
passively collecting the participant's statements like gathering pebbles on the beach. No, the
researcher is much more directly involved as he or she actively steers and co-determines the
entire course and nature of the interview (Kvale 1996: 183). Consequently, the knowledge that
is constructed in the interview cannot be accepted as an independent given, let alone as a direct
representation of an underlying ("really real") reality. Rather, the knowledge that is
constituted through the research interview is a socially co-constructed creation. It is, in
Kvale's (1996: 124-125) words, "created inter the points of view of the interviewer and the
interviewee". In this sense, the research interview is a specific form of human interaction
through which knowledge is produced interactively.
An understanding of the interactive, interrelational construction of knowledge within the
interview compels a consideration of the power relationship between the researcher and the
researched. Here it becomes important to recognise as Kvale (1996: 227) does that, whatever
may be attempted, the research interview "is not a reciprocal interaction oftwo equal partners.
There is a definite asymmetry of power".
The asymmetry of power within the research interview stems, as Brannen (1988: 554-557)
shows, from two primary sources: the control over interaction and the control of information.
The first source of power concerns the ability of the researcher to control the interaction itself
by commanding both the form and the content ofthe interview. Within the in-depth research
interview, where the format is not rigidly specified, the locus of control at anyone moment
will emerge interrelationally. The participants thus have the opportunity to control the
interview and, hence, to dictate its form and content. Where this is allowed to happen, the
exercise of power in the interview has the potential of more genuinely becoming a two-way
process - with power being exerted by both researcher and researched.
The second source of power lies in one participant having power over the other participant by
virtue of possessing sensitive or even damaging information. The researcher usually not only
possesses such information, but also has the power to interpret it; that is, to attribute meaning
to the descriptions of participants. For Kvale (1996: 227-228) the danger here is one of
'expertification" where the "expert" researcher expropriates meaning from participants'
descriptions and reifies it into 'the real meaning' of their experiences so as to give expression
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to some "more basic" reality. In the process, participants may be rendered vulnerable
individually and collectively as they have very little control over how the researcher or anyone
else interprets their stories (cf. Finch 1984: 85). Within the in-depth interview, as seen by
Kvale, there is no question about some "more basic reality". The stories told by participants
within the dynamic (power-laden) research relationship is a product of and, therefore, directly
contingent on this very relationship (cf. Cunningham-Burley 1985: 76). It is not a given. It is
not to be worked through or attributed extra "expert" meaning. For there is no more "really
real" reality, no more "basic" knowledge, than that constituted by and through participants'
descriptions.
Because of its well-established reputation as well as the more powerful conceptualisation of its
nature, the in-depth research interview appeared the most appropriate - and the most
promising - option for me to follow. It indeed contained the ability both to capture the
richness and complexity inherent in the illness experience of participants and to accentuate and
illuminate the researcher's own experience of and within the research process. Thus, the in-
depth interview could not be excluded from the design of a sensitive methodological approach
for this study.
The interview design: How did it work?
Direction
In order to facilitate the development of an intimate understanding of human experience within
this study, I adhered to the advice of Rubin and Rubin (1995: 76-81) in explicitly directing the
entire interview design towards depth, detail, vividness and nuance. Depth is an attempt to
elicit thoughtful accounts from different participants in order to gain access to different points
of view and to different meanings and ways of understanding. Detail adds substance,
thickness and clarity to the accounts provided by participants. Vividness is supplied by the
stimulating first hand descriptions given by participants, while nuance facilitates an
exploration of the subtlety of meaning.
In combination, these qualities served not only to enhance the richness of the data collected,
but also to enable me to present strongly convincing support for my final description. In
addition, I believe that a deliberate focus on such pertinent qualities of design enhanced the
communicability and, thereby, also the credibility of the study as a whole.
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Interview guide
The "semi-structured" (Kvale 1996: 124) nature of the interview approach adopted in this
study required the design of an interview guide. Weiss (1994: 48) defines an interview guide
as "a listing of areas to be covered in the interview along with, for each area, a listing of topics
or questions that together will suggest lines of inquiry". The interview guide therefore serves
as a basis for the interview, an "orienting framework" (Laslett & Rapoport 1975: 970) for the
systematic exploration of the particular field of research.
In constructing an interview guide for both the first (Appendix B) and the second (Appendix
C) round of interviews I heeded the advice of Weiss (1994: 48) by listing the lines of inquiry
so that they could be grasped at a glance, with just enough detail to make clear what
information was desired. Although I did foresee possible questions, I did not include these
into the final interview guide as I wished to ordain each interview guide with a substantial
measure of openness to change.
An openness to change rightfully suggests that I did not plan to apply the designed interview
guides rigidly. Indeed, instead of strictly following every area of interest as listed, it was more
important for me to permit the participants to talk about what they wanted to talk about in a
way most meaningful to them, provided that it was at least somewhere near the focus of the
study. Like Weiss (1994: 48-49), I sincerely believed that allowing the participants to do so
would invariably produce better data than plodding faithfully along lines set out in the
interview guide. After all, the ultimate goal of every interview (and indeed of the entire
research process) was for the participants to develop a construction of their own experience in
their own way (cf. Laslett & Rapoport 1975: 970).
Wording of questions
In considering the wording of those questions employed within the interview situation, I
looked to Kvale (1996: 129) for advice. He suggests that every interview question should be
evaluated in respect of two crucial dimensions: the dynamic and the thematic.
The dynamic dimension of interview questions aims to promote a warm and amiable research
relationship. I thus aimed to make every research question contribute to the establishment of a
positive interaction between myself and the participant, to engender a steady flow of
conversation, and to motivate the participant to give full expression to her experiences.
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The thematic dimension of interview questions aims to show the relevance of the question for
the research theme. To do so, it was important that every research question should serve to
inspire the participants to base their accounts on actual experiences. I therefore deliberately
worded interview questions to clearly suggest the desired level of thoughtfulness and detail
required in the response. In other words, I asked participants to particularise. For instance,
"Could you walk me through the last time you visited a doctor, just what happened?" Or, "Is
there a specific instance you have in mind when you say... T" Also, "Could you tell me what
happened there, starting from the very beginning?" In asking for and about specifics, I
attempted to avoid accounts which are framed within what Weiss (1994: 72) calls the
"generalized present". This is a tense participant's "most frequently employ for a generalized
description. It summarizes developments that occurred in the past and continue through the
present". In effect, when the participants provide generalised accounts, "their description
expresses a kind of theory of what is most typical or most nearly essential in the class of the
event". By doing this, the participants in a sense pre-empted my interpretation and analysis.
Thus the need for particularisation.
A good interview question, then, is required to contribute dynamically in order to promote
positive interview interaction, and thematically in order to contribute to sound knowledge
production. The decisive issue in this study was not whether my questions could be
condemned as leading or not. Rather, as for Kvale (1996: 159), the issue was where my
interview questions were leading and whether they were leading in the direction of an in-depth
description of human experience as produced through conversation.
Number of interviews
Brannen (1988: 557-559) and others have suggested that when conducting sensitive research it
is imperative that interviews should not be repeated. There should be no fear on the part of the
participant that his or her path will ever cross again with that of the researcher. When the
research relationship exists only for the purpose of the research and is terminated as soon as
the interview is completed, the researcher cannot exercise any social control over the
participant. It is said that a single encounter with a "friendly stranger" (Cotterill1992: 596) is
likely to permit the participant to talk openly about highly sensitive areas of interest, without
the fear of any aftermath. This is a reasonable contention, especially given the argument that
the relationship between disclosure and intimacy is a curvilinear one. In other words, as Lee
(1993: 113) explains, the recipients of intimate details about a person's life are most likely to
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be either those standing in a very intimate relationship to the person, or those who are socially
very remote like the "friendly stranger".
On the other hand Laslett and Rapoport's (1975: 973-974) argue that a one-off interview may
be insufficient and that the "inter interview dynamic", particularly the period between the first
and second interviews, is of crucial importance. What is usually presented during the first
interview is a more publicly acceptable "surface" account whereas, typically, a more complete
and deeper account is likely to emerge at the subsequent interview. Cotterill (1992: 595) and
Ribbens (1989: 580) suggest that the difference in the nature of the accounts constructed
during the first and second interviews may be related to the dissimilar levels of familiarity and
intimacy experienced by the participant in these two settings. So, during the first interview,
the participant may be acutely aware of the need to manage his or her conduct within this
extremely unfamiliar situation shared with someone who is regarded as a stranger.
Consequently, during many first interviews participants are likely to produce a "public"
account as they attempt to accommodate the researcher by making the "right" responses. This
does not mean that they are deliberately trying to deceive the researcher, but rather that they
are merely abiding by culturally defined rules of appropriate behaviour between strangers in
unfamiliar situations. By the time of the second interview a higher level of trust, confidence
and familiarity has been established within a more intimate research relationship. From now
on more "private" accounts are likely to emerge. These arguments convinced me that it would
be desirable to interview all participants more than once. I therefore designed the research
process to include two in-depth interviews conducted individually with each of the four
participants. Whether more than two interviews would take place with any of the participants
would depend on the participants' state of health, the possibility and/or necessity of
postponement, and the quality of coverage of those areas pertinent to this study.
The first set of interviews closely corresponded with what Rubin and Rubin (1995: 28)
describe as "cultural interviews". That is, they focused on the participant's experience as an
integrated entity. Participants were allowed considerable freedom to explore and define their
experiences in their own way. I hoped that our first interaction would sensitise participants to
the areas of concern in the study and so prepare them for our subsequent encounter. Also, I
made a conscious effort during the first interview to establish a good research relationship so
that the participants and I could get to know one another better and achieve a sense of the
rhythm and flow of our exchange and interaction (cf. Weiss 1994: 57).
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The second round of interviews assumed the form of "topical interviews" (Rubin & Rubin
1995:28-31). Based upon the extensive descriptions obtained during the first interviews, these
encounters focused more narrowly ("zoomed in", so to speak) on specific areas of the
participants' experiences. The main objective at this stage was to secure and clarify detail,
example and context. As in the first interviews, the second encounters were marked by a
strong emphasis on the sensitive management of our interaction.
Thus, the desire to establish more familiar and intimate relations with the participants and in
this way to develop the fullest possible construction of their experiences, led to my carrying
out two interviews with each participant. These interviews had the potential of providing a
comprehensive but detailed understanding of human experience.
Length of interviews
Throughout the interview process I followedWeiss (1994: 57) in believing it to be good policy
to support the participant in constructing the fullest possible account and, hence, to continue an
interview as long as it was productive. Nevertheless, interviewing can be - and was -
exceptionally taxing. It did, after all, require unswerving attention, intense sensitivity, and
constant monitoring of our interaction, of my own performance, of the material collected, and
of practical matters such as the tape recorder. I soon discovered that I could only do it (and do
it well) for a limited period of time. I therefore tried not to schedule too many interviews in
short succession of each another and certainly not more than one a day.
However, I still found certain interviews extremely exhausting. In such cases, when I became
too weary to be fully in touch with what was being constructed, and if it was possible to
schedule another interview, I would call a halt. It was then time to take a break, make a pot of
tea and talk more casually before returning to the interview itself or arranging that the
interview be continued at a different time. However, when a participant lived far fromme, say
a two- or even four-hour drive out and back, and there was no possibility of rescheduling, I
would commit myself to the interview and would stay as long as there was material to cover
and descriptions to construct.
The duration of interviews varied greatly. While the shortest lasted a comfortable (and
generally acceptable) l'li hours, the longest interview continued for an exceptional time of 9
hours, the drive there and back excluded! Predictably, one of the most prominent factors
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influencing the duration of interviews was the participant's state of health at the time; how
much energy did she have to tell her tale, to speak to me, to construct her experiences with me.
This seems to correspond very closely with Cannon's (1989: 67) experience while studying the
subjective illness experience of those suffering from breast cancer. For her, as for me,
participants' health represented a deciding factor in determining the length of time an
interview could be endured.
Location of interviews
Most of the interviews were conducted in the participant's homes. This choice of location was
predominantly dictated by their state of health and, in particular, their general lack of mobility.
There were three exceptions to this rule. In one case, the participant and I had struggled hard
to find a suitable date, time and location for an interview. When, by coincidence, she found
herself in the vicinity of my residence, we jumped at the fortuitous opportunity finally to
conduct our first interview. In the remaining two cases, the participant's own residential
situation did not allow an interview to be conducted without hindrance and interference. We
decided it best to conduct both interviews in the quiet and privacy of my residence.
Interestingly, Finch (1984: 74) notes that, in an interview setting where one woman "visits" the
home of another woman, the interaction may easily assume the character of an intimate
conversation. The participant may feel quite comfortable with this precisely because the
researcher is present as a friendly guest, not an official inquisitor. In effect, "the model is ... an
easy, intimate relationship between two women" (Finch 1984: 74). Whether this indeed
proved to be the case will be revealed in Part V.
Recording of interviews
In recording interviews, I had two options: note taking or tape recording. I chose tape
recording.
Note taking, as Weiss (1994: 52-53) points out, tends to simplify and flatten participants'
speech patterns. The conversational spacers (for instance, "you know what I mean") are not
recorded in note taking. So are participants' false starts, stray thoughts and parenthetic
remarks. As notes can never capture exactly what happened during an interview, the very
vividness of the encounter disappears. What is more, note taking inevitably enmeshes the
action of recording with the action of editing, leaving the researcher with no way of knowing
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what changes had been made to participants' actual comments. What is more, there is no way
for the researcher to determine how great an influence his or her own expectations and
perceptions had played in what was heard, recalled and noted. With this as background it was
clear that note taking was not a desirable option in this study.
Some (cf. Laslett & Rapoport 1975: 972) would argue that the mere presence of a tape
recorder serves to remind the participants that they are indeed being recorded and that this may
inhibit and constrain their expression of experience. Although I acknowledge this possibility, I
wanted to learn more about how participants saw and responded to events and situations than
simply to learn about the events and situations themselves. I therefore had to rely on a tape
recorder to capture the important nuances and complexities of speech which I surely would
have missed had I simply taken notes. Tape recording thus presented the most appropriate
option.
In accordance with Weiss' (1994: 53) experience I found that by using a tape recorder (and,
hence, not relying exclusively on note taking), I could more directly attend to the participants
and their descriptions. I had more freedom to concentrate and become involved with them in
the dynamic of the interview situation. I did not have to worry about "getting it all down", or
carefully quoting their every word. I could now rely on the tape recorder to produce the
material for a more accurate transcription of the interview. The part I played during the
interview, at least on a verbal level, would also be more open to scrutiny in such a
transcription.
Finally, it is important to note that the decontextualised transcriptions based on tape recordings
do not represent a complete record of the non-verbal communication and interaction between
researcher and researched. Indeed, much happened before and after an interview that was not
tape recorded. The importance of these informal and non-verbal elements of interaction can
never be under-estimated (cf. Laslett & Rapoport 1975: 972). As a result, a degree of note
taking was inevitably required to record these elements. Such note taking typically occurred
directly after or at least very soon after an interview had been concluded.
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Interview process: How did it proceed?
Preparation
Thorough preparation was required to accommodate the desired design features throughout the
interview process. In fact this meant, as Kvale (1996: 126) predicted, that a substantial part of
the investigation had taken place before the tape recorder was turned on in the actual interview
situation. The issues which needed to be addressed at this stage included acquiring a thorough
pre-knowledge of the particular field of research, formulating a clear purpose and direction for
the interview process, and being sufficiently familiar and at ease with the chosen interview
technique and its application. In short, I needed to be informed, focused and proficient.
Approaching the topic
At the start of the interview process participants were introduced to the research project. This
introduction, also referred to as a "briefing" (Kvale 1996: 127), established the context of the
interview, defined its purpose, and outlined its course. At this stage participants were also
offered the opportunity to clarify or question any aspect of the research (cf. Appendix D).
These first steps into the interview process were, as Kvale (1996: 128) recognises, absolutely
decisive. It was here where the participants formed their first impression of me before
allowing themselves to talk freely and expose their experiences to this "stranger". It was also
here where it was most important for me to show respect, interest and understanding for
whatever concerns the participants voiced.
Defining the exact boundaries of my research topic complicated this introductory process. If I
defined it too broadly, the participants might have felt left in the dark as to the precise purpose
of their contribution. If I defined it too narrowly, it could inhibit the participants from
formulating their experiences in their own way, and raising topics which would appear to them
to be beyond the defined scope of research. I also realised that, once the boundaries were
defined, it might be difficult to inquire into aspects of participants' lives not clearly falling
inside these boundaries (cf. Lee 1993: 102-103). With these concerns in mind, I set out to
define the research topic in a manner distinct enough to give direction and show purpose, but
general enough to allow freedom and inspire exploration (cf. Appendix D).
A concern for the most appropriate definition of the research topic also brought into focus the
question of informed consent. Although I had tried to be as clear and farsighted as possible in
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introducing the study to the participants, there was no way for me to predict all that would
transpire. The element of uncertainty was seriously increased by the fact that this study
concerned a field of research about which very little was known, and it thus demanded
considerable flexibility in both purpose and design. Change and adjustment came with the
territory. Neither my participants nor I could have anticipated everything that the study
eventually encompassed (cf. Kvale 1996: 112-113;Lee 1993: 103). All that I could do was to
inform the participants as comprehensively as possible about the foreseen contingencies of the
proposed study and to strongly emphasise its distinctly flexible (and therefore slightly
unpredictable) nature. On this basis, they consented to participate.
Listening
Following the advice of Devault (1990: 102-104) and apie (1992: 59), I aspired to listen
attentively to the participants' descriptions as they constructed them. The general framework I
followed while doing so was to check whether I was clear on all relevant aspects: Do I know
what led to the experience? Do I have a detailed understanding of the experience itself? Do I
know who else was involved in the experience? Do I have an understanding of how the
participant felt at the stage? Do I have an understanding of how the participant thought about
the experience? Do I know what followed the experience?
While listening, I deliberately listened for what Weiss (1994: 77) calls "markers". These are
references to an important event or state of feeling often made in passing by a participant in the
course of talking about something else. When the opportunity came, I attempted to follow up
on these markers, usually by saying something like, "you mentioned earlier that ... can you tell
me more about it?" This approach generally worked towards the development of a more
elaborate description, often yielding significant insight.
In addition, as Devault (1990: 102-104) and apie (1992: 59) recommend, I not only listened to
what was said, but also to what was not said. As I noted the "missing" elements, I also became
aware of the ambiguous, the paradoxical, the contradictory and the marginal. While such
elements might be regarded as quantifiably insignificant, their presence (or absence!) time and
again led me to regard the participants anew, to hear their accounts in novel ways, and so to
develop a more intimate understanding of their experiences.
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My guiding concern throughout was to judge if what was being revealed, added greater
understanding. In other words, as I listened intently to my participants the pertinent question
in my mind was, "Does this material help to illuminate lived experience in any area of the
present study?" This was no easy judgement, especially not during the early stages of research
when everything disclosed to me appeared relevant to the study. Generally, whenever I was
overcome with doubt, I allowed the description of an experience to develop. In this way I
could include for analysis not only what was expected and run-of-the-mill, but also what was
unanticipated, surprising, incredible, and even inconceivable.
Managing transitions
At certain stages during a research interview it became necessary to redirect our interaction at
obtaining greater detail about particular areas of interest. Here the direct management of
transitions from one area to the next became crucial.
At every transition I was concerned not to fluster or alarm participants by introducing a new
area of interest simply out of the blue. I rather tried to follow their associations as far as
possible. In the process, I reminded myself that through my responses (however subtle or
seemingly insignificant) I had considerable influence over the direction in which these
associations could go. Admittedly a more direct approach was sometimes required, especially
in those instances where a participant strayed off at a tangent with no hope of spontaneous
return. In such cases I tried to warn participants of a coming reorientation by summarising or
rephrasing what had been said, thereby drawing the participant back and drawing that part of
the conversation to a close. I would then mention that there was still another area of
experience I was very interested in. In this way the impending reorientation was introduced
and alarm avoided.
Managing emotions
At times during the interview process it was clear that participants experienced intense distress
evoked by their very participation in the interview. Such distress stemmed from the fact that
participants were ill - often desperately so. For them there were moments when it was
excruciatingly difficult to talk, let alone sit up straight, for any extended period. Their distress
also became most acute when sensitive, stigmatised or otherwise problematic areas of
experience were broached, as well as when they painfully struggled to find words through
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which to give expression to such experiences (cf. Bratmen 1988: 553). Often the resulting
accounts were shrouded in emotionality.
Such distress and emotion needed to be managed throughout the course of the interview
process. Here, in following Brannen's (1988: 559) directive, I tried to remain consciously
aware of the ways in which I attempted to manage participants' distress as well as of my
motives for doing so.
So, when participants struggled, became distressed, and fought to hold back their tears, I had to
consciously decide how to respond. Often at such times all I could undertake was the difficult
task of enduring and sharing the pain of the participant. In line with Cannon's (1989: 73)
approach, I often felt that the less I said the better, since nothing I could say could possibly
change their situation, regardless of how much I longed to make it better. I limited myself to
providing much needed tissues, making a soothing pot of tea, providing some form of
comforting physical contact such as holding a hand, or a combination of these whilst
remaining more or less quiet. Through doing so, I wanted to ensure that participants knew that
they could take all the time they needed to recover, settle down, and work through the incident
that was evoking such sadness and discomfort. I needed them to know this because I realised
that it was only when they had personally worked through such experiences that they would be
able to construct them with me in and through our conversation.
Regardless of all my noble intentions, I still found it extremely difficult to bear the distress and
emotion evoked in my participants by my study. I found it a genuinely stressful and, on
occasion, a severely tormenting experience to interview ill participants about highly sensitive
and disturbing experiences (cf. Lee 1993: 107).
Termination
I was intent not to violate the participants' worlds, their very lives, through the consequences
of the study. Hence, in the final interview I directly asked them to share with me their
impressions of the research (cf. Appendix E). How did they experience it? What did they
think or feel about it? How did they experience me? Did they think there were any mistakes
made? How could it have been done differently? What did they hope would happen to the
study and its results? Through this process, called "debriefing" by Kvale (1996: 128), I hoped
to give participants ample opportunity to express and work through any doubts, anxieties,
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hostilities, and reservations that the interview process might have elicited (cf. Laslett &
Rapoport 1975: 973-974). In addition, I also used the opportunity created by the "debriefing"
to assure participants of the unique value of their personal contribution to the study.
My intent not to violate participants' worlds also required me to explain as well as I could
what would happen next, how I would go about working with the data, and how the findings
would be published. Here, I mentioned the thesis as the obvious form of publication and also
indicated that articles concerning pertinent aspects of the study could appear in reputable
academic journals. I also promised each participant a copy of my the thesis which was, after
all, produced as a result of their combined contribution. This gesture was very well received.
Conclusion
This study was directed towards an intimate understanding of human expenence. The
development of such an understanding relied upon the rich descriptions of lived experienced
constructed with participants through our inter-active relationship in the context of the in-depth
interview. In terms of both its design and its process the in-depth interview was geared
towards the attainment of such descriptions - descriptions without which this study would not
have been possible.
Admittedly, actual interview conditions did not always obey the interview design and process
described above. But like Cotterill (1992: 602) I believe it is quite indefensible to differentiate
between participants, let alone eliminate a participant, purely on the basis of what is
considered to be a "good" or "bad" interview situation. Instead, I accepted that this study
depended upon the cooperation of the participants, and that the onus rested on me to adapt to
the participants' unique circumstances and make the best of the sometimes less than ideal
interview conditions.
The Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (TSCS)
Towards the end of the first interview every participant was requested to complete the
Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (TSCS) as developed by Fitts (1964).
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The use of this measurement was geared to contribute to a multi-dimensional perspective on
the ME sufferer's experience of illness and, in particular, of Self. After all, it has been shown
that a self-concept engendered by a stigmatised illness, such as ME, may directly influence the
sufferer's experience of the particular illness (Weinberg et al. 1994: 23-25). Following the
advice of Strauss and Corbin (1990: 18-19), I also believed that the use of the TSCS could
provide both structure and validation to the data collected through more qualitative methods.
My reason for choosing the TSCS will become more apparent as the nature of this instrument
is considered.
Development
Raid and Fitts (1964: 1) explain that the development of the TSCS was based upon the theory
that an individual's self-concept influences much of his or her behaviour and also directly
relates to the individual's personality and state of psychological well-being. Fitts therefore
proceeded to develop the TSCS in order to meet the need for a self-concept scale that would be
"simple for the respondent, widely applicable, and multidimensional in its description of self-
concept".
Fitts began the developmental work on the TSCS with the Tennessee Department of Mental
Health in 1955. According to Raid and Fitts (1964: 53), the first step in the development of
the scale was to compile a large pool of self-descriptive items. The original pool of items was
derived from a number of existing self-concept measures as well as from written self-
descriptions produced by patients and non-patients. After considerable study, items were
classified into a two-dimensional, 3 x 5 scheme of rows and columns. After items were edited,
seven clinical psychologists classified them according to the 3 x 5 scheme and judged each
item as to whether it was positive or negative. The final 90 items to be included (divided
equally as positive or negative) were those on which the judges reached perfect agreement.
The final 3 x 5 groupings were then used to construct the Rowand Column scores of the
TSCS. The remaining 10 TSCS items comprise the self-criticism score.
Standardisation
Raid and Fitts (1964: 56) explain the process by which the TSCS was standardised: "the
original standardisation group included 626 participants from various parts of the United
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States, with ages ranging from 12to 68. The group was composed of an approximated balance
of males and females, blacks and whites, representatives of all social, economic, and
intellectual levels, and of educational levels from sixth grade through the doctoral level.
Participants were found through high school and college classes, employers at state
institutions, and various other sources". Roid and Fitts (1964: 56) believe that this original
norm group has been shown to be reasonably representative.
Based upon the norm group, as well as numerous subsequent independent investigations, Roid
and Fitts (1964: 57-63) established that the effects of such demographic variables as sex, age,
ethnic, education and intelligence were small and so accounted for very little variance in TSCS
scores.
In addition, Roid and Fitts (1964: 66) found that repeated measures of the same individuals
over long periods of time revealed a remarkable similarity of TSCS profile patterns. The
implication is that an individual's self-concept is so fundamental that is does not readily
change even though a person begins to feel and act differently. There is, however,
considerable evidence that individual concepts of Self do change as a result of significant
experiences. According to Roid and Fitts (1964: 82-83), the TSCS is capable of reflecting
such changes both validly and reliably.
Indeed, throughout their discussion, Roid and Fitts (1964: 65-90) highlight both their own and
independent evidence which testify to the reliability and validity of the TSCS as a scientific
measurement of self-concept.
Administration
The TSCS is a pencil and paper questionnaire consisting of 100 self-descriptive statements
which the participant uses to portray hislher own picture of him/herself. In the process, the
participant rates each statement on a scale of 1 (Completely false) to 5 (Completely true)
according to how descriptive the statement is of hislherself. Most individuals will complete
the questionnaire in 10 to 20 minutes, provided that they are 13 years of age or older and can
read at approximately a forth-grade level (Roid and Fitts 1964: 1).
Two versions of the TSCS are available: the hand-scorable and the computer-scorable. Both
versions use exactly the same test items. In this study the hand-scored version was used. This
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version can be scored and profiled in two ways - using Form C (the Counselling From) or
Form C & R (the Clinical and Research Form). For this study Form C was used. This choice
was influenced by the fact that I did not need an extensive background in psychometrics and
psychopathology to interpret From C results, and that it was appropriate to discuss the results
with participants. Form C provided 14 different scores for each participant. Roid and Fitts
(1964: 3-4) present a brief description of each of these scores which is summarised in Table
4.1 below.
For hand administration and scoring of the TSCS, the re-usable Test Booklet and the Revised
Answer-Profile Form were used. To administer the TSCS, participants were given the TSCS
Test Booklet and the Revised Answer-Profile From. The scale is essentially self-administering
and requires little explanation beyond what is provided on the Text Booklet. Nevertheless, in
an attempt to ensure the utmost clarity and comprehensibility, I did explain the procedure
verbally to each participant (cf. Appendix F).
In following the directions provided by Roid and Fitts (1964: 8-18), I hand scored participants'
responses. I proceeded to transfer the raw scores from the Work Sheet to the Profile Sheet
which was used to provide a graphic display of participants' TSCS scores. Each participant's
scores were interpreted comparatively, noting in particular the individual scores that were
either extremely high or low in relation to each of the other scores. Individual item responses
to statements concerning such particularly high or low scores were also investigated.
Information gained in the process was pursued in the second interview session. During the
latter, the TSCS Profile, as a simple graphic representation of a participant's responses, was
shared with each participant (cf. Appendix G for an example of such a profile).
In summary, then, the TSCS can be regarded as a well-standardised, widely applicable
measure that is easy to complete, easy to interpret, and easy to share. In this study it was used
to attain an indication of the self-concept held by participants and through this to explore how
this concept might both reflect and illuminate their experience of illness.
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Table 4.1 TSCS score description
Score Sub-score Description
Self-criticism The individual's openness to and capacity for
healthy self-criticism
Total score The individual's overall level of self-esteem - the
most important TSCS score
Row scores The individual's internal frame of reference
Row 1: Identity The individual's perception of his or her identity
Row 2: Self- The individual's satisfaction with the perceived
satisfaction self-image
Row3: The individual's perception of his or her own
Behaviour behaviour
Column scores The individual's external frame of reference
Column 1: The individual's view of his or her body, state of
Physical Self health, physical appearance, skills and sexuality
Column 2: The individual's moral-ethical frame of reference
Moral-ethical in terms of moral worth, relationship to God,
Self feelings of being a 'good' or 'bad' person, and
satisfaction with his or her own religion
Column 3: The individual's sense of personal worth, feeling
Personal Self of adequacy as a person, and self-evaluation of the
personality apart from the body or relationship to
others
Column4: The individual's feelings of adequacy, worth, and
Family Self value as a family member
Column 5: The individual's perception of Self in relation to
Social Self others and sense of adequacy and worth in social
interaction with other people in general
Variability The amount of inconsistency from one area of self-
scores perception to another.
Total The total amount of variability for the entire record
variability
Column A summary of variation within columns
variability
Row variability A summary of variation across rows
Distribution A summary of the pattern of the individual's
responses as distributed across the five available
response options for each TSCS items as they
appear on the Answer Sheet
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The autobiographical sketch
For Daly (in Plummer 1983: 82), "a man's life is to him the most obvious and overwhelming
of all realities". A full exploration of this "reality of all realities", called for a method that
would expose a person's intensely subjective experience of being. To this end, I opted to
incorporate the autobiographical sketch into the methodological design of this study.
The autobiographical sketch was considered akin to Redfield's (in Plummer 1983: 14)
conception of a "human document". In this view the autobiographical sketch constitutes a
document "in which the human and personal characteristics of somebody who is in some sense
the author of the document find expression, so that through its means the reader of the
document comes to know the author and his views of events with which the document is
concerned". The central thrust of the autobiographical sketch is to enable the voices of
participants to be heard on their own terms.
To facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the nature, use and value of the
autobiographical sketch within the bounds of this study, I will now consider its distinguishing
emphasis both on the subjective and on process.
A doorway into the subjective
The autobiographical sketch is, as Plummer (1983: 14) acknowledges, "a purely subjective
account". It is primarily concerned with the subjective and, in particular, with the subjective
perspective of the participant. This "subjectiveness" does not mean that a sketch should be
considered untrue or even "unscientific". What matters more than the exact particulars of the
account, more than its "objectiveness", is "the facilitation of as full a subjective view as
possible" (Plummer 1983: 14). Where the autobiographical sketch escapes entrapment by the
objectivist belief in "the one truth", it opens the way towards a truly full exploration of the
subjective realm.
Within this subjective realm, the autobiographical sketch permits the attainment of insight into
the ways in which participants interpret, make sense of and give meaning to their own lives as
well as to the world around them. According to Plummer (1983: 65), such insight allows the
researcher to discern the often unique confusions, ambiguities and contradictions that
characterise the continuous flow of participants' lived experiences. It is easy to see why
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Plummer (1983: 82) concludes that "the central value of life documents - and the job they can
best do -lies in the tapping of ordinary, ambiguous personal meanings".
Thus, the uniquely subjective perspective attained through the use of the autobiographical
sketch allowed me not only to seriously consider, but also to become intimately familiar with
participants' concrete lived experiences (Plummer 1983: 65 & 72). Because I was thus able to
root my understanding firmly in the empirical world being studied, I could avoid the risk of
unfounded speculation, the risk of simply being wrong.
A testimony to process and history
In addition to showing the way into the subjective, the autobiographical sketch contains a clear
emphasis on process and history. Hence, it offers incisive insight into the ever-changing
nature of human experience (Plummer 1983: 68).
Process is, in fact, a particularly difficult quality to capture in research because all research -
qualitative research included - invariably has to amputate, select and organise materials. This
is done from a particular point of view or perspective. For Plummer (1983: 68-69), the
perspective which governs the use of the autobiographical sketch is one of totality: "the totality
of experience". This is a totality which necessarily weaves between biological bodily needs,
immediate social groups, personal definitions of the situation, and historical change both in the
participant's own life and in the outside world. The autobiographical sketch allows the
researcher to grasp a sense of this totality of a life, admittedly not as an undiminished whole,
but at least to the extent that it is concerned with the field of study in question.
The perspective of totality that distinguishes the autobiographical sketch leads the way, then,
to a consideration of process and of history. As Bogdan (in Plummer 1983: 69) explains, such
a perspective does, after all, offer "a fuller understanding of the stages and critical periods in
the process of development. It enables us to look at subjects as if they have a past with
successes as well as failures, and a future with hopes and fears. It also allows us to see an
individual in relation to the history of his time, and how he is influenced by the various ...
currents present in his world. It permits us to view the intersection of the life history of men
with the history of their society, thereby enabling us to understand better the choices,
contingencies and options open to the individual". Thus, through its unmistakable perspective
of totality, the autobiographical sketch endorses the hope for greater insight into the changing
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meaning of participants' lives as they move not only through history in general, but also
through the history of their illness in particular.
Conclusion
It is clear that I could not consider this study to be sufficiently appropriate without the use of
the autobiographical sketch. Indeed, I found that the inclusion of the autobiographical sketch
into the methodological approach of this study promised access to what Plummer (1983: 67)
calls the "human coefficient". It would illuminate the ways in which participants constructed
and gave meaning to their own lived experiences, and it would inspire understanding.
Consequently, at the end of our first interview session and after the completion of the TSCS,
participants were requested to compose an autobiographical sketch describing their own
experience of ME (cf. Appendix H). To assist them in doing so, I offered a brief guide
consisting of a limited number of questions to which they could respond in whatever way
seemed meaningful to them (cf. Appendix I). These sketches were to reach me before our next
meeting. I anticipated that the autobiographical sketches produced by participants, in
combination with the material developed in the first interview as well as the TSCS results,
would provide a powerful foundation for the second and final round of in-depth interviews.
This expectation, indeed, reveals still another value of the autobiographical sketch: its huge
potential to compliment other methods within a sensibly designed methodological approach.
Conclusion
This study was directed towards an intimate understanding of human expenence. The
development of such an understanding relied upon the rich descriptions of lived experiences
co-constructed with participants through our interactive relationship. This relationship was
distinctly structured according to the opportunities and limitations introduced through the in-
depth interview, a self-concept questionnaire and the autobiographical sketch. Together, these
instruments not only worked in complementarity to stimulate descriptions of the world of ME
suffering, but also directed the very form and content such descriptions could assume.
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Chapter 10
Transformation of information: Dealing(s) with the data
In this study I was explicitly concerned with the relational unfolding of rich descriptions -
descriptions which construct unique social realities, which tell about participants' worlds as
these were co-produced through our interaction. Yet, once I stepped out of the research
encounter, such descriptions became subject to my manipulation as they were transcribed,
analysed and interpreted. Chapter 10 describes the ways in which I manipulated - and indeed
transformed - the data to produce a credible description of the social world being studied.
Transcription
In this study the tape recordings of all interviews as well as of one autobiographical sketch
were transcribed. Such transcription encompassed the transformation of interpersonal
conversation into a literary style that would facilitate the communication of participants'
stories to others (Kvale 1996: 166). Like Kvale (1996: 163) I had to recognise that such a
transformation of speech from the oral to the written mode inevitably involved a series of
judgements and decisions.
The challenge
Kvale (1996: 129) asserts that the lived interview situation, with participants' voices as well as
their facial and bodily expressions accompanying their every statement, provides a much richer
access to the meaning they construct than the transcribed text alone. Still, in order to
communicate the meaning of participants' stories to potential readers, it is necessary to
transform the interpersonal interaction of the interview situation into a written transcript.
The transcripts are not identical to the conversational interaction of the interviews themselves.
In fact, unlike that which had transpired through the interviews, the resultant transcripts can
never be the "rock-bottom" data of research. And they are certainly not copies or
representations of some more "original reality". On the contrary, transcripts are what Kvale
(1990: 167) calls nothing but "decontextualized conversations", artificially constructed for the
purpose of communication. They are "abstractions, as topographical maps are abstractions
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from the original landscape from which they are derived" (Kvale 1990: 165). Thus, while
transcripts attempt to describe interview situations and their content, they can never fully
represent what had actually transpired.
Why is this so, why can transcripts be nothing more than abstractions? Because the process of
transcription "freezes" a living, ongoing conversation into a written text. Thus ''the words of
the conversation fleeting as the steps of an improvised dance, are fixated into static written
words. .. The words of the transcripts take on a solidity that was not intended in the immediate
conversational context. The flow of conversation, with its open horizon of directions and
meanings to be followed up, is replaced by a fixated, stable written text" (Kvale 1996: 167).
In the process, through "freezing" conversation into static text, context is greatly diminished.
The temporal, spatial and social dimensions of the interview interaction are no longer
immediately given as they were in the interview itself. Consequently, where the interpretation
of meaning depends on context, the basis of such interpretation is gravely impoverished. This
once again shows that transcripts can never be accepted as the fundamental data of a study.
They would simply fall far too short to produce any significant insight or understanding.
Still, it is necessary to recognise that without transcripts, even frozen as they are in all
dimensions, there would be no opportunity of repeated inspection. There would be no way
(for either the researcher or anyone else) to take another look at what had happened during a
conversation with a participant. This does not mean that transcripts must be regarded as "the
fundamental verbal data". Instead, it simply means that transcripts can be accepted as a means
of evoking and reviving for the researcher the personal interaction of the interview itself. It is
not the basis of all future analysis, but it can undoubtedly aid and support it.
The actual doing
In following the example set by Devault (1990: 109), I deliberately attended to the details of
my participants' speech in the process of transcription.
In the process, I developed the rudiments of a system for preserving some of the "messiness"
of everyday talk. I systematically transcribed and indicated details of emphasis and pause. I
included "false starts" (when a sentences is started, abandoned, and started again), particular
emphasis, periods of silence and even apparently superfluous phrases. I inserted an
ungrammatical " ... " to indicate hesitation and pauses in mid-sentence and between sentences.
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I included most of the "mmm"s, "uh"s and "you know"s interjected by participants. I
indicated smiles as well as outright laughter. I recorded deep sighs and smaller "out-of-
breaths" which often signalled an emotional experience. I also transcribed the often confusing
and highly complicated process of self-correction.
In these ways, I recorded more of the inelegant features of participants' talk than is customary.
As a result of this somewhat unorthodox approach, I was able to retain at least some of the
distinctiveness of participants' verbal expression (and construction) of their lived experience.
Indeed, had I not included these details, had I edited these exchanges and freed them of the odd
and "non-essential" noises of talk, I would have reworked their construction and, hence, their
meanings. Then, "the transcript would move forward in an orderly and formal manner. But
the dynamic construction of what was said would be gone" (Paget in Devault 1990: 109). If
the dynamic construction of participants' experience were to be lost, so too would the building
blocks of the subsequent analysis. It was therefore critically important for this study to
preserve as much detail as was possible.
Aside from the detail of speech itself, included into every interview transcription were also
brief pre- and postscripts. In the prescript, I noted when the meeting started, what we talked
about before the "official" interview commenced, the nature of our interpersonal interaction,
my experience and impression of it, my hopes and fears for the interview that lay ahead, and
how the interview then did actually start. In the postscript, I similarly noted what had
transpired as we reached the end of our encounter, what was said once the tape recorder had
been switched off, the nature of our interpersonal interaction, my experience and impression of
it, my perception of the interview as a whole, and how our encounter then came to a close.
Like Kvale (1996: 129), I regarded these immediate impressions as invaluable, especially in
offering a much-needed context for the later analysis of transcriptions.
Still, I have to agree with Devault (1990: 108) that no matter how complete a transcript it
cannot preserve all the details of a participant's speech, let alone of the dynamic interpersonal
interaction marking a research encounter. What is more, it must also be recognised that no
single transcript can be regarded as the most ''true'' or most "objective" transformation of
speech and interaction into a written text (cf. Kvale 1996: 166). There is no one perfect way of
doing this. And there is certainly no easy way.
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So, then, armed with the counsel offered by Devault and Kvale, I set out to personally
transcribe all interviews and one autobiographical sketch. By doing so I tried to ensure that the
countless details I regarded as pertinent to the analysis would be included. This rather stressful
and acutely tiring endeavour took an almost unbelievably vast amount of time. On average,
one hour of interviewing took more or less eight hours to type verbatim (remember: it was my
first time!). Eventually, it added up to about 250 hours of dedicated transcription. Despite the
all but overwhelming nature of this task, I continue to consider every transcript that was
produced worth the effort, time and dedication it had demanded.
The presentation
In Parts IV and V examples of transcribed talk will be discussed. In choosing how to present
these examples, I was faced by two opposing positions (cf. Blauner in Weiss 1994: 192).
The preservationist approach
On the one hand, there is what Weiss (1994: 192) calls the "preservationist" approach. The
basic idea here is that literally every single element in a participant's expression - be it non-
standard grammatical constructions and pronunciations or seemingly confused narrative - has
value as communication and, therefore, demands inclusion into any presented interview
excerpt. This demand for total inclusion is linked to the notion that to reach understanding of a
participant's experiences necessitates a focus on the very specific ways in which these are
related and construction. Correspondingly, any exclusion of such intrinsic and essential
elements of the interview encounter would introduce distortion and misrepresentation of the
interaction, the speech, and the speakers.
As an aside, the preservationist approach also requires that anyone wishing to evaluate the
claims and interpretations that the researcher has made about sections of transcript, wants to do
so without being "handicapped by information lost through judgements about what is
extraneous" (Potter 1996: 9). That is, only when all information is presented as part of a
transcript can research (and the researcher) be fully open to outside scrutiny.
Thus, arguments in support of the preservationist approach do not demand that detail be
preserved in the presentation of transcripts simply for the sake of an empiricist flourish in
order to demonstrate completeness, conscientiousness or rigour (all of which it can do, of
course) (Potter 1996: 9). For supporters of this approach, it is more a question of preserving
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original speech, pristine and without any editorial interference, so that the participant's
construction, indeed, the participant's Self, can be adequately represented. "Anything else
distorts. .. Anything else is playing with the evidence, no matter how benign the intent"
(Weiss 1994: 193).
The standardisation approach
The argument for standardising excerpts from interview transcripts is, as Potter (1996: 8) and
Weiss (1994: 193) explain, that non-standardised speech both distracts from content and
impedes intelligibility. That is, far from enriching insight, a too faithful rendering of a
participant's speech may actually strike the reader as complicated, affected and annoying.
Instead of being able to understand the meaning of a participant's construction at first glance,
the reader would now have to struggle through "unnecessary" detail to puzzle out the intended
meaning.
Mindful of this possibility, the standardisation approach encourages the researcher to
simplifying a transcript, thereby stripping it of all extraneous elements. In this sense, speech
needs to be "cleaned up" so as to be more readable as well as easily accessible to all those not
involved in the original situation (Potter 1996: 8).
The compromise
Like many other investigators (cf. Weiss 1994: 193-194), I opted for a compromise. So, for
the interview excerpts presented in the following chapters I had made those modifications
which I believed would make the excerpts easier to grasp but without affecting the
participant's meaning. I permitted myself to eliminate words, sentences, and paragraphs (also
often my own questions) - all in order to achieve a more compact statement. However, I never
changed or added a word. Also, every effort was made to preserve the participant's phrasing
and characteristic mode of expression.
Furthermore, although aware of advice by researchers to omit "nonsensical" noises such as
"uh-huh" and "mmm" from quoted text (Weiss 1994: 196-197), I could not follow this advice
blindly. Very often, such "distractive" utterances and phrases served a distinct purpose within
communication. Inthis study it was, for instance, important to indicate when participants were
struggling to express their experiences either because of a lack of vocabulary, or because they
had not thought about the answer so intensely prior to our encounter, or because they were
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beginning to suffer from the cognitive difficulties which set in with increasing fatigue. The
only way to do so was through the inclusion of participants' interjections. So, far from being
simply unnecessary distractions, such interjections helped to clarify meaning and made a
valuable contribution to an understanding of the text. In addition, they often helped to
establish a sense of speech as a co-constructed product of contextualised interaction. I
therefore opted to retain such information, provided that it did not pose a major obstacle to the
intelligibility of the text in question.
In addition, in the name of coherence, I attempted a fair amount of reorganising of the
participant's description. For instance, if a participant develop a theme (such as, "I hate the
illness"), went off to something else, and then returned to the original theme, I would bring
together all the material dealing with the original theme. It is, after all, asking quite a lot of a
reader to sort out scattered thematic material. Usually, when portions of speech had been
omitted from a text, it would be indicated using ellipsis points. Yet, like Weiss (1994: 198),1
have rarely found this exceptionally useful. Ellipsis points were rather generally used in this
study to indicate the ebb and flow, the pause and continuance, of the human conversations in
which meaning was constructed.
Thus, I admit that in terms of my compromise in the presentation of interview transcripts, 1did
make modifications. Everyone of these was done with the clear intent of enhancing the
communicability of text, and never to be to the detriment of the participants or their
constructions.
Conclusion
In all my transcriptions I endeavoured to remain as faithful as possible to the participant's
choice of words, sentence structure, and manner of expression. While mindful of the fact that
no amount of faithfulness can produce a complete rendering of the interview situation itself, 1
could not deny the fact that sensitive transcription constituted the best (if not the only) way of
both illuminating and communicating the participants' constructions. Hence, in these
transcriptions as well as in the presentation thereof, 1 was ceaselessly trying to offer a just and
intelligible representation of the participants' stories.
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Analysis
Dey (1993: 30) explains that the word "analysis" "derives from the prefix 'ana' meamng
'above', and the Greek root 'lysis' meaning 'to break up or dissolve'. It is a process of
resolving data into its constituent components, to reveal its characteristic elements and
structure. Without analysis, we would have to rely entirely on impressions and intuitions
about the data as a whole. While our impressions and intuitions certainly have their place in
analysing data, we can also benefit from the more rigorous and logical procedures of analysis".
These procedures for analysis need to be explicated. Kvale (1996: 207) stresses that, in
contrast to the readers of a critic's analysis of a poem, the readers of a research report (such as
this text) will not have access to the tape recordings and the often many hundreds of pages of
material on which the researcher's interpretations are based. The reader of a report has to
depend on the researcher's selection and presentation of the research material. In the light of
this it is not surprising that Kvale encourages the researcher to thoroughly explicate the
procedures for analysis, including his or her own perspective on the material. The researcher
should, so to speak, put his or her cards on the table for inspection. Only then does the reader
become able to retrace and check the steps of analysis. Only then can a reader adopt the
viewpoint of the researcher and so look at the data through the eyes of the researcher.
The most productive way by which I can readily describe the perspective I adopted and the
procedures I applied in the process of analysis in this study is through an analogy. With
reference to Dey's (1993: 40-47) discussion, the analogy I find best to apply is the one of a
jigsaw puzzle. In the process of analysis described below, all the pieces of the data puzzle
were cut out in such a way that they could again be put together to produce a new picture in
the form of my final description.
Cutting out the puzzle
I found that the data gathered in the course of the research process represented an almost
seamless aggregation of material. From this aggregation I was able to cut out all the bits of my
jigsaw puzzle. Once cut out, I needed somehow to re-organise all the pieces of the puzzle.
Hence, I embarked on a process of classification whereby, based on an assessment of its
characteristics, I assigned every piece to a particular category. So I became able to discern, as
Dey (1993: 40) explains in jigsaw puzzle terms, that "this bit is a corner, that one an edge, this
blue bit is sky, that brown bit is earth, and so on". Gradually, as in a jigsaw puzzle, all the blue
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bits together made the sky, the brown bits the earth, and the green bits a forest. The categories
through which I had initially organised the pieces - flat-edged, blue, brown and green - now
led towards a new concept-based classification - sky, earth, forest - in terms of which I could
proceed to describe an overall picture.
This conceptual process of classification, then, clearly involved two activities. I had not only
cut out the data into bits and pieces; I had also assigned these to different categories and
eventually to different concepts. So, all the bits "belonging" to a particular category were
brought together and united under one concept. As the process became more focused, I was
able to discriminate more clearly between the criteria for allocating material to one concept or
another. The boundaries between concepts were defmed more precisely. New concepts were
created. Some older concepts were subdivided. Others were subsumed under more abstract
concepts. Every one of these concepts was firmly based upon the participants' descriptions of
their world and, in combination, geared to reflect an intimate understanding of this world (Dey
1993: 45; Rubin & Rubin 1995: 226).
Thus, faced with the ever-increasing mass of data, I proceeded to cut out the different pieces of
my jigsaw puzzle. These pieces were organised, classified, and united under a set of concepts.
These concepts not only corresponded to the different facets of the social reality under study,
but also provided a preliminary framework through which the pieces of the puzzle could again
be brought together in an analytically meaningful way (Dey 1993: 45).
Putting it together again
As Dey (1993: 40) notes, "the only point of taking the puzzle apart, of course, is to find a way
of putting it together again". In other words, cutting out the jigsaw puzzle and organising
these pieces into concepts did not constitute an end in itself. It served an overriding purpose:
to produce a picture. So, while classification had provided the basic concepts, these concepts
now had to be meaningfully connected to produce a new picture.
In order to establish such meaningful connections, I looked to Dey (1993: 47) as well as Rubin
and Rubin (1995: 226-227) for advice. They suggest that while working through the by-now-
classified-data, the researcher should be sensitive to regularities, variations, and singularities,
as these are very often indicative of larger associations. By studying such associations, I was
able to weave different concepts into distinctive themes. These themes, which appeared to
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explain or give insight into related issues, constituted the basis of my emerging understanding,
of my new picture.
So the different parts of my jigsaw puzzle again came together. For me, as for Dey (1993: 40),
the emerging picture that this development introduced represented a very important step
towards defining the findings of this study. It did, after all, reflect an understanding infinitely
clearer and more complex than any initial impression of the data might have intimated. In this
sense, analysis involved much more than simply fitting the different pieces of the puzzle
together; it involved the conception of something new, of something extraordinary, of
something profoundly novel.
Conclusion
"Meaning is", as Dey (1993: 37) acknowledges, "always negotiable". This was particularly
true in the process of analysis. For, unlike the impression that might have been created above,
this process did not proceed in neat sequence. And it certainly did not constitute a static, one-
dimensional process. Rather, the process of analysis occurred throughout the research process,
in tandem so to speak, with every step of data collection. Hence, the resulting analysis was
very similar in character since it both stimulated and was stimulated by the collection and
investigation of data. Thus, while analysis was undoubtedly systematic, it was also very much
continuous and iterative in nature. And it was these traits that conferred upon its product a
unique measure of openness to change and to negotiation.
In addition, as the process of analysis was not static, so it was not neutral. In fact, it could not
be. It was always analysis with a purpose (Dey 1993: 46). And the governing purpose was to
develop a coherent (though not necessarily highly abstract) account that would serve to
adequately address the research question of this study. Stated differently, the process of
analysis I had followed was not just muddling through the mass of data. It was very clearly
and very deliberately directed towards an overall purpose: to produce an in-depth
understanding of the social reality under study. It is towards the production and presentation
of this understanding to which I now tum.
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Interpretation and description
In the process of analysis, I have broken down the data puzzle in order to re-organise and
classify it, I have created and employed the resulting concepts, and I have established the inter-
connections between these. This had provided the basis for the construction of a fresh
description.
As a production
Dey (1993: 30) feels that description forms the very bedrock of science. What is more, such
description is exclusively the responsibility of the researcher. The data and its analysis provide
the basis for the description, but it does not dictate the description, let alone produce it on its
own. But how does a researcher go about producing a description of the research and its
findings? Moreover, how did I go about doing so?
Through description (paradoxically) researchers very often want to do more than describe;
they wish to interpret, explain, and understand. In doing so, they go beyond the initial
description, and transform the data into something it was not (Dey 1993: 30; Kvale 1996: 201).
Like other researchers I also wanted to do that. I wanted to go beyond what was directly said
and what was immediately apparent, beyond ... into a reality of a different kind.
Creating (constructing) a reality
With my eyes firmly fixed on what lay beyond, I definitely did not attempt to locate and reveal
"one true and real" meaning through the description presented in Part IV. I certainly did not
regard research as mysteriously capable of offering "direct access to unadulterated provinces
of pure meaning" (Kvale 1996: 226). Instead, I was more concerned with a relational
unfolding of meanings - meanings which construct unique social realities, which tell about
participants' worlds as these were co-produced through our interaction. Thus, whatever is
presented in and through my description does not represent a revelation of some pre-existing
meaning, but merely supports those meanings developed during the course of an interactive
research process.
In this sense, the rendering of an account of the research and its fmdings was not simply a
question of "reporting" or simply re-stating participants' views, accompanied by my own. No,
description was a matter of production (Dey 1993: 237). Indeed, as Dey (1993: 242) stresses,
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the term "fmdings" can be "grossly misleading, with its implication that we have only 'found'
what was already in the data simply waiting to be discovered". If this were the case,
qualitative work would be "as straightforward as collecting rubbish. And if we were to adopt
this approach, rubbish is all we might be able to produce!" Far from rubbish collection, the
description I produced was very much the product of the conceptual tools that I had used in its
creation.
One very important set of conceptual tools which I had employed in the production of my
description derived from the literary tradition of story telling. In other words, as I was
describing the research process and human experiences it had studied, I was making use of the
particular writing style and techniques entailed in telling a good story (cf. Dey 1993: 39). I
summarised events, focused on key episodes, selected and developed themes, delineated roles
and characters, and even set out a chronological sequence. Every one of these techniques of
story telling was used to construct the most illuminating narrative I could. In doing so, my
wish was to tell the story in the best way I knew because I needed to be convinced (at least in
my mind) that there was no better way to present the understanding that has been reached, or
to present the realities of the participants.
Revealing the journey
Through narrative structures and devices, I set out to produce a meaningful description of the
interactively produced realities of the participants. For Dey (1993: 239) such a description, if
really is a good story, becomes very much like a journey that allows readers to travel with the
characters of the story through the intricacies of the plot, eventually reaching its final twist in
the form of a conclusion.
To enable others to travel with me and my participants it was, as Dey (1993: 239) emphasises,
imperative that I should reconstruct the journey which had led to the final conclusion. Of
course, the original journey had included some blind alleys, a couple of u-turns, and even the
odd short cut that turned out to be a long road. What was important to me in the reconstruction
of my journey was not to include every such detour but that I had discovered along the way the
"right" path leading to the final conclusion. I was, therefore, now in a position to mark out this
path for those who wish to follow and arrive at the same conclusion.
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This emphasis on the importance of revealing the journey taken in the description of the social
world under study indicates that another researcher can look at the same data and come up
with the same interpretation. Of course, as Giorgi (in Kvale 1996: 209) recognises, there is
also the possibility that a different researcher can look at the same data, ask different questions,
adopt a different perspective, and then come up with an entirely different interpretation.
However, the point here is not so much whether a different interpretation of the research
material can be developed - this possibility has already been acknowledged - but rather
whether a reader, following the same journey articulated by me, can also see what I had seen,
regardless of whether or not he or she is able to agree with me. Giorgi sees this as the key
criterion for good qualitative research. For me, it is the very point and focus of Part V.
What is more, perhaps the different interpretations to which a study such as this one lends
itself is not a weakness but rather, as Kvale (1996: 226) believes, a strength. The likelihood of
different interpretations does, after all, demand of the researcher to thoroughly explicate the
journey taken. This brings the researcher face to face with the challenge of explaining his or
her own choices, actions and procedures to others. Should the researcher choose to live up to
this challenge, this choice may very well promote both a more integrated interpretation and a
more forceful description (Dey 1993: 237).
As a responsibility
As already noted, description is the responsibility of the researcher. For Brannen (1988: 552),
an important part of this responsibility consists in the protection of participants in and through
what is disclosed in the description of their world.
Disclosure and disguise
"What should be disclosed?" This is a central anticipatory issue when the results of research
on a sensitive social reality are to be described and published. Implicit in this question is the
requirement to choose to what degree participants should be disguised in order to protect them.
When disguise is at issue the use of pseudonyms immediately comes to mind. Here, it is worth
noting, as Lee (1993: 185) does, that "pseudonyms have long been used in published reports to
disguise research sites and research participants. Anonymity protects ... those studied". While
I acknowledge that the use of pseudonyms is certainly far from universally applicable, it
indeed appeared necessary in this study. I had therefore selected - completely at random -
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
184
pseudonyms for the participants. This course of action was based on my belief that where
participants could not be identified, they could not be harmed. By disguising the participant's
identity by the use of pseudonyms I wished to steer them as far as was possible clear of all
harm, embarrassment, exploitation and/or harassment.
In addition to the use of pseudonyms, I also had the option of changing more details where I
deemed necessary (Lee 1993: 187). So, where it did not seem to matter much, I made
whatever changes seemed useful for disguise - and these added up to few in number. For
instance, where it carried very little importance, I preferred to drop a reference to a place rather
than invent a substitute. While doing so, I was consciously aware of the risk of distortion and,
hence, deliberately tried not to misconstrue the character of participant's lived experiences.
Thus, while telling the participants' stories, I wanted to ensure that they would not be
recognisable to others. The changes made to this end were, in my mind, enough to provide
disguise and thereby offer protection, but not enough to distort the very human elements that
were so essential to their stories.
Self-censorship
Lee (1993: 187-188) recognises that researchers may engage in partial self-censorship by
deliberately "choosing to omit specific items of sensitive information from published reports".
A common source of such self-censorship - and the one governing my choices within this
study - derives from the need to protect the participants.
Thus, in the present study, when faced by material strikingly sensitive in nature and/or highly
capable of bringing embarrassment or harm should the participants be identified, I simply did
not give the information (not even in an invented form). The inclusion of such information
into description and publication could, after all, have served to upset the participants, to attract
unwanted publicity, and/or to permit others to treat the participants in an exploitative or hurtful
manner (Lee 1993: 191). On the advice of Lee (1993: 191), I did however guard against a too
"sentimental" approach. So, while I persistently tried to be as aware as possible of all potential
consequences of description and publication, I consciously remained wary of exaggerating any
of these.
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Dissemination
Obviously, besides publishing this study in the form of a thesis I also foresaw, as part of my
responsibility as a researcher, that the results of this study would be disseminated to a wider
audience (cf. Lee 1993: 194-195). This expectation was sparked by my sincere longing to
grant the lived experiences of ME sufferers a truly wide coverage. Thereby Ihoped to inspire
a better understanding of them and their illness. Such popular understanding could also
possibly catch the attention of potential users, policy-makers, and even members of the elite
who yield significant power. In addition, a broad coverage of this study - as of any scientific
study - could only work towards a wider understanding of the doings and workings of social
research among the very public that supports and very often (has to) take part in it.
A guiding frame of reference
In the production and publication of my description of the social reality under study, Iwas
firmly guided by the ethical principles of my discipline. For me, the general thrust of these
principles is summarised in the principle of "beneficence" as identified by Kvale (1996: 116).
This principle demands that the risk of harm to a participant should always be minimal. In
addition, the sum of potential benefits to a participant and the importance of the knowledge
gained should always outweigh the risk of harm to the participant. My adherence to this
principle was substantially enriched by my personal sense of integrity and ethical intuition.
My concern throughout was not only with the specific individuals involved but also with the
larger collective of which they were a part. My responsibility as a researcher did, after all,
encompass the duty to anticipate and be aware of both the immediate and the delayed
consequences of my choices and actions for those both directly and potentially involved (cf.
Lee 1993: 192-193; Kvale 1996: 116).
Thus, in description and publication, Irelied on both the explicit rules of my discipline and the
more personal and tacit intuitions of my Self to guide me. All in all my genuine concern was
for all those who were involved.
Conclusion
When I constructed a description I longed to go beyond the obvious and thereby to create a
different reality. This was certainly not intended to be ''the'' reality. Instead, it was rather
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more like a story, one that would represent the product of a dynamic, interactive research
process. To allow others to fully appreciate this story, I needed to reconstruct the journey I
had followed in its construction. I dedicated Part V to such a reconstruction.
During the process of construction I remained acutely aware of my responsibility to protect the
participants and the community they represented. Hence, I very consciously employed
disguise and self-censorship with the explicit goal not to distort, but to protect. In this process,
I was steadily directed by the ethical principles prescribed by my discipline as well as by my
own sense of honesty, justice and respect for all those involved.
Throughout I was dedicated to producing a description - a story of understanding - that would
not only be truly faithful to the experiences of the participants, but would also, in terms of both
its significance and its implications, reach beyond the immediate ...
Questions of credibility
The credibility of a qualitative research study is customarily determined at the hand of its
validity, reliability and objectivity (Smaling 1998: 9-23). However, these terms have recently
been marked by a substantial measure of controversy, contention and dispute. In fact, Rubin
and Rubin (1995: 85) strongly contend that these terms are not at all appropriate within the
domain of qualitative research. Indeed, these authors feel that, ''trying to apply these
indicators to qualitative work distracts more than it clarifies". Consequently, I will henceforth
consider a somewhat different approach to evaluating the credibility of this study; an approach
based on transparency.
What many discussions concerning the credibility of research do have in common (Rubin &
Rubin 1995: 85-87; Smaling 1998: 18-22), is a clear-cut emphasis on transparency. In other
words, where a study's credibility is at issue, it is often advised that this quality can be best
exposed by rendering the research process in its totality as transparent as possible.
For Rubin and Rubin (1995: 85-87) as well as Smaling (1998: 19-22), such a rendering
transparent should encompass a comprehensive recording of literally the entire research
process. This record should, then, include thorough descriptions of all methodological,
theoretical and personal aspects of the research process, its progress, its context and its
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participants. In addition, it is also deemed important to incorporate an explicit consideration of
the rationale and reasoning underlying the choices made and arguments presented throughout
the study.
Rubin and Rubin (1995: 85-87) and Smaling (1998: 22) contend that such a high level of
transparency renders the research process open to independent scrutiny both within and
beyond the research community. Through such scrutiny the credibility of the study can be
fairly assessed.
Aside from enabling such an assessment of credibility, transparency in the research and its
presentation carries the promise of still further benefits. Indeed, according to Rubin and Rubin
(1995: 85-87), the demand for transparency encourages the researcher to remain close to the
data both during the research process as well as in the presentation thereof. This, in turn,
enhances the researcher's ability not only to show convincing evidential support for the
conclusions of the study, but also to show how these conclusions may, in terms of their
significance, reach beyond the directly studied research setting. So, through a thoroughly
transparent account of the research, the researcher can reveal how the conclusions of a study,
in part or as a whole, may be informative, helpful or usable beyond the immediate context (cf.
Kvale 1996: 233; Smaling 1998: 19).
Lastly, Kvale (1996: 234-235) suggests that to render a study transparent is to envisage
possibility. In other words, while "telling it like it is", a researcher can also "tell it like it can
become". A researcher can present and examine alternatives of thought and action and so
explore a novel way of knowing and doing. In the process, the researcher may challenge and
transform the conventional and, thereby, indeed enrich the science itself. All of this (and
perhaps still more), becomes possible simply by exposing a study and its contents to scrutiny;
by truly rendering it transparent.
Thus, a transparent description of a study, such as this one, will not only reveal its credibility,
but will also profoundly enhance it in terms of its conclusions, its significance, and its
implications.
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Conclusion
I have transcribed, analysed and interpreted the data. My personal contribution to this process
is evident throughout. It was my choice how to transcribe and present the data, how to develop
a novel way of assembling it anew, and how to present a final interpretation through a
description of the social world under study.
Ideally, the sum of my choices would result in products with claims to knowledge so powerful
and convincing in their own right that they would carry their own validation with them. For
this to happen the research procedures would be clear, the results evident, and the conclusions
of the study intrinsically convincing as "true". Appeals to external certification or official
stamps of approval would then become secondary. Such research would indeed make
questions of credibility superfluous.
However, we cannot assume that research procedures, procedures and results are intrinsically
evident and clear. Instead, they have to be made so. Hence, to establish whether all questions
of credibility can indeed be made superfluous in my study, I need to describe it in lucid and
transparent terms. This conclusion again echoes and supports the epistemological approach,
and specifically the freeing of knowledge through the practice of critical reflection adopted in
Part II.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
189
References
Brannen, J. 1988. Research note: The study of sensitive subjects. Sociological Review 36(3):
552-563.
Devault, M.L. 1990. Talking and listening from women's standpoint: Feminist strategies for
interviewing and analysis. Social Problems 37(1): 96-116.
Dey, I. 1993. Qualitative data analysis: A user-friendly guide for social scientists.
London: Routledge.
Kvale, S. 1996. Interviews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing.
Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Lee, R.M. 1993. Doing research on sensitive topics. London: Sage.
Potter, J. 1996. Representing reality: Discourse, rhetoric and social construction.
London: Sage.
Rubin, H. 1. & Rubin, I. S. 1995. Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data.
Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Smaling, A. 1998. Objectivity, reliability and validity. (Class handout; March 1998).
Weiss, R.S. 1994. Learning from strangers: The art and method of qualitative interview
studies. New York: The Free Press.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
190
Summary
Throughout the design of this study I was guided by the firm regulatory principle of doing
justice to the social world being studied I wanted it to speak, its voicers) to be heard Like
Dey (1993: 53-54), Ifound that this vision caused my methodological approach to evolve more
as a journey up a mountain than simply walking down a straight path.
At the onset of this journey up the mountain I had determined to regard the social world that I
wanted to study as a unique, dynamic reality inhabited by active, creative human beings. In
order not to loose sight of this distinctly human world, I every so often stopped and turned to
look at the horizon. At these times I saw the surrounding countryside as it emerged through
the perspective afforded by my new position. While it was the climb that had made this view
possible, I was of course only able to obtain a different perspective if I remembered to look as
wel! as to climb.
By looking, I could attain a fresh view, not just of the surrounding countryside, but also of the
path I had taken. As I looked down at the path I had already treaded, parts of my journey
became too faint to discern, others became clearer. The patterns and beacons that emerged
were important because I knew that I would later have to map this journey for others - as I had
indeed already started to do. This does not mean that I regard my journey as directly
repeatable in any significant sense. Such a view would, after all, require of me to believe that
the world I chose to look at was a stable, static one - and this I could not do. I was not
interested in a static entity devoid of life itself My focus was on a vibrantly dynamic human
world Thus, far from rendering my research journey repeatable, I simply noted the path I had
taken so that, when telling others about it, they would be able to trace my steps and appreciate
what I had seen.
When I stopped to look at the countryside and the path I had already travelled, I also peeked
ahead By taking a closer look and adjusting my direction I could seek out the most
appropriate trail. Admittedly I had a fair amount of freedom in mapping out the path to
follow. Still, my every footstep was determined by my intent to do justice to the social world I
had longed to view. Hence, it was imperative that my chosen path would not be insensitive to
the undeniably human nature of this world, that my footfall would indeed reflect my respect for
this world on which my entire journey depended
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Some parts of this journey towards the ever-alluring summit were easy, swift and
straightforward, others were difficult and required considerable care and effort. Along the
way I took some devious paths, certainly not always going straight or even going up the
mountain. Occasionally I even had to retrace my steps. This climb, with its circuitous paths,
tangents and apparent reversals captures the dynamic and non-sequential character of my
research journey. Inevitably, the twist-and-turn character of this journey at times rendered the
progress of my climb painfully slow and tedious. Yet, I nevertheless remained steadily
directed towards the view at the top. What is more, my progress was throughout (and
especially at the end of the climb) rewarded by unique vistas which made it possible to reach a
novel understanding of the humanness that marked the world below my gaze.
While I cannot describe in Part 111 every intricacy of my climb to the top of the mountain,
more will be revealed in subsequent chapters. It is in these chapters that the translation of my
journey into the minutiae of actual interpersonal, interactive human relationships will be
explored. It is also in the chapters to come that the panoramic view afforded by this journey
will be revealed. Perhaps there is nothing remarkably radical about this journey and the view
it offered. But I believe that, if it is presented well, this path towards understanding is
sufficient to offer and inspire care, caution and even change. What is more, it will do justice to
the human world I had set my gaze upon.
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Introduction
There is a multitude
Of Demons-
Tiny though they be -
Tying knots
In Jubilation
Inside of me.
- Betty Sue Fox, a ME sufferer of more than 20 years (1999: 29)
In these few words Betty Sue Fox succeeded in giving expression to the experience of a severe
illness shared by so many others. But what exactly is the nature of these demons who so
maliciously cause havoc in the life of Betty Sue and other ME sufferers? What is involved in
the subjective illness experience of ME sufferers? Part IV is dedicated to the discoveries I
made in my pursuit of an adequate answer to this question.
My quest for a greater understanding of the chronic illness experience of ME sufferers, of the
demons at work inside them, is fundamentally based on an acceptance of Cassell's (J 991: 35)
contention that suffering is ultimately a personal matter. It is, hence, the sufferer who enjoys
primary insight into the presence and extent of such suffering.
Consequently, the discoveries presented in this Section are primarily based upon the personal
experiences of the four ME sufferers who participated in this study. I wil! not claim that these
four "cases" are "representative" in any statistical sense. But I do contend that they
symbolise, portray, and represent something important about the experience of illness. They
offer powerful, if idiosyncratic, illustrations of the very essence of the severe chronic illness
experience.
The participants' accounts of their illness experience revealed that the dimensions of chronic
illness extend to virtually all levels of human existence, from the molecular to the social. Each
level where life is lived is marked by intense complexity. Each level is a chapter in the story of
their illness experience.
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To make sense and reach an understanding of the complexity involved in each ME sufferer's
story, I will commence with a glimpse into the physical severity and disability which results
from ME. Although the physical reality of this disease is not the primary focus of this study, it
is certainly not in any sense separable from the social nature and consequences of illness and
suffering.
Leading ME researcher, Dr. Jay Goldstein (1990: 17) describes ME as "a
psychoneuroimmunologic disorder meaning it has elements of psychological, neurological and
immunological dysfunction". In other words, ME affects the patient's thinking and emotions,
the brain itself, and the body's immune system. The ME sufferer is therefore likely to
experience the physical and mental impact of ME as encompassing virtually every aspect of
his or her functioning.
The experience of the participants in this study substantiates this observation. They
experienced the very real and immediate impact of ME most severely in a number of key areas.
The participants noted the severe fatigue and fatigability that accompanies ME. For them,
fatigue was not a normal recovery state following exertion. Recovery is exactly what did not
happen. Instead, intense fatigue and weakness persisted. The participants also suffered from
severe pain syndromes, at times penetrating their entire physical being. In addition,
participants experienced crippling cognitive dysfunction. They were no longer able to take for
granted the ability to read, learn or recall. They forgot words, names, even people. This
experience was augmented by the auditory and visual dysfunction that accompanied their
illness. Such dysfunction seriously impeded the sufferer's ability to fully enjoy and participate
in life. Lastly, the participants commonly refer to disturbances in their sleep patterns. For
most of them the onset of the illness was marked by severe hypersomnia, while more erratic
sleep patterns marked the later stage of the illness.
Thus, from fatigue to sleep ... these are just some of the most prominent symptoms experienced
by the participants in this study. That this list is far from all-inclusive is evident from the wide
array of additional signs and symptoms mentioned by the participants. For instance, these
included chemical imbalances in the brain, seizures, vertigo, frightening brain storms, anxiety
attacks, emotional lability, a constant high temperature, increased sensitivity to heat and
sunlight, skin irritations, marked weight gain and bloating, clumsiness, endometriosis,
incontinence, even dental problems. Truly, an almost endless list which sharply highlights the
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severe and confusing pattern of signs and symptoms that distinguish the physical reality of
ME.
Thus, for the participants the very real, immediate and forcefol impact of ME was revealed
through the pervasive onset of a wide array of harshly severe symptoms. Yet, in addition to
coping with sleeping too much' (or too little), with feeling exhausted and weak, and with
struggling to communicate or be communicated to, the participants also had to deal with the
utter unpredictability and variability of the signs and symptoms that marked their chronic
illness experience. That is, while participants did not know which symptoms to expect, they
had discovered that whatever symptoms appeared would persist - and would turn what was
previously possible for them into the impossible. In fact, a sense of not being able to do, of
utter incapacity, at times became a way of life. Sadly, genuine disability became part and
parcel of all the participants' experience of the physical reality of ME.
Yet, the all-encompassing and fiercely intrusive physical reality of ME is but one side of the
coin. As Natalie despairingly expressed:
Ek wens dit was net 'n fisiese siekte - dit sal alles soveel makliker gemaak het ...
On the other side of the coin lies the human reality of ME. The distinction I draw here
between the physical and the human reality of ME corresponds with the distinction made in the
philosophy of medicine between the terms "disease" and" illness".
Within the latter context, according to Jennings' (1986: 865-866), "disease" refers to
demonstratabie patho-physiology or patho-chemistry and is diagnosed by the demonstration of
pathologic features through investigation of relevant symptoms and signs. A pathological
diagnosis is, therefore, a statement about a patient's body based on evidence that is
independent of the patient's reports or actions, and so is final. Disease, as such, with its focus
on the objective indications of a specific impaired state, corresponds with the physical reality
of ME as described above.
Whereas "disease" is a matter of physics and chemistry whose presence is betrayed by
physical signs, "illness" is an experience the presence of which is often communicated by
complaint. Its study ultimately depends directly on phenomenologic analysis of experienced
suffering as expressed through individual self-reports and behaviour (Jennings 1986: 866).
"Illness ", in other words, refers to all the experiential aspects of bodily disorder as shaped by
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
197
those factors governing the perception, the labelling, and the explanation of the discomforting
experience (Fitzpatrick 1989: 259). It is a subjective state of suffering. Hence, as Lloyd et al.
(2000: 472) rightly remark, it "can only be understood and defined with reference to the sick
individual". This conception of illness corresponds with the human reality of ME which
clearly transcends the merely biological and physical consequences of organic malfunction.
The human reality involves the person as a whole - physically, psychological, emotionally and
socially.
But why is the human reality important? Why does it deserve any attention?
According to Wessely et al. (1998: 404), its importance is twofold. Firstly, "because without it
one cannot hope to comprehend the extraordinary passions and disputes that accompany the
condition, and which, while not unique to ME, are certainly more prominent there than
elsewhere ". Secondly, "because the very uncertainty of ME provides a window into modern
ideas of illness, which would not be open in illnesses with a more defined pathophysiological
basis".
Moreover, a greater understanding of the human reality of ME is important simply because the
participants say so. The centre stage position of the human reality within the experience of
ME is indeed supported by compelling statements such as:
... die menslike aspek van die siekte word 'n geweldige probleem self, dit word 'n tweede probleem van
die siekte ... en dit moet definitief aangespreek word op 'n manier. (Natalie);
and:
... d..die sosiale aspek en die psigiese aspek raak amper groter as die siekte self. Definitief! (Natalie);
and:
... die fisiese komponent daarvan is ... is moeilik om te hanteer elke dag, maar ek dink wat baie mense ...
afskeep is ... almal konsentreer so op die fisiese deel daarvan datjy die emosionele en die geestelike
deel daarvan heeltemal afskeep ... En op 'n stadium haal ditjou in ... (Denise);
and yet again:
Coping with the emotional aspects of ME. .. was probably the most difficult task for me (Helen).
For Natalie and the other participants their experience of ME did not so much concern the
very nature of the disease itself, but was rather more closely bound to the reaction their illness
provoked both in others and in themselves.
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Thus, to develop a better understanding of the human reality of ME, of the subjective illness
experience, I will, as Cassell (1991: 52) recommends, focus on two distinct aspects of the
human condition: firstly, the interaction of the person with the social world, and secondly, the
complex personhood of the sufferer.
A focus on the ME sufferer's interaction with the social world will build upon the conviction
that "there is no self without others" (Cassell 1991: 40). Indeed there is, as Cassell (1991:
40) asserts, "no consciousness without a consciousness of others, no speaker without a hearer,
no act or object or thought that does not somehow encompass others. There is no behaviour
that is not, was not, or will not be involved with others, even if only in memory or reverie".
Accordingly, there is almost no limit to the ways in which the ill person's experience of
suffering may be influenced by the social world where life is lived.
I will therefore devote considerable attention to the influence of those social forces which
shape the subjective experience of ME. Such a substantial focus on the social side of the ME
experience does not in any way imply that ME is fundamentally a social construction. ME
does however exists in the real world, where people such as my participants experience real
suffering. In this world, sufferers encounter wide-ranging attitudes toward illness and toward
ME in particular. Understanding these interactions and the difficulties that often result is not
an intriguing footnote to the experience of ME. It is as much part of the condition as any
putative neurobiological, psychological or virological process which may be involved in the
physical reality of the disease.
The examination of the social identity of suffering will be followed by a consideration of the
personhood of the sufferer. A person has a relationship with the Self. A person has a set of
roles, obligations, rights, and responsibilities. A person also has a body and thus has physical
and mental abilities and actions. A person has a past, a present, and a future. A person has a
life of the spirit, of dreams, of fantasies and of secrets. These dimensions of personhood not
only exert an influence on but are equally influenced by the experience of illness and suffering
(cf Cassell 1991: 38-43). Hence, to gain greater insight into the human reality of ME, the
complexity of personhood will be thoroughly probed.
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Chapter 11
Medical encounters and confrontations
In my pursuit of a greater understanding of the chronic illness expenence of ME I paid
considerable attention to the very first source of aid approached by those who feel ill: the
medical profession. Members of this profession make a crucial contribution to sufferers'
attempts to meaningfully reconstruct their world around a chronic and severely disabling
illness (cf. Field 1976: 347).
Modern medical practice is, however, marked by a striking paradox. It is indeed, as Jennings
(1986: 865) recognises, "a hybrid, a mixture of art and science", for "in addition to addressing
problems specific to the investigation and treatment of physical diseases, it necessarily
addresses those diseases in living persons. Consequently it is confronted by patients' personal
experience of their disease. .. as distinct from the disease process itself'.
This distinction between disease and the subjective experience of that disease often translates
into separate nuclei of attention: whereas patients are primarily concerned with their
experience of illness and suffering, physicians appear to concentrate their expert attention on
the disease itself. The discussion below will show that for the ME sufferer this disparity often
gives rise to a profound sense of confusion, disappointment and sheer desperation.
Nurturing wellness
For the ME sufferers in this study the road to wellness was firstly directed at obtaining a
diagnosis, thereafter they sought adequate medical care.
When considering the process of diagnosis, Field (1976: 357) writes that "once a person has
been tentatively identified as ill by himself or others, he may seek out a physician in order to
obtain a diagnosis of what is wrong with him, for diagnosis is seen as the first step to
recovery".
Before considering how participants took this "first step", it is important to understand the
importance of the diagnosis which is eventually received. Firstly, a diagnosis explains. A
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diagnosis is, as Field (1976: 357) emphasises, "of crucial importance to how the person views
his illness". Violon (1982: 31) similarly states that a sick person "needs to have a name and an
explanation for what he feels... He needs it for himself in order to be able to comprehend
what is going on in him". Sick persons need a diagnosis in order to understand and make
sense of their own suffering. Secondly, a diagnosis objectifies. Field (1986: 355) and Ware
(1992: 353) contend that the attachment of a diagnostic label often serves to resolve or, at the
least, to mitigate the anxiety, uncertainty and ambiguity which accompanies the onset of a
severe illness such as ME, by objectifying the situation. Thirdly, a diagnosis legitimates. A
diagnosis is often regarded as the physician's "stamp of approval" that the person is genuinely
ill. Field (1976: 337) suggests that this "stamp of approval" serves to "legitimate the status of
the sick person as ill". The sick person can no longer be viewed as somehow morally suspect
- as a malinger or hypochondriac - for he or she has received a medically endorsed label as
being ill. Fourthly, a diagnosis structures. According to Field (1976: 355), the diagnostic label
serves to structure the situation by pointing towards the expected treatment and prognosis.
This in turn directs the attention of the ill person as well as those with whom he or she interacts
towards the appropriate attitudes to be adopted and actions to be taken regarding the illness.
In this study I encountered two contrasting experiences of the process of diagnosis, of how
participants experienced the "first step".
The first is typified by Denise's account:
Mmm... die dokter... het half... het half tot ons redding gekom deur die feit dat hy ME erken en
diagnoseer en... en mmm... dit het... dit het 'n groot verskil gemaak... as jy besef wat. .. wat aan die
gang is, hoekom is hoekom... hoekom voel jy moeg, hoekom is jou lyf seer, hoekom... kan jy nie
konsentreer nie, hoekom dit, hoekom dat, dan... dan maak dit dit net soveel makliker... Sy diagnose
was 'n verligting... uiteindelik het iemand besef 'alles is nie net in jou kop nie'.
The participants found not knowing incredibly difficult to bear. The failure of the medical
profession to name their condition left participants feeling not only betrayed but also with no
means of coping. Without a diagnosis there was no way to fight the illness, no way to make
important life decisions - there was only a sense of paralysis. Hence Denise's relief when the
medical practitioner finally recognised and diagnosed her condition as ME. For Denise, the
diagnosis offered a sufficient explanation of her condition. In helping her to make sense of the
syndrome of signs and symptoms which she experienced, it relieved (at least in part) the
confusion and anxiety she had experienced while not knowing what was wrong with her body.
It objectified her situation for her. It legitimated her status as being genuinely ill and removed
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any suspicion of psychological illness. Even though the diagnosis could not offer any
guarantee in terms of treatment or prognosis, merely having her condition diagnosed as ME
made the situation subjectively easier to bear.
The second, contrasting, position is exemplified in Natalie's recollection of how she was first
diagnosed:
... hy het toe nou gesê hy vermoed nou maar dat ek ly aan CFIDS, wat natuurlik iets heeltemal vreemds
is, ek bedoel, op daai stadium, jy weet, niemand weet daarvan nie mmm ... jy weet, dis ... dis vir jou net
iets in die donkerte... En ek bedoel, ek was nie eintlik enigsins die diagnose het vir my eintlik maar
niks beteken nie, want dit sê mos nou maar eintlik niks, daar is nie eers baie inligting omtrent... daaroor
nie ...
The diagnosis left Natalie in the dark, no closer to understanding her condition than before she
was diagnosed. It did not offer any explanation. It did not bring any objectivity to the
personal turmoil and confusion that the onset of ME had evoked. It had no power to legitimate
her position as being severely ill. It did not offer any hope of treatment and perhaps of a
positive prognosis. The ME diagnosis brought her no certainty or clarity. It had no power to
affect her subjective experience of the illness favourably.
While it is difficult to identify the exact rationale underlying the difference between these two
contrasting experiences, it is reasonable to argue that the level of knowledge about ME at the
time of diagnosis played a significant role.
Denise was diagnosed in the mid-1990s. At that stage ME had already become part of public
knowledge, especially in the deceptive identity of "yuppie flu". In other words, Denise had
had the opportunity to read about it in the media or to hear about it from others. She had some
knowledge prior to the diagnosis about an illness known as "yuppie flu" or ME. Hence, the
diagnosis to her was not such a foreign entity. It even made sense to her. Natalie, on the other
hand, was diagnosed in the late 1980's during a time when very little was known about ME.
Very few people had heard or read about ME, let alone actually known someone who had it.
For Natalie a diagnosis of ME was completely devoid of any power to bring help or relief. For
her the absence of any prior knowledge of the illness transformed the diagnosis into an empty,
meaningless phrase. It brought no power to explain for there was no shared knowledge ofthe
illness in her immediate environment. And without meaningful terms to describe it, it was
difficult to argue convincingly for ME as a disease in a social setting. For Natalie, then, the
diagnosis for ME was not a "real" diagnosis at all.
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Thus, it was the lack of sufficient knowledge about ME, and not the nature of ME itself, which
carried the potential to bluntly destroy, for some, the power of diagnosis to explain, objectify,
legitimate and structure the illness experience.
Now, armed with a diagnosis for their illness, however poorly understood, participants
continued on the road to wellness and sought adequate medical care for their condition.
According to the participants' experiences the "adequate medical care" they did receive was
characterised by an open recognition of the restricted nature of medical knowledge, a sensitive
understanding, an unfaltering commitment, and a holistic approach to the patient as a whole
person.
Firstly, the importance of an open recognition of the restricted nature of current medical
knowledge was clearly reflected in participants' accounts. Helen, for instance, says:
I admired these doctors who were willing to admit their own confusion and lack of answers ...
Cheryl also recalled:
... we preferred to go to him, because although he... he honestly ... said that he didn't know anything
about ME, he was very willing to listen and help us symptomatically a bit. ..
A similar sentiment was detected in Natalie's account:
Hulle was baie eerlik omtrent die feit dat daar nog nie 'n kuur is nie, hulle het aan my nooit enige beloftes
gemaak nie en het probeer help met simptomatiese behandeling ... ek ... is baie-baie dankbaar vir die
goeie hulp wat ek wel van sommige ontvang het.
These accounts show that the limited nature of current medical knowledge need not preclude
the delivery of adequate medical care. Indeed, as Lloyd et al. (2000: 472) state, "people with
ME are clearly ill, and are often disabled, even though an underlying disease process has not
yet been identified. Our goal as medical practitioners is not only to identify and treat disease,
but also to help relieve suffering and disability, whatever the cause". Thus, while doctors
should be prepared to recognise the limitations of their current state of knowledge, this should
not prevent them from responding adequately to their often distressed and confused ME
patients (Oldmeadow 2000: 76-77).
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Secondly, the participants emphasised the importance of an open expression of understanding
and acceptance of their suffering by the doctors they consult. Cheryl, for instance, related her
positive encounters with a doctor who exemplified sensitive understanding:
... this chap ... mmm knew everything that was at that stage to be known about ME ... he was ... well, it
was ... a tremendous comfort to us to find a doctor who was relating ... who was a... mmm ... he could
almost describe me to me, if you know what I mean... He could relate to everything I was saying ... and
nothing I said to him was un ... unusual, he'd seen it all before, he could put all the symptoms under the
umbrella of ME... I was very grateful to him... and he tried to help me ... for about a year and a half we
saw him regularly and he treated me symptomatically... So ... this guy was an enormous help to me ...
for almost two years this man gave me hope that what I had was real, recognisable and that the
symptoms could be controlled to a certain extent.
For Cheryl, and the other participants, those doctors who offered genuine understanding and
empathy promoted an experience of adequate medical care even where definite answers were
lacking. The importance of such an approach is supported by authors such as Kriel (1997:
186), Lloyd (2000: 472) and Oldmeadow (2000: 77) who encourage medical practitioners to
adopt an empathic and non-judgemental style, to acknowledge what their ME patients are
feeling, and to display acceptance of their patients' suffering. For the participants this
sensitive style of engagement among doctors rendered their journey toward wellness all the
more tolerable.
Thirdly, a sensitive understanding of the ME sufferer's situation should be complemented by
an unfaltering commitment to nurture the patient all the way on the road to wellness. Denise
related a particularly vivid expression of such care:
Sy was ... sy't ook baie gehelp, sy't. .. as dit nodig was dat sy in die nag moes uitkom, dan het sy in die
nag uitgekom en sulke dinge, wat 'n mens baie waardeer, want jy ... jy kan nie net in jou kar klim en
dokter toe gaan nie... Mmm ... en so, sy het drips en goed by die huis kom doen, wat 'n groot. ..
verligting was dat jy nie elke keer hoef hospitaal toe te gaan nie en... Mmm ... sy het baie gehelp om die
medikasie en goed goedkoper te kry ... wat ook 'n groot verskil maak, want die medikasie het omtrent...
word nogal 'n astronomiese bedrag... So, sy het baie gehelp ... by haar het ek 'n ander faset van dokter
wees ... half ervaar. .. sy ... sy stap saam metjou die tweede myl. ..
Also, Natalie's expenence showed that even when faced by uncertainty and confusion a
medical practitioner could still provide committed medical care:
En toe omtrent die derde k... derde keer wat ek by die psigiater instap en ek onthou ... ek het by die
deur ingestap by hom en hy't vir hulle gesê ... iets lyk nie vir hom reg nie toe het ek al begin sukkel om
te loop... En hy't dadelik vir hulle gesê hy gaan my hospitaliseer en hy glo eintlik glad nie in sy eie
dia ... diagnose meer nie ... Wat ek die Here voor dank, want as ek nou nog langer moes sukkel met. ..
met. .. mmm ... met die idee van ek het sielkundige probleme en ek ... en ek gaan net voort en voort en
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dwing my liggaam... En toe het hy my nou ... jy weet, toe het hy nou maar begin rondkrap en soek en...
hy't rêrig nie geweet nie... En ... elke keer as ek by hom kom sal hy vir my sê, nee, jy het nie simptome
vir depressie nie en ek kan jou nie behandel nie, maar ons kyk nou maar net verder wat kan ek vir jou
doen... En ... die ... die psigiater wat ek gehad het is die beste wat ek voor kon wens, want hy het my nie
een oomblik verkwalik of enigiets nie ...
For Denise and Natalie, their medical practitioners' willingness to demonstrate a commitment
to continued care served to guide them along the path to wellness, providing hope and the
expectation of improvement throughout. Lloyd et al. (2000: 472) as well as Oldmeadow
(2000: 76-77) stress that the management of patients with ME demands of medical
practitioners a commitment to constant, continued care. For participants, such medical care
fostered an invaluable sense of "stability in the uncertain world of sickness" (Cassell 1991:
78).
Lastly, in the provision of adequate medical care, the medical practitioner's honesty,
understanding, and commitment should ultimately find expression within a holistic approach
to the patient as a whole person. However, for most of the participants, encounters with such a
holistic approach were largely confined to their contact with alternative or complimentary
medicine. Note Denise's experience in this regard:
Wat die komplimentêre gesondheid betref ek vind oor die algemeen daardie mense meer simpatiek en
meer ... meer met 'n holistiese benadering en hulle het ook oor die algemeen meer tyd... Dit is nie
soos 'n dokter waar jy 'n kwartier in en uit is en jy met 'n papier in jou hand na die apteek toe gaan nie ...
Mmm ... in my ... in my si ... in die verloop van my siekte het die komplementêre mense my meer gehelp
as die ortodokse mediese professie ...
Denise's account reveals that a holistic approach required both time and an effort to listen to
the patient actively and attentively. It is only then that attempts to address physical symptoms
can be meaningfully complimented by sound advice on how to cope with ME on all levels. To
loose sight of the person as a whole would be to negate any possibility of providing adequate
medical care for the ME sufferer. Indeed, Imhotep (195?: 2-3) clearly states that "no doctor
can treat disease; he can only treat the person who has the disease - with his full and free co-
operation". In fact, 'the necessity ofthe personal approach ... is always present ... You are the
sufferer, you are the one the doctor must get to know; and he must get to know not only the
sound of your lungs, the beats of your heart, the feel of your tummy - but the state of your
mind. He must assess not only how your body reacts to disease, not only how your mind
reacts, but your whole body-mind, your psycho-somatic system, you - the person in the body".
It is the person as a whole, the complete interaction between bodily perception, emotion and
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cognition, that will affect the course of the illness, the effectiveness of the treatment, and the
rate and even the extent of recovery. As Denise's account shows, the necessity of such an
explicitly holistic approach is even more pronounced in the management of a chronic and
severe illness like ME where the body can never be regarded as a separate world merely
functioning in parallel to the remainder of the person (cf. Field 1976: 355-356; Krie11997:
186-187;Violon 1982: 32).
Once their condition was diagnosed, the participants equated "adequate medical care" with an
honest recognition of medical limitations, an empathic understanding and acceptance of their
experience of illness, a commitment to continued care, and an unreserved appraisal of the
wholeness of the sick person. According to Kriel (1997: 186) and Lloyd et al. (2000: 472),
such an approach to medical care continuously builds toward an effective therapeutic alliance
between doctor and patient; an alliance that holds the promise of progress on the road to
wellness.
Cruel encounters
Participants related these experiences:
Dokters is onkundig. (Natalie)
... there is an overall gross lack of understanding of ME within the medical profession. Most of my
encounters were frustrating and dissatisfying... (Helen)
Dit was 'n frustrasie om... om hier te soek en daar te soek en nêrens rêrig 'n antwoord te kry nie...
(Denise)
Unfortunately, the horrid message conveyed through these quotes represents the majority of
participants' cruel encounters with the medical profession: doctors do not understand ME and
generally do not know how to treat patients who suffer from it.
Why? What is the origin of this ignorance? Why so many cruel encounters in the doctor's
surgery? Why does it involve ME and those afflicted by it?
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I argue that the ignorance within the medical profession, and hence, the cruel and
disappointing encounters recalled by all the participants, is born in the biomedical model as the
underlying philosophy within which modem medicine operates.
How physicians approach their patients and the problems they present is very much influenced
by the conceptual models into which their knowledge and experience are organised.
Commonly, however, physicians are largely unaware of the power that such models exert on
their thinking and behaviour. This is because the dominant models are not necessarily made
explicit. Rather, they become that part of the fabric of education which is taken for granted,
the cultural background against which they learn to become physicians. Their teachers, their
mentors, the texts they use, the practices they are encouraged to follow, even the medical
institutions and administrative organisations in which they work, all reflect prevailing
conceptual models of the era of modem medicine. It is this implicit and subconscious
philosophy that gives their way of doing things "an aura of naturalness, of having-to-be-that-
way, of God-given normality", and that "prevents them from questioning those very
assumptions". This dominant philosophical model can be referred to as the biomedical model
(Kriel 1989: 324).
Engel (1977: 130) explains that, in modern Western society, "the dominant model of disease
today is biomedical" with, as its name suggests, molecular biology as its basic scientific
discipline. "It assumes disease to be fully accounted for by deviations from the norm of
measurable biological (somatic) variables. It leaves no room within its framework for the
social, psychological, and behavioral dimensions of illness. The biomedical model not only
requires that disease be dealt with as an entity independent of social behavior, it also demands
that behavioral aberrations be explained on the basis of disordered somatic (biochemical or
neurophysiological) processes". This model is, as Kriel (1989: 324; 1997: 182) recognises,
clearly based on a mechanistic view of life. According to this view, man's body is assumed to
be a machine that can be understood completely in terms of the arrangement and functioning of
its parts - with no reference to other social dimensions and phenomena related to health. This
means that in true biomedical fashion, the diagnostic process is to abstract the patient from his
or her concrete existence and to assume that the patient, who is conceptualised purely as a
biological organism, can be diagnosed in a context-free environment (Kriel 1997: 184).
Because of this combination of pure reductionism and Cartesian dualism, only physical-
chemical data are seen as having any meaning - and as having "ultimate explanatory power"
(Kriel 1989: 324). Since its inception in eighteen-century Europe, this approach to medicine
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has been portrayed as objective, technical and scientific (meaning non-social), and has
provided the ultimate foundation for the scientific study of disease as a strictly biological
entity.
The biomedical model dictates the medical profession's understanding of the concepts of
health and illness, which renders these concepts everything but self-evident. Within this
framework health is understood as "faultless mechanical functioning of the body machine" -
once again excluding all other phenomena that could be related to health (Kriel 1989: 324).
Similarly, disease has come to exemplify "a category of natural phenomena urgently
demanding explanation" (Engel 1977: 130). Disease is regarded as "a person-centred,
harmful, and undesirable deviation or discontinuity. . . associated with impairment or
discomfort" (Fabrega in Engel 1977: 130). In other words, disease becomes a purely
biological phenomenon that reflects the malfunctioning of bodily mechanisms (Kriel 1997:
182). And, because "the condition is not desired it gives rise to a need for corrective actions.
The latter involve beliefs and explanations about disease as well as rules of conduct to
rationalize treatment actions. These constitute socially adaptive devices to resolve, for the
individual as well as for the society in which the sick person lives, the crises and uncertainties
surrounding disease" (Engel 1977: 130). For modern Western society, these beliefs,
explanations and rules of conduct find reason and structure within the framework provided by
the biomedical model.
Thus, in modern Western society, the biomedical model represents the fundamental basis for
the scientific study of disease as well as for the dominant culturally specific perspective about
such disease. It is a perspective that strongly "embraces both reductionism, the philosophic
view that complex phenomena are ultimately derived from a single primary principle, and
mind-body dualism, the doctrine that separates the mental from the somatic" (Engel 1977:
130).
While a model based on both reductionism and dualism may offer a powerful tool for
understanding disease, it also has the potential to create profound misunderstanding when
applied unwisely. For starters, its definition of disease as a deviation from the biological norm
implies a particular conception of "norm" or "normality". Yet, as Findlay (1993: 121) shows,
"normality" is not a standard judgement. It is a concept open to different interpretations. It
invites questions on how it was determined, who determined it, and where its application
might cease to be relevant. For Findlay, these underlying aspects indicate that the definition
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applied here is not a purely objective measurement in the sense of being neutral and value-free
as is assumed in the biomedical model. They also point to the risk that the definition might be
wrongfully applied, subjecting patients to contextually inappropriate judgements about their
physical condition. Furthermore, the biomedical model may, as Lloyd et al. (2000: 471) and
Engel (1977: 134) point out, be particularly harmful when, because of its almost exclusive
reliance upon diagnostic tests, recognised pathophysiology, and established pharmacological
and other physical treatments, it (purposefully) neglects the impact of non-biological
circumstances upon biologic processes. In fact, the biomedical model entirely neglects the
psychological, social, spiritual and environmental aspects of illness (KrieI1989: 324). In turn
this may lead to immense frustration among "those who find what they believe to be their
legitimate health needs inadequately met by too technologically oriented physicians" (Engel
1977: 135). Thus, the conceptualisation of disease within the biomedical model is not only
likely to differ from the patient's actual experience of the illness, but may in fact aggravate it.
In this study it is shown that the participants' experience of their illness was unmistakably
shaped by the pervasive influence of the biomedical model upon many of the medical
practitioners they consulted. To demonstrate the manifestation as well as the consequences of
this influence, I will consider two accounts that are not only particularly illustrative but also
completely representative of the bulk of each participant's contact with the medical profession.
Natalie:
... ek dink nou spesifiek aan 'n dokter ... ek het na die dokter toe gegaan telke male ... ek was vir baie
toetse en ... hulle het niks verkeerd gevind nie ... en toe het hy nou maar gesê hy is nou maar seker ek is
depressief. En ek kan so goed onthou hoe ek vir hom gesê het, maar ek ... ek is seker daarvan ek is nie,
ek mag miskien so voel as gevolg van die feit dat ek so sukkel, maar ek is ... ek voel baie siek. En ek ...
ek onthou hoe hy nou sy laai oopgemaak het en hierdie pakkie kaarte uitgehaal het met al die simptome
van depressie en hoe hy hulle so uitgepak het en ... dit so voor my neergesit het en hoe meer ek vir hom
sê, maar, ek is oortuig daarvan daar is iets verkeerd met my, hoe harder het hy daai kaartjie neergesit op
die tafel, jy weet ... om vir my te probeer oorreed dat ek het al daai simptome.
Cheryl had this to say:
I met an anaesthetist I didn't know. I... I asked to see him... When I came to be pushed down to
surgery ... I said, 'I actually don't want to go into surgery without knowing my anaesthetist'... So, we get
down to theatre ... and I... I still haven't met the anaesthetist. I'm going to lie there, at his mercy... So,
they pushed me into a side room and called him. And I sat up in the bed and I prepared to ... do my
humble, polite ... routine and lower my eyes and ... and look as though I was worthless in the sight of
the great doctor story (sigh), golly, (sigh) ... he just waded in boots and all and said, 'Gmhf, you're the
one that wanted to see me before the operation. I do not like your attitude.' I said, 'what ... what attitude?
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I haven't even told you why I wanted to see you here'. He said, 'I can tell everything I need to know as
you ... as you get into theatre and you're lying there, I hook up my instruments and I know what I need to
know'... So, I said to him, 'well, actually, that's really not good enough for me, because I've had some
bad experiences with ... with ... anaesthetics'. And he said, 'Augh, if you must, tell me about them!'. So, I
tried to give him a brief sketch of how ... 'I honestly don't want you to think that I expect you to believe ME
exists, but there are doctors who've diagnosed me with a muscular condition, which sounds like what one
reads about ME. However, be that as it may, it would appear that I have these weird reactions to
a..anaesthetics that I never had before ... I had ME. I mean, it is completely different. .. '. But he took
absolutely no notice at all of what I told him... I wasn't making a fuss, because I thought I was going in
for open-heart surgery. I was... I was simply wanting the anaesthetist to know my reactions to
anaesthetic. But he totally misunderstood me, you know, he thought I was neurotic.
These two accounts tell of cruel encounters with the medical profession and offer a clear
display of both the influence and consequences of the biomedical model. Natalie and Cheryl's
experiences clearly highlight medical practitioners' reliance on test results, their diminished
capacity to listen to their patients, their propensity to assign what is not found in the body to a
state of the mind, their arrogance in openly questioning patients' personal awareness of their
being, and their profound inability to comprehend an illness that is both as complex and as
subtle as ME. These attributes point to the array of consequences that follow when ME is
encountered within the clinical medical practice where the biomedical model is still dominant.
There are three principal consequences which I will now consider more closely.
The first significant outcome which results when the biomedical model is applied to the ME
scenario may be described as the "cookbook method" (Goldstein 1990: xi). Goldstein (1990:
xi) says, "my own feeling is that many doctors stop thinking once they get their diplomas.
Once they are out in practice, there is such an overwhelming amount of information pouring
down on them and there is so much to learn, that they tend to do things by what I call the
'cookbook' method. If it's not in the cookbook (which is the sum of their acquired
knowledge), then it simply doesn't exist. This approach reveals an underlying assumption that
presupposes medical knowledge to be sufficiently comprehensive to recognise all (real)
disorders presented by patients (Fischer-Rosenthal 1992: 140). As a result, we have doctors
telling patients that they really aren't sick or that their symptoms are all in their minds. Can
you imagine telling someone who has swollen lymph nodes, fevers and other obvious
symptoms that these are all imaginary?" Unfortunately, many ME sufferers like Natalie and
Cheryl can imagine such a scenario - they were there and they actually experienced it at first
hand.
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Expanding on the "cookbook" method, Goldstein (1990: 2) says that "you come in with
symptoms and they look in the cookbook (of their medical minds) to see where your symptoms
fit. If your illness happens to fit a recipe in their cookbook, they give you a diagnosis and
prescribe a treatment. However, if you happen to be so unfortunate as to have an illness that is
so new (to medicine) that it's not in the cookbook, they are lost as to what to do. Too often
their response is NOT to see this as a challenge and say, 'Now here's something unusual that
will take some thought and research'. Instead they too often turn a blind eye to the illness and
deny that it exists. 'But,' you the patient protest, 'I'm sick!' 'You can't be,' this type of
doctor replies (in his mind). 'Your symptoms simply aren't in my cookbook, ergo, either
you're lying or you've got a mental problem. Since I wouldn't want to insult you by saying
that you're lying, I'm going to refer you to a good psychiatrist. '" Does this sound familiar?
Goldstein's description of the "cookbook method" indeed bears an uncanny similarity to the
typical experience of the participants in this study.
Thus, the biomedical model does not inspire doctors to listen to their patients because they rely
almost exclusively on test results. Because ME has yet to be reliably associated with any
identifiably organic pathology, a barrage of tests for diagnostic purposes are ordered. When
these tests, rather predictably, deliver negative results all around (because they were designed
for other illnesses) it leaves the doctor at a loss. If nothing shows up in the tests, no disease
can be accurately recognised. Hence, as there are no "numbers to be fixed" no treatment can
ensue. In frustration, the doctor then promptly refers patients such as Natalie or Cheryl either
to a specialist or to a psychiatrist (Ware 1992: 351). The patient who dares to suffer from a
poorly defmed disorder is doomed, with no single diagnostic test and no simple treatment
options available. This approach reflects a deep-seated biomedical mode of thought: the
assumption that what counts as "scientifically real" (and hence worthy of further investigation)
must be physically measurable (Kriel 1997: 183). Hence, if it does not show up in the test
results and therefore has not been observed and so cannot be measured, it does not exist. Or
more specifically, if it does not show up in the test results, it does not exist in the body. What
is not in the body must then be in the mind.
One could hardly ask for a clearer illustration of the mind-body duality at work in medical
practice. Cassell (1991: 34) contends that, in accordance with the mind-body dichotomy, the
body has been exclusively assigned to medicine. As a medical category, the body has no room
for the concept of person. Hence, the person has found a place in the category of mind.
Where the mind is problematic (i.e., not identifiable in objective terms), its very reality
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diminishes for science, and so too does that of person. The concept of person then becomes
associated with the subjective, with that which is not truly "real" and which therefore falls
outside the domain of scientific medicine.
This dichotomy between the body and the mind, the real and not real, extends to the patient-
doctor relationship. There the doctor, as the one who deals with the body (which is seen as
"real"), is given the role of the "expert", the one knowledgeable about the (passive) patient or,
more specifically, the patient's body. In turn the patient is confined to that space which is
reserved for the stories about the personal meaning of living with the syndrome - but not to
that space which is provided for expert explanations. The patient is assigned a passive role,
where any indication of knowledge of his or her own condition and treatment would
immediately be in conflict with the practitioner's position. In other words, the mind-body
dichotomy transpires within the roles that emerge in the doctor's office. Here each social role
is believed, or is made to be believed, to possess unique and exclusive forms of knowledge.
The "expert" knows about the syndrome and its treatment. The person living with ME knows
about personal suffering. Even though these roles or categories rarely correspond with the
multiple experiences of the people who suffer from ME, those who dare speak "out of
character" are often silenced. These silencing effects are directly the result of the impenetrable
boundaries which cordon off the knowledge in "medical science" into an unquestionable
domain. Thus, the medical practitioner is the expert on the body and the "real", the patient the
merely passive recipient of medical treatment (cf. Heaphy 1998: 24-25).
Running concurrently to this construction of the doctor-patient relationship is what Kriel
(1997: 183) identifies as the particular nature and implications of the doctor's agenda. Kriel
describes this agenda as one aimed at diagnosing the physical disease causing the patient's
symptoms. The doctor is therefore not interested in the patient's needs, fears and expectations
(in other words, in the patient's agenda), but rather wishes through direct questioning to draw
the patient into the reductive, mechanical and materialistic medical agenda - all in order to
make a diagnosis and prescribe treatment (Kriel 1997: 183 & 186). The biomedical paradigm
which in this way dictates the structure of the interaction between the patient and the doctor is
further likely to inspire a sense of separation or even alienation. As a result of this particular
configuration of the patient-doctor relationship, biomedicine has become "separate" from the
individual patient. The uniqueness of this patient, in this situation, interacting with this doctor
has been submerged in general categories which are largely impersonal. Biomedicine is
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therefore easily viewed as standing "outside" the individual and even as representing a
contrasting view in the attempt to solve health care problems (Kaufman 1988: 339).
According to Cassell (1991: 104-108) this mind-body duality has furthermore led to a belief
among physicians that diseases are the "real" things - the things that count - and that
symptoms are the direct, unmediated manifestations of such diseases. That is, disease is tacitly
"conceived of as a thing per se in the world", as a material entity - and typically as "a
malfunction" in an (anonymous) human body that can be described in purely physical terms
(Kriel 1997: 184-185). This disease is "objective" - it does not bear a personal face nor is it
related to any individual biography or life history "(Fischer-Rosenthal 1992: 134). What is
more, a patient is assumed to be capable of clearly "representing" a disease - this malfunction
- by means of his or her bodily symptoms which will, in turn, become "the objectives of the
physicians' gaze and manipulations" (Fischer-Roenthal 1992: 140). Within this context, the
task of the physician is clearly confined to purely that of correlating the clinical findings (as
"represented" by the patient) with a classification of physical diseases - that is, "to diagnose a
disease rather than to understand a patient" (Krie11997: 182).
Cassell (1991: 105) strongly questions the validity of the beliefin diseases as "real" things. He
firstly contests the assumption that diseases are real. He argues that "diseases are not real
things in the manner they are conceived to be. Diseases are real in the same sense that ideas
are real, concepts are real, and categories are real... Diseases do not have independent
existence; they are not things like lungs or livers. Cancer of the breast does not have free-
standing concrete existence and neither does pneumococcal pneumonia. Diseases are
abstractions, conceptual entities that serve a concrete purpose. They are generalizations,
categories that contain the facts about the abstraction in the sum total of its numerous
expressions. Only the individual expression of the disturbance has actual touch-them-with-
your-hands existence. But even though they exist, the expressions of the disease can never be
observed by themselves, because while they have existence, they do not have independent
existence" (Cassell 1991: 105). Disease is, therefore, not in any sense an entity that enjoys
independent existence in concrete reality.
Cassell (1991: 108) goes on to contest the view that symptoms are the unmediated expression
of diseases. He argues that "the bodily occurrences that lead to the process of perception and
then verbal expression of symptoms are inevitably subjected to interpretation and distortion by
the patient. The effect of the addition of the patients' personal meanings ineluctably
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individualizes and personalizes the altered physiology that is the disease process, so that what
emerges and is presented to the physician is the unique illness unfolding over time that is the
expression of the disease in a particular person" (Cassell 1991: 108). Thus, patients are not
capable of somehow directly "representing" their experience of physical disorder to the
physician. Neither are physicians capable of perceiving the experience of the patient as an
independent observer who simply recognises an already classified pattern of disorder. This
raises some doubt about the physician's quest "to pull the disease free, so to speak, from the
obstructions and entanglements of the patient ... It turns out that the object of the physician's
search, the disease entity, does not exist in concrete reality but is merely an abstraction without
independent existence. The only thing the clinician can work on (a paradox for medical
science) is this sick person" (Cassell 1991: 108). It is in fact, as Fischer-Rosenthal (1992: 140)
recognises, only in interaction with this sick person that the physician will be able to develop
an understanding of (but not directly perceive) the patient's experiences as they are affected by
disease.
While the person - the whole person - represents the primary object of study with which the
doctor interacts every day, the biomedical model simply cannot include the patient and his or
her attributes as a person, as a total human being. The model "cannot make provision for the
person as a whole nor for data of a social or psychological nature, for reductionism on which
the model is predicated requires that these must first be reduced to physical-chemical terms
before they can have meaning" (Kriel 1989: 325-326). In practical terms this means that the
subjective reality of the patient (including his or her world of meaning, hopes, fears,
responsibilities and values) is not really part of the disease with which the doctor is concerned.
There is in fact a very clear difference between what the doctors understands as disease and
what the patient experiences as illness. Based on this, Kriel (1989: 326) concludes that this
model renders the very essence of medical practice beyond the reach of medical science. It is
indeed as Engel (in Kriel 1989: 326) suggests "an incomplete scientific model" - it cannot deal
with the totality of phenomena related to health or disease.
Because disease ultimately fmds expression in an individual sick person, Cassell (1991: 32-34)
strongly appeals for a rejection of the historical dualism of mind and body. Without such
rejection the place of the person in human illness cannot be understood. After all, it is "not
possible to treat sickness as something that happens solely to the body without risking damage
to the person. An anachronistic division of the human condition into what is medical (having
to do with the body) and what is non-medical (the remainder) has given medicine too narrow a
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notion of its calling" (Cassell 1991: 34). In the name of adequate medical care, this clearly
calls for the (re-)construction of the patient as a whole person.
The second major repercussion of the management of ME in accordance with the biomedical
model is the all-too-frequent tendency to pigeon-hole ME patients as suffering from
somatoform disorder, and specifically, from depression.
To his dismay, Goldstein (1991: 55-56) finds that ME patients are often labelled as
somatocizers. This label suggests that they suffer from a disorder that is marked by recurrent
and multiple somatic complaints, of several years duration, for which medical attention has
been sought, but that apparently are not due to any physical disorder. Complaints are often
presented in a dramatic, vague or exaggerated way or are part of a complicatedmedical history
in which many physical diagnoses have been considered. Nowhere in this description of
somatozation disorder are references to be found of recurrent flu-like illnesses or sore throats
or painful lymph nodes so characteristic of ME. In fact, as Oldmeadow (2000: 76) recognises,
"prior to developing this illness many patients have lived uncomplicated, functional,
productive and busy lives, with no hint of psychiatric disturbance or frequent recourse to
medical consultations".
ME patients are equally often misdiagnosed as suffering from depression. Goldstein (1990:
57) observes that sufferers, even though they do not meet DSM criteria for depression, may be
judged to have "masked depression", a "depressive equivalent", or (to really stretch the point),
"depressive disorder not otherwise specified", a catch-all loophole used when a person does
not have the grace to neatly fit any other DSM category. This happens despite clear-cut
evidence that ME is not a somatic presentation of depression or any other underlying
psychological disorder (cf. Hickie et al. 1990; Steyn 1993). Where, then, is the logic in this
"it's all in the mind" approach? Perhaps, Goldstein (1990: 6) suggests, it seems easier for
many physicians to "explain away" the illness by focusing on the patient's depression than to
accept the challenge of dealing with it. On the other hand, perhaps it simply points toward the
classic biomedical model in practice: if nothing is wrong in the body, something must be
wrong in the mind. Hence, the sick person's own experience of illness can, as in Natalie's
account, be bluntly denied.
The impression that ME is a psychological disorder is unfortunately not only prevalent in
encounters with medical practitioners like those described by Natalie and Cheryl. It is also
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even advanced by researchers such as Barsky and Borus (1999: 910) who define ME as a
"functional somatic syndrome", characterised "more by symptoms, suffering, and disability
than by disease-specific, demonstrable abnormalities of structure or function". Indeed, they
suggest that, "the suffering of these patients is exacerbated by a self-perpetuating, se1f-
validating cycle in which common, endemic, somatic symptoms are incorrectly attributed to
serious abnormality, reinforcing the patient's belief that he or she has a serious disease".
In response, English (2000: 329) points out that Barsky and Borus cite no post-mortem
examinations, no brain biopsies, no negative findings of any kind. Yet, they say, "evidence
suggests organic disease: abnormal findings on single-photon emission compute tomography,
positron-emission tomography, and magnetic resonance imaging scans, hypothalamic
hypofunction, and cognitive deficits". The burden of proof is on the authors, Barsky and
Borus, to show "no demonstrable tissue abnormality". They do not. In fact, they consistently
ignored evidence which does suggest an organic cause for ME.
Thus, while Barsky and Borus (1999: 910) state that patients often "devalue and dismiss
medical authority and epidemiologic evidence that conflict with their beliefs", the authors
themselves seem to have done the same. Their paper ignores, dismisses and distorts research
evidence concerning the nature of ME. For instance, when focussing on ME, they often refer
to articles which deal with fatigue or chronic fatigue; not with chronic fatigue syndrome. In
addition, despite their use of more than 200 references, Barsky and Borus's search of
published articles seems to have missed all the studies and reviews which suggest that
biological factors playa major role in ME, as well as those studies and reviews challenging the
effectiveness of psychological intervention.
English (2000: 329) also argues that even if there were normal histological findings in ME,
Barsky and Borus's argument still rests on shaky ground. Schizophrenia was once the
quintessential psychiatric illness, reputedly caused by cold, distant mothers. Tissue
examination of schizophrenics also revealed no consistent abnormalities. Today, however,
schizophrenia is considered a neurological brain disease. Numerous other diseases, including
lupus, multiple sclerosis, AIDS, Lyme disease and even cancer, suffered similar fates before
"tissue evidence" was available. Albrecht (1999: 18) recalls that, "in the 13th century, for
instance, people 'knew' you wouldn't get bubonic plague if you lived a simple, carefree life
with many enjoyable but not overly stimulating activities. In the 18th century, gout was
regarded as a payback for overindulgence in liquor and luxury foods. In the 19th century
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everyone understood that it was emotionally sensitive people - poets, painters, artistic people
generally - who got tuberculosis. The 20th century has been no better. When I was in graduate
school in the late '50s, we took for granted that asthma was a direct outcome of unresolved
Oedipal conflict, and until the '90s everyone I knew accepted the fact that ulcers came from
stress and working too hard, being too competitive. Yet, plague, tuberculosis and many ulcers
are caused by bacteria; asthma starts with allergy and creates physical alteration of the
airways; gout is a metabolic problem. The fact is that no illness affecting a diverse population
has ever turned out to be primarily or predominantly mental". Albrecht (1999: 18) terms this
tendency among medical practitioners to ascribe any condition that falls beyond the bounds of
current medical knowledge to a psychological origin "hysterical medicine". In fact, he
somewhat derisively suggests that "hysterical medicine" might even in itself be "an
overlooked mental illness" which mysteriously afflicts many physicians as well as some
members of the general population.
Angell (1985: 1571) suggests that myths such as those described above surrounding poorly
understood disorders appear to arise "when a disease of unknown cause is particularly dreaded.
The myth serves as a form of mastery - we can predict where the disease will strike and we
can perhaps ward it off by modifying our inner life". Some may consider the belief that a
particular mental state is an important factor in the cause or cure of a disease as harmless, even
beneficial, since it allows patients some sense of control over their disease. Moreover, it
closely corresponds with the Protestant work ethic that motivates patients to participate in
therapeutic interventions and to expect that more is better. That is, the more medical
intervention sought and received, the closer patients will be (or at least expect to be) to
recovery (Kaufman 1988: 346). The belief in the power of a particular mental approach and
the Protestant work ethic, taken together, encapsulates one important Western perspective:
"that the individual can acquire the ability, through training and perseverance, to reverse
disease outcomes and, in fact, to overcome nature" (Kaufman 1988: 346). Unfortunately, this
perspective also carries the potential of personal failure. If a patient believed in some method
of thought control, yet failed to arrest the progress of the illness, the patient is at fault. After
all, "a view that attaches credit to patients for controlling their disease also implies blame for
the progression of the disease" (Angell 1985: 1571). A dualistic mode of thought that invokes
a narrow "mind-over-body" understanding of illness may amplify into a powerful means of
placing the blame on the patient. Hence, while he is not in favour of abolishing all personal
responsibility for health, Angell (1985: 1572) firmly states that it is "time to acknowledge that
our belief in disease as a direct reflection of mental state is largely folklore".
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Goldstein (1990: 54), almost despairingly, observes that each time he dares to believe that the
clinical research community has convincingly dismembered, exploded or destroyed the notion
that ME is due to some imperfect, even reprehensible, mental state, or to a somatoform
disorder, or more specifically to depression, unwary or foolhardy researchers such as Barsky
and Borus, or medical practitioners such as those encountered by Natalie and Cheryl, manage
to resurrect this destructive superstition. Still, Goldstein (1990: 59) remains hopeful that soon
the weight of published evidence should be so overwhelming that those who still choose to
make the assertion that ME and depression are one and the same "will charitably be viewed as
being in denial of reality".
Thirdly, those who practice medicine in accordance with the framework provided by the
biomedical model are simply unable to understand either ME or the sufferer's experience of it.
ME symptoms are vague, as Goldstein (1990: 9) points out, they may wax and wane, and they
can be symptomatic of other diseases. In addition, the symptoms do not fall within a single
medical discipline but instead cross many boundaries. With no discipline willing to embrace
the disease (with the possible exception of psychoneuroimmunology), ME still remains "an
unwanted stepchild of medicine" (Goldstein 1990: 87). Furthermore, although the major
symptoms of ME suggest a non-localised disturbance of central nervous system function, its
pathophysiological basis remains obscure. A diverse array of aetiologies has been proposed,
but no simple explanatory model has been consistently supported. Thus, as Lloyd et al. (2000:
472) state, "ME challenges the standard concept of discrete disease categories linked to
specific aetiologies. The practitioner is confronted with the challenge of explaining the
patient's symptoms without reference to a coherent biomedical model".
In these circumstances, many doctors are reluctant to even admit that ME exists, let alone
agree to treat it. If their instruments cannot identify the problem, there cannot be a problem.
Many doctors would rather fall back on out-dated notions of "psychosomatic disease" than
endorse ME as a real and severely debilitating illness. This is supported by a leading ME
researcher, Dr Paul Cheney (in Garloch 1990: 19), who remarks, "the emergence of this
disorder has demonstrated a weakness in the medical community's ability to identify and
characterize subtle disorders". The dominant model on which the medical community relies,
the biomedical model, is simply too simple, too narrow, to explain the nature of an illness such
as ME and has, hence, led to serious problems in patient care.
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When doctors start believing in instruments and stop listening to their patients, they become
unable to understand the experience of illness of the sick persons who consult them. Cassell
(1991: 176) explains that in the era of biomedical clinical practice, "the only real knowledge is
thought to be scientific knowledge: that which is gleaned from natural science and is objective
or measurable. Other kinds of knowing are considered oflesser value". Yet, the question of
whether someone is suffering is not open to scientific knowledge. It cannot be verified or
empirically demonstrated. It is unavoidably doubtful and uncertain. Consequently, the relief
of suffering - as medicine's fundamental purpose - cannot be achieved through purely
scientific medicine. This does not imply a rejection of objective facts as the basis of medical
science. It simply means that these facts, necessary as they are, are in themselves insufficient
to the medical practitioner's task. Suffering is after all the distress of the person as a whole,
not of the person merely in the (objective) biological sense. Indeed, "the wholeness or
individuality of suffering extends beyond the confines of the body" (Cassell 1991: 211).
Cassell (1991: 211) contends that "sick persons, unlike livers or enzymes, do not meet the
criteria as objects of science. They cannot ever be completely known or known apart from the
knower, and they cannot be measured solely in the objective terms of science... They are
ultimately individual and therefore inevitably different from another". Thus, it is clear that
focusing only on the body, the biological, represents but a small slice of the total relevant
biography of the sick person; relevant, that is, in the provision of adequate medical care.
Very few disorders in modern medicine have generated such uncertainty and controversy as
ME. According to Goldstein (1990: 16), Dr. Anthony Komaroff, a well-known and leading
ME researcher, is quoted as saying that "even AIDS was simpler than this". Unfortunately, as
Goldstein (1990: 2) frankly admits, "the medical profession has badly mishandled the CFS
problem". Although there is great reluctance to think that the very way medical science looks
at things may be the culprit, it is clear that much of the difficulty surrounds the dominant
reductionist and dualist paradigm of biomedicine. The discussion above and, more
importantly, the participants' experiences, show that a broader paradigm is called for - a
paradigm that will acknowledge the dense web of delicate interconnections between the
physical, the psychological and the social which comprise the patient as a whole person. Such
a paradigm is likely to advance medical practitioners' insight into the illness experience of ME
sufferers and, hence, allow them to provide more constructive roadside support for their
patients on their journey to wellness.
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In response ...
The participants compared the experiences they had with the medical profession to a grinding
cycle where hope of relief was regularly replaced by deep disappointment. Denise offered a
clear expression of the type of experience which the other participants also encountered:
... en dan ook half die teleurstelling of die ... jy gaan ... jy hoor van die ... 'die dokter' en met 'n verwagting
gaan jy na 'die dokter' toe ... hopenlik dat hulle vir jou 'n diagnose kan gee en 'n behandeling ... en dan
werk dit nie... Dan dis half ... jy bou 'n verwagting op en dan is dit 'n teleurstelling ... en 'n verwagting
en 'n teleurstelling en dit laat jou dink, maar, jy weet, jy's besig om mal te word... Mmm ... so dis
weer ... die kwessie van jy het 'n verwagting en dit word teleurgestel en jy het 'n verwagting en dit word
teleurgesteL.. Mmm ... en dan kom dit maar weer terug op 'moet op prinse nie vertrou nie' ...
In this cycle of successive hopefulness and disappointment the latter was often caused by a
combination of the very real physical harm following medical treatment, the dire lack of
adequate medical care, and the relentless insistence on pursuing the psychological route.
The participants repeatedly cited the physical harm they experienced when submitted to
inappropriate medical treatment. Again, it was Denise who offered a hair-raising description
of the consequences which followed such treatment:
Dit was vir my ... ek het. .. ek het baie erger gevoel daarna, ek was op baie medikasie en dit gee vir jou
konvulsies en newe-effekte en dinge en... Toe ek daar ont. .. toe ek daar uitkom, toe is ek ... ek was
omtrent nie in staat om te loop nie, ek was heeltemaL .. mmm ... non compos mentus ...
Denise later sadly added:
... ek kan vir jou eerlik sê dat. .. dat as ... as 'n mens half dit. .. anders hanteer het, dan dink ek sou dit
baie minder skade gedoen het. .. dan dink ek is jou pad van herstel vinniger en makliker... Ongelukkig
betaal jy net nou nog steeds die prys daarvan ... jy weet, skade en goed wat medikasie aangerig het wat
jy ... wat se effekte jy vir 'n lang tyd saam met jou in jou liggaam gaan ronddra ...
Cheryl's experience of so-called medical expertise in practice was similarly disturbing:
He (a neurologist) ... he too ... he put me on medication that. .. made me feel dreadful, .. and even more
agitated ... and ... so we went back to the ... the doctor ... and I said to him I cannot tolerate the
medicine... So, I was completely ... now this was the first time ever that I became emotional. .. emotional
in front of a doctor ... because he put a call through to the neuro ... neurologist, while we were sitting
there ... on the edge of our seats, waiting for help, waiting for an answer, finally got the call through and
the GP ... said to us the neuro ... the neurologist said your reaction to the medication was perfectly
normal. .. far from coming off it, you must double the dose... And I just burst into tears, because I knew
that medication was doing me no good at all... I just. .. I just was so desperate ...
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Denise and Cheryl experienced that medical treatment did not bring relief. Instead, it simply
inflated the burden of their suffering. Suddenly participants' assumptions were overthrown
that medicine is omnipotent in its ability to restore normalcy. Naturally disappointment
followed for the participants in this study. This is similar to the disenchanting experiences of
stroke sufferers in Kaufman's (1988: 346) study when medical treatment failed to deliver any
physical results.
Experiences of medical treatment which are physically harmful were often alternated by
experiences where no treatment was offered at all. The patient was pricked, poked, palpated,
submitted to a variety of technical examinations, to innocuous or painful diagnostic means, and
to varied therapeutics, all to no avail. Even where the ME diagnosis was finally accepted, it
held no guarantee of sufficient medical treatment, as Natalie's experience revealed:
'n Ander dokter het telke male wat ek hom besoek het my nie eens deeglik ondersoek nie. Hy het net
vasgestaar teen die diagnose van ME, hy het gesê jy weet wat jou diagnose is, jy weet dit is ongeneeslik.
Sy belangstelling in simptomatiese behandeling, al was daar ernstige simptome op daardie stadium, was
minimaal.
Also consider Cheryl's statement:
We are losing them as a 'caring profession' in many, many cases... Even the old family doctor has all
but disappeared. In my opinion good old fashioned physical examinations, thoroughly done, knowledge
of the patient's home situation and lots of listening would be far better than all these tests in MANY
cases.
When the sufferer experiences neither understanding nor receives treatment, desperation sets
in. It therefore came as no surprise when Denise despairingly disclosed:
'n Mens bereik 'n punt waar jy jou eie dokter wil wees ...
Thus, during the sufferer's interminable journey through the medical mill, a grave sense of
disappointment followed each of the repeated instances where they were confronted by the
utter inability to provide adequate medical care. They eventually experienced the lack of
recognition of their illness, and the apparent absence of any intent to at least treat its
symptoms, as a "betrayal" by the medical profession (Ware 1992: 351).
According to the experiences described by the participants, this sense of disappointment was
further augmented by medical practitioners' insistence that they follow the psychological
route. The absence of observable evidence of pathology, together with the ambiguous status
of the illness in professional medicine, combines to preclude the possibility of a physical
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diagnosis. And if an illness is not physical, it must, it follows, be mental. Natalie, for
instance, recalled:
... ek dink aan 'n dokter waar ek was ... wat my vir 'n ... twee en 'n kwart jaar behandel het en ... vir my
gesê het op die ou end ... mmm ... sy kan my nie gesond maak nie, so sy is oortuig daarvan ek het iets
anders, iets psigies, verkeerd met my. Ek onthou daai dag so goed, want. .. ek het so hard probeer en
alles wat sy gesê het het ek so goed gedoen, jy weet, elke reëltjie nagekom ... ek het nooit oortree of iets
nie... en ek was so ontsteld, ek was so hartseer ... dat dit vir die soveelste keer gebeur het. ..
This expenence shows that when faced by a patient who presents unaccountable and
seemingly untreatable aches and pains, the medical practitioner may, as Violon (1982: 30)
acknowledges, indeed be tempted to treat the patient as "a malinger, as mentally disturbed or
as an hysteric". That this represents a very strong possibility is confirmed by Green et al's
(1999: 67) finding that more than three quarters of the ME sufferers who had participated in
their study had been exposed to psychological labelling. In response, the patient will
inevitably be reluctant to follow the psychological route: "the 'real' doctors do not believe
him, don't want to treat him anymore, think that he exaggerates his pain, and consider him as
crazy" (Violon 1982: 31). Patients feel that talking about their past, childhood, parents,
family, or feelings make no sense. They think that they are receiving an inappropriate
response to the question of their physical suffering because they are convinced that their
psychic life has nothing to do with their suffering. Patients know that their suffering is not
"imaginary". Consequently, as the participants' accounts revealed, they experienced
disappointment in the medical profession's inability to accept and understand the patient's
illness experience.
Thus, when exposed to physical harm, to utterly inadequate medical care, and to outright
demands to pursue psychological help, the grinding cycle again and again ended in
disappointment. For this participants this dreadful outcome caused two processes which
operated concurrently: the first, a changing awareness of Self, the second, an increasing
disenchantment with the medical profession.
Natalie firmly placed the influence of the medical profession's response to ME within the
context of the sufferer's awareness of Self when she states:
... mense se konsep van die siekte ... kom direk terug na jou toe.
And more specifically:
... die dokters speel 'n ... 'n vreeslike groot rol ... by 'n mens se... se self-indrukke ...
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
223
Hence, how medical practitioners responded to the experience of illness of ME sufferers
influenced their perception of Self. Indeed, sufferers were liable to feel misunderstood,
blamed, labelled, even stigmatised. Consider Helen's account:
At a time when I was desperately trying to understand my own illness and acknowledge the changes it
brought with it, I had a great need to be understood. I did not expect immediate answers as to the cause,
effect and prognosis with regard to ME, but I needed the doctors I consulted to accept my symptoms as
real and as affecting my life in a very overwhelming way... Their frustration was overt and contributed
greatly to the uneasiness I came to feel whenever I consulted a new doctor. The majority of times I came
away feeling misunderstood and labelled as one suffering from a 'psychosomatic illness' ...
Ware's (1992: 350) research suggests that labelling the patient's illness as psychosomatic - as
"all in her head" - embodies a particularly severe delegitimizing experience for ME sufferers.
Worse yet, for the ME sufferer like Helen, the medical profession's inability to recognise,
comprehend and treat ME not only delegitimises her own experience, but also adds the
additional burden of stigma. In this respect, Green et al. (1999: 64) suggest that "it is likely
that ambiguous, chronic disorders ... create a vulnerability to stigmatization by others in people
with the syndrome". Furthermore, "because medical professionals in our society are accorded
high status ... they may be an important source of stigma in patients with chronic, etiology-
defying illnesses". Green et al' s (1999: 64) concern is that the experience of stigma, as an
additional stressor, "could interfere with the process of recovery from CFS or, at the least,
impact adversely on the quality of life of people who already suffer". This possibility is
supported by Totman's (1990: 157) review of numerous research initiatives which converges
on one common finding: "that an individual's physical and mental health is profoundly
affected by other people" - obviously including high-status medical practitioners.
The potential of the seemingly high-minded medical professional not only to cause a dreaded
stigmatisation, but also to pervert the sufferer's illness experience, was strongly supported by
Natalie's description:
... die mediese professie .. sjoe, ek kan nou eerlikwaar sê dit het my selfbeeld baie aangetas. Dit moes
nie, maar dit het, want ek het. .. 'n mens het s ... 'n sekere soort respek vir iemand wat. .. iets weet, wat jy
dink iets weet, jy sien... En dit maak ongelooflik seer as jy by 'n dokter kom, nadat jy ... uiteindelik
miskien vir jouself uitgeklaar het dat jy nou nie ... mmm ... besig is om jou verstand te verloor nie en jy
weet daar is fisiese goed verkeerd en jy is nou oortuig daarvan en jy kom sê maar by 'n paar dokters en
almal van hulle oortuig jou maar weer andersins ... en sê vir jou, nee, maar, wag, ons sien niks verkeerd
nie... En dit is vreeslik moeilik, want daar begin dit. .. dit is miskien waar die groot geveg binne-in my
begin het... die elke dag se bevraagtekening ... 'n mens begin jouself ontleed en bevraagteken en
wonder ... is hulle nie maar reg nie, hulle kry dan niks nie... En huile ... eintlik, huile ... is miskien nie
bewus daarvan nie ... maar werk hulle vreeslik met jou kop, want. .. hulle smokkel daarmee, want. .. wat
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hulle van oortuig is, probeer hulle jou van oortuig en dit is nie noodwendig reg nie en jy dink omdat dit die
mediesie professie is ... is dit.
Natalie's account shows the self-doubt which is induced by the ignorance of the medical
profession. It also shows how such ignorance undermines the validity of the perception and
understanding which ME sufferers have of their illness. This theme was also identified in
Green et al.'s (1999: 70-71) study of ME sufferers. They found that "among our subjects,
physicians' apparent ignorance of, or sceptical attitude toward CFS, played a role in the
potential damaging 'delegitimation of illness experience': physicians reconstructed reality to
signify that the illness of the CFS patient was 'not real"'. This apparent assau1ton sufferers'
sense of reality of the nature of their illness results in self-doubt.
Ware's (1992: 352) study of ME sufferers similarly confirms that the experience of having
their perception of reality repeatedly denied quickly paves the way to self-doubt. She observes
that "those who had had such experiences described in frustrated tones how at one point or
another they felt compelled to accept the possibility that what they were feeling might, after
all, be 'all in their heads' and that that might mean they were 'crazy"'. Ware is ofthe opinion
that the fear that their illness may after all be psychosomatic confronts self-doubters not only
with the possibility that they do perhaps suffer from a psychological disorder, but also with the
stigma which this entails. The suffering of self-doubt thus "lies in the prospect of adding the
burden of a stigmatised identity to that of living with a chronic illness that is severely
debilitating, basically untreatable, and of questionable authenticity in the eyes of others" (Ware
1992: 352). This means that the consistent denial of their experience by the medical
profession leads ME sufferers, like the participants in my study, to disbelieve their own
experiences. And this - along with the stigma such a question of personal reality might invoke
- adds directly to their suffering.
When the reality of their illness experience was questioned, this inevitably led the participants
to doubt themselves. For them, the mere fact that the validity of their experiences was
questioned hinted at the possibility that their very characters were suspect. In other words,
whereas an illness acquired through external agency such as a viral infection is seen as
blameless, an emphasis on psychological factors being the cause of their illness is perceived as
pointing to personal failure or weakness of character. This predicament is eloquently
expressed by Ware (in Wessely et al. 1998: 271): "Mind is the seat of reason and volition,
body the locus of 'natural' biological processes that lie largely outside the realms of rationality
agency and intention. The task and the challenge of mind is to exercise dominance over the
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body, to bring it under rational control. With control and volition come responsibility. We are
held accountable for what we command or intend. Thus paradoxically, sickness of mind ('loss
of reason') signifies not only failure of will and loss of control, but a failure of will and loss of
control we brought on ourselves. It follows that we are responsible; psychological disorder is
'our own fault"'. Thus, despite "the fact that psychosomatic medicine was originally
conceivable as an antidote to biological reductionism", as "an attempt to bring mind and body
together in biomedicine in more or less equal union", experiences shows that "psychosomatic
diagnoses have come to be classed with psychiatric disorders", thereby "reproducing dualistic
thinking and sharing the stigmatized status of mental illness as a disability we 'bring on
ourselves" (Ware 1992: 356).
Like Natalie, all the participants in this study experienced this dilemma. Whenever the
medical practitioner unthinkingly assumes the role of "expert", which is made possible by the
biomedical model, the ME sufferer's awareness of her own body, of her own physical reality,
was often denied and rendered suspect. At one time or another each participant has been either
directly told or made to feel that her illness was trivial, that it could be dismissed as
psychosomatic, or that it could only be the result of her own doing. The blame, humiliation
and even shame that this approach evoked - because it made the sufferer feel wrong about her
own interpretation of reality - was one of the most devastating experiences caused by
delegitimation. As a result, each participant has at one time or another doubted her own
experience of reality. At times some even believed this to be true, but thankfully not
permanently.
All the participants' changing awareness of Self eventually developed into a stronger belief in
their own experience and their own reality, to such a degree that even when they were faced
again by an ignorant and disbelieving practitioner, their own perception of reality now
remained secure. Note, for instance, Natalie's account:
... ek het hierdie ... absolute duidelike ... prentjies wat ek kan herroep in my kop waar ek by dokters gesit
het wat ... vir my goed gesê het wat ek op daai oomblik geweet het is so verkeerd, so onwaar, want ek
het nou al myself so baie keer ontleed en ek is so seker ...
Natalie's view of herself as knowledgeable of her own physical state clearly opposed the
practitioner's account of her condition. But Natalie's belief in her own experience remained
steadfast. She knew she was truly ill and no longer required the practitioner's affirmation that
this was so.
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Cheryl expressed an even stronger personal perception of reality:
... it would be very easy to become frustrated at the fact that it is not acknowledged by ... a doctor here,
but that. .. that I don't actually need, because I. .. I. .. I'm... I believe in myself enough to know that I. .. if I
think ... if I. .. what I'm experiencing is so obviously real and it's been reinforced so many times that it's
not just mental or emotional or anything like... And it. .. every time it is reinforced it's an encouragement
to me, because that. .. remains important to me that I don't. .. mmm ... sink into a ... a ... syndrome of ... of
thinking I'm ill and perhaps not getting up when actually that day I could get up, for example. So, it's very
important to me to co ..constantly reassure myself that it is a physical illness, but it happens in ways that I
don't even look for ... and which are sometimes unpleasant, because the physical symptoms can be so
overwhelming. But. .. mmm ... no, I don't need to be reaffirmed by a medical person ... and I don't think
I'm ever going to be...
Cheryl's account not only described a new-found confidence in Self and personal reality, but
also hints at the second process at work: the growing disenchantment with the medical
profession.
Natalie voiced a similar awareness, but more directly:
Heelwat van hierdie negatiewe ervarings het tog maar gesorg dat my respek vir die mediese professie
half verlore geraak het. Ek is skepties om dokter toe te gaan, want ek voel. .. mmm ... hulle kan in elk
geval nie iets vir my doen nie.
Natalie's description confirms that her repeated encounters of ignorance and disbelief from
insensitive medical practitioners led her to lose respect for and belief in the power of medicine,
and has even induced a sense of scepticism and alienation. This sensation may lead a sufferer
to feel forlorn and disconsolate, especially when desperately ill: if my doctor cannot help me,
where should I tum to?
Indeed, after another encounter with medical ignorance, Cheryl said:
So ... we again lost a... a... it was sad because ... we lost a support structure... it seemed like
everywhere support structures were falling down... ;
and after yet another such an encounter:
... once again it... it's like ... a carpet being pulled out of u... under our feet... I mean, it's absolutely
astounding to me ...
Finally, Cheryl was in despair:
I feel I have no doctor. A frightening feeling when very ill.
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Cheryl thus experienced a growing sense of disenchantment with the medical profession that
was closely accompanied by a stark sense ofloss and desolation.
On the other hand, this sense of disenchantment held the potential of an almost empowering
experience for the sufferer. Indeed, for the sufferer, it stood to obliterate any sense of
intimidation by medical expertise or of embarrassment when seeking help for such a "strange"
illness. Thus, whereas a sufferer might have initially felt obliged to listen to "the doctor", even
to follow seemingly unhelpful or harmful treatment regimes, repeated encounters with sheer
medical ignorance and incompetence, combined with a stronger belief in Self and personal
reality, were likely to set the patient free from this obligation (cf. Kotarba 1983: 190-191).
Helen described the insight that guided her towards this liberating experience:
It took me a long time to realise that I was not necessarily the strange, depressed person I was often
being made to feel, but that those who were labelling me as such, were scientifically minded people who
were struggling to cope with their own discomfort surrounding an illness that left so many questions
unanswered... I found comfort seeing my illness as a new challenge to the medical world ...
For Helen, as well as for the other participants, disenchantment with the medical profession
did not end with scepticism and alienation. It also brought the wisdom to dismiss an
unqualified belief in the medical profession's ability to bring relief and healing. Thus, far from
relying solely on the medical profession to bestow confirmation on and bring relief from their
symptoms, participants such as Helen were now able to assume the position of 'expert' over
their own physical reality. While such accounts should not be excessively exaggerated - or
worse yet, romanticised - they do show that there is a different way of coming to grips with
this illness. In effect these accounts open up spaces where the voices of other ME sufferers
can be heard, and where they can actively engage and, where appropriate, directly challenge
the apparently all-authoritative claims of the medical profession (cf. Heaphy 1998: 25).
Thus, the participants' experience of the medical profession's response to ME was marked by
a cycle of successive hopefulness and disappointment. In response, participants developed a
deeper awareness of Self that grew from self-doubt to self-affirmation. This was accompanied
by greater insight into the limited scope of present-day medical knowledge and capacity.
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To cope ...
The way in which the participants' response to encounters with the medical profession became
a process through which they grew and developed, was echoed in the way they eventually
learned to cope on the medical front. Their approach speaks of change and of development
away from unqualified obedience and trust in medical authority, to self-reliance and a newly
clarified image of the ideal doctor.
At the onset of their illness, participants' mode of coping was marked by unqualified
obedience to the medical practitioner. Natalie explained:
En ek het... ek het altyd almal se raad baie mooi gevolg ... mmm ... as jy vir my gesê het. .. jy gaan nou
vir ses maande niks suiker en niks melk en niks stysel inneem nie, sodat daar omtrent niks oorbly om te
eet nie, dan sou ek dit doen ... ek sou nie een dag verneuk nie, jy weet. .. dit is nou maar net soos dit is,
jy weet. .. daar is nou maar net geen kans ... mmm ... want ek wou ook agter die kap van die byl kom, ek
kon nie verstaan wat gaan aan in my lewe nie ...
Cheryl succinctly expressed a similar mode of coping:
I was still in '94 in the stage where I bel ... I had elected to believe and trust the doctors ... I presumed the
doctors knew what they were doing ... then I was relatively passive and went along with most of what the
doctors suggested ...
It appears as though participants' obedience to whatever the doctor deemed essential followed
from their trust in the medical profession. Cassell (1991: 76) suggests that patients' trust in
doctors represents their way of solving the intolerable uncertainty which accompanies illness.
He explains that when they are ill, patients experience "an increased urgency to act. But,
decisions and actions that are seen as having to do with one's very life require levels of
certainty that are not available to the sick person - they simply do not have enough
information, as no one does in such circumstances. Trust in others is one of the central human
solutions to the paralysis of unbearable uncertainty. For these reasons the sick put their trust in
doctors" (Cassell 1991: 76). Very importantly, patients indeed have very little choice but to
trust the medical practitioner.
Patients' trust in medical practitioners therefore endows the latter with both the power and the
responsibility to act on patients' behalf. But what happens when medical practitioners
mishandle their power or act irresponsibly? What happens when the patient's interests are not
served?
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Cheryl offered insight into this predicament as she told of an experience, which was typically
experienced by all the participants:
... we've realised some have just been over their heads and not been able to help us and others
have ... not really wanted to go the distance with us, because it's looked to complicated and some of
them have been downright unkind ...
Cheryl's experience does not testify that her uncertainty was resolved. Neither does it testify
of the provision of adequate medical care. It does not testify of doctors acting in accordance
with the power and responsibility they are usually expected to exhibit. Instead, Cheryl's
account, which represents the experiences of all the participants, testifies of indignant
frustration in the face of such dereliction of duty by medical practitioners.
Financially too, the medical profession's failed to handle the ME sufferer's best interests.
ConsiderNatalie's recollection:
Finansieel op lang duur word dit ook natuurlik 'n probleem. Finansieel-gesproke is daar heelwat
praktiese probleme. Mediese onkoste vir toetse, dokters, medikasie ... dit beloop letterlik duisende rande
en dit raak 'n huishouding en almal in die familie se leefwyse. Mediese fondse is gedurig deur uitgeput. ..
Dit is 'n probleem vir my om op die ouderdom ... nog op my pa se mediese fonds te bly, al het ek bewyse
van 'n chroniese siekte ...
Cheryl offers an even more startling account of the financial implications for the person who
suffers from ME:
We have ... we have had to sell so many things to try to keep up and we're still heavily in debt... It's
enormously expensive, because even with the medical aid you're always running out and paying the
excess ... or the medical aid cover runs out because you're needing so much help from the medical aid ...
So we've sold our only car, we've sold my engagement ring, all that sort of thing, and ... my husband sold
his boat. .. and we still are heavily, heavily in debt. .. we've made a conscious decision not to sell any
furniture so that our house still looks ... mmm ... presentable, because also, you know, you don't get much
for furniture, you get a odd R100 here or there, and what will that help in the end... So we've made a
conscious decision to sell everything we can that has any value ... and ... you know, keep everything else
looking fairly normaL.. So, I mean, no one really knows that I don't have an engagement ring anymore,
for example ... it's pretty obvious we don't have a car, I mean, that makes life very difficult... This all
happened in the last two or three years, that... the money ... the money-side of things just totally
overtook ... by then we just couldn't cope anymore ...
Cheryl's startling experience tells of the impoverishment that accompanies chronic illness (cf.
Kriel1997: 186Ware 1999: 313). In its most benign form, such impoverishment means doing
without non-essentials, or sometimes, cutting down on essentials. Like Cheryl and her family,
ME sufferers may stop going out for meals, postpone home repairs, sell the second car, and
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trade in valuable items for cash. All the while, income (or the ability to generate income) is
reduced while expenses relentlessly increase. What makes treatment so expensive?
The answer to these questions lie partly in the process of referral. ME sufferers are typically
sent from one specialist to the next - more and more tests, mounting costs - to no avail at all.
Again and again the participants pointed out how expensive it was to be on the medical
treadmill. Note, for instance, Cheryl's recollection of the second neurologist she was sent to
see:
... when every test result, including a R4000 MRI scan did not show results he could 'put in a box' and
label he simply handed over a bill for R1800! and left us flat (This did not include the price of.ê.!JYof the
tests, We were really battling).
Then came the third neurologist:
He ordered R1000's worth of tests which I did not have the strength to resist or the brainpower to
remember that I'd already had some of them (for eg, a CAT SCAN etc) and after two days he simply
telephoned my bedside 'phone and told me to stop taking drugs... I went home pretty shattered (to put it
mildly) and realized I'd once more lost a support 'system' (network). Also in my unhappy state I did not
think to ask the neurologist or the physician for any of my results and my husband simply spent months
paying off bills. I wasn't even given the scans, x-rays or anything. (And subsequently too weak &
downhearted to demand/request, whatever ... )
These are only two of the more than 20 medical specialists Cheryl had consulted during her
eleven-year illness. It is not difficult to imagine the costs involved in each of these
consultations - the expense, the debt, the problems. What is partly responsible for the high
costs is the ever increasing and sometimes inappropriate role that technology plays within the
modem medical practice. Reliance on such technology not only "creates a depersonalised and
inhuman atmosphere", but, for the participants, also directly contributes to the soaring costs of
medical care (Kriel 1989: 327). And here we are only considering the mainstream medical
practice. If the sufferer ventures into the terrain of complementary medicine, as many of the
participants did, expenses rise even more. Approaches to illness management such as
acupuncture, homeopathic remedies, vitamins, nutritional supplements, and non-prescriptive
medications are after all only rarely covered by medical aid.
Goldstein (1990: 1) strongly affirms that, in his experience with ME sufferers, too many of
them are either misdiagnosed or over-referred to medical specialists. He notes that "it is not
uncommon for a patient in these circumstances to ping-pong from doctor to doctor, usually at a
cost of tens of thousands of dollars in often inappropriate diagnostic tests all for nothing, since
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the patient is not helped by these medical efforts". The patient is not only "not helped", but is
also left to bear the added fmancial burden and the often ensuing impoverishment.
Frustration in the face of medical negligence, combined with grave financial difficulty, did not
serve the participants' best interests. Their uncertainty was not resolved and their illness still
raged unchecked. Consequently, their trust in the medical profession eroded away, and was
often all but destroyed. Cheryl openly admitted:
... then I presumed the doctors knew what they were doing... I now know they don't understand what
they're doing ... and to a large extent I have to help myself ...
Cheryl's profound realisation represents a point which all participants eventually reach. At
this juncture, the medical establishment's mismanagement of ME caused the sufferer's
unqualified obedience to medical authority to be firmly replaced by two related actions: first
the sufferer started to avoid contact with the medical profession, and secondly, the sufferer
tended to become more self-reliant.
Natalie clearly expressed the rationale for avoiding contact with the medical profession:
Ek gaan eintlik nie dokter toe nie ... ja ... gaan ek omtrent nie meer nie, want ek voeL .. ag, weet jy, dit is
net vir my so ... veral as 'n mens nou na 'n ... 'n ander dokter soek, om nou van voor af die hele storie te
vertel ... dit is al so holrug gery die storie... Gewoonlik lê ek maar nou maar 'n paar dae of ... ek hoop
maar net dit gaan gou om... So, dit is my oplossing daarvoor ... dit is al wat ek kan doen.
Cheryl said:
And then since then we have ... we decided ... mmm ... we'd try and steer clear of doctors as much as
we could .
For Natalie and Cheryl, as for the other participants, there was simply no reason to consult yet
another doctor. When there was no constructive help forthcoming, there was no reason to
return. When it was doubtful that the professional knew more than the sufferer, there was no
reason to return (Ware 1992: 351).
When there was no reason to return to the doctor's surgery, the Self became the only hope;
hence the development of self-reliance. Cheryl offered a particularly illustrative account of a
ME sufferer's ability to find a doctor inside the Self:
My eyesight from the very beginning gave me problems... I did not think of the fact that if ME affects
muscles, surely my eye muscles too would be affected - those that control eye movement particularly, I
would think... I was taught how to carry on at home, but my eyes became worse and worse ...
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Eventually ... professionals (eye specialists) 'gave up' on me. They simply had no diagnosis for what was
wrong. I finally made my own and realized I had to rest my eyes in the same way that I had to rest my
body. And I also noticed how easy reading was on 'good' days! It began to fall into place ...
At first glance it appears an almost nonsensical expectation to find a doctor inside the Self.
After all, most of us are very used to turning up at a doctor's surgery and walking out a few
minutes later with a prescription in hand to cure the ailment. ME is not like that: "There is no
magic bullet and, at this stage, patients will be foolish to expect one" (Franklin & Sullivan
1989: 163). If sufferers have been used to rely on their doctor for the answers to all their
health problems, they will probably have their illusions shattered. Doctors do not have all the
answers. As this study shows, this is particularly true in the case of ME.
Herzlich (in Willems 1992: 112) points out that this "new sick person" - the self-carer - "is a
new type of personality in our culture". This person is no longer a passive patient, but rather
someone who has learnt to respond to symptoms in ways that do bring relief from suffering.
In doing so, participants in this study challenged one of the "central distinctions of our society:
the often criticized opposition between the knowing who impose their knowledge and those
who have no choice but to undergo it" (Herzlich in Willems 1992: 112). Where this
opposition no longer applies, the division of knowledge and skills between medical
professionals and "lay" patients becomes less and less distinct. The borders have shifted.
Yet, as Willems (1992: 113) recognises, there is still a boundary between the actors in a
medical consultation. However porous and shifting this boundary may have become, doctors
and patients still remain separated. And patients, like my participants, still find themselves on
the side of those who need the expert's knowledge. Thus, despite a firm commitment to avoid
medical practitioners and to get along by themselves, participants were still aware of the need
for professional help from the medical circle, as Cheryl explained:
... I was feeling worried about. .. the middle of this year ... I realised that for ... a year and a half, I've been
more or less treating myself ... you know, self-medicating, which I didn't feel was sensible ... and I was
worried ... I was really very worried that. .. I needed a doctor to help me through this.
Thus, while ME sufferers were essentially in charge of themselves, they still needed the help
of the medical world to cope with their illness (cf. Cassell 1991: 125). Their search for such
help followed many roads. For many participants in this study, as in Ware's (1992: 351)
research, seeking help and relief ended in endless encounters with doctor after doctor. Helen
described this process of "doctor shopping":
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My desperate searching for acceptance of my symptoms and understanding of my illness is evident in
the number of doctors I consulted ... this could be labelled as 'doctor shopping' but it was a process I
needed to work through in coming to accept my illness and the lack of definite answers and solutions it
presented to me ...
Strauss and Glaser (1975: 32-33) point out that the medical world sees this process of "doctor
shopping", of switching and supplementing, or at least only partly adhering to the doctor's
regimen, as either an unjustifiable lack of faith in the medical profession or as a search for the
impossible cure. However, from the standpoint of ME sufferers, loyalty to one doctor no
longer holds the sure promise of relief, let alone a cure. In fact, as Natalie revealed, they very
seldom expected a cure:
... kyk, ek verwag nie veel nie ... ek verwag nie hulle moet ... mmm ... ek wil nie hê hulle moet my belowe
dat hulle my gesond sal maak nie, want ek weet op dié stadium ... dat hulle tien teen een sal jok ...
In fact, they were rather looking for the relief of suffering, which is after all the medical
practitioner's primary task. In the light of the bitterly severe nature of ME, as well as the
general lack of medical help and understanding, it was therefore not surprising that
participants' quest for relief was often marked by pronounced desperation. They wanted to get
better - so much so that they would seek out treatments, even treatments of questionable
effectiveness, simply because of their desire to do something.
Consider, for instance, Denise's statement:
Uit desperaatheid het ek onder andere met die volgende in aanraking gekom: homepatie, refleksiologie,
aromaterapie, chiropraktisyn, kinisioloog, mikro-nutrient en voedingskliniek, kolonterapie en limfdreinasie.
With reference to an extreme approach that included a lengthy period of strict fasting, Denise
said:
En dis ... dis weer eens 'n groot paradigma skuif wat jy moet maak ... vir so tipe ekstreme behandeling,
maar as jy desperaat is dan doen jy dit... Dis 'n plek waar jy by uitkom as jy regtig desperaat is ...
Denise repeatedly stressed:
... jy kom op 'n punt wat jy desperaat is en enige iets sal doen ...
Cheryl's account reflected a similar experience of desperation:
I have investigated dagga ... with my chemist, because he has one patient who is on it ... by prescription.
It is legal ... oh, but the ramifications of that prescription... It's very difficult to get and it's enormously
expensive, enormously expensive... I mean, I have heard people say that it does help for ... for aches
and pains and ... there is one or two folk in ... in the ME world who believe it might be helpful. But I
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
234
wouldn't be able to do anything like that. I would want to do it legally. .. not only because it's right, but
because... eh... the ramifications of... of taking any substance without back-up should something go
wrong... it absolutely overwhelms me. No, I... I could never do that. But it's very tempting ... when the
pain is at its worst, you think, gosh, if there was just some way I could get my hands on a powerful
substance. Very tempting.
Indeed, in the face of soaring symptoms and medical disinterest, the ME sufferer may, as
Lloyd et al. (2000: 472) acknowledge, be dearly tempted to pursue useless or even harmful
unproven therapies - including dagga. This is utter desperation.
Thus, in their quest for relief, the participants consulted numerous medical practitioners and,
often in desperation, followed countless deviations which offered possible help. Through this
process they discovered what they were indeed looking for: the picture of the ideal doctor had
emerged.
Firstly, on a very practical level, the ideal doctor should be located in close proximity to the
sufferer. Cheryl said:
I could have done with that sort of medical help closer. I could still do with it closer. In fact, by tomorrow
I could probably do with it...
Natalie supported this wish:
... ek is nou nog eintlik op soek na 'n dokter naby...
ME sufferers are unable to travel any substantial distance when they are desperately ill. A
journey to a far-away doctor is indeed likely to counteract any possible benefit of the medical
treatment. Thus, a doctor close to home is the ideal.
Secondly, the participants' image of the ideal doctor included the crucial ability and
willingness to listen attentively to the patient. Natalie highlighted the importance ofthis:
... al wat ek soek is 'n dokter wat. .. sal luister ... dis... dit is so ongelooflik belangrik, dat hy net sal hoor
wat ek vir hom sê...
Cheryl explains the reasoning behind this strong emphasis on listening:
The difficulty comes in where they won't accept the fact that you've got this... mmm... underlying
condition that could be affected by whatever they do. There're certain drugs you can't tolerate and you
know jolly well you can't tolerate them, but you haven't got a good enough reason as far as they're
concerned. You know... and they will override you and prescribe something which you won't even go
and... fetch from the chemist, because you know it's a waste of time and money... No doctor likes being
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told anything. They are rare ... doctors who are prepared to listen in anyway are rare. Doctors who are
prepared to have suggestions made to them are rarer still.
Cheryl provides further substantiation of this when she gave a very clear example of the harm
done when the doctor does not listen:
... a physician was called in to give advice... He was yet another 'NO bedside manner'sort and I don't
think he ever heard a whole sentence of mine. He chatted on his cell phone, listed tests to the nursing
sister and just walked out. We've just discovered he duplicated the surgeon's tests - so two or three
days apart we have pathology accounts for exactly the same tests in many cases... If only this man
would listen to his patients! I could have told him what tests had been done.
Clearly, much more effective medical care could take place if the medical practitioner would
listen to the patient and try to understand the patient's way of experiencing the situation. For
the participants this was an indispensable quality ofthe ideal doctor.
Thirdly, the ideal doctor should have sufficient time available to listen attentively to his or her
patients. Natalie strongly emphasised this quality:
En baie belangrik is iemand wat tyd het vir jou, want ... ongelukkig die medici ... my ervaring op die
oomblik is hulle is altyd net so haastig... En 'n mens ... mmm ... 'n mens voel skaam om te kla oor klein
goedjies, jy weet, maar dit... dit. .. daar is altyd net so 'n klomp klein goedjies ... jy weet, en ... dan ... dan
besluit jy maar ... jy sal maar oor die helfte sal jy maar niks sê nie, want hulle is altyd so haastig... As 'n
mens net rustig kan gaan sit en miskien ... mmm ... stap vir stap 'n klomp goed kan uitskakel, dan sal
dit ... dan sal dit ook 'n verbetering wees ...
When the patient found that the physician did not have time to listen, it became impossible to
forge an effective alliance between the sufferer and the physician in the struggle against ME.
Fourthly, the participants required the ideal doctor to be willing to offer sensitive symptomatic
relief. Natalie explained:
As ek vir hom sê ... my vel aan my voete is te sensitief en ek nie kan skoene dra nie, dit is net 'n klein
probleempie, dat hy dit sal probeer na kyk en dink wat kan hy daaraan doen... Die probleem is ... die
dokters wat ek op dié stadium het, sê vir my die volgende ... mmm ... jy weet mos nou waaraan jy ly ...
kyk, hulle glo nou gelukkig, hulle weet nie veel nie, maar hulle weet dat dit bestaan ... en dan ontsien
hulle alles jy weet waaraan jy ly ... miskien is 'n ... 'n sensitiewe vel nou maar deel van die siekte-
simptome kom ons vergeet nou maar daarvan, is daar iets anders? Dit. .. dit is nie vir hulle belangrik
dat daar klein goedjies is wat 'n mens kan verbeter, wat ongemaklik is nie ...
"There is nothing more I can do" is a devastating statement. It is also generally untrue.
Cassell (1991: 125-126) forcibly asserts that "there is virtually always something that can be
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done to improve the patient's situation, no matter how small or seemingly inconsequential".
This neither implies that the ideal doctor should pursue one useless treatment after another nor
that the ideal doctor should maintain the pretence that the patient will be cured when this is
impossible. Yet, for participants such as Natalie, even the slightest form of symptomatic relief
is of importance. It makes a difference to them.
Cheryl's opinion lends further support to this contention:
I think drugs are not. .. are not. .. mmm ... are not an invention of the devil. I think they must be used and
they must not. .. I think doctors must not be so frightened of prescribing, because the intervention that. ..
that gives you a good night's sleep and a time free of pain is not going to be the sort of thing that you are
going to seek out to become addicted to ... because ... well, I certainly don't have any drugs that produce
any pleasurable sensations, they might bring a measure of relief, but that's all. So ... I. .. I think there
should be more intervention from that side, more to help us through.
Thus, symptomatic assistance and the type of relief sought by Cheryl and the other participants
should be directed towards helping them feel in control. When faced by symptoms which flare
up, sufferers neither want to feel personally helpless nor surrounded by medical practitioners
who appear equally helpless. Instead, they expect their doctors to present them with choices
and options that will allow them to still feel personally empowered and in control.
The ideal doctor should therefore be sufficiently knowledgeable about ME to be able to offer
such "choices and options". Natalie voiced this need:
... ag, dit sal help ook om iemand te hê wat darem so bietjie van die ... van die siekte weet. ..
Cheryl supported this:
... I do need their help! I need their knowledge and I need their intervention.
In fact, Cheryl repeatedly emphasised the necessity of sufficient knowledge ME among
competent medical practitioners:
I would really appreciate some excellent brains on the subject. .. you know... I'd really appreciate that
back-up ... that's the sort of help I would like with the ME... Just somebody who has the sort of ... the
brains ... to help me during a crisis time, you know.
Of course, ME sufferers realised that knowledge of their illness is still limited. However,
limited knowledge should not prevent the medical practitioner from at least trying to do
something. In other words, the lack of good evidence about the best treatment should not be
accompanied by lack of treatment (cf. Cassell1991: 119; Tuckett 1976: 215).
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Lastly, the participants required the ideal doctor to have insight: the physician should be
perceptive to the patient's experience of ME. Natalie described this quality as follows:
... so, ek verwag nie veel nie, maar ek sukkel om so 'n dokter te kry ... en een wat darem ten minste
weet. .. dat as ek die dag vir hom gaan sê ek voel nou moedeloos, dat hy nou nie in die lug gaan spring
en my dadelik vol anti-depressante wil pomp of so nie, maar dat hy ... met insig sal dink ... dit is normaal,
dit. .. dis verstaanbaar ...
The requirement here was insight into the "full picture" of ME. As Natalie's experience
showed the sufferer may, in facing and surmounting the many difficulties of ME, at times feel
doubtful, diminished, or deteriorated. It is then the doctor's task to restore ability, to inspire a
return to optimism, and to reinforce the capacity to cope with the illness. Such intervention
requires a mindful and deliberate awareness of the patient's experience of illness.
In summary: for the participants in this study, the ideal doctor is available close to home, is
able to listen attentively, is known to have time for his or her patients, is willing to offer
symptomatic relief, is sufficiently knowledgeable about ME to do so, and is perceptive to his
or her patient's experience of ME. This image clearly entails a very strong re-focusing on the
human skills which a doctor should possess, rather than on the skills involved in purely
technical intervention.
In their search for relief of suffering, their ultimate destination, the participants in this study
embarked on a process of change and development. Whereas they had initially been more than
willing to trust their fate to the "wise doctor", their experience of negligence and financial
exploitation eventually all but destroyed their confidence in the medical profession. In
avoiding contact with this profession they began to discover the doctor inside themselves.
They became more self-reliant; they were in charge of themselves. Their journey towards their
ultimate destination did not stop here, though, for they still needed help to cope with their
illness on the medical front. They consulted many medical practitioners and ventured along
many a side road which promised relief. This journey has helped them to distinguish those
qualities which would defme the ideal doctor. These are human qualities which testify of a
genuine capacity for caring and a genuine desire to help. In their search to cope with their
illness the participants are not looking for a miracle or for the impossible cure. They are rather
simply looking for relief of suffering, and most of them are still searching.
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Conclusion
The experiences of the participants in this study revealed that ME sufferers firstly turn to the
medical profession as an important source of aid. In their encounters with members of this
profession they primarily pursue relief from suffering. In the medical profession they see a
glimmer of hope, a possibility of such relief. Through the trust they place in the profession to
afford such relief, they endow their doctors with the power to act on their behalf. Their
interests are now in the hands of the knowledgeable doctor.
Yet, repeatedly, participants had to endure the consequences of wholly inadequate medical
care. From the preceding discussion it is clear that the provision of adequate medical care is
primarily inhibited by many medical practitioners' dominant reliance on the biomedical model.
The reductionist and dualist principles embraced within this model prevent medical
practitioners from understanding the complexity of ME, from accepting the sufferer's
experience and perception of reality, and from acknowledging human suffering as distress
which affects the person as a whole. Indeed, within the biomedical model, the doctor's task is
to define the disease in biological terms, to determine its cause, and to institute specific
treatment. In this world there is no room for the patient's meanings, values, fears and hopes.
Those dimensions which make a person whole do not enter the doctor's understanding of
health and disease. Inevitably this leads to the depersonalisation of the doctor-patient
relationship - and of medical care itself. Furthermore, the tendency to define "medically
invisible" bodily complaints as psychogenic and therefore imaginary, is a direct reflection of
scientific materialism which accords primacy to substance, equates the real with the physically
observable, and discounts or altogether ignores the subjective experience of the patient. Those
medical practitioners who operate within the constraints of the biomedical model are restricted
from seeing the full picture and, hence, are restricted in their ability to bring relief of suffering.
The task of medical practitioners to care for the sick have been artificially circumscribed. This
was not done deliberately because no-one is so explicitly directed towards helping the sick
than the medical practitioner. It rather points to the intractability of the biomedical model for
as long as biomedicine remains efficacious, politically entrenched, and consistent with the core
values and concepts of West em cultural tradition, we may expect this situation to continue.
The mountains of ignorance which bar the ME sufferer's way to relief of suffering led the
participants to experience intense disappointment and often desperation. They found that the
uncertainty of their illness could not be alleviated by the certainty contained in medical
knowledge. They discovered that medical knowledge is almost inevitably imperfect. The
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
239
emergence of a new "mystery" illness such as ME highlights this imperfection in current
medical skills and concepts. The medical profession indeed reveals itself as a profession that
is as much searching for answers to the many questions surrounding ME as those who suffer
from the illness.
Their encounters with the medical profession led sufferers to come to the conclusion that their
illness is seen as not "real" at all, but rather a fabrication based either on their needless
exaggeration of everyday complaints (in which case they are malingerers) or on the perception
of imaginary symptoms (in which case they are simply "crazy"). In either case, the self-doubt
and the threat of stigma induced by the ambiguities of this illness contribute to the suffering of
the ME patient. The participants' ensuing disenchantment with the medical profession led
them to abandon the unqualified belief they had earlier in the power and ability of this
profession to indeed bring relief of suffering. Their trust in the medical profession was cruelly
violated. Hence, they often moved to revoke the power endowed on the medical practitioner to
act on their behalf. As this power is assumed by the sufferer, a significant change in the
balance of power between doctor and patient takes place. Usually within this relationship
patients occupy the weaker position. After all, their illness may literally render them
powerless and they may be in desperate need of the doctor's help, which makes the patient
dependent on the doctor. While the participants in this study are still in need of medical help,
they have discovered that their medical practitioners cannot necessarily be trusted to provide
such help. Hence, as they are no longer dependent on their practitioners to the same degree as
before, they have repossessed the power to exert control over their own body and over their
own person as a whole. Through this process the participants fully restored the validity of
their own experience of reality. They discovered a new and stronger belief in the Self. They
are now in charge of themselves.
What is left for the medical profession to do? Should they simply stand aside? Should they
regard their imperfect knowledge as a licence to inaction? Should patients with illnesses
falling outside the biomedical model abruptly be left to their own devices?
The participants' experiences point to the contrary: patients require medical practitioners to
adopt a more holistic response in which their psychological, behavioural and sociocultural
characteristics - along with their physiological and biochemical characteristics - are
recognised as influencing the course of their illness (and their recovery), and are therefore
directly relevant to medical care (KrieI1997: 187). In other words patients need to be viewed
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in their "wholeness". The participants in this study reject being reduced to biological terms. In
this study, then, a holistic approach has come to represent "a more humane medicine"
(Kaufman 1988: 339) than traditional biomedicine which so blatantly excludes all but
measurable biological variables in the consideration of health problems. The holistic approach
furthermore advocates patient responsibility for learning about his or her condition, for making
treatment decisions, and for actively participating as a member of the health care team.
In meeting this responsibility, patients like our participants require medical practitioners to
guide them actively to discover the doctor inside themselves. In other words, ME sufferers
like the participants in this study still need medical help, but of the kind described by the great
Doctor Albert Schweitzer (in Franklin & Sullivan 1989: 163-164): "Each patient carries his
own doctor inside of him. They come to us not knowing this truth. We are at our best when
we give the doctor who resides within each patient a chance to go to work". A call to address
the doctor inside another person summons the human inside the doctor. It is this dimension of
doctor-hood that will acknowledge the human person in the suffering and will respond
humanely to the suffering person. For ME sufferers this is the road to wellness - to the relief
of suffering, the fundamental calling of medicine.
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Chapter 12
Family: In fme style?
In accordance with the human reality of ME, the illness experience of the ME sufferer is not
confined to one person. Instead, it involves many diverse contexts of human interaction. In
this study, it became evident that the sufferer's family represents the first of these contexts
where the influence of ME is intensely perceptible. As Natalie observed:
... dit is definitief so dat dit ander mense om my dadelik raak ... en my huismense veral. ..
Indeed, for Natalie and the other participants, the family most often represents the main
context where life is lived - a context which is not only greatly influenced by their illness
experience, but which in turn exerts a powerful influence on their illness experience.
Consequently, in order to achieve a greater understanding of the illness experience of these
ME sufferers, of their human reality, a thorough investigation into the intricate family relations
in which they were engaged must be made (cf. Strauss & Glaser 1975: 67).
Nurturing wellness
Numerous authors, such as Collinge (1993: 99-101) and Totman (1990: 143-154), extol the
extraordinary benefits that follow from "good quality social support" for the sick person within
the family. These authors clearly see that such support intends to nurture the sick person along
the road to wellness.
While wellness is indisputably the ultimate destination, one cannot but wonder: what qualifies
as "good quality" family support for the ME sufferer?
Helen provided an answer to this question when she succinctly described her experience of the
essence of family support:
Without my family and the support they offered, my struggle with ME would have been far harder to bear.
My family offered me endless understanding, support and advice throughout my illness. They were
never too busy to stop and listen ... or to go out of their way to do the odd chore for me. During the times
when I felt most alone and isolated, I knew I could always turn to them for some warmth and
encouragement... My family encouraged me to trust myself when those around me had almost
convinced me that I was 'strange' or that the most likely diagnosis was depression ...
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It is clear that the question "What is a supportive relationship?" will elicit as many different
answers as there are different people. Still, Helen's account identifies a number of crucial
elements of support that are strongly echoed in each of the other participant's experiences.
Firstly, Helen emphasised that an important element of "good support" is the unconditional
belief in the reality of the illness and the experience of illness. Franklin and Sullivan (1989:
103) offer substantiation of this when they say that the most important means of support open
to family members is simply "to believe in their illness".
The importance of such an unconditional belief in and acceptance of the ill person was
endorsed by all the other participants. This was underscored by the intense sentiment in
Cheryl's words:
My nuclear and extended family do not necessarily understand ME, but believe me completely mmm ...
I can say that my side of the family, nuclear, both sisters, Dad and his brother ... and his sister all
accept me completely... It all helps. I am completely accepted as I am ... it's wonderful. .. because they
are completely and utterly understanding, believe that I am ill, they don't even ask for the phy ... physol. ..
physiology, they just trust me.
When family members sincerely believe that the illness is real, they help sufferers to believe in
themselves and in their own experiences, even when faced by others who disbelieve. Natalie
made it clear in this account:
... dit is waar my ouers 'n groot rol gespeel het. Dit. .. dit was vir hulle tog baie duidelik dat. .. dat ek s .
fisies siek is en daar het hulle my geweldig ondersteun, want hulle het my oor en oor ... herinner aan .
aan goed. Hulle sal vir my sê, maar, my kind, jy kan nie loop nie ... so, dit kan nie net... jy weet, jy kan
nie net jouself dit verbeeld nie.
For Natalie, then, the support of her family is a "protective shield" (Totman 1990: 153) which
shelters her against the noxious and hurtful responses of the world outside the family.
A second and closely related element of "good support" which emerges from Helen's account
is that of encouragement. By offering tender encouragement along the path to wellness, family
members offer a valuable contribution towards a growing feeling of acceptance and especially
of self-acceptance (Collinge 1993: 99-100). Natalie recalled such a gesture of encouragement:
So toe is ek nou ~it die skool uit, ek onthou my ma het daai dag vir my 'n baie mooi briefie geskryf, ek sal
dit nooit vergeet nie ... mmm ... om vir my te sê, jy weet, ek moet maar uithou en aanhou en geen muur is
te hoog nie ...
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By this seemingly small gesture Natalie's mother helped her to confront and accept her new
Self and her new limitations. For Natalie this made a difference.
Consider also Cheryl's heart-warming account of the limitless encouragement she experienced
within her marriage:
... my husband has told me for ten years that I'm absolutely gorgeous... and he's been supportive in
every way ... He still tells me ... almost daily that I am desirable ... Even on an obviously awful day where
my face is so swollen I can hardly open my eyes he just says: 'Darling, just remember you are sick, it's
only temporary' - besides he adds, 'You're still sexy'! Isn't he a dear... I mean, he is so sweet in those
ways ...
Cheryl later reconfirmed this:
If it weren't for my husband, I'd feel devastated... My husband re-inforced it at all times that I was very
attractive to him which did and still does help me so much to cope with this ...
The endless encouragement offered so lovingly by Cheryl's husband directly mitigates the
potentially devastating consequences of her suffering. It soothes the cares and eases the
burden of illness.
Thirdly, Helen's account highlights the importance of open communication as another
important element of "good support" within the family. Collinge (1993: 99) indeed identifies
open communication as one of the most essential components of supportive relationships.
According to Collinge (1993: 99), "this means honest sharing of feelings, wants, needs, and
caring". Natalie strongly emphasised the value of communication of this nature:
... ek was so wonderlik geseënd om ouers te hê waarmee ek gedurig deur kon ... gesels oor my siekte en
hulle het altyd so ver hulle kon wyse raad aan my gegee.
For Natalie, open communication provided an opportunity to talk frankly and freely, to share
emotions and experiences, and to seek advice that is often so deeply needed.
In addition, open communication also means that "parties feel free to say 'no' when they need
to do so, without feeling guilty. In an environment of mutual respect there is freedom to be
oneself without fear of judgement" (Collinge 1993: 99). Denise recalled her experience of
such communication with her parents:
Ek dink huile ... hulle luister meer na wat ek sê... mmm ... en hulle sal. .. hulle sal. .. hulle sal vir my vra,
jy weet, wil jy dit doen of wil jy dat doen of... Dis ... dis taai tipe benadering wat jy wat hulle jou in ag
neem ... mmm ... wat ek dink vir hulle 'n groot klemverskuiwing ook is..; Mmm so, hulle het meer
begrip wat dit aanbetref ...
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Denise's experience reveals that within the context of open communication the freedom to
express oneself often gives the sick person the precious opportunity to be heard and to be
understood. Indeed, the opportunity to openly confide in another family member, to disclose
the Self, may very well be extremely conducive for wellness and healing (cf. Totman 1990:
103).
Fourthly, Helen's description of "good support" highlights the important dimension of family
support in practical matters. Natalie vividly describes such support within her family:
... dit het so geraak later dat my ma-hulle alles gedoen het. .. jy weet, my pa het my hare gewas en droog
geblaas en hulle het... As daar nog mense gekom het, ek onthou dit so goed, het hy elke half-uur
ingekom dan vra hy vir my kan hy nou maar my badkamer toe vat. .. en dit was ... dit was baie moeilik, ek
was baie siek ...
In a similar vein, Natalie recalled:
... my ma het 'n punt daarvan gemaak dat ek ... ek dink nie ek het een dag lank my ... mmm ... nagklere
aangehad nie, ek het elke dag aange ... ek was elke dag aangetrek, sy het elke dag my hare geborsel,
sommer partykeer grimering aangesit (lag) ...
Each instance of the practical support offered by Natalie's family is not only directed towards
lightening her load but testifies to incredible sense of sacrifice and care. Cheryl confirmed the
value of purely practical support within the marriage:
It's often said it's the little things that count and it really is. For example he brings my toothbrush, topped
with toothpaste to my bedside as he does his own teeth before bed, because he know I... get tired
standing at the basin ... so I sit in bed and brush my teeth and only when they feel really good and clean
do I have to go to the basin... Again to another family that would seem daft, but to me it definitely helps
me cope!
Cheryl's experience shows that the practical dimension of family support directly concerns life
where it is lived - in the home, in the sick person's bedroom - there where it is needed most
and where it matters most.
Lastly, Helen's description of "good support" within the family stresses that such support is
constant, endless, enduring, and unfailing. Participants repeatedly point to the importance of
constancy of support, like Denise :
My familie was deurentyd ondersteunend ...
So too, does Natalie:
My ouers het nog altyd baie ondersteunend probeer bly ...
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
248
Cheryl similarly recognised the unfailing nature of her husband's support:
... my husband has never wavered ... he has stood behind me 100% ...
For each participant constant family support provides a basis of stability and a dependable
haven. Both Collinge (1993: 99-100) and Totman (1990: 103) are of the opinion that support
of this nature is likely to foster both physical and psychological security for the sufferer.
The other participants firmly corroborate those features which Helen identifies as the most
significant features of "good quality social support" within the family context. These features
combined to kindle a safe, secure and enduring environment where it becomes possible for ME
sufferers to believe in and accept themselves, to express themselves openly and freely, and to
receive reliable help when and where it is needed most. As in the experience of other chronic
illness sufferers (Monks 1995: 462-463), it is this nurturing environment that not only lightens
the load of their illness, but also lovingly encourages participants along their journey to
wellness.
Cruel encounters
Unfortunately the participants do not only experience caring support within the family. On
the contrary, they also encounter cruel disbelief and rejection among those from whom they
expected it the least. Cheryl describes what happened to her:
My husband's family doesn't recognise ME at all. .. which has been difficult... I mean, his family has
totally rejected it... When I got ME she (Cheryl's mother-in-law) decided that I was malingering and
causing her son trouble and mmm ... hasn't hesitated to tell everybody on that side of the family ...
and eventually ... mmm both brothers, he's got two brothers, and their wives, verbalised the fact that
they didn't believe that there's anything wrong with me and that I was just ruining the lives of my family ...
They make it obvious how sorry they feel for my husband and tell my children quite openly that their
mother had better stop being lazy! And how sad they are for them all the time assuring them there is no
such illness!
Cheryl reveals how this incredibly sad lack of understanding influenced her immediate family:
... all three children haven't been helped by my mother-in-Iaw's ... influence which was much greater than
we realised, much greater. And the fact that she's so very good with the children, especially as
youngsters ... she was wonderful with them... So, I was delighted when the invitations continued to come
when I... I became ... ill. .. I was very glad that she would step in to do all those energetic things during a
school holiday... So, I was grateful for that, but I didn't realise that she was feeding them a constant diet
of, 'you poor children', you know, 'your mother just lies there, when is she going to pull herself together?'.
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I didn't realise that until they got old enough to verbalise it... None of us knew it was happening. So,
they ... they've all gone through a time of ... of tremendous crisis of deciding whether for them it's a real
illness or not. ..
Cheryl experienced undisguised disbelief, disdain and rejection. Her husband's family could
neither accept nor comprehend the nature of her illness. They thought that she was selfishly
malingering, scandalously shirking her familial responsibilities, maliciously destroying the
lives of her family. However, it was their ignorance and their lack of understanding which
brought sorrow, hurt, agony and distress to Cheryl, her husband and to her children.
The participants also show that where there is no understanding of ME, inane advice abounds.
Denise, for instance, recalled how her parents often responded to her illness:
Met tye ... het hulle na 'n wonderkuur en 'n ... as ek vir hulle sê ek is moeg of ek voel sleg, dan sê hulle
nou maar drink net. .. sewe ekstra vitamienpille of iets in daai lyn, maar ... maar jy besef dit is nie wat. ..
wat no ... wat gaan help nie... Ek dink met tye was hulle nogalongeduldig dat. .. hoekom word ek nie
beter nie ... mmm ... dit bly net aangaan en aangaan en aangaan ...
Although such a response may be a desperate one born out of love for the suffering person, it
adds tremendous strain to the relationship and increases the sick person's suffering (cf.
Franklin& Sullivan 1989: 103).
The participants often interpreted those ignorant and inept responses from family members as
pressure on them to recover - promptly! Natalie verbalised this experience:
... soms raak hulle baie moedeloos, geaggiteerd as ek vir dae min goed kan doen. My ma veral raak
selfs kwaad, want sy wil nie hê ek moet ledig wees nie... Hulle raak bekommerd oor ... oor al die tyd wat
ek verloor, en soms raak hulle geweldig haastig ...
When they do not understand the sickness and do not know how to respond to it, family
members such as Natalie's parents at times become desperate, frustrated, and even angry. In
tum, ME sufferers like Natalie experiences this response as pressure from family members not
to be ill any longer, not to disappoint any more, not to tread the path of ME any further.
Again, this unjustified pressure simply exacerbates their illness experience.
Each of the cruel encounters related above show that even family members have trouble in
understanding the experience of illness caused by ME, and that this lack of understanding
almost inevitably causes an inability to respond appropriately to those who suffer from this
illness. It is reasonable to suggest that if family members had a better understanding of the
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
250
illness experience caused by ME, they would be better able to respond to the ill person. The
combination of improved understanding and a better response will, at the very least, not
aggravate the situation any further and, at the very best, may even alleviate the experience of
illness of the atllicted family member.
In response ...
The participants in this study could not but respond to the very real and immediate influence of
their illness on the members of their families. Natalie clearly indicated this:
... wat 'n baie groot terugvoerende invloed op my het is die mense om my ... en hoe hulle dit hanteer ...
Very often the participants experienced a deep sense of disappointment, both in themselves
and in their families. The source of such disappointment stems from the notion that they are
incapable of living up to the expectations and role demands within the family.
Denise described the disappointment she experienced within the family context as she
repeatedly failed to live up to her parents' expectation of recovery:
... ek dink ... ook maar, jy weet, teleurstelling, want jy dink ... sjoe, jy het nou dit en dit en dat probeer en
dit gaan nou beter, hoekom gaan dit nou weer ewe skielik sleg? Of dan voel jy miskien." wat het jy nou
weer verkeerd gedoen dat dit slegter met jou gaan? Het jy nou iets verkeerd geëet, het jy te veel stres
gehad, het jy iets nie reg hanteer nie, het jy jouself ooreis of wat ookal, .. want, jy weet, jy voel soms dis
jou skuld ... en dan soms laat hulle jou verstaan dis ook jou skuld... En dit maak 'n mens nogal
magteloos, want jy wil nie so voel nie en jy sal enige iets doen om te keer dat jy so voel. ..
Denise felt that she had disappointed her parents and herself. She questioned her behaviour,
her actions, her choices. She felt confused and guilty, as though the unpredictable onset of yet
another relapse was her own doing, her own fault. Sadly, she sometimes felt that her parents
also held her accountable for the state of her health. This experience left her feeling helpless,
powerless, and defenceless.
Natalie described a typical encounter with her parents, which revealed a similarly agonising
experience of disappointment and frustration:
By tye dat ek beter is", dan dan gaan dit nou, jy weet, dit gaan goed, .. en dan .. , dan sal my pa en my
ma byvoorbeeld praat van 'jy's beter' ... en dit frustreer my geweldig, want ek weet ek ... ek .. , ek is
beter van .. , van die absolute akute stadium af, maar ek weet mos nou hoe ek voel en ek probeer mos
nou maar hard om nie te veel te kla of wat ookal nie ... en dan ... dan maak dit my gefrustreerd, want ek
weet more kan weer 'n dag wees waar daar 'n groot terugval kom ...
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Natalie felt intense frustration at the thought of not being able to live up to her parents'
expectation of improvement and recovery. What if a relapse set in tomorrow? Would her
parents feel disappointed? Would they hold her accountable for the sudden deterioration?
Once again it was the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of ME that presented numerous
potential pitfalls of misunderstanding, and was also likely to induce a miserable sense of
failure, frustration and disappointment in both the sufferer and the family.
Disappointment within the family also follow when the ME sufferer feels unable to live up to
role expectations and demands. Cheryl emphatically disclosed:
... what still hurts very much is disappointing the children... and... my husband...
Cheryl offered a very illustrative description of the challenges she faced in attempting to fulfil
her role within the family:
With the children it has saddened me greatly that I have not been able to host birthday parties - great
'extravaganzas' they used to be! I have not been able to be as effective in helping with school work
either... I would dearly love to be more supportive. My husband says I am now that they are older
because I am always available to talk and I write to all three of them at least weekly... But when they
were primary school children it was really dreadful. My youngest hardly remembers a Mom that took part
in everything... He hardly remembers all the entertaining, baking and cooking... Let alone the games
we played... Another sad thing is that ... while I still had two children at school. .. I had to give up making
breakfast and being present for those early morning problems or worries that inevitably surface if
something's been forgotten or an exam is looming that day. It simply became impossible to get up at
5:30AM with the family when I had perhaps had only 90 minutes of sleep or less! It was effectively as a
broken 'night' every night for me... it became impossible to function... This saddens me still... Also the
very real problem of my day/night sleep reversal pattern means special birthday breakfasts in bed are a
thing of the past. Even on these special occasions everyone has to wait until I can 'function' - usually by
12 0' clock midday - sometimes later as I wake up very, very sore and slow moving. This frustrates
everyone, I know... I miss an awful lot. ..
Cheryl's description cnes of disappointment and frustration, of sadness and sorrow.
Regardless of how hard she tried - and she did try - it was simply impossible to sustain the
same nurturing role as she fulfilled before the onset of her illness. According to Crook (1982:
72-73) an intrinsic conflict may arise when the limitations imposed by the ME illness
challenge the family care-taking duties dear to the sufferer. Under these circumstances, the
sufferer is forced to confront the sheer inability to maintain adequacy of role function within
the family. Cheryl experienced this inability to uphold her care-taking responsibilities within
the family context as intensely disturbing.
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Crook (1982: 72-73) also observes that "the power of roles is so great that it has been asserted
that a person's perceptions, motivations, self-concept and psychological functioning are.
shaped and steered by the specific configuration of roles incorporated from society". Thus, the
person's "configuration of roles" directly contributes to the nature, essence and meaning of
that person's life - there where life is lived. It therefore comes as no surprise that when ME
challenged and inhibited her nurturing mother role, Cheryl experienced a very real sense of
loss.
The piercing awareness ofloss repeatedly reverberates in Cheryl's story:
... they ... they have missed out because I've been sick. I haven't been there all the times I've wanted to
be there. I haven't done all that I've wanted to do... So, I feel sad for myself, but more sad for them. We
have lost a huge chunk of our lives ... to this illness.
It does too in Natalie's words:
Almal dink ek voel maar of ons iets verloor het in die proses ... mmm ... sjoe, dis mos nou nie wat ek mos
vir myself beplan het in die lewe nie, ek is seker daarvan my ouers ook definitief nie... en dis is baie
ontstellend ... veral as ... veral as jy niks kan doen nie, daaraan nie ...
For Cheryl, Natalie and the other participants, the experience and awareness of loss within the
family constitute a very real part of the experience of illness caused by ME. Franklin and
Sullivan (1989: 102) suggest that "grief' is not too strong a word to describe the feelings that
occur in a family touched by ME.
It is clear that, within the family context, the influence of their illness caused the participants in
this study a multitude of confusing and disturbing emotions, of which the excruciating sense of
disappointment, by both the family and by the participant, was very prominent. They could
not live up to expectations. They could not fulfil role demands. The unpredictable and
seemingly uncontrollable course of their illness posed a direct challenge to their very being
within the family. Hence, they developed a real sense of loss, which became part of their
human reality.
To cope...
The family of a ME sufferer struggles to understand and respond to the illness experienced by
the afflicted family member. In tum, the ME sufferer experiences disappointment and failure
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as it becomes beyond their reach to fulfil their role expectations within the family. These
circumstances impose an onerous burden on relationships within the family.
After eleven years of illness Natalie sorrowfully concludes:
... na elf jaar voel ek al dat my eie huisgesin sukkel om my te ken ...
She adds:
... ek weet my broer. .. mmm ... ek het 'n broer gehad op daai stadium wat in standard 5 was, hy's nou al .
22, hy ken my glad nie, ek dink nie so nie... Ons probeer baie hard werk aan 'n mooi, jy weet, broer-
suster-verhouding, maar ek dink nie hy kan enigsins onthou wie ek was voor ek siek geword het nie ...
Alhoewel albei van ons nou baie ouer is en 'n mens se optrede verander tog met ouderdom, het my broer
my leer ken as iemand wat altyd moeg is, altyd pyn het, te energieloos om mee te maak, iemand wat nie
veel saam met hom sosiaal verkeer nie ... in plaas van iemand wat vrolik is, besig, vol sports, talentvol,
iemand wat omgee vir hom en wat hy doen. Die bekommernis is dat hy nie die ware ek sal kan sien deur
dit alles nie, dat hy dalk sal dink ek wil nie graag sosiaal wees of belangstelling in hom toon nie, dat ek
sommer net 'n 'ou tannie' van geaardheid is ...
The strain and tension is obvious. Because there virtually never was a moment without ME in
their relationship, there never was a moment in which Natalie could reveal herself to her
brother as she felt she really was. Equally, there never was an opportunity for him or the rest
of her family to really get to know and appreciate her for herself. Sadly, this left Natalie to
feel permanently misunderstood, held captive by the bounds of her illness.
Cheryl related how she experienced strain and tension in the family:
... while I've been sick ... things have been a bit of a strain on the children as well because ... mmm ... if I
had been ... irritable ... because I was in pain and I don't know what to do and I can't move and I really
need help just to get to the bathroom and I'm not wanting to ask for it and I'm being stubborn ... and ...
mmm ... then he'll say something simple like, 'what's for supper' ... and I'm thinking 'I'm about to die and
this man wants supper' you know ... and then my reactions will be all wrong and then he will go and get
irritable with the children tell them to 'tidy their rooms' or 'start studying' or 'go and clean the kitchen' or
'haven't someone unpacked the dishwasher' or whatever... So, it's a... it's actually a... sometimes a
very awkward situation ... We have ... have tremendous blessing in being a happy family 90% of the time,
but there's a ... there's a good fat 10% where the ... wheels come off ... there's no doubt about it, where
our family suffers directly because of the fact that I'm not able to fulfil my role like I used to ...
Cheryl has this to say about her "dearest and nearest relationship" :
... I was finding myself becoming a bit short-tempered and irritable, which I... which is still a problem ...
which ... which was difficult for the kids, but... nooo, not really the kids, it was more my husband who
suffered, because with the kids I do my level-best to keep up pretences until bed-time ... and then my
husband would have me collapse on him after the kids were in bed ... and then I would say ridiculous
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
254
things ... mmm... I don't know now anymore ... but. .. I would blame ... I would ... I would bring up a
conversation that would end up blaming him somehow for the fact that I was in a heap... I don't know
how I did it, how ... eh ... how ... convoluted it could have been, that this poor guy received the worst end
of my day but. .. it always was ... mmm ... in my worst times ... it always ended up with me taking it out
on him or or just collapsing on him ...
ME issues a challenge very few families and very few couples are prepared for. It causes
unpredictability, sudden severity, irrationality, ridiculous reactions, and uncertainty. As a
natural result the ME sufferers in this study, as well as persons who suffer from other chronic
and severe illnesses (cf. Dyck 1995: 311-312; Monks 1995: 463-464), experience that family
relations become stressed.
Still, for many ME sufferers the family remains the pivotal point of interaction. They are
ultimately part of a family and regard amicable family relations of indispensable value. This is
equally true for the participants in this study. From their accounts it is evident that they try to
appease tension and to inspire harmony. This effort firstly involved adjustment, and secondly
demanded a special effort.
Adjustment within the family particularly involves accommodating the sufferer's limitations
which are imposed by the illness. Consider Cheryl's very illustrative account:
At the moment it is already past 3am. For (my daughter's) birthday tomorrow I am desperate to feel
rested but, and here I confess, even a double dose of sleeping tablets has had NO EFFECT. So she'll
only see me late tomorrow morning - if I am lucky and manage 7 or 8 hours (fairly rare). She'll only see
me to open presents etc. at midday... we have tried to adapt family life to my sleep pattern as unfair as
that seems and even the birthday boy or girl who gets their choice of favourite breakfast at lunchtime ...
Most families would think this DAFT - but that's one eg. of how we cope.
Cheryl's day / night sleep reversal pattern demands adjustment from the whole family. "Daft"
as some of these adjustments may seem, it works for them.
Cheryl noted a further unfortunate consequence of her day / night sleep reversal pattern that is
even more upsetting because it affects her most cherished relationship:
The worst effect of this is that about 4 months ago we came to the conclusion that my husband could no
longer cope with my tossing and turning and frequent need of my little torch to find a tissue or something
and I couldn't cope with so many hours trying to lie still in the dark! So he uses the spare room bed after
±10pm. We still spend the early evening together in bed but we hate sleeping apart, but can find no
other solution. My husband was so exhausted by the disturbed nights next to me. At first we tried
moving me to the spare room so as to make getting dressed for work easier for him ... but I found I collect
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SO much around me during the day that to move all that each evening, down to a jug of water & glass,
medication, reading or writing materials ... and so on, just too much. All he needs is fresh work clothes ...
he doesn't need anything else to while away the night tOO like I do.
Cheryl's account lucidly illustrates a lamentable yet essential adjustment in family life caused
by the constraints imposed by ME. Without adjustments of this nature, neither a marriage nor
a family would be able to master the challenges posed by ME.
In addition, adjustment to the limitations of the ME sufferer often involves the redistribution of
responsibility within the family. As Natalie admitted:
'" die ander ding is ... prakties gesproke ... partykeer het ek sulke groot terugvalle dat daar ... daar is
goed wat ek moet doen wat ek nou nie kan doen nie, dan moet hulle dit doen... So, dit raak hulle
onmiddelik.
When certain tasks and responsibilities fall beyond the ME sufferer's reach, the family needs
to step in. The sufferer's responsibilities become the family's responsibilities.
Cheryl provided a further example of the redistribution of responsibilities within the family:
... often after a long working day he has to pack the dishwasher, make something to eat... load the
washing machine etc etc and ... and start doing things, which I'm sad that he has to do, I would rather he
didn't have to ...
Mundane as these tasks may seem, being able to count on someone to do them makes a huge
difference to the sufferer. After all, for an ME sufferer like Cheryl who was used to running
the household efficiently, the worry of lapsed housework and overdue tasks might prove to be
unendurable at times. Hence, as the family lifts the burden of responsibility from the sufferer's
shoulders, they offer the sufferer the space to get better without any undue worry or stress (cf.
Dyck 1995: 314; Franklin & Sullivan 1989: 104). Making the required adjustments within the
family therefore may pave the road to wellness for the afflicted sufferer.
As is clear from the participants' accounts, adjustment within the family is often accompanied
by a special effort on the part of the sufferer. Such special effort is neither disguised as a bribe
nor intended as a subtle way of saying "thank you", but it is rather an effort to aid the family in
coping with ME, despite the odds. Heed the sentiment as Cheryl expressed it:
Also a very good thing to do is simple and easy and energy saving treats for your family. You know you
aren't cooking and baking like you used to, so listen carefully and try and pick up what their current
favourite sweet is, and then ... put one of these treats on their pillow... Really anything that shows you've
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listened and care. I include this as a way of coping with ME because to hold a family together during this
sort of strain is only by God's grace and His wisdom.
On a more intimate level a huge special effort was required. Cheryl explained:
As far as a sexual relationship goes there are a host of obstacles! Anti-depressants reduce your desire
or your ability to achieve orgasm - as do some other drugs. On top of that your body is often just too
sore to move! We have worked out successful positions and very seldom leave a long patch without
intimate relations... If is also important to the 'patient' as you must endeavour to continue to feel
attractive and desirable and this also reinforces your worth as a person ... We set whole weekends aside
to be completely alone and this is very valuable. Sometimes I spend that entire weekend - booked
somewhere in advance ... sick in bed, but sometimes all goes well and we feel almost 'NORMAL' again.
She candidly added ...
... another thing that helps a married relationship - especially one that needs a bit of extra effort due to
my circumstances, is buying 'sexy' underwear to surprise my husband. You won't believe this, but on our
last weekend away ... I managed to be alone ... and bought a red lacy bra and matching panties! Can
you believe fat and middle-aged doing that... And was my dear man just bowled over! And he so
appreciated the effort and the surprise.
Cheryl's account reveals that ME imposes restrictions in all spheres of family and marital life.
These restrictions in many cases require a "remaking" of the lives of the ME sufferers. Part of
this "remaking" involves what Ware (1999: 319) calls a process of "downshifting", of cutting
back and doing less where possible. Yet, to do so demands special effort from the sufferer.
While activities considered disposable are summarily cut, those regarded as essential to the
well-being of the family and to married life are still very deliberately pursued.
Often the attention given to adjustment and special effort creates an environment that allows
each member of the family to deal boldly with the influence of the illness. Moreover, in
dealing with the illness and its consequences, the family is more often than not drawn closer
together. Natalie gave expression to this experience:
En dan die ander ... ander sy daarvan is weer ons het 'n goeie verhouding ook daardeur opgebou,
omdat ... mmm ... hulle is basies al wat ek het, die enigste mense waarmee ek ... reguit kan praat, jy
weet. .. en ek kan vir hulle sê, kyk, dit is rêrig hoe ek nou voel en ek weet julle kan niks daaraan doen nie,
maar ... dit help my net as iemand miskien dit hoor... Daar is positiewe en negatiewe dinge daaraan,
want wat hulle vir my sê raak my natuurlik baie, omdat huile ... hulle invloed is groot, jy sien, omdat dit
is ... dit is die persone wat ek het. So, hulle kan ... mmm ... jou positief beïnvloed of negatief beïnvloed, jy
weet, jou seer maak of ... positief beïnvloed en help om die ding in die gesig te staar en te weet jy het so
ver gekom, so jy kan verder gaan.
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Natalie's account, which closely corresponds with the experiences of the other participants,
powerfully illustrates the central position which the family of the ME sufferer occupies.
Indeed, the nature and content of relations within the family can steer the sufferer towards
either hurt or healing. Hence, the family's influence on the ME sufferer and his or her
experience of illness cannot and should not be underestimated.
ME evidently places a substantial burden on the relations within the family. It is indeed the
very nature of ME, its unpredictability, severity and uncertainty, which challenges both the
family and the sufferer. To respond to the challenge and to cope, the family afflicted by ME
adjusts to the constraints and consequences of this illness, while the sufferer contributes by
making a special effort. In this way, in their intimate alliance, the family and the sufferer
grapple with the strange illness in their presence. They try, endeavour, attempt, strive, and
they cope, as best they know how.
Conclusion
The family is important. This is the undeniable conclusion reached by the participants in this
study. Perhaps the family is no longer the absolute pivotal basis of social interaction as it once
was, but for the ME sufferer its eminence and influence is certainly far from negligible, let
alone extinct.
The participants were also deeply aware that, as they suffer from ME, so too does their family.
More importantly, the participants realise that their families exert a powerful influence on
them and on their experience of illness. They realise that with the help of their families they
may reach their destination ofwellness whereas, without it, they will loose their way.
Hence, the participants earnestly ask their family, "Believe me and believe in the reality of my
illness; talk to me and let me talk to you; encourage me and always be there for me; do not
judge or reject me; do not demean my illness through unsound advice; help me not to feel so
useless and helpless; help me to find new ways to be with you, to be part of you; and please,
please, try to understand me".
When the family of a ME sufferer responds to this call, profound adjustment and sacrifice
follows. In tum, sufferers try to lighten the load assumed by the family by helping, by
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contributing, and by making a special effort. In an intimate union the family and the sufferer
construct a protective shield which can blunt the potentially harmful effects of the illness in
their midst. It is an all-encompassing security that is carried forward from within the family
into the rest of the sufferer's life.
Where the family and the sufferer fail to create a unity of defence against the ravages of ME,
the sufferer's journey to wellness is blocked. Conversely, where the family and the sufferer
succeed in joining forces, the sufferer's journey to wellness is likely to prosper. Thus, for ME
sufferers, their family is important; for ME sufferers this is their human reality.
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Chapter 13
Friendships - Firm and frail
Strauss and Glaser (1975: 58) state that "the chief business of a chronically ill person is not to
stay alive or keep his symptoms under control, but to live as normally as possible". This is the
very human reality of all illness and especially of chronic illness (Atkin & Ahmad 2000: 509)
and it is also true for the ME sufferer. After all, every ME sufferer desperately wants "to live
as normally as possible" - despite the illness, the symptoms, the limitations, and despite the
adjustments.
For the ME sufferer, as for any other individual, an essential element in the pursuit of such a
"normal life" is friendship. However, how is friendship affected by exposure to the realities of
ME? Do friendships endure or do they fail? An answer to this question will contribute
towards better understanding how the ME sufferer subjectively experiences the human
dimension of friendship, and of illness
Nurturing wellness
The participants in this study painted brilliant word-pictures which glow with the treasured
kindness, care and support that they received from very special people in their lives: their
friends.
For the participants these special people were the ones who tried to understand and who
accepted them as they were ... illness, symptoms, limitations, adjustments and all! Helen very
specifically emphasised the effort to understand:
My close friends who I value as special friends, were ... very supportive and tried to understand, although
I was aware it was difficult for them at times as I was not my energetic, enthusiastic self ...
For Helen just the mere attempt to understand, to gain some insight into her situation, difficult
or even impossible as it may be, showed that her friends cared. It convinced her of their
support.
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As Helen found comfort in the very attempt to understand, so did Cheryl discover delight in
unfettered acceptance:
The best. .. the best. .. the best. .. the best are those who ... who ... who don't need any explanation, but
accept me ... accept me exactly as I am. You know ... accept the fact that I no longer bake and cook and
fuss around like I used to be able to do for them, accept the fact that the house is generally dirty and
dusty and ... that sort of thing .. and they just accept it. .. Those are the best people.
Cheryl's words truly burst with delight! In the best of friendships she had discovered an
infinite acceptance that demands neither explicit understanding nor flawless fulfilment of
previous standards.
Now, consider Denise's emphasis on the rewarding combination of understanding and
acceptance:
... soos ons was nou weg vir ... vir 'n naweek en ... en as ek moeg was het ek eenvoudig gaan lê en
slaap... Dis half asof hulle verstaan het... So daarin het 'n mens 'n mate van vryheid ervaar dat huile ...
en begrip dat huile ... besef jy ... sover as wat jy kan dan doen jy mee, maar as jy nie kan nie, dan kan
jy net nie dit. .. dit maak vir my 'n groot verskil. ..
Indeed, it made a difference. In the combination of understanding and acceptance Denise
found freedom: the freedom to be, even when that freedom included being ill.
For the participants their valued friendships were also characterised by tender encouragement.
Denise described her experience in this regard:
... jy het vriende wat by jou staan regdeur die hele storie... Jy kan hulle miskien op jou twee hande tel,
maar hulle is daar en jy weet. ..... maak nie saak wat nie hulle sal by jou wees... Mmm ... so dit. .. dit. ..
dit het my baie bemoedig ...
Denise experienced encouragement in knowing that her friends where there - regardless (or
perhaps in spite of) her state of health.
Natalie also shared her experience of encouragement within her circle of friends:
Ek dink ek was baie bevoorreg ek het 'n groepie vriende gemaak wat baie lief was vir my ... en mmm ...
baie trots was, want hulle kon sien ek sukkel... My ... my een vriend spot. .. mmm ... ek kom in die klas
dan bewe ek verskriklik, dan sê hy vir my, oeg, vandag gaan jy darem lekker skets, jy weet, jy kan lekker
daai potlood so laat skets... Jy weet. .. mmm ... ek sou nie vir hom sê nie hoekom nie, maar hy kan dit
sien, ek bedoel, dis baie ooglopend... So dit was goed, want in daai opsig het ek ... humoristiese
ondersteuning gekry en ... ek glo natuurlik hulle is almal engeltjies ...
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Natalie's heart-warming experience portrays the jubilant victory of witty humour over the
obvious pain of a distressing illness. Itwas encouragement of this nature that inspired Natalie
to celebrate her friends as little angels - little angels who lightened her load and paved the way
to wellness.
Thirdly, the participants ascribed great value to open channels of communication within
friendships. Cheryl gave expression to this sentiment:
The friends that still ask and actually want an answer are very s... precious and... even if they don't
understand a word I'm saying, if I need to talk, they'll let me talk ...
She later strongly reiterated:
... there are definitely some of those who are interested enough to set aside time to talk to me ... and they
are ... they do listen ... they remember what I say ... they phone me back ... and I appreciate that
enormously ...
Cheryl found in open communication a freedom to express the Self, a freedom to be listened to
without fear of intolerant or opinionated judgement. Thus, when friends made an effort - to
listen, to remember, to reply - it was noticed, welcomed and deeply appreciated.
Fourthly, the participants III this study strongly emphasised the importance of practical
support. Natalie gave a pertinent example:
Toe ek, byvoorbeeld, geswot het. .. mmm ... as ek nou vir twee weke nie meer by die Tech kan wees nie,
dan kom daar nou groot probleme, jy weet. .. my vriende moet begin ... goeters organiseer om my te help
en ... uit hulle pad uit gaan ...
Natalie's friends made a special effort to lessen the load of overdue work and ease her return to
the course. Without such invaluable assistance, Natalie might not-have been able to complete
her studies and, hence, to pursue her vision of "normal life" .
For Cheryl, practical help and assistance from friends made a tremendous difference:
... in the beginning, friends, family, acquaintances, the church, everybody rallied round, I mean, there
was just a constant flow of meals, and visits, and flowers, and everything, and it was ... obviously very
heart-warming ... I mean, all of that, it made an enormous difference that I had support from everybody ...
Even today, eleven years later, Cheryl still enjoys such support from special friends:
There there's one family that. .. that never ever come without a meal... They come at least once a
month and always bring food with them. That's ... enormously kind. And they don't know a thing about
ME... So, golly, we're greatly blessed!
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These instances of practical support testify to an exceptional degree of care often found among
the friends of a ME sufferer. It is exceptional for it flows forth even in the absence of insight
into the illness. It requires no reason or understanding. It is offered in simple, unqualified
kindness.
The last quality in friends that the participants highly valued is dependability. Cheryl offered
an example of unwavering dependability among friends:
... good friends have stayed good friends and we could call on anyone of them at anytime of the day or
night should we need help.
Denise substantiated this:
My vriende het my deur dik en dun bygestaan ...
Any time, any day, any situation ... support is there, unwavering, unflagging, unfaltering. For
the participants this is the essence of dependable support among their friends.
Thus, through vivid word-pictures, participants in this study depicted the invaluable treasure of
support found within friendships. The qualities of this treasure - understanding and
acceptance, encouragement and communication, practical help and dependability - are
unconditional, undemanding and unwavering. For participants, this treasure of support
provided the freedom to be and express the Self on the road to wellness. It provided the peace
of mind, the certain knowing that along this road there will always be special people - there
will always be friends.
Cruel encounters
The experiences of the participants in this study revealed that not all friends were supportive.
From some so-called friends they actually experienced cruelty.
For the participants cruel encounters with friends stemmed from one focal point: a dire lack of
understanding. Cheryl recalled an experience that epitomises such ignorance:
... we were all home ... and something made my husband open the front door, and at the front door
was a television and a video and ... a note from the minister of the church saying that he thought that
we would find this useful, .. we saw the note and thought, 'oh, that's very kind of him ... it must be
something up-building or interesting or whatever'... It turned out. .. it turned out to be a video produced
by the AA ... and ... mmm ... the characters in the story had children exactly my age, husband and wife
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
264
with ... children verging on their teens ... and ... and a mother who was a alcoholic... I couldn't believe it. ..
I howled my eyes out throughout the whole movie, because it wasn't. .. mmm ... even a victorious ... battle
over alcohoL.. So we ... were absolutely shattered... I presume that they thought I was a secret
alcoholic ... or they thought that I was ... mmm ... endangering my family by pretending to be an invalid ...
that would be the charitable view... the less charitable view is that they thought that I was a secret addict
of some sort... So we invited this chap now, this minister, to come and talk to us ... and he came round ...
and ... he said that... he just wants us to know that that video wasn't just from him, that there were ten
other people in the church who got together and decided that it was applicable to our. .. our ... life at the
moment. .. and that we needed to be jolted back into reality, to realise what was hap ... what I was doing
to the family was so destructive. We just sat there with our mouths open, we didn't know what on earth
he meant... I mean, obviously, I realised that my illness was not bringing ... mmm ... great joy into the
family... Our family was suffering trauma ... and ... it was being heightened by what the community was
doing to us...
This account cries out bitterly against ignorance! Certainly there is nothing more frightful than
ignorance in action! It was in ignorance that Cheryl was blatantly accused of addiction and
that she was accused of destroying her family life. It was in ignorance that she was called to
acknowledge "reality". It was in ignorance that she was shattered.
It is no wonder that such experiences, recounted by all the participants, repeatedly led them to
the conclusion that some friends (perhaps even most friends!) would never understand or share
any real insight into their situation. Consider Natalie's statement:
My vriende verstaan nie... Ek kan nie sê ek het een, een, maar een vriend of so wat al ooit moeite
gedoen het om, byvoorbeeld ... intens met my daaroor te gesels of my uit te vra daaroor of miskien iets te
wil lees daaroor nie ... ek weet nie of dit s ... hulle sou help nie, maar dit sou miskien vir hulle 'n bietiie
insig gegee het. So, ek dink ek kan sê hulle doen baie moeite om dit te verstaan nie... Mmm ... en die
vriende wat ek nou maar gehad het toe nou toe ... hulle het nie juis veeL .. veelomgegee daaroor nie ...
Natalie's account contains a sharp sense of disenchantment. Her friends did not understand,
let alone try to understand. For Natalie this conveyed one clear message: they simply did not
care.
Natalie continued ...
Voorheen was ek nooit tussen mense nie, toe ek nou tussen mense kom, toe sien ek hulle reaksie
teenoor my siekte ... wanneer hulle geweet het daarvan, het hulle dit hanteer in onkunde, in die sin dat
hulle maar altyd gedink het dit is in my kop ... op 'n manier. .. mmm ... al het jy flou geval voor hulle, sou
hulle oortuig wees daarvan dat jy nou weer te lui was of iets ... Daar is baie ... wat my nou nog 100% in
twyfel trek as ek vir huile ... sê ek ... mmm ... ek voel nou siek ... dis die faset waar mense onkundig is
en ... hulle raak lelik metjou ...
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Ignorance is, thus, as Natalie sadly discovered, often accompanied by two treacherous
companions: doubt and disbelief.
Helen all too frequently encountered doubt and disbelief amid her friends' response to her
illness. She sadly related that her friends...
... clearly did not have any idea of what I was going through and ... reacted in very strange ways ... they
reacted with anger, disbelief and resentment. ..
Unfortunately, this response often translated into added anguish for the sufferer:
On numerous occasions, I was told I should eat more, as I had lost a lot of weight. .. and there were
rumours that I was anorexic or bulaemic ...
Denise related a similar experience of friends reproaching her:
... hulle het nie altyd verstaan nie, hulle dink jy is nou maar ... up-stairs of jy ... is 'n swot-freak of wat
ookal, maar intussen wil jy net jou deur toemaak en op jou bed lê ...
Instead of much needed understanding, Helen and Denise were challenged with recurrent
criticism and even ridicule. These experiences simply served to amplify their suffering.
Indeed, for all the participants their friends' callous ignorance of and deplorable response to
their illness at times appeared almost unbearably relentless.
And relentless it was - the participants' experiences within the context of friendship were
exacerbated by an awkward logic that appeared to be at work among their friends. This logic
allowed even the most blatantly ignorant of her friends to discharge a barrage of advice onto
the poor sufferer.
Natalie repeatedly experienced this logic. She vividly described the ludicrous advice which
saturated such confrontations:
... as hulle nou begin weet wat jou probleem is, dan is daar weer ander goed wat by kom ...
byvoorbeeld ... mmm ... ons het gehoor hierdie siekte is maar net alles in jou kop ... ons het gehoor jy het
nie genoeg dryfkrag nie ... of ons het gehoor ... jy weet. .. of ons vriendin was 'n week lank was sy ... het
sy yuppie flu gehad, maar sy's nou beter, jy moet na 'n ander dokter gaan... En toe daai stadium verby
is, het die ... het die nuwe stadium begin en dit was van ... jy moet positief dink ... pain is gain (lag) ...
mmm ... jy weet ... ag ... lig jou kop op ... eh ... jy weet. .. het jy al ooit... mmm ... na musiek geluister wat
jou kan kalmeer? .. worry jy te veel? .. daai tipe van ding, jy weet. .. Ek het elke dag, elke liewe dag van
my lewe as ek by daai Technikon kom is daar iemand, ek weet nie elke dag wie dit gaan wees nie, maar
dan is daar iemand wat vir my 'n klein prekie afsteek ...
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Denise also vented her intense annoyance and displeasure with the inane advice so frequently
offered by the ignorant:
Wat 'n mens ook half frustreer het is ... as jy sê jy het ME dan ... dan het almal altyd raad, jy weet, hierdie
broerskind of daai suster se vriendin se dogter het dit ook gehad en sy het net appelasyn gedrink elke
oggend en sy is beter, jy weet, of hierdie broer se seun het dit gehad en hy het elke dag drie glase
wortelsap gedrink en hy's nou heeltemal gesond .... Jy weet, dat hulle sulke ... sulke raad vir jou ... almal
dra vir jou raad aan, maar ... en almal neem jou kwalik dat jy nie hulle raad gebruik nie, maar jy kan net
nie ...
This inane advice may eventually even include religion and the concept of salvation. Consider
Natalie's account:
Ander mense gee nie raad nie, hulle verkwalik jou; hulle beskuldig jou; hulle preek vir jou. Hulle vertel
jou jy is skuldig aan jou eie lot, want jy is 'n negatiewe persoon; jy is 'n pessimis; jy ken nie diepere
waardes en reëls van die lewe nie. Ek het al selfs gehoor ek is nie God se kind nie of ek glo nie genoeg
nie ...
Cheryl expressed a sense of perplexity in the face ofa similar approach among friends:
Even Christians who tell me that this can't be from a loving God and if God hasn't healed you, then ... you
need deliverance from satanic powers. Golly! How can that be?
Denise offered a more elaborate account of the chiding received from friends:
Jy kry die mense wat dink ... jy weet, wat die benadering het van ... 'kom ons bid vir jou en jy gaan
gesond word en as jy nie gaan gesond word nie is daar een of ander iets in jou lewe wat. .. wat keer dat
jy nie gaan gesond word nie' ... En mense wat in jou verlede grawe ... en die een moet jy nog vergewe
en daai een moet jy vryspreek en daai sonde het jy gedoen en as jy nou met al daai goed gaan breek en
dit gaan hanteer dan gaan die Here jou genees ... jy hanteer nou maar wat jy moet hanteer, wat hulle sê
jy moet hanteer ... en later aan besef jy, maar, dit is nie die oplossing nie ... op 'n stadium moes ek daai
mense vergewe dat hulle so half jou ... jou onder veroordeling plaas ...
Well-meaning advice perhaps, but undoubtedly tormenting.
What assistance could there be in judging a person as simply not positive enough? What sense
could there be in telling a severely ill person to enjoy a glass of carrot juice? What logic is
there in preaching deliverance from evil powers?
Within the context of friendship, sanity had apparently succumbed under the onslaught of
Ignorance.
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The fragile nature of friendship was demonstrated by the sad tendency among friends of the
ME sufferer to distance themselves from their ill friend. When their friend needed their help
and support the most, they chose to look the other way. Natalie sadly told of this experience:
My beste vriendin het my geheel en al. .. jy weet, sy het eendag vir my gesê as ek nou nie my humor
terugkry en begin lag en so ... dit was nie 'n kwessie van humor nie, dit was 'n kwessie van ek het nie
krag eers om ... om humoristles te wees nie ... en ... en sy het my geheel en al in die sop gedrop, sy het
net, jy weet, heeltemal haar gedistansieer van my, ek het haar nooit weer gesien nie, tot vandag toe
nie ...
Natalie's friend did not understand. She responded in ignorance. And her response was cruel.
Cheryl also came to know such cruelty. She sadly recalled the attempts friends made to
distance themselves from her and her strange illness:
The few friends we still had left... they decided that... they were not going to offer help anymore,
because ... mmm ... I was obviously ... it was weird, it came across in such a weird way ... they decided
that if they carried on helping our family, in any way, by providing meals or anything like that. .. they
were ... mmm ... encouraging me to become an invalid... Three ladies phoned me and gave me this
information... all of whom... didn't know my situation at all, who just were people in the church
community who had come under the influence of what the minister had now decided was best for our
family... And another two ladies, who I considered very close friends, came to visit me ... to pass on this
information and now ... they were all going to help me get out of invalid-mode, tough-love sort of thing,
you know And ... at that stage, to be honest with you, there wasn't much help forthcoming, because we
were over the initial period where no one knew what was wrong and I was desperately ill... So there
wasn't actually a steady flow of help ... I mean, we were now already ... mmm ... seven years into the
illness ... there weren't people rallying around at that point. .. so why they even had to make this ...
statement at that point I don't know ... don't know what prompted it, I can't imagine what prompted it. .. I
mean ... they weren't bringing us meals or anything like that, we were just really struggling very much on
our own ... nobody seemed to want to have anything to do with us anymore ...
Cheryl's friends deliberately endeavoured to create distance. Perhaps, in some sense, it is a
comprehensible reaction. They did not understand the illness and did not know how to
respond to it appropriately. Hence, to avoid embarrassment and failure, they avoided the
illness and the sufferer. Perhaps it is understandable, but the fact remains that when the ME
sufferer needed their help the most they deserted the friendship. They left their ill friend in the
cold void offriendlessness. How could this be anything but fiercely cruel?
It is quite clear that the cruelty of the participants' friends originated from an incredible lack of
understanding of this strange illness. Indeed, in the face of the inexplicable, their friends made
false accusations, reached wrong judgements and lavishly dispensed senseless advice. When
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this approach accomplished little, they often abandoned the friendship. In this manner insane
ignorance ruled and bitter cruelty prevailed.
In response ...
Participants' response to their encounters with friends reverberated with a strong sense of
tribulation. See how this shines through in Natalie's words:
... ek dink die sosiale aspek van die siekte en die siening van mense en hulle reaksies op jou is 'n baie-
baie groot euwel. Dit is tot 'n mate meestal negatief; dit is soms kru; dit maak ... seer al moet dit nie ...
For participants such as Natalie this sense of tribulation became manifest in the very tangible
experience of isolation. Within this context, isolation can be regarded as the result of a two-
fold process: firstly, friends withdrew from sufferers, and secondly, sufferers retreated from
friends (cf. Field 1976: 348).
Friends withdrew and were, hence, lost to the sufferer, because the ill person had changed.
This change primarily involved a physical inability to sustain friendships. Denise explained:
Jy het baie vriende ook verloor in die proses ... mmm omdat jy nie in staat is om vriendskappe rêrig in
stand te hou nie ... en baie mense verstaan dit nie ... jy jy is fisies nie in staat... nie ... mmm ... wat sleg
is, want jy verloor goeie vriende langs die pad ...
Natalie voiced a similar concern:
Jy weet. .. ek voel. .. ek s ... wanneer ek 100% in 'n vriendskap insit, dan lyk dit net soos 10%, want ek
kan nie ... eh ... ek kan nie alles meemaak nie ...
Natalie's statement emphasises the fact that an inability to sustain friendships is closely bound
to an inability to actively participate in friendships. This important point is further clarified by
the following experience related by Natalie:
... ek het ook van my vriende verloor, want dié van hulle wat met my kon identifiseer of waarmee ek kon
identifiseer ... hulle het ook behoeftes om sekere goed te doen, byvoorbeeld, hulle gaan naweke weg
plaas toe... En die ... die inspanning van so iets is vir my te groot om te sit saam met my studies, so ek
moes kies... Ek kan tien teen een dit gedoen het, ek kon tien teen een 'n naweek saam met hulle plaas
toe gegaan het. .. maar ek het besef as ek Maandag wou T ..Tech toe gaan ... so ... daar ... daar het
afstand weer begin... Ongelukkig ... het ek heelwat vriende verloor as gevolg van dit, ook moontlike
vriende wat ek nog kon maak ...
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Denise described a similar experience of physical frailty foiling friendships:
Dis nie altyd lekker nie ... as jy 'n hele naweek beplan het en jy kom op die Donderdag by die huis en jy
besef, kyk, ek gaan eers Maandag opstaan ... mmm ... Dis swaar, want dan moet jy ... dis weer waar die
vriendskappe inkom, party mense gaan verstaan as jy hulle bel en sê, ek is jammer, maar ek kan nie .
ek is moeg ... of wat ookal. .. en ander sal sê, ja, maar lê 'n uur en dan is jy reg ... en dit is nie so nie .
So, jy kry mense wat verstaan en mense wat nie verstaan nie ... partykeer maak dit jou seer dat jy ... dat
jy weet jy verloor vriendskappe daardeur ...
Sadly, Natalie and Denise's experience of loss, caused by sheer incapacity, was shared by all
the participants. Their friendships were disrupted and often disintegrated under the impact of
reduced energy, impairment of mobility, bodily restrictions, symptom management, and the
like (cf. Strauss & Glaser 1975: 54-55). For them, ME brought limitations and adjustments
which hindered participation in and enjoyment of friendships. For them, ME brought loss and
isolation. This experience is, as Kelly and Dickinson's (1997: 260) study shows, not
uncommon among those who suffer from severe chronic conditions. In their study,
respondents who suffer from ulcerative colitis (chronic inflammation of the large bowel lining)
reported the experience of friends having moved on in their lives leaving them feeling "very
friendless" and almost isolated for protracted periods of time.
Yet, besides a change in the physical ability of the sufferer, the fate of friendships was also
notably influenced by an intrinsic change in the Self of the sufferer. For Natalie, this
realisation unfolded as follows:
... ek kan tereg sê ek het heelwat vriende verloor, omdat dit heel moontlik is dat 'n mens as persoon
heelwat verander. Wat ek was en wat ek is ... daar is verskille. Baie van 'n mens se vriende sukkel om
dit te hanteer... Die rede is dat daar so 'n groot verskil kom ... daar is so 'n groot verskil tussen hoe jy
was en wie jy nou is... eintlik ... hoe kan 'n mens eintlik aangaan, 'n mens verwag ondersteuning van 'n
vriend deur dik en dun, maar dit is nie meer dieselfde vriend eintlik nie, die persoon nie, dit is so groot
verskil. ..
Thus, when the ill person changes and relationships cannot be renegotiated on a new basis, an
experience ofloss and isolation is almost inevitable (cf. Crook 1982: 73).
Just as friends withdraw from the ill person, so too does the ill person retreat from friends. In
fact, they do so for exactly the same reason: there is no remaining basis for friendship. Yet,
there is a different emphasis in each party's reasoning: for friends, the basis of friendship has
been negated by the sufferer's inability to participate in the friendship as before; for sufferers,
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the basis of friendship has been ruined by their friends' inability to understand or at least
accept their situation.
ShareNatalie's experience of retreat from friendship:
... ek het nou iemand gehad by die Technikon wat my gedurig deur ... dis asof sy my uitgesoek het elke
dag om vir my te sê ek moet 'n meer positiewe ingesteldheid hê en ek moet meer geloof hê en ek moet. ..
En ek het later, omdat ek nie geweet het hoe om vir haar ... te ... te laat insig kry en ... en ... en te laat
verstaan dat ek al daai dinge probeer en dat dit my nie gaan help as sy my raad gee elke dag nie, het ek
my begin distansieer van haar, jy sien, ek het haar begin vermy ... Dis a/wat ek kon doen ...
Helen's words reflect a similar notion of defection and evasion:
I became extremely sensitive to their comments and responded by isolating myself even more ... in order
to protect myself ...
For Natalie and Helen as well as the other participants a vicious cycle was grinding its way
through their friendships: the less understanding others showed towards them and their illness,
the more isolated they felt. Yet, the more isolated they became, the less likely it was that
others would understand and the less likely they were to experience any understanding. For
the participants this constituted the way in which the illness had built (and still builds) a wall
of isolation between them and their friends.
Each time cruelty is encountered this wall of isolation is strengthened. And each time, the
sufferer resolves not to talk about the illness any longer, to anyone. The sufferer desperately
wants to protect the Self from the cruelty, from the hurt it carries. A tone of desperation
resounds clearly in Natalie's account:
En ek dink ... ai, dit het my seergemaak ... ek was baie seergemaak ... mmm ... baie dikwels... En waar
ek miskien voorheen my mond sou uitwas, vir hulle 'n goeie storietjie sou vertel, het ek gevoeL .. maar
die siekte is nie iets wat ek kan rondslinger nie, dis nie iets wat jy ... jy kan dit nie aan iemand verduidelik
nie, jy het miskien nie die krag om dit aan iemand te verduidelik nie ... en jy sien later nie eers meer die
sin daarin nie, jy wil dit graag wegsteek, jy wil dit graag weghou van mense af ... mmm ... veral as gevolg
van die onkunde ...
Natalie later sadly added...
... die feit dat daar so baie negatiwiteit is en so baie wanbegrip is ... dit affekteer my baie, op hierdie
oomblik, nou nog mmm ... net omdat dit moeilik is om ... uit niks uit vriende te maak ... van niks af nie ...
omdat daar klaar daar is klaar baie kere saadjies geplant. .. ek vind dit moeilik en ek vind dit moeilik
om ... van myself te gee, omdat ek bang is ek kry seer, want ek het al baie seergekry. So, ek maak baie
minder oop, dink ek ...
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Natalie's words reflect the sadness of defeat in the face of a seemingly invincible ignorance.
In response, she closed up and she reduced access to the Self. For an ME sufferer such as
Natalie, a decision not to talk about the illness does not constitute a deliberate attempt to be
slyly secretive about the illness. Instead, it simply signifies the sufferer's desperate attempt to
protect the Self from the deeply hurtful reaction of others. In turn this approach heightens the
sufferer's sense of isolation (cf. Crook 1982: 73; Strauss & Glaser 1975: 54-57; Ware 1999:
316-317).
This isolation signified the very essence of each sufferer's tribulation ...
... die isolasie dink ek het ... het rêrig my heeltemalondergekry, dit is iets waaraan ek glad nie gewoond
was nie ... (Natalie)
But why does the sufferer find it so difficult to bear? If it is such an arduous task to build and
maintain friendships, is there then no relief in not having friendships to maintain? For the
participants in this study "not having friendships to maintain" brought no relief for, despite
their illness they are still very much human. Natalie explained:
... ai, ek is dan lyk my maar ook 'n mens ... ja, ek wil vriende hê en ek wil aanv ..aanvaar word Ja, daar
word altyd mos gesê jy moet jou nie soveel steur aan ... dis mos nou net 'n eksterne ding, maar nee, ek
dink nie so nie, ek dink dit. .. dit is alles deel van jou emosionele maaksel, wie jy is is jou vriendekring,
die mense waarmee jy omgaan, so ... Dis een van die kwessies, dink ek ... mmm wat vir my dit baie
moeilik gemaak het, want natuurlik wil ek ook mos aanvaar word, natuurlik wil ek 'n vriendekring hê ...
Natalie is an ME sufferer and she is a human being. Thus, in the midst of her suffering, she
longs to share the harmony of acceptance and friendship with others. Instead, she now
experiences the pinnacle of isolation - loneliness:
... die waarheid is, ek het miskien nie meer so baie vriende oor nie ... dis vir my baie moeilik, ek is eintlik
baie alleen ... ja, dis ... vriendskapsgewys is ek baie alleen... Ek weet nie, ek het net so dit was net so
'n kluisenaarsbestaan vir so lank dat ek so ... jy weet... So, dit is ... ja, ek is alleen, dis 'n dis 'n feit. Ja,
ek voel alleen ... dis simpel, maar ja ... ek voel baie alleen.
Natalie's words speak for all participants. It is an experience of stark aloneness, of being
forced into solitude.
Thus, the participants responded to tribulation; they changed. They changed because of ME.
They changed because of the stubborn ignorance encountered in others. As a result, they are
now caught in the midst of a conflict raging between their desperate need for self-protection
and their inmost longing for the intimacy of friendship. In this conflict the ME sufferer is
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vulnerable - overwhelmed by the difficulties they face that emerge from both the direct
consequences of living with a chronic illness as well as the impact of that illness on their
ability to maintain a sense of normalcy (cf. Atkin & Ahmad 2000: 509). This conflict, left
unresolved, will potentially thwart the ME sufferer's avid desire to live life as normally as
possible. For, as Ware (1999: 317) suggests, the more intense the experience of isolation, the
more difficult it becomes to connect to the outside world. Thus, already marginalized and
dealing just with the illness itself, people with ME may find they have lost the sense of a world
shared with healthy people. When this happens, increased social distance seems inevitable.
To cope ...
Natalie unveiled an eternal longing:
... dit sou soveel makliker gewees het as mense 'n ander ... uitkyk daaroor gehad het. .. vir 'n mens
self ...
At this moment Natalie's "if only" longing is not part of the reality of ME. But, if 'if only' is
merely a wishful fantasy, how does the ME sufferer cope?
To cope within the realm of friendship is, as each participant discovered, often extremely
difficult. See how this is clearly revealed in Natalie's description:
... ek het nou iemand gehad by die Technikon wat my gedurig deur ... dis asof sy my uitgesoek het elke
dag om vir my te sê ek moet 'n meer positiewe ingesteldheid hê en ek moet meer geloof hê en ek moet. ..
En ek het later, omdat ek nie geweet het hoe om vir haar ... te ... te laat insig kryen ... en te laat verstaan
dat ek al daai dinge probeer en dat dit my nie gaan help as sy my raad gee elke dag nie, het ek my begin
distansieer van haar, jy sien, ek het haar begin vermy en so aan... Dis al wat ek kon doen ... dit kom
maar net terug na my toe, omdat ek nie weet hoe om te ... te reageer daarop nie... Sien, dit raak net
later so moeilik. Nou, ek ... liewe aarde, ek weet nie, jy weet, ek het soveel aande huis toe gekom en ...
en ek het besef sy is besig om die oorhand oor my te kry ... maar ek weet net nie hoe om dit te hanteer
nie.
Natalie was tortured by the anguish of "not knowing" how to respond:
Ek het nog nie 'n antwoord gekry oor hoe ek moet optree teenoor vriende nie, wat sal die oplossing wees
nie ... mmm ... want ek het al alles probeer, ek het al probeer om eerlik en openlik met hulle te wees of ek
het al probeer om dit te ignoreer... Albei kante toe werk dit nie ... my een vriendin sê vir my ek maak nie
oop teenoor haar nie, wat vir haar 'n klap in die gesig is, die ander vriendin sê sy wil niks van my weet
nie ... mmm ... ek moet net. .. ek is net haar vriendin, sy stel nie belang om dieper te kyk nie... Nou watter
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kant toe gaan jy nou, want as ek iets sê dan onstel ek die een en as ek nie iets sê nie ontstel ek die
ander een... Dis baie moeilik...
The distress is obvious. The solution is not.
Still, the participants did find the "unobvious" solution. They discovered choice. Denise
described this discovery as follows:
... dit is... 'n wilsbesluit, want gewoonlik wil ek alles doen, en jy dink as jy dit nou nie gaan doen nie
dan... jy weet, wat gaan hulle nou dink en wat gaan hulle nou sê en al daai dinge... Maar ek het toe nou
net vrede gemaak daarmee en jy kom op 'n punt waar jy nie omgee wat mense van jou dink nie, jy
moet... jy moet daarmee saam leef...
In choice, Denise found a way to deal with the reactions of others to her and her illness. She
discovered that she could deliberately choose how to endure and respond to their reactions.
She discovered that in the power of choice lay the power to govern her own experience.
Helen's account offers further elucidation of this discovery:
One large turning point in my learning to cope with ME, was the day I realised that I did not have to
subject myself to the negative responses I received from others... and could actively avoid encounters
with those individuals that invariably left me feeling misunderstood and drained from energy... It left me
feeling more empowered... and less the victim of others' views and lack of understanding...
Helen recognised that although ME sufferers are almost inevitably bound to confront negative
reactions from others, including from friends, they have the power to protect themselves from
such reactions. Armed with this realisation, Helen firmly resolved not to expose herself any
longer to the negative comments and contributions of others. Helen too discovered the power
to guide and command her own experience.
Thus, the discovery of choice empowered these participants. More specifically, it empowered
the participants to control their experience amid friends through the choice to discriminate, to
adjust and to accept:
Firstly, the ability to choose empowers one to discriminate. Cheryl explains:
.. you are the only person I've talked to in depth... in depth on this subject... I am careful who I... I talk
to... more than just. .. superficially. There are certain peoplewho you know really want to know. And the
other people... when they say, 'how are you', desperately want you just to say, 'fine'. You have to learn
to find out which ones are which! I... I think I've... I've learned pretty much which ones are our friends by
now.
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It is ultimately Cheryl's choice exactly what she will reveal about the illness, and to whom.
Through this ability to discriminate she finds the power to determine whether or not her ill
status will enter into or even impose upon her interaction with friends. Ware (1992: 353)
identified a similar tendency in her work with ME sufferers. Strauss and Glaser (1975: 60-61)
identify this approach as a "normalizing tactic" through which chronically ill persons work
hard to keep their poise. It is a tactic that Atkin and Ahmad (2000: 509) also identified among
their participants who suffer from thalassaemia major. Through the power to choose and the
resultant power to discriminate Cheryl, like other ill persons, do their best to maintain control
of the nature and content of their interaction with friends.
Secondly, through the discovery of choice the ill person is ordained with the power to adjust.
Cheryl again illustrated the reward gained through the power to adjust within the context of
friendship:
... as far as... good friends are concerned I cannot function socially as I used to. I was well known for
entertaining and good cooking... now all we manage is a few bits of salad sliced by one of the children,
bread rolls and some braaied meat. .. after 1994 we only ever braaied for friends... I've never cooked a
lovely meal for friends since then ... very sad... But braaiing and chopping up tomatoes and spreading
rolls can at least bring friends together even if not haute cuisine!
Thus, instead of choosing to avoid friends while seriously ill, Cheryl chose to adjust ... to
invite fewer friends at a time, to make meals simpler, to employ the rest of the family in the
preparation of dishes, to accept help when offered. Perhaps this sounds mundane or even
insignificant, but it is not. Adjustments such as those described in Cheryl's account allow the
chronically ill person to sustain invaluable friendships despite the odds.
Lastly, the power of choice offers the ill person the opportunity to accept. This acceptance
follows a two-step process which, firstly, requires an acceptance of the stubborn nature of
ignorance among friends. Helen explained:
I tried extremely hard to accept that I would never be able to convey to people the real isolation,
loneliness and depression one feels coping with an illness that has no guaranteed time limit and that
draws a halt to most aspects of your life. In order to cope, I began to spend less energy on trying to
convince others of what I was feeling and concluded that most people will never understand such an
illness unless they have the misfortune of suffering themselves... or witnessing a loved one suffer...
There is no road around this obstacle called ignorance. It is there, and it is stubborn. Yet,
instead of responding with tiresome resistance, the ill person can choose to acknowledge its
presence in the very midst of friendships.
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The choice that makes allowances for the obstinate nature of ignorance empowers the ill
person to accept friends. It is not an acceptance of friends despite of their ignorance, but it is
rather an acceptance of friends because they are friends. Chery1's account illustrates this
choice perfectly:
... we've got a ... couple of groups of friends like that. .. who we cherish, because we have had them for
many, many years ... from before we got married, they were friends... and we are not prepared to loose
them on the grounds of the fact that they can't come to terms with the illness they don't understand ... and
we haven't tried to force it on any of our friends ...
Hence, in accordance with the choices she had made, Cheryl was able to observe:
I. .. I've come to accept in ... in my friends that are too precious to loose, I've come to accept that they ...
can't accept it, so I just accept them ...
For Cheryl, embracing the power to accept allowed her to prevent her status of being ill and
the lack of understanding surrounding it from destroying the usual ("normal") character of her
interaction with cherished friends ... precisely because they are such cherished friends.
Taken together, these strategies point to a recognition among ME sufferers that in a world
where their condition already precludes full social integration, they should ideally avoid doing
anything that would call further attention to their impairments if they wish to preserve
whatever degree of social connectedness they still possess (Ware 1999: 316). By doing so
through personal choice, they are now in charge of the very essence of their social interaction.
Such interaction - and the friendships that may depend on it - is now fully under personal
control.
However, as Ware (1999: 316) points out, this approach to social integration tends to result in
a kind of "silencing" of talk about illness. Participants, even more than the most of us, cannot
admit to feeling less than "fine", cannot make reference to illness-related issues or activities,
cannot discuss their limitations. If they do, they risk compounding their social isolation
through abandonment or outright rejection by others. If they do, they forsake the dream of
living their lives as normally as possible. But if they do not, they may find they have
preserved outward social ties at the expense of their inner authenticity. Paradoxically, then,
those very attempts at ensuring connectedness to the social world may lead to alienation from
the Self.
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Conclusion
ME sufferers pursue a vision of normal life, despite the symptoms, limitations and adjustments
caused by their illness. A fundamental element of this vision is the friendships which sufferers
forge. The discussion above has revealed that while some friendships stand firm in the
presence of ME, others appear to be frail and crumble dismally in the face of this illness. One
cannot but wonder what determines the stability, the sustainability, of these friendships?
At first glance, it appears as though the answer to this question lies in the forces which govern
the fundamental strength of the ME sufferer's relationship with friends. In many situations the
strength of friendships falters under the cruel influence of ignorance. Such cruelty induces the
sufferer to change. It prompts a newfound awareness of the need to protect the Self, even
against friends. It builds and re-builds a wall of isolation. Thus, the forces of cruelty create a
lonely void in which many friendships simply dissolve. Still, in other contexts, the vivacity of
the ME sufferer's friendships is sustained through unwavering, unqualified kindness. It is a
caring kindness which is independent of any understanding of ME. It is a caring kindness
which allows the sufferer the freedom to be and express the Self, not only on the road to
wellness, but also in the pursuit of the ultimate vision of "normal life". It is in the forces of
kindness that friendships find the spirit to survive.
Is it then the forces of cruelty and kindness alone which test the strength of ME sufferers'
friendships?
I argue that that is not the whole truth. The forces of cruelty and kindness are most certainly at
work, but to accept their influence as a conclusive explanation would deliver sufferers
helplessly into the hands of forces seemingly beyond their own control. And this is not the
case. ME sufferers are not the victims of their circumstances; they are not the victims of their
illness. They share responsibility for the vigour and vitality of their friendships. They have a
contribution to offer and a choice to make. Indeed, through choice sufferers have the power to
redesign, to shape, to guide both the content and nature of their friendships. While some
friendships may always resist the power of choice, others will endure and prosper, because the
sufferer made a choice.
Thus, it is the sovereign power of personal choice which keeps the ME sufferer's faith in
friendship alive and, hence, makes the earnest aspiration ''to live as normally as possible"
attainable.
~ ---~_.~-------------
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Chapter 14
The media: Teacher or false prophet?
Cassell (1991: 52-53) reminds us that "even though suffering is an essentially private matter,
the notion of privacy supposes a public world". Indeed, the public world is the world where
life is lived. It is the world where ME exists. It is the world where ME sufferers tread. It is
the world where much suffering occurs.
So far we have established that in this public world, ME sufferers interact with physicians,
family and friends: they meet, they join, they concur, they communicate, they participate, they
associate, they relate, they challenge, they clash, they collide, they contradict, they confront,
they dispute, they resist, they protest. But their circle of interaction extends ever outwards,
beyond these personal bonds, and they meet society at large.
This section will be devoted to their encounters with the primary representative and interpreter
of society at large: the media. Wessely et al. (1998: 312-317) show that the media played an
important and complex role in the social history of ME and that it is therefore necessary to
scrutinise very carefully the media's contribution in shaping the public perception of ME and
hence the personal experiences of ME sufferers. The participants too support such a scrutiny.
Natalie spoke for all participants when she stated:
... die media ... man, hulle speel mos nou 'n baie groot rol. .. want wat hulle daar gaan uitdra is ... dis wat
die mense gaan glo... So huile ... het so baie ... almal ... almal wat enigsins weet daarvan ... hoe ... hoe
kom hulle aan daai inligting ... of hulle ken iemand wat dit het of hulle het daarvan iets gelees in die
media.
Indeed, the media, both locally and abroad, has been inundated with reports concerning ME
and the plight of those who suffer from it. MacLean and Wessely (1994: 776) agree that
"during the past decade attention given to the chronic fatigue syndrome by the professional
and popular press has risen enormously producing a media epidemic". Hence, in their journey
through the public world, the participants in this study were inevitably exposed to the media's
version of their illness.
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Nurturing wellness
Participants' accounts reveal that, on their road to wellness, media coverage of ME has served
a very important purpose by giving widespread publicity to the illness. Cheryl noted:
The media has done ... a... a favour to people with ME, to a certain extent, by publicising it. ..
Indeed, the extensive media coverage of ME facilitated the broad dissemination of an
awareness of and interest in ME.
For sufferers this may be of vital importance, as many of those with whom they interact in the
public world will only know ME by the reports they have come across in the popular media.
Note, for instance, how Cheryl's reasoning behind her use of the term "yuppie flu" illustrates
this point:
I still use that term when I'm speaking to somebody who genuinely seems interested, but obviously is not
going to have a clue until you mention 'yuppie flu'. So, I still use that term to help people out when they
are trying to understand what's wrong with me ... and generally for nurses. They've read more in the You
magazine than they will in ... in any textbook, that's for sure ...
When people genuinely try to understand or are in a position to help the ME sufferer, use of
the widely publicised term "yuppie flu" represents the first easy manoeuvre towards creating
greater insight into the sufferer's situation.
Furthermore, because there is a tendency within the media "to promote polarization and
division whenever considering unexplained symptoms and syndromes, areas which by their
nature are grey and uncertain" (Wessely et al. 1998: 317-318), discussion and debate will
follow when reports onME appear. Cheryl recognised the potential value of this tendency:
... I can't honestly say there's been a single article... in normal media, I don't mean a proper, well-
researched book ... mmm ... no, not ordinary journalists, they haven't done any good. The best I can say
is that they've created debate ... which is not been ... mmm ... has not been without its merit.
Thus, through coverage of ME, be it of whatever nature, the media promotes controversy and
contention, dispute and deliberation. It offers a vital forum in which different views, often
conflicting and contradicting, may be heard and weighed. It allows each beholder to reach his
or her own verdict concerning the substance of ME.
A further important result which follows from the widespread coverage enjoyed by ME is a
growing awareness among sufferers, such as the participants in this study, that they are not
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alone, that there are others who share a plight similar as their own. Denise gave expression to
this awareness:
... ek dink met die media ... het jy ... het jy die ondersteuning beleef van 'hier is nog mense wat voel soos
watjy vae!' ...
What comfort to know: "I'm not alone". The discovery that they are not alone inspired a
growing sense of community with other ME sufferers among the participants. This is evident
in Denise's words:
En ... mmm ... om te weet daar is nog ander mense wat. .. wat min of meer deur dieselfde gaan as
waardeur jy gaan... Dit het jou half in kontak gebring met. .. met ander mense ...
For sufferers such as Denise, the certain knowing that there are "others" with whom they share
such a central part of their live gives rise to a sense of security, coherence and mutual support.
The emergence of such a sense of group identity is, as Wesselyetal. (1998: 272) maintain,
strongly facilitated through media coverage of ME. According to these authors, it is especially
the language of such coverage which prompts impassioned group identification. In
substantiation of this contention they refer to an editorial in a patient's magazine entitled,
"Belief in Ourselves" which commented that, "We are standard bearers... We know that
somehow, somewhere, out there, a mistake has been made. We know we are in the right ...
Every sufferer's experience helps us bear witness to the truth ... One day we shall prevail" (in
Wessely et al. 1998: 272). It would indeed be difficult to ignore the effect of such passionate
rhetoric and conviction. Reports of this nature must undeniably contribute towards an
awareness of an "us", of a group to which the ME sufferer belongs.
The media's chronicle of the stories of specific ME sufferers does not only inspire a strong
sense of community, but may also lead other sufferers to feel more empowered. When they
read or hear what other sufferers have accomplished, it provides assurance, hope, and
expectancy. Cheryl observed:
Even Yankelowitz and his story has got so many people in such a state of running around the country
after lawyers... in the hope that they will get something from Old Mutual. So, somewhere somebody
might have been helped ... to stand up for themselves or to understand the illness a bit better ...
The ''Yankelowitz story" to which Cheryl refers concerns a very recent court case in which
Mr. Leon Yankelowitz, a ME sufferer from Cape Town, took Old Mutual to court over its
refusal to payout a disability policy for ME. In August 1999, three Cape High Court judges
ruled against the insurance giant (Coetzee, 1999: 138-139;Mokwena 1999: 1).
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The court's decision made newspaper headlines and, in the Cape Times, even the front page
where it was aptly titled, ''Yuppie flu: Landmark ruling a victory for sufferers". It was widely
heralded as "binding on all disability claims by yuppie flu sufferers" (Mokwena 1991: 1). It
was a ruling that would "bring relief to people whose claims were previously treated with
scorn" (Mokwena 1991: 1). It was declared "a precedent setting judgement", one that would
certainly 'pave the way for other long term sufferers who are unable to work and can be
considered permanently disabled' (Whitaker 1999: 3). This case indeed set a precedent.
Through the media coverage enjoyed by this single case many ME sufferers such as Cheryl
became aware that they could now, for the first time, claim disability benefits on the grounds
of their disabling condition. Hence, through their newfound knowledge, they were empowered
to act in their own best interests.
Thus, as the participants in this study experience, the widespread publicity enjoyed by ME
facilitates a greater awareness of and deliberation on the substance of their illness within the
public world. For them, the media-inspired interest in ME often provides a valuable
background when communicating their situation to those who want at need to understand
more. In addition, the media coverage of ME provides the certain knowledge that there are
others who share their plight, with whom they enjoy a sense of community, and from whom
they can learn much. In this knowledge the participants found the security, encouragement
and expectancy to act on their own behalf. .. and hence to advance on the road to wellness.
Cruel encounters
The essence of cruelty is the expression "yuppie flu":
... you know, 'yuppie flu' did us a lot of harm. Everyone with ME was now branded ... (Cheryl)
For all the participants the most negative aspect of media coverage of ME was the use of the
term "yuppie flu".
Consider Denise's observation:
Mmm... ek weet daar was artikels in die Huisgenoot en ander tydskrifte en sulke dinge wat die
sogenaamde 'yuppie griep' bespreek het en sulke dinge ... en ek dink dit het. .. meer skade gedoen rêrig
as goed ... want. .. toe het almal begin dink, joe, as jy moeg is dan het jy 'yuppie griep'... Dit was hierdie
term wat almalop 'n Donderdag-middag begin uitpak het by die werk ... jy weet. ..
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
282
For ME sufferers such as Denise the label "yuppie flu" is loathsome and offensive. For
journalists it provides an eye-catching headline and gives the subject a wider, if inaccurate,
social context (MacLean and Wessely 1994: 776-777). In short, it sells newspapers.
It appears therefore as if media coverage of ME, and specifically the use of the term "yuppie
flu", was chiefly directed at sensation. The facts were not important - or at least not as
important as the story. Denise recognised this bias in the press:
... ek dink baie van die media ... dit het gegaan oor sensasie en nie ... nie rêrig oor die feite nie... die
kriteria wat hulle daar sit vir ME kan elke derde mens omtrent mee kwalifiseer ... mmm ... en van daai
goed het 'n mens se hare rêrig laat reg-op staan... Ongelukkig was die minder goeie artikels, dink ek, in
tydskrifte wat groter publisiteit geniet. ..
The pursuit of sensation unfortunately justified the bias. This tendency is supported by the
findings of MacLean and Wessely's (1994: 776-777) research on newspaper coverage of ME.
These authors discovered that all journalists that they interviewed "agreed that their primary
criterion for covering this or any other topic was 'will it make a story?' Hence, although the
journalists were often aware of other research papers, they did not cover them because they
were not newsworthy".
"Newsworthiness" - sensation - the ability to sell - was thus the key credential of a "good
story". What classified a ME report as a "good story" was, as MacLean and Wessely learned,
not only the eye-catching "yuppie flu" headline or the broad social context to which it
apparently applied, but also the utter controversy in which the illness is immersed. According
to journalists interviewed by MacLean and Wessely (1994: 777) "the highly charged medical,
social, and political atmosphere surrounding the subject made it good copy".
The participants experienced that when sensation was the main consideration in a news story, a
lack of facts and general misinformation prevailed. Cheryl disclosed:
... it has done, generally speaking, it's done more a disfavour, really, because they've trivialised the
illness ... and ... people then do believe that, you know.
MacLean and Wessely's (1994: 777) research revealed that the trivialisation of ME was often
most noticeable in the health pages of the women's press. These pages often follow a coherent
theme - "that of empowerment in health and lifestyle. They promote the philosophy that
'total health' is possible if you follow the appropriate diet, take the appropriate nutritional
supplement, or adopt the appropriate lifestyle. The unsubstantiated claims concerning the
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efficacy of changes in nutrition, diet, and lifestyle in the chronic fatigue syndrome fit in with
this philosophy". Such claims do not only provide misinformation and false hope, but also
create an illusion that the ME sufferer's state of health is personally completely controllable.
In other words, if the sufferer does not recover it can be ascribed to his or her own doing, or
lack of doing. This approach is intrinsically cruel, because it belittles the true complexity of
health and illness and places the blame for suffering squarely on the shoulders of the sufferer.
Distortion, misinformation and trivialisation often go hand in hand. Cheryl recalled:
... I don't actually even believe that what we read is necessarily that person's actual experience ...
because I can get half way through an article on ... 'my life changed' ... you know, 'an x number of years
ago when suddenly I couldn't get out of bed the next morning'. And I can get half way through the article
and suddenly it is unrecognisable. And yet half way down you knew that that person had ME, it was so
clear. And then the ... the journalist gets lost somewhere down the ... along the way... I don't know
whether folk are educated even ... enough to even recognise those sort of anomalies.
Natalie also pointed out how much ME is distorted in the media:
Verder word ME dikwels in die verkeerde lig gesteL .. deur die media. Die media sê soms dinge soos dat
dit slegs A-persoonlikhede is wat daaraan ly, dat dit oorywerige, ambisieuse mense is wat hulleself
uitbrand ...
Media coverage of this nature severely distorts the true character of the illness and of the
suffering which accompanies it. In fact, it simply adds further suffering. This notion is
supported by Barsky and Borus (1999: 910-911) who show that the media often uses
hyperbole and uncritical reporting to portray complex and often misunderstood syndromes
such as ME. They state that "preliminary data, tentative findings, and the personal accounts of
individual sufferers are reported as conclusive medical evidence". Through sheer
sensationalism and alarmism the media may indeed serve to compound and intensify the ill
person's subjective experience of the illness.
A very important and, for the participants, a very prominent feature of misinformation and
distortion of ME in the media is the almost absurd fanfare and publicity surrounding the
discovery of so-called 'miracle cures' - by the dozens! Natalie said:
Nog 'n erger onkunde wat gesaai word is hierdie sogenaamde 'nuwe genesings' - wat ek nou in
hoofletters wil benadruk - dit word dikwels bemark in die vorm van 'n nuwe middelof 'n nuwe dokter ...
The sheer detestation in Natalie's words speaks for itself. So too does the annoyance in
Cheryl's statement:
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
284
... we don't need silly reports about 'yuppie flu' and miracle cures and ... and then you spend ... you
spend your entire salary on Moducare and you still don't get better, you know ...
Also, consider what Denise had to say:
... ek dink ook spesifiek ... ek dink nou aan 'n ander artikel wat in die koerant was van onlangs van ...
hierdie wonderlike mmm ... deurbraak ... in terme van om ME te behandel. .. en ... dit is dit is 'n klomp
nonsens... So dan dan breek dit ME se beeld verder af in plaas van om dit rêrig op te bou. So, ek
dink die media ... sit. .. sit vir my ... die pot redelik mis wat ME aanbetref ... ongelukkig ...
The media is indeed in error. Moreover, through their sensational blundering they again and
again exacerbate the ill person's suffering. They promise hope and recovery, and leave the
sufferer to pay the price of disillusionment. For ME sufferers the media's eager exaltation of
each new "miracle cure" represents a bitter cup filled to the brim with false hope and the
guarantee of bankruptcy.
In response ...
In their response to the media's public portrayal of their illness and of their private suffering,
participants followed a barren road leading from frustration to apathy.
Cheryl expressed the intense frustration she experienced in the face of harmful reporting:
... they (the media)... know so little ... that... I suppose in ... in my own menial strength I become
enormously frustrated with them.
Denise supported this sentiment:
... ek dink met die media ... het jy weer 'n frustrasie beleef van 'hierdie is nonsens' ...
After much exposure to hurtful reporting, the participants' experience of frustration turned into
disillusionment. Natalie explains the new perspective she developed:
... ek het nou 'n heel ander sy van die media gesien, sien, ek ... ek het so baie gelees oor 'wonder-kuur',
jy weet. .. en dan weet ek maar dis nie waar nie. So, ek het nou 'n heeltemal 'n ander verhouding met die
media as wat ek ... wat ek miskien sou hê. En dis baie goed, ek is baie bly daaroor ... andersins sou ek
net toe-oë deur die lewe gegaan het! Almal. .. baie mense ... mmm ... joe, 'n mens ... mens is darem baie
verkeerd om ... om te glo in die media ...
Natalie's repeated exposure to ignorant and distorted reporting transformed her perspective on
the very nature and conduct of journalism. She discovered that the creations manufactured by
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the media is not to be taken at face value because in such creations truth and untruth are often
intimately intermingled, all for the sake of "a good story".
For some of the participants this disillusionment often led to outright avoidance. Natalie
explained:
... ek het. .. gelees ... so hier en daar artikels gelees van mense wat daardeur gegaan het. .. dit was vir
my maar ... dit was net altyd vir my nie aangenaam gewees nie... Weet jy, dit het my baie keer
ontstel, .. dit raak 'n mens nog baie ... daarom lees ek glad nie ... ek weet nie of dit 'n manier is om myself
te beskerm nie, maar ek distansieer my redelik baie ...
In order to protect themselves against further wounds inflicted by slanted sensationalism and
distortion, ME sufferers such as Natalie deliberately shun the media.
As ME sufferers become disillusioned and start avoiding exposure to the media, they are
inclined to become increasingly unresponsive to the iniquities committed by the media and
eventually to reach a stage where their energy to protest against the distortions dies away.
Cheryl explains:
I'm not a ME lobbyist anymore, so I don't ever respond... I might have in the beginning ... I can't
remember... But. .. mmm ... now I. .. I feeL .. now my reaction to anyone who is so ignorant, as the press
could be and some of them are, would be that. .. I'm too tired to educate them ...
One detects an apathy, even a dispirited surrender in Cheryl's words: "Why bother, they
certainly won't listen; they're obviously not interested in the facts" - the sad results of
inaccurate and sensational journalism.
Thus, in response to the media's mistreatment oftheir illness and the blatant ignorance which
was put on public display, the participants in this study first experienced a sense of frustration
which grew into disillusionment as they repeatedly recognised how easily the media mixed
truth and untruth. Finally, the thought of protest dwindled into detachment and indifference,
for they now had to start protecting themselves against the distortions and falsehoods put out
by the media.
To cope ...
The participants often found it difficult to cope, or to know how to cope, with the media's
distorted presentation of their illness. As thankful as participants were for the greater public
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awareness and debate that was stimulated by soundmedia coverage of ME, as bewildered were
they by frivolous coverage.
To comprehend what exactly ME sufferers confront in the media, consider the following
distressing example. It is an extract entitled "Tekens van yuppiegriep" from a regular health
column which recently appeared in a well-known and widely read Afrikaans Sunday
newspaper (Suster Wagner 2000: 5):
Liewe Suster Wagner:
Ek is 26 en het verneem dat ek yuppiegriep het. Of altans, dis is hoe 'n vriend my diagnoseer. Ek sal
seker die een of ander tyd dokter toe moet gaan, maar wat sê ek vir die man? My simptome is gedurige
moegheid en 'n verkoue wat kom en gaan. Kan u meer inligting omtrent hierdie siekte pos? Ek sal
graag meer tekens wil ken voordat ek dokter toe gaan.
Antwoord: Jy verwys na 'n sindroom wat dokters al lank laat kopkrap. Dit is in die laat jare vyftig deur 'n
dokter van Pinelands aangeteken as 'n siekte, maar tot nog toe kon geen laboratoriumtoets enige
verband vind tussen die sindroom en 'n virusteenwoordigheid nie. Die feit dat mense soms koorsig is en
verkoues kry, is deel van die resultaat van moegheid en dat die ou gestel dan bietjie af is. Die beste
behandeling is bedrus. Die feite wys dat die meeste mense met die sindroom mense is wat laat werk en
baie vlytig is totdat hulle naderhand begin sukkel. Dit kom veral by vooruitstrewende jong mans voor.
Vandaar die naam yuppiegriep. AI wat jy vir jou dokter moet se, is hoe jy voel en waarom jy dink jy het
die sindroom. Hy sal jou goeie raad gee.
Suster Wagner's response to the questioner's inquiries shows outright ignorance. The little
information that is offered is at best questionable and at worst completely wrong. ME does not
merely entail a fever and a cold, or a body that feels a bit on the down side. ME is not treated
by complete bed rest. ME is not predominant among men. ME is not the same as "bum-out"
due to over-eager over-exertion. What Suster Wagner imparted did not constitute "die feite"
about ME, nor did it offer any useful help to the questioner. She did, however, succeed in
showing a dreadful ignorance, in perpetuating the many misconceptions surrounding ME, and
in adding to ME sufferers' concern about appallingmedia coverage.
Suster Wagner's reply is but one example of ME sufferers' recurrent "difficult-to-cope-with"
exposures to the media. Natalie peaks for many ME sufferers when she says:
Hierdie soort sensasie-media en mense se onkunde beïnvloed die reaksies teenoor jou as lyer en dit
beïnvloed jou eie reaksies teenoor jouself.
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Instances such as Suster Wagner's portrayal of ME are difficult to cope with exactly because
they influence how others think about ME and, hence, how people respond to those who suffer
from ME. Moreover, such instances make it even more difficult to cope with the illness
because they influence the sufferers' own perspective about the illness and thus, how they
respond to the Self.
In order to cope and to avoid complete bewilderment ME sufferers need to make sense of these
instances of ignorance in the media and to reach some understanding of the media's portrayal
of their illness. Cheryl offered a description of her attempts to do just that:
I don't know a media person who knows more than I do about it for sure. There's no one who ...
bothers ... but for what would they bother to study it for? I mean when Kosovo and ... and ... mmm ... all
these ... these... I mean, Chechnya and these things that are happening all around the world are
occupying journalists of the highest calibre ... why one earth should they investigate ME, why should they
even try and get to the bottom of ME? I mean, there's absolutely no good reason for it. So, I don't blame
the journalists ...
She added:
... I can't actually see why I, as a journalist, would go out on limb for ME. Let's be frank, I mean, what is
in there for them? They are not going to win the Pulitzer Prize of the year for a report on ME. They are
not going to win anything, except an awful lot of controversy next time they visit their own GP ... or if
they ... heaven forbid, think they've got ME. They'll forever be thought of ... that they just associate with
these people.
Cheryl rationalised the situation and developed an understanding that allowed her to make
sense of journalists' lackadaisical approach and attitude towards ME. This helped her to
comprehend and even accept journalists' evident lack of interest to understand the illness and
to reach her own personal understanding of the situation.
Thus, because of the ignorance about ME that they found in the media, the participants were
challenged to discover a way to cope with journalists' depiction of their illness. It became
even more vital to do so when they realised how many people - including ME sufferers
themselves - are influenced by what the media prints. The participants met the challenge and
they developed a personal understanding that allow them to acknowledge, comprehend and
even accept the media's presentation of ME.
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Conclusion
The media - the primary representative and interpreter of society at large - puts private
suffering on public display. It presents to the public world an image of ME and the suffering
which takes place behind closed doors. The participants found that this image has two faces.
The first face can be described as kindly benign as it smiles down on ME sufferers. It creates a
public awareness of their illness, it facilitates interaction with the world outside their illness
and it stimulates debate about their illness. It offers the sufferer personal justification because
it shows that the illness does indeed exist, and it offers a break-out from isolation because it
shows that there are other sufferers too. This face of the media lightens the ill person's
experience of suffering. The second face is a cruel one. This is the face of sensationalistic
journalism that is more intent on selling a "good" (albeit even false) story than creating
understanding and spreading enlightenment. This face unquestionably adds to the ME
sufferer's burden of suffering.
The double-faced image of ME presented by the media prompts ME sufferers such as the
participants in this study to review their beliefs and ideas about the media, its conduct and its
creations. They have learned to quickly distinguish the combination of truth and untruth, and
they have learned to understand that the sensationalism, the misinformation and even the
blatant ignorance are all part of the publicity package. And, after all, they understand that the
media is certainly not obliged to ease anyone's suffering.
The media's double-faced approach to ME ultimately becomes an expression of the very
natural conflict situation that exists between the sick person and the public world. It is a
conflict that revolves around different interests, motivations, and ideals. It is a conflict that
again sharply highlights the undeniable fact that ME sufferers do not exist by themselves and
unto themselves, but that they are very much a part of society at large where life and suffering
are lived.
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Chapter 15
Society at large ... at last
The ME sufferer's circle of interaction expands ever outwards, until it reaches the furthest
frontier of experience: society at large. This is the world where social forces constantly
influence and shape the ME sufferer's subjective experience of illness. It is a very real and
immediate world, known not only through its primary representative, the media, but also more
directly and more personally through person-to-person contact. I now turn to the participants'
experiences of such contact in order to explore and illuminate their encounters with the social
dynamism that ultimately defines their human reality.
Nurturing wellness
On the road to well ness, the participants in this study experienced extraordinary expressions of
kindness within society. Cheryl ardently exclaimed:
... there was... there was incidences of kindness that were unprecedented, I mean, you can't imagine
how wonderful peoplewere...
The participants often defined kindness simply as the absence of disbelief. Consider what
Denise says:
Ek het griep gekry of 'n 'n lugweg-infeksie... ek moes toe daarna vir sewe weke lê, dit het my totaal. ..
van my voete afgehad Dit is 'n moeilike situasie, want jy begin by 'n nuwe werk en almal vra vrae,
maar... jy beleef... ek het meer ondersteuning beleef as wat ek skeptisisme beleef het... waarvoor ek
dankbaar was...
Denise equates gestures of kindness within society with support without any scepticism, doubt
or disbelief. Thus, kindness is to have others accept and believe one's experiences, even when
they may not understand or have insight into the illness.
At other times, kindness in society was described as the willingness to offer practical help
when needed. Natalie offered the following testimony of such kindness in society:
... ek het al baie ondersteuning gehad van mense, prakties-gesproke, as ek iets moes doen of so .
Mmm... ek sou mis... ek gaan mos nou nie in detail in nie, maar ek sou vir hulle, byvoorbeeld, sê .
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mmm ... ek is siek of hulle vir my sal help met hierdie of daardie of so ... en dan help hulle my. Dis
wonderlik en ek is baie dankbaar daarvoor ...
This willingness of people to make an effort makes an incredible difference to ME sufferers
because it helps them to achieve what would have been impossible without assistance.
The participants say that kindness in society also lay III the friendly advice offered
spontaneously by others. Natalie recalled:
Ek het 'n wonderlike, wonderlike lektor gehad! Hy't vir my niks prakties gedoen nie, maar hy het vir my
daai ondersteuning gegee ... psigies... Ons sal voor die tekenbord staan dan sal hy vir my sê, maar, ek's
te styf, my liggaamstyl is baie styf, nou ek weet hoekom, as gevolg van pyn en moeg en altyd ... jy weet,
is ek ingetrek, ek's glad nie meer los en oop en ... soos ek was nie, maar ek was nooit bewus daarvan
nie, maar hy sou dit vir my sê, hy sou vir my sê, 'I don't know why, but you ... you're co ... cranked up all
together, you know, open your arms' ... dan sal ek nou eers baie kwaad wees, jy weet, wie is hierdie man
nou ... (lag). Maar dit het my baie gehelp, dit het my rêrig gehelp, want ek dink ek het baie dinge oor
myself geleer en ek het gesien hoe ek lyk wat ek nie voorheen gesien het nie ... so dit was 'n goeie
ervaring ...
For Natalie, the constructive advice offered by her lecturer was essential for personal and
professional progress. It presented the opportunity to learn more about herself, to adjust and to
grow, despite the odds.
However, the participants also reveal that they did not simply wait for instances of kindness to
happen, but that they actively sought out nurturing support. They deliberately avoided or tried
to avoid unresponsive or critical encounters and moved to more sympathetic social spheres (cf.
Strauss & Glaser 1975: 54-55). Such sympathetic spheres often involved interaction with
fellow ME sufferers. Natalie described her experience in this regard:
Ek het nog heel..heelwat kontak met ander ME-lyers... Dit is ... miskien ... mmm ... dis maar wat ek my
vriende kan noem, omdat. .. ons praat dieselfde taal, jy sien ... hulle verwyt jou nooit. .. of sê ooit vir jou ...
mmm lig jou ken op en staar die wêreld in die gesig nie... Dit het my goed laat voel om te weet. ..
mmm jy is deel van ... van 'n groep mense daar buite wat. .. wat weet, wat verstaan ... en dat jy nie die
enigste een is nie ... dis ongelooflik belangrik... En ... die insig ... dis net. .. daar's goed wat hulle
heeltemal verstaan, hulle verstaan ... hulle verstaan al die praktiese probleme... Ons het, byvoorbeeld, in
die afgelope elf jaar nog nie een keer met vakansie gegaan nie ... dit klink baie eienaardig, maar dit was
net tot dusver 'n baie moeilike ding om aan te pak... En ... om dit vir so iemand te sê ... hulle verstaan dit
100%, want hulle is in ... baie van hulle is in daardie posisie ... Dis half 'n verstaan wat 'n mens nie hoef
uit te spreek nie, dis net 'n band wat jy het. .. wat. .. wat help.
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Interaction with fellow ME sufferers offered Natalie the security of knowing that there are
others who share similar problems and difficulties. It also offered a sympathetic context in
which Natalie was able to openly express her experience of ME without fear of judgement or
rejection. It was indeed a haven of nurturing support.
Natalie elaborated:
... dis vir my goed om nou en dan ... kontak te maak en ... ja, ek reken as 'n mens terugvalle het dan is dit
die beste eintlik om met iemand anders te gesels wat dit verstaan, want huile... hulle gee vir jou
perspektief. Jy weet, hulle sê ... huile ... hulle laat jou onthou dat jy ... mmm ... miskien 'n week terug nou
nie so erg was nie en jy sal weer daaruit kom... En al rede hoekom jy na hulle luister en hulle glo is
omdat hulle self daardeur gaan ... dis al rede.
Contact with fellow ME sufferers proved immeasurably important at times of physical distress.
Such contact placed her illness in perspective and reminded Natalie that she was not alone, that
there were others who understood, and that there would again be a change for the better. In
addition, Natalie, as many other ME sufferers do, found it easier to follow someone's advice
when that person also suffered from ME. Their shared experiences added a special measure of
trust and confidence to the relationship (cf. Franklin & Sullivan 1989: 90). Moreover, it
allowed them to care and be cared for as ME sufferers.
Indeed, care, counsel and advice represented important components of the nurturing support
received from contact with fellow ME sufferers. Natalie explained:
As 'n mens nou saam met die mense gesels is dit wonderlik dat 'n mens kan kommunikeer en kan uitreik
na mekaar en vir mekaar kan ondersteun, veral prakties, jy weet, jy kan vir iemand sê, maar, jy kan ...
luister, ek weet jy kan nou nie dit doen nie, maar miskien kan jy dit so of so doen ... omdat jy dalk al
voorheen self daaraan gedink het of so en ... goedjies wat hulle vertel en so aan, dan dink ek, ja, jene,
ek het dit ervaar en ek het gedink dis mmm ... baie eienaardig of ... of so en dan ... sê hulle dit dan ...
dan half 'n mens ... 'n mens put half humor daaruit partykeer, jy weet, jy lag saam of jy ... jy huil saam of
so ... en ... dis baie goed, dis baie positief ...
Interaction with other ME sufferers seem to offer an especially rich arena for exchanging
information, for listening and learning from the wisdom and experience of others. This is
especially important when it is accepted that a little-understood illness such as ME demands an
unusual degree of autonomy and responsibility from the sufferer for the maintenance of health.
Interaction with those in the know may assist the sufferer to fulfil this responsibility to secure
the highest possible level of health and functioning. In addition, ME is a chronic illness. The
sufferer cannot strive towards a cure for there is none. Therefore, adjustment rather than cure
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offers the sufferer the most favourable outcome (cf. Gallagher & Wrobel 1982: 39-40). The
nurturing support of fellow sufferers may here offer a significant contribution in the effort to
adjust. Such support may, of course, as Natalie's account suggests, also afford crucial
emotional underpinning for all those involved (cf. Collinge 1993: 117; Goldstein 1990: 127).
Thus, on their journey to wellness, participants m this study were met by spontaneous
instances of kindness within society. For them, such instances meant being believed and
accepted, being helped to render the impossible possible, and being guided to defeat all odds.
Aside from such kindness encountered at random, participants also actively sought out
nurturing support, and found it in fellow ME sufferers. Among those whose journey paralleled
their own, participants experienced a profound understanding born from similar experiences as
well as a freedom to express, to care, and to be cared for. Through the perspective acquired in
witnessing another sufferer's journey the participants in fact received an important degree of
reinforcement to persist bravely on their own road to wellness.
Cruel encounters
Participants revealed the essence of the cruelty they encountered in society:
... regtigwaar die oorgrote reaksie van mense is ... is negatief ... ongelukkig ... huile ... het. .. altyd 'n
verkeerde reaksie en dit is altyd negatief... So, die reaksie is... ag, jene, tog, dit is altyd... baie
negatief ... (Natalie)
And the demon behind such cruelty? Ignorance:
Daar heers baie onkunde om ... omtrent ME as 'n siekte ... (Natalie)
It is not an ignorance that stems from the absence of information. It is rather the ignorance
which stems from superficial knowledge and misconceptions:
Ek dink net so min mense ... ja, di..dis soos 'n bo-lagie van inligting, almal. .. 0, baie mense weet daarvan,
maar wat hulle daarvan weet is heeltemal verkeerd... So, daai soort onkunde ... ek waardeer dit nie baie
nie, want dit is so onwaar ... (Natalie)
The participants say that this ignorance is, at least initially, often hidden behind a pretence of
understanding, but soon the disguise falls away. See how Natalie described this process:
Onderwysers, lektore en werknemers probeer baie dikwels aanvanklik voorgee dat hulle geheel ingelig is
en dan, wanneer dit kom by die punt wanneer jy iets nie kan lewer nie, dan plaas hulle weer druk. Hulle
noem dinge soos dat jy verskonings soek; dat jy lui is ... of praktiese probleme ... dat jy nie jou tyd reg
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beplan nie; dat jy te senuweeagtig is; dat jy te negatief gedink het van die begin af. Aan die ander kant
sê baie lektore en onderwysers ... vir jou jy dryf jouself te ver; jy is te ambisieus; jy is te perfektionisties; jy
brand jouself uit. Dit is al aan my genoem dat ek nie kan hanteer om te verloor nie, daarom is ek siek.
Natalie's words clearly reveal that many members of society do not understand ME and that
they simply do not grasp the very nature of this illness. Denise's account lends further
substantiationto this impression:
Aanvanklik het ek beleef dat mense nie rêrig verstaan het nie... Mmm ... en aanvanklik as jy vir mense
gesê het jy het ME dan het hulle nie geweet wat dit is nie en as jy sê jy het 'yuppie griep' ... '0, jy's altyd
moeg'... en jy ... jy weet jy's altyd moeg, maar dit... dis baie meer as dit, as dit maar al was ... dan ...
mmm ... kon 'n mens dit beter hanteer ...
Natalie's experience highlights an important dimension of the ME sufferer's experience of
delegitimation: the trivialisation of symptoms. Ware (1999: 313) says that because many of
the terms used to describe ME symptoms sound like minor complaints - fatigue, headache,
sore throat, muscle pain - this leads to people mistakenly equating profound distress with
everyday ailments. Because everyone endures aches and pains from time to time, a sore throat
and fatigue, such complaints are often "construed as minor, if discomfiting, consequences of
everyday living rather than as indications of serious illness" (Ware 1992: 350). As a result,
ME sufferers like Natalie often meet a disconfirming response when they try to explain their
illness to an other: "Oh, so you are just tired; well, so am I. So what?"
Society then, often wrongfully equates ME with an experience of tiredness, a symptom we all
experience at one time or another. Fatigue, as it is experienced in ME, is not understood
either. Denise explained:
... ek haat dit om te sê ek is moeg, want moeg in terme van ... my moeg en hulle moeg is twee
verskillende goed ... As mense hoor jy is siek is dit algemeen vir hulle om te ... sê dat jy oor 'n week weer
beter sal wees. As hulle dan moeg is en rus ... voel hulle dan beter ... dis asof hulle die konsep rus nog
nie rêrig verstaan nie ... vir hulle is rus ... jy's moeg en jy gaan lê 'n uur op jou bed en jy staan op en jy
voel beter en jy gaan aan ... mmm ... hulle besef nie rus is ... in terme van ME is totaal iets anders nie ...
In society ignorance prevails not only about the concept of ME, but also about the fatigue that
accompanies it and with which it is so closely associated. The "meaning, patterns and
implications of fatigue in CFS", as Ware (1999: 305) explains, "make it difficult, if not
impossible, for persons with this illness to conform to certain culturally prescribed
expectations for behaviour". Where long days crammed full with activity are the norm, ME
sufferers lag behind. It is simply not a fatigue cured by an hour in bed; it is not cured by any
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amount of sleep for that matter. It is utterly and completely different from anything known in
"healthy" life. Apparently, such an experience of fatigue falls outside the bounds of
comprehension of many members of society.
The participants also indicated that, besides the ignorance about ME and the fatigue associated
with it, people do not understand the chronic nature of the illness. Consider Natalie's
description:
Met die begin van my siekte was daar ook heelwat mense wat probeer insig kry het, hulle het
belangstelling getoon, hulle het my en my ouers kom besoek, maar met die tyd het... en dis nogal 'n
belangrike punt: die chroniese aard van die siekte, die geweldige langdurigheid daarvan... gesorg dat
sosiale ondersteuning maar net opdroog. Mense wil nie altyd iets negatiefs ervaar nie, selfs familie bly
weg...
Cheryl related a very similar experience:
... in the beginning, friends, family, acquaintances, the church, everybody rallied round... But as soon...
as soon as it became obvious to everybody that I didn't have an... an very, very obvious and
recognisable physical illness, I started experiencing people getting a bit tired of this person who was sick
all the time... they started becoming more distant... the offers of help would become less frequent. .. the
majority of people were... tired of the fact that I was forever not able to do things ...
ME is not an acute or immediate state of illness with a discrete beginning, middle and end.
Instead, it represents a complex, unpredictable, ambiguous state. Society is, however,
intolerant of ambiguity. Society wants the certainty of knowing what to expect. Society does
not' know how to deal with chronicity. When it is confronted by it, it responds in less than
ideal ways. And for the sufferer this response, as Cheryl's account shows, very often leads to
a sense of social isolation. The ambiguous status of ME indeed represents a critical
impediment to social interaction. The fact that it is not well-described, explained, recognised
or accepted as an illness category makes it hard to explain - "to share with somebody" (Ware
1999: 316).
When society is faced by a seemingly incomprehensible illness, it wants to see the signs and
the evidence of its existence. With ME, this is not always possible. Natalie reveals why:
... aan die ander kant, is daar die meeste mense wat vir jou sê, ag, maar, jy lyk dan so goed, daar kan
rêrig niks met jou verkeerd wees nie... mmm... ek sou sê daar... 'n groot mate van diskriminasie het
begin toe ... in die sin dat as mense geweet het, het hulle nie geweet... hulle het nie die feite geken nie,
so hulle het maar net self geoordeel... So... wat hulle gesien het en wat agter toe deure gebeur het...
mmm... jy weet, as jy my hier in die stoel kom neersit het en iemand kom met my gesels, dan sou jy
weggaan en sê, nee, maar, jy weet... mmm... alles gaan heel goed daar...
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The person suffering from ME may, even while desperately ill, actually appear healthy on the
surface. This lack of observable evidence of illness is probably the prime reason for the
delegitimation of the disease and for leading others to question the ill person's true state of
illness. The ME sufferers do not look sick, they are not pale, thin, in wheelchairs, nor do they
sport casts. They may even function normally, at least for a time, in work and social settings.
But for society seeing is believing. Our society demands to see a scar, a crutch, a wheelchair
or whatever other external sign of illness. If there is no evidence, suspicion sets in. If there is
no evidence, there cannot possibly be any illness (cf. Strauss & Glaser 1975: 50). For ME
sufferers this lack of understanding - when the severity of the subjective experience of the
illness is belied by outward appearance - represents a source of desperate frustration. They
simply "look too good to be sick".
Denise's account highlights the dire outcome which follows the "seeing is believing" mentality
in society:
... sodra hulle dan agterkom dat jy rêrig siek is ... dan verander huile ... heeltemaL.. Ek weet spesifiek dit
het gebeur toe ek begin studeer het. .. Toe, jy weet, het hulle gesê, 'ME, 0 ME', jy weet. .. En ... tot op 'n
stadium dat ek weer siek geword het. .. toe het hulle vir my gesê hulle het nie besef ek is rêrig so siek
nie, so hulle is jammer dat huile ... dat hulle nie aanvanklik verstaan het nie... Ongelukkig is dit half ...
is dit hartseer dat. .. dat jy eers half tot die einde van jou 'you must come to the end of your rope,
before they realise what's going on'... En elke keer betaal jy die prys en moet jy weer jou stukke
bymekaar kry ... maar ten minste voel jy iemand het daaruit iets geleer, al is dit nou net dat mense besef
dat as jy siek is, is jy siek ... en dat ME nie net. .. nie net 'n verskoning is nie, maar 'n realiteit.
''You must come to the end of your rope before they realise what's going on" ... an incredibly
sorrowful and completely unnecessary predicament. Why should the ME sufferer be forced to
bear aggravated suffering before society is willing to recognise the existence of ME? Why the
impulsive assumption that those who do not carry the required scars are most certainly
deliberately deluding society? Because for society, seeing is believing. When society cannot
see any physical signs and does not understand the signs that are visible, the symptoms either
do not exist or are only "imaginary". ME sufferers' complaints and their experiences are
therefore often discounted as "not real" (Ware 1992: 352).
When society does not understand an illness and cannot fathom its symptoms it reacts to the
sufferer in unfortunate ways, as Natalie's account illustrates:
Ek was ... by die Technikon eendag ... en ek het geweldig ... mmm ... ek het gevoel of nou gaan flou val,
ek het net gevoel hoe my bloeddruk val en so aan ... En ek was naby die sekretaresse se kantoor en ek
besluit. .. as ek flou val is dit die beste piek... En ek het ingegaan en ... in 'n stoel gaan sit. .. en iemand
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anders het ingekom en vir my gesê ... eh ... jis, jy lyk vreeslik bleek en ek sê toe vir haar, ja, ek voel
vreeslik flou ... flouerig. En die sekretaresse het my so gekyk en net gesê, ag, nee-wat, jy sit sommer
nou net aan en vir die ander persoon gekyk en gesê, ek is seker daarvan sy sit sommer nou maar net
aan. Die woorde 'sit aan' ... ek kon ... die vermeteldheid, ek kon nie dit glo nie, sy ... wie is syom dit te sê
of enigsins oor my 'n opinie op te trek of ... in my gesig ... ek het gedink dat. .. dat die sekretaresse
ongelooflik onbeskof was en dat daar geen verskoning is vir wat sy gesê het nie, hoegenaamd nie, al het
sy geen kundigheid oor my siekte of enige inligting oor my nie ... daar is geen verskoning daarvoor nie ...
Natalie's outrage is perfectly understandable. When society lacks understanding, it
unhesitatingly responds in an ignorant manner - it condemns, blames, denounces and berates.
These reactions show the traces of antagonism toward the sick that shine through the social
fabric when an illness is not understood and when suspicion instead of sympathy prevails.
Such delegitimation denotes what Ware (1999: 312) terms the "systematic disconfirmation of
the experience of being ill". For the ME sufferer this response may, as in the case of chronic
pain sufferers, represent a very real loss of a "legitimate" world, that is, a world consisting of
those ways of being that are culturally valued and defined as normative (Kleinman in Ware
1992: 349).
For the ME sufferers in this study, ignorance did not only mean inappropriate responses. It
was also very often accompanied by inane advice. Denise said, for example:
As die woorde 'ruk jou reg' maar net soos 'n towerstaffie kon werk sou dit dinge dalk makliker gemaak
het... Wat baie mense nie besef nie is ... jy wil, maar jy kan nie, en dat dit soms vir mou meer frustreer
om so te wees, as vir hulle om jou so te sien ...
Also, consider Cheryl's experience:
... ladies who had never even telephoned me, let alone visited me, telephoned to say what a bad
example I was. Others visited but only to tell me to 'pull myself together' ... And some even admonished
me face to face for being such a bad Christian ...
The message is clear: "Pull yourself together - now" . Yet, if the ill person is advised to
resume control, it implies that whatever is the matter indeed falls under the domain of personal
control. In other words, the ME sufferer is held responsible for being ill (cf. Goldstein 1990:
7).
Usually, when a person falls ill, he or she assumes the sick role, the special social position in
society occupied by a person who is considered legitimately ill. According to Parson's (in
Kotarba 1983: 103) analysis of this position, one of the very distinctive rights granted to a
person in this role is that he or she will not be held responsible for his or her condition. The
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person who is struck by illness is not only shielded from blame or censure, but is also entitled
to sympathy and support, depending on the severity of the condition and the degree of
suffering it causes (Gallagher &Wrobel 1982: 37). Why does this not apply to ME? Because
society does not understand ME. And where there is no understanding, there is evidently no
legitimacy. The ME sufferer is not considered legitimately ill and is, hence, barred from
access to the rights that would normally accompany the sick role.
Regarding ME as an "illegitimate illness" has the further result that society refuses to exempt
ME sufferers from their normal "healthy life" social obligations. Consider Cheryl's
experience in this regard:
At first I received sympathy ... and gradually disbelief that I could still be ill and then outright requests to
take up my role in society again ...
But ...
... I gradually was not able to do my ... fulfil my role in ... in society... They'd phone up and say, the
standard four mums are all going to be doing the cool drinks for the for the sports day ... and I'd have to
say, I'm actually not well enough to spend the day out in the sun or I don't know how I phrased it in
those days ... because in those days I didn't know what was wrong with me, but I would have to decline ...
I had to excuse myself from a lot of things which, obviously, people didn't understand ... made worse by
the fact that I didn't understand ...
Consequently,
I think if the community ... had accepted me as ill. .. and helped me to accept I was ill. .. I might have
recovered sooner, but I still found myself teaching Sunday School and selling cooldrinks at school sports'
day ... for example ... and attending the usual round of school meetings, church meetings and community-
help projects. Obviously I had to make excuses at times, but some people went as far as to say that I
was not 'pulling my weight' any longer - in other words: plain lazy!
Although Cheryl was challenged every day by routine tasks such as showering and getting
dressed, by the utter unpredictability of the illness which made her fail to keep to proper
schedules, by her failing communications skills, by the lack of stamina to get things done, and
by the constant distraction of chronic pain, she was still expected to fulfil her role within
society. She did not enjoy any exemption from former role expectations. This is in sharp
contrast with Parson's (in Kotarba 1983: 188) analysis of the sick role. According to this
analysis, the occupant of this position has the right to claim exemption from normal
obligations and responsibilities. If this does this not hold true in the case of the ME sufferer it
can only mean that ME is not recognised enough as a serious and debilitating illness. ME
simply does not count as an illness that would justify permission to not fulfil normal
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obligations and responsibilities ... because it is not understood, the very nature of ME is not
understood.
Cheryl's experience hints at a further result of society's lack of understanding: the danger of
marginalisation. When the community did not understand Cheryl's illness and thought she
was not pulling her weight, it became easy to start shunning her. It is "the incompatibilities
between qualities of distress in chronic fatigue syndrome and culturally specific standards for
social life" - constant activity, speed, "sheduledness" - that "trigger social processes of
marginalisation" (Ware 1999: 305). According to Ware (1999: 305), the "combined effect is
to push persons with CFS toward the periphery of their everyday social worlds". That is,
while society is speeding along, ME sufferers are left behind.
Unfortunately, the denial of exemption from normal role expectations not only shows a deficit
in informal social understanding among the individual members of society. It also
demonstrates the absence of more formal validation of the ill person's claim to sickness and to
full access to the sick role. Consider Cheryl's experience in this regard:
... I'd had a policy with Old Mutual and they'd refused to payout, because there's no such illness as ME.
And we've been mis ... we really then ... my kids were still little, it was '94 ... I could really have done with
domestic help... And that's what we understood this policy was for, not just for death, but for
disablement. And we thought, well, even if we can just pay a housekeeper with the money every month,
it would be such a help. So we explained everything to them. I wrote my usual screeds and screeds and
screeds. And they just said there was no such illness and they advised us incorrectly. I think we ... we
were probably into debt for doctor's bills and we took something like three or four thousand that. .. as a
pay ... as a pay ... which we shouldn't, but we didn't understand that ME would ever be rec well, it isn't
recognised. Leon Yankelowitz remains a lone case at present.
The insurance company refused to formally validate Cheryl's state of illness. Consequently,
no exemption from customary responsibilities, even temporarily, could ensue. This experience
once again typifies the dire lack of understanding of ME within societal institutions and within
society itself.
Clearly, for Cheryl and many other ME sufferers, the prevailing ignorance surrounding ME
prevented them from enjoying any sanctioned respite from the obligations of daily life. When
an ill person is denied access to the sick role and its accompanying rights, the "normal" rules
of society remains applicable. The person is still obligated to fulfil normal role expectations.
Failure to live up to these expectations is, as Kotarba (1983: 187-188) as well as Gallagher and
Wrobel (1982: 38-39) explain, generally considered "wrong" or "deviant". Thus, when a
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person IS legitimately ill and his or her illness prevents the fulfilment of normal role
expectations, the illness is regarded as deviant. When the person is considered healthy, yet
still fails to fulfil normal role expectations, the person - not the illness - is regarded as deviant.
Unfortunately, when the participants' experiences are reviewed, it is the latter scenario that in
many cases applies to their encounters with society at large.
Thus, the participants in this study experienced many hurtful reactions from society m
response to their illness. They identified the culprit behind these reactions as a blatant and
pervasive ignorance. Society evidently lacks the smallest degree of understanding of the true
nature, presentation and course of ME. In the absence of understanding, it appears to society
that the sufferers are not really ill. Consequently, if there is no real illness, there is no reason
for them to occupy the sick role. Should sufferers dare attempt to assume the sick role, in
conflict with society's ruling, they are condemned as deviant. And why should they not be?
As society is quick to point out: ME sufferers are not really - really - ill at all.
In response ...
Society's often cruel reaction to ME undoubtedly has a profound influence on those who suffer
from it. Indeed, Natalie's open admission confirms that participants could not avoid
responding to society's judgement of ME:
... dit is rêrig nog so dat ... dat wat ander mense dink ... dit ... 'n mens moenie dat dit jou soveel beïnvloed
nie, maar dit. .. dit is deel van hoe jy op die ou end jouself sien. So, ek kom altyd terug na myself toe en
dink, goed, wat is dit, hoekom sal iemand vir my sê jy sit nou net aan, wat het hom daai. .. wat het daai
saadjie geplant, wat was my optrede ... jy weet, so dit is vir my baie moeilik ...
Natalie's account suggests that the participants attached great importance to society's reaction
to ME because it inevitably influenced the way they saw and thought about themselves. In
other words, how members of society constructed their illness - and by extension, constructed
them - influenced their personal concept of Self, their very identity (cf. Field 1976: 345-347).
For the participants society's construction of ME unfortunately translated into the very real
experience of stigma and stigmatisation. Denise disclosed:
'" ek het. .. ek het baie die stigma-kant daarvan ervaar ... mmm ... en dit was nie altyd lekker nie, want jy
voel jy is ... jy is siek, jy kan nie nou nog die stigma-kant daarvan ook hanteer nie, jy moet net probeer om
siel en liggaam aanmekaar te hou ...
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Indeed, Denise and the other participants experienced that stigmatisation caused society
eventually to associate ME with some undesirable quality and difference, perhaps even
inferiority. Consider, for instance, Denise's experience in this regard:
... ek dink ongelukkig ... baie mense het dit gebruik, jy weet, het ME gebruik as 'n verskoning om nie ...
om nie hulle kant te bring ... nie. So, ek dink dit het ook die ... die samelewing baie sku gemaak ten
opsigte van ME ... dat as ... as daar iemand is wat. .. wat gediagnoseerde ME het dat hulle almal half oor
dieselfde kam skeer ... '0, jy's een van daai wat nie ... nie jou kant wil bring nie' ... of ... of ... of wat ookal. ..
In Denise's experience, there is a belief among many members of society that those who claim
to have ME are simply lazy, indolent dolts who only use ME as an excuse to avoid societal
responsibilities. It seems that ME represents to society nothing more than a shoddy
justification for lethargy. This encounter with society - and its cruel prejudices - clearly
indicates the sinister presence of stigma (cf. Green et al. 1888: 66-72).
Stigma - the social meaning constructed by society to account for ME sufferers' apparent
physical impairment - not only aggravated the participants' suffering, but also influenced their
personal construction of identity and of Self (Field 1976: 347). In order to create a greater
understanding of this process as it operates within the lives of ME sufferers, consider the one
area in our society where most of its members find a distinctive identity: work. In our society,
the dominant "work ethic" indeed exerts a great pressure on everyone to work, to earn a living,
to contribute to society (Franklin & Sullivan 1989: 92). Thus, even though persons with ME
lack stamina, they live in a world with strenuous work habits where people are devoting ever
more hours to their work. In our society, 'jobs define who we are and how we feel about
ourselves; success at them is a powerful indicator of the well led life" (Ware 1999: 309).
Yet, those who suffer from ME are frequently not capable of full-time work (Franklin &
Sullivan 1989: 92-94). Consider Natalie's description of the severe difficulties faced by a ME
sufferer in the workplace:
Dit is weer eens... praktiese probleme wat. .. wat 'n mens kniehalter en wat indirek 'n mens se
selfvertroue aftakel. Werksure is lank en dit is vas ... mmm ... as ek siek raak is ek bang ek gaan iemand
in die steek laat. .. eh ... ek is nog nie so mobiel om ver rond te ry of rond te stap nie, ek vind probleme
met trappe... My liggaam raak seer en moeg en siek as ek dalk te veel doen, verkeerde posisies sit, of
my hand te veel moet gebruik. Selfs konsentrasie en kreatiwiteit kan 'n probleem lewer wanneer ek siek
of moeg is, veral met terugvalle.
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Consequently:
... ek het nou onlangs... het iemand een van my werke gesien en hulle wou dit. .. hulle wou dit gebruik ...
en natuurlik sal ek dit met ope arms ontvang, ek is baie bly, maar die oomblik toe daai persoon vir my
nog werk aanbied en sê, hoor hierso, jy kan nou nog 'n hele reeks goed vir ons doen, toe trek ek
kleinkoppie, want ek weet nie in hoe 'n mate ek van nou af tot volgende jaar Februarie gaan krag hê nie,
wat van as ek kom in Februarie en ek het net die helfte van die werk gedoen ... dis vir my baie moeilik ...
Natalie simply could not rely on her body to cope with the expectations entailed in a full-time
position. She feared that she would experience pain, that her concentration and creativity
would not hold up, that she would let someone down, that she would fail to meet promises.
When faced by this array of fears she could not possibly commit herself to any form of full-
time work. These concerns, which appear to be shared by sufferers of other severe chronic
conditions (cf. Kelly & Dickinson 1997: 259) clearly highlight the sharp contrast between the
high activity levels demanded by the modern work situation and the levels that an ME sufferer
can muster on a "good day" (Ware 1999: 309).
However, society does not tolerate idleness and certainly not the apparent permanent weakness
of illness. Instead, it demands active participation in the occupational environment (cf.
Franklin & Sullivan 1989: 92). Natalie responded to these stringent demands and expectations
as follows:
... ek moet 'n werk hê, dit. .. dis nou maar net 'n feit, jy weet. .. en ... dis geweldig frustrerend vir my ... Ek
weet nie, dis vir my ... die eerste keer in my lewe ... dis seker 'n punt waarby ek nou gekom het. .. ek is
nou klaar geswot en ek is nou op hierdie ouderdom en nou besef ek, goed, nou is hierdie ... nou is hierdie
toekoms daar voor my ... dit is ... dit is 'n vreeslike groot probleem. Dis 'n voltydse ding in jou lewe en
daai. .. daai besluit wat jy gaan neem en daai werk wat jy gaan doen is die belangrikste ding ... jy moet
weet jy gaan dit kan doen... So, dis ... dis vir my baie moeilik ... en dis ... dis net moeilik vir my om te
verstaan hoekom ek 'n talent gekry het en hoekom ek siek moes word en hoekom ek die twee nou nie
kan versoen nie ... dis mos baie ... frustrerend ... So ... daai deel is baie moeilik ...
Natalie's words vibrate with sheer frustration and desperation. She wanted to work, but was
prevented from doing so by ME. She was scared of not being able to live up to the work ethic
of our society. Her inability to meet society's standards plunged her into an experience of
failure because somehow she was - in society's eyes - "lacking". But not only in society's
eyes. Society's views became her own views, became part of her own construction ofthe Self
(cf. Green et al. 1999: 72). Hence, as her inability to prove social competence prevented her
from enjoying a full sense of social acceptance and worth, she concurrently experienced a loss
of personal value and of self-esteem (cf. Cassell 1991: 53; Strauss & Glaser 1975: 52-53).
Now, in her own eyes, she became lacking. She no longer qualified as a "proper person"
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(Field 1976: 346). Thus, as Natalie internalised society's views of ME and of work, her own
identity changed. It was now "spoiled" (Field 1976: 346).
Natalie's expenence of the brutal confrontation between societal expectations and the
disabilities caused by ME vividly illustrates the process whereby an illness experience that is
so clearly stigmatised by society spoils the ill person's conception of Self. Now, both the
illness and the ill person are fixed under the stigmatising glare of society. This shows why, in
response to the ways society deals with ME, those who suffer from it may internalise the
repeated disconfirming interpretations. Ware (1999: 313) confirms that as a result they may
begin to question their own perceptions, eventually asking themselves if they are not perhaps
really "only crazy" after all?
Thus, for the participants in this study, society's callous reaction to ME transformed into the
stigmatisation of their illness experience. In tum, this reaction exerted a forceful influence on
how participants saw and thought about themselves. Through the stigma attached to ME, they
became aware of an inability to live up to society's standards, of failing to exhibit sufficient
social competence... and they experienced failure, a deficiency, an incompleteness. As their
sense of social worth dwindled, so too did their sense of personal value. The stigma that
society had attached to ME had now become part of their own construction of Self, of their
now spoiled identity. The cruel stigmatisation of an illness had found ultimate expression in
the stigmatisation of the ill person as well.
To cope...
Cassell (1991: 53) observed that "while most chronically ill individuals cannot play the game,
they rarely stop wanting to". This is also true for the ME sufferers who participated in this
study. Although patently aware of the very real difficulties that involvement in society might
entail, they remained eager to enter and contribute to society. They wanted to be and feel part
of society. They wanted to "play the game".
However, the participants wished that "playing the game" could have been much easier...
Mense se reaksies wissel. .. daar buite is dit meestal negatief ... ai, ek wens dit was anders ... (Natalie)
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And:
... ek voel. .. dit sou soveel makliker gewees het as mense 'n ander uitkyk daaroor gehad het. .. vir 'n
mens self Jy sien, as ander mense as as die samelewing mmm verstaan het dat dit 'n
siekte is, byvoorbeeld, sê maar nou soos hulle kanker sien, dan dink ek kan 'n mens baie positief en
verrykend opgetree het vir ander mense se onthalwe ... (Natalie)
If only society did not judge their illness expenence so cruelly. If only society did not
stigmatise them so wilfully. If only society tried to understand a little more. If only ...
Had 'if only' contained any hope of realisation, participants' expenence could have been
much, much different. They could have played the game whole-heartedly, perhaps even
despite their illness, perhaps even to the benefit of others. But now 'if only' remains a vain
hope. They are left to face an often unsympathetic society.
The participants found it difficult to respond, for how does one respond to a society that so
eagerly judges, condemns and stigmatises? Natalie pointedly expressed this dilemma:
... ek weet net nie hoe om dit te hanteer nie ... joe, ek weet nie, ek weet nie hoe om te reageer nie ...
Ek ... ek weet nie, as daar êrens 'n wetboek is met reëls wat vir my kan sê ... wat doen 'n mens, want
ongelukkig kry ek seer en ek is nou al. .. ek sal nooit immuun daarteen raak nie, want ek is net 'n mens.
Ek glo dit is ... dis partykeer net so onregverdig ... ek weet nie hoe hulle kom by ... by wat hulle vir my sê
nie... En ... ek neem hulle nie kwalik nie, maar daar kom darem tye, joe, dat ek dink ... hoe moet ek nou
reageer, want ek kan nie dink aan hoe nie, jy weet, ek kan nie ... ek kan nie 'n manier kry nie.
Natalie's account bears witness to the hurt and anguish which sufferers experienced when they
desperately looked for a way to cope with society's reaction to ME and those who suffer from
it. Because it is so utterly difficult to cope or to know how to cope, neither Natalie nor the
other participants always had the answer. For them, their feeble impotence and ineptitude in
the face of society's response to their illness represented a severe dilemma, but not one that
was severe enough to stop them from playing the game. Indeed, despite their incompetence in
coping, they wanted to participate, to play the game... there in society, in the world where life
is lived.
Consider the following account provided by Natalie as a representative yet remarkable
example of the participants' willingness to play the game and to face the difficulties that
entails:
Dit hang miskien af in watter milieu jy is of ... of hoeveel die mense verstaan van jou situasie, hoeveel
hulle weet... Miskien sê jy glad nie vir hulle nie ... maar dan is daar ander goed wat hulle miskien gaan
lees in jou... As jy nou nie, byvoorbeeld, vir iemand sê nie, maar jy moet. .. byvoorbeeld, ek moet nou ...
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my ... in fotografie, as ons fotografie doen in ... in die ateljee is dit redelik fisies mmm ... jy moet opklim
en groot swaar balke uithaal en papier daarop rol vir die ... vir die backdrops en nou onlangs het ek...
het die ... die fotografie-lektor vir my gesê, ja, doen dit, doen dit, doen dit. .. en ek sê toe vir hom, maar,
'listen, Douglas ... I think I'm going to get somebody to help me today, because I... I can't do it today' ...
En ek het geweet ... mmm ... ek kon nie op my twee bene staan nie, hoe gaan ek nog klim... Ja, en hy
vra toe vir my onmiddelik hoekom, jy weet, nou maar goed, nou ... mmm... ek kan of vir hom 'n kort
kragtige antwoordjie gee wat niks te doen het met die waarheid nie of ek kan nou maar vir hom sê, jy
weet ... eh ... goed, ek is 'n bietjie siek vandag ... En onmiddelik na ek vir hom gesê het, kyk, ek is ... ek is
siek en ek het net nie vandag so baie krag nie, het hy vir my gesê, ja-nee, hy ... hy s ... soos hy dit nou
opsom is dit 'n sielkundige probleem en hy het die ideale dokter vir my en so... Nou maar, jy weet, nou,
okay, nou, my reaksie is, ag, liewe aarde, spaar my net. .. mmm ... dat ek deur hierdie gesprek kom ...
mmm ... volgende keer sal ek stilbly ... belowe myself nou Dan die volgende keer sal ek miskien stilbly
en dan sal dit die oneerlikheid self wees ... en dis nie ek nie .
Natalie's account tells of a ME sufferer who tried to play the game in society. She ventured
into the public world of society and tried her hand at studying. There she encountered an
environment in which she was often expected to perform beyond her physical capabilities. It
was an environment unresponsive to and often even dismissive of any account for her physical
distress. Within this environment, Natalie simply had to cope. Her endeavour to do just this
highlighted two very important questions that demand to be answered when an ill person
attempts to cope in society. The first question entails a rather pragmatic consideration,
whereas the second revolves around issues of a more moral-ethical kind.
The first question: when faced with very real and inescapable changes and limitations, is the ill
person willing to accept and adjust? Natalie found herself in an environment which demanded
her to perform strenuous physical tasks that she was not always able to accomplish on her own.
If she did not ask for help, she wou1drisk the danger of doing herself harm, if not physically,
then at least emotionally. How, then, did she cope with these limitations which stood out so
clearly in the glare of the public world?
To cope, Natalie needed to accept the unavoidable limitations imposed by her illness, and the
fact that she needed help to perform her tasks. She had to avoid causing damage to her body
and so she had to discard the pride and egoism that would prevent her from asking for help.
She had to adjust her beliefs so that needing help from others no longer constituted weakness
to her. And even if it did, it was not a weakness that would make her any less of a person
(Collinge 1993: 98; Franklin & Su1livan 1989: 94-96). By accepting her limitations and
adjusting her ideas, she could protect her definition of Self, her identity, from succumbing to
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society's crude and stigmatising concept of weakness, illness and ME (cf. Field 1976: 345).
This was however not as easy as it may sound.
The second question deals with the dilemma which the sufferer confronts when the opportunity
arises to disclose the nature of one's illness: should the sufferer choose honesty or secrecy?
Each time that the public world confronted Natalie with the opportunity or the necessity to
explain her condition she could be open, or she could dissemble. When she refrained from
telling the truth she felt that she was untrue to herself. When she was honest about her
situation, she was met by callous ignorance and prejudice.
To cope with this situation Natalie, like every other ME sufferer, has to make a choice. It
would be misleading and somewhat naïve to simply assume that such a choice would represent
a rational, calculated weighing of the costs and benefits of available options - certainly not in
situations permeated by severe emotional and physical strain and agony. It would rather
represent a fusion of feeling and thought, of the rational and irrational (cf. Kotarba 1983: 198-
199). Combined with this peculiar mixture is the indisputable fact that it is the sufferer who
needs to take care of his or her own needs. Natalie needed to protect herself against society's
discrediting definition of ME and the ME sufferer (cf. Field 1976: 345). Nobody else would
do so. Of course, she could accomplish this through complete avoidance of society's reaction
to ME - either by avoiding society itself or by concealing the illness from society. In her study
of ME sufferers, Ware (1999: 313) did indeed find that in response to repeated delegitimisation
her participants often decided to keep their condition "secret". Yet, this approach runs the risk
of disrupting the sufferers' sense of connectedness with others and directs limited energy into
efforts to conceal. It may also lead the gap between the experience of illness and the "world of
wellness" to widen, leaving sufferers feeling in some strange way as if they don't "really
exist". In other words, by avoiding society's response Natalie might quite conceivably have
created a denial of her Self and her relation to this world. There is also the danger that by
keeping the illness a "secret", ME sufferers deprive themselves of "the catharsis of talking
about what is most on their minds and of receiving comfort in discovering there are others who
care and may provide help when needed". Ironically, "they also preclude the possibility of
being affirmed in their experience of their illness" (Ware 1992: 353). In this way, a secretive
approach in dealing with society's response to ME might entail its own type of suffering in the
very alienation it may induce. Perhaps a better way to cope would involve a compromise
between the Self and others, perhaps even a redefinition of the meaning of honesty for the Self.
But perhaps it all ultimately depends, as Natalie indeed suggested, on how much is understood
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within the particular context in question (cf. Green et al. 1999: 70-73). In other words, within
a context of understanding the need for the protection of Self and identity would be far less
pronounced than within a context where ignorance is rampant. Hence, the choice between
honesty and secrecy - or how to cope - would depend on the measure of understanding that
the sufferer experiences within a particular situation.
Thus, the participants in this study wanted to be involved in society at large; they wanted to
"play the game". They longed for a society that would judge less and understand more, but for
them this avid desire sadly remained unfulfilled. Still, in spite of a stubbornly opinionated
society, they wanted to play the game. But to stay in the game, they needed to find ways and
devise tactics designed to cope in and with society. This they did. They recognised the
necessity of accepting changes and limitations induced by the illness, but not to let society's
judgement of such changes and limitations harm their Self, their identity. They also
discovered the power of choice and learned that choice is essential to the understanding of ME
within a particular situation. By choosing and making decisions the participants ultimately
assumed responsibility for the care and protection of the Self - despite society at large. By
making this choice the participants became able to preserve existing social positions and roles
or re-fashion them in ways that fostered social integration. In these ways, the disruptive
effects of illness - and of society's response to the illness - were minimized.
Conclusion
Participants' experiences in and with society serve to emphasise that "much suffering arises
from disturbances between the sick person and the public world" (Cassell 1991: 52-53). Their
experiences, indeed, offer a vivid testimony of the disparity between the sick person and
society. It is a disparity between their respective wants and needs, perspectives and positions,
expectations and objectives. It is a disparity that results in a hostile, almost antagonistic
relationship between the sick and society.
On the one hand, the sick, such as the ME sufferers in this study, long for a trusting
acceptance, for practical help, for constructive advice and guidance, for crucial emotional
support, for sound and reliable information, for a reinforcement of their social and personal
worth, and for a freedom from demeaning judgement. They simply want to be understood.
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Society, on the other hand, responds to an illness through the construction of socially imputed
meanings based upon the specific physical impairment. Where a physical impairment is not
understood, as ME is not understood, society responds by delegitimizing and condemning the
ill person as deviant, by blaming them for their own condition, and by withholding access to
the rights of the sick role. In emphasising the ill person's undesirable difference and
inferiority, society distances itself from these "wretched delinquents". In doing so, society's
response evokes processes of marginalisation - those "influences that push sick persons
towards the periphery of their everyday social worlds" (Ware 1999: 312). As a result of such
processes, the ill person is eventually regarded as "slightly less human". This reaction exposes
society's intolerance of the not so readily understandable, of the inexplicable, of the
ambiguous, of the unpredictable, of the variable, of the non-immediate. It also points to
society's unshakeable conviction that what is observable is real- the only real reality.
What appears to be at issue here is the struggle over the proper definition of reality in the case
of ME - physical or psychosomatic, real or unreal. This struggle will determine whether
patients will be accorded the status of sane persons who are genuinely sick and therefore
deserving of the right to occupy the sick role. If so, much of their personal (if not physical)
suffering will be alleviated. If not, they must continue to deal with the implications of having
a "not real" disorder which is only rarely recognised by the medical community, and often
blatantly rejected by society.
This is the dire struggle that ME sufferers engage in when they enter society; still they want to
be part of it, perhaps because they inevitably are and will always be part of it. Hence, they are
compelled to learn to cope in this almost heartless environment. In the process of learning to
cope, of overcoming their feeble impotence in the face of society's reaction to their illness,
they discover personal responsibility. They become aware of their own power to negate and
counter society's corrupt judgement of their illness and of them. They assume the power to
choose an alternative perspective, to adjust their outlook in order to protect and take care of the
Self. They are now ultimately - and perhaps for the first time consciously and competently-
responsible for themselves.
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Chapter 16
The person in personhood
What is involved in the subjective expenence of illness by ME sufferers? Hitherto, the
discoveries made in this study in pursuit of an adequate answer to this question have focused
upon sufferers' interaction with their social world, as the first fundamental aspect of the human
condition. Now, the focus shifts to the second, equally important, aspect of the human
condition: the personhood ofthe sufferer.
In accordance with the work of Cassell (1991: 37-57), each sufferer is a complex being, a
personhood of almost countless, intimately interconnected dimensions. Each dimension is
susceptible to injury, damage, hurt and loss. Each dimension carries the potential for suffering
that resides within every one of us. Each dimension can be profoundly influenced by a truly
life-changing illness such as ME.
Unlike other objects of science, persons such as the ME sufferers involved in this study cannot
be reduced into their constitutive parts or dimensions in order to better understand them. Still,
without forgoing any respect for the extraordinary complexity of the person, a simple topology
of personhood will be presented below. Through this topology, I will seek a greater
understanding of ME sufferers' subjective experience of illness, of suffering, as it touches the
very essence and integrity of the person in their personhood.
A person ... has a relationship with the Self
Strauss and Glaser (1975: 52) contend that in the midst of a serious illness, the ill person's
relationship with the Self cannot remain unaltered. Although this does not necessarily entail
the development of a hopelessly detached and dubious relationship with the Self, the very
efforts made to sustain the Self and its relationship with others will contribute to a changed
sense of identity. In the light of the representativity of Natalie's statement, this clearly also
holds true for the ME sufferer:
... ek dink die eerste ding wat ek wil sê is dat dit. .. dit het geweldig baie aan my selfbeeld gedoen ... my
selfbeeld is 'n baie-baie groot aspek van hierdie siekte, want dit het. .. dit is heeltemalomver gewerp, dit
het baie verander ... in baie opsigte het ek 'n goeie selfbeeld ... maar dan êrens daar is daar vir my so 'n
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groot gat wat ek ... ervaar en wat. .. wat vir my geheel en al die idee gee dat ek het nie 'n selfbeeld het
nie, jy sien ... en ek dink daai gat het heeltemal met my siekte te doen ... Laat ek dit so stel. .. ek dink dat
as ek gesond was dan sou daai deel. .. daai persepsie wat ek het van my selfbeeld ... mmm ... en dat ek
sukkel daarmee en so dat. .. dit sou tien teen een nie daar gewees het nie.
The participants' accounts revealed that the influence of ME on the relationship with the Self
became perceptible in a development marked by intensive introspection which evolved into a
changed view of the Self. I consider this development as a process, though it would be wise to
bear in mind that it is not necessarily a development which occurs in a neatly consecutive
sequence. There is indeed much room for variation, for alternation, for overlap, for repetition.
It is a development that not only transpires over days, months and years, but also occurs within
a single instant of existence.
The first phase in the development which brings change into the ME sufferer's relationship
with the Self is characteristically marked by denial. Denise concisely described her
employment of delusive denial:
Althoewel jy half dood voel en jouself met moeite aan die gang kry, wil jy nie weet jy is siek nie... Ek het
gevoel soos 'n 'afkop hoender' wat net moet rondskarrel, met die laaste bietjie lewe in my ...
Denise was clearly set to deny any possibility of illness and struggled to maintain normal
"healthy" activity - at any price (cf. Friedberg 2000: 59-65).
The practice of denial, intimately combined with the desperate struggle to maintain "normal"
activity, is also vividly expressed in Cheryl's account:
Now, in the situation that I am in now ... my personality can very easily be perpetuating what's happening
to me... But it's ... it's not a simple thing to I mean ... strictly speaking who I am is not bad... It's good
to want to be organised and on time and available to people who need you ... it. .. it's all good, that's
why it's so difficult to change ... you see because it's not a ... it's not actually bad traits, character
traits ... they're just character traits that are not conducive to getting better, because I won't. .. I won't
allow myself ... I won't. .. I won't actually admit to myself that I'm an invalid ... that's ... that's probably
the ... the plainest way of saying it... I've never thought of myself as a sick person ... I'm battling to come
to terms, after ten years of ME, that I am a sick person ... It's crazy ... but I don't think ... I can't imagine I
could change, that's just the way I am ... I want to feel organised ... and I want to feel that I'm in ... that I'm
in control of what my house looks like, what my room looks like, what I look like... Ja, I don't know if I
could change ... I want to make nice meals for my family, I want to be available to them when they need
to ... to talk or they need help ...
In the face of an illness that directly challenged her concept of personal significance,
competence and value, Cheryl preferred to maintain activity. She did not want to admit to
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herself that she was, in fact, seriously ill. She did not want to admit that she could no longer
fulfil those roles and obligations which directly contributed to her relationship with her Self.
Cheryl did not want to accept that ME was now an inescapable part of her life, and of her
relationship with her Self.
The experience of such illusory denial is similarly reflected in Natalie's tenacious questioning
of the Self:
Aanvanklik wou ek dit glad nie glo nie ... ek was oortuig daarvan dat ek myself om die bos lei. .. dalk sit ek
aan, dalk soek ek 'n verskoning vir iets. Ek het baie hard en ondersoekend opgetree teenoor myself ...
het ek gesweer dat ek besig is om aan te sit, het ek gesweer ek is besig om net, jy weet, ve ... geestelike
probleme te hê... Dit was ... dit was die eienaardigheid self, ek het geheel en al geloof verloor in wie ek
is en wie my liggaam is, ek het nie meer geweet wat om te glo nie, want ek kry soveel verskillende seine
van myself ... jy weet, ek het geheel en al geloof verloor in wie ek was, want ek kon net nie ... ek kon
verstaan wat. .. wat aangaan nie... Ek bedoel, ek was ... hemel, ek was ... mmm ... wel, die een dokter
het vir my gesê dit lyk asof ek semi-polio het. .. daar is niks meer in my liggaam wat. .. wat. .. jy weet, my
spiere wou nie meer saamwerk nie ... maar dan sal ek seker net dink, ag, jy weet, dit is nou nie die geval
nie ... ek ... ek dink ek sit nog steeds aan ... jy weet, dit was 'n baie ... baie ... ek het baie skepties teenoor
myself geraak, baie ... mmm ... en dit. .. meestal dink ek omdat ek nie verstaan het wat aangaan nie ...
In consequence, Natalie sadly related:
... ek was baie ongelowig, ek het baie ongelowig gebly in myself ... ek is baie hard op myself in die sin
dat. .. partykeer wil ek myself nie glo nie, jy weet... Daar kom tye dat ek sê maar nou baie energieloos is
en ek byvoorbeeld nie fut het of ... of dryfkrag het nie, jy weet, dan sal ek myself nou heeltemaL .. (sug) ...
ek sal. .. myself ... ek sal myself bevraagteken, jy weet, hoekom het jy nou nie hierdie dryfkrag nie en
hoekom voel jy nou so... Dit. .. dit het baie van my selfvertroue van my weggeneem ... selfs my aksies ...
mmm ... mens kan sien daar is 'n tekort aan selfvertroue. Die dinge wat ek skep ... ek het vertroue daarin
verloor... Ek dink by tye, byvoorbeeld, dat ek glad nie kreatief is nie en dit is nie die geval is nie. Dit
begin veral baie ernsitig raak wanneer ek ... nie kan werk nie ... veronderstel ek sukkel met 'n terugvaL ..
ek begin myself vertel dat ek werklik lui is, ek gaan selfs sover om my ... teen my beter wete te dink ek sit
aan.
Natalie had developed a strategy to deal with the storm of inexplicable symptoms that had
exploded inside her and had now turned into a full-blown onslaught directed towards the Self.
Where denial had previously protected her Self from being overwhelmed by her illness, it now
prevented her from believing in her own awarenesses, in her Self. Her very being was
permeated by self-doubt as the interrogation in search of the "true" agenda behind every
perception, every weakness, every strength continued insistently. It is not surprising that this
approach has led to a steep decline in Natalie's belief and confidence in her Self.
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Thus, denial, as the primary characteristic of the first phase of a changing self-relationship,
offers a degree of oblivion, an escape from the acute awareness of illness. Denial would,
therefore, appear to provide a simple answer to the problem of suffering for those afflicted by
ME. But it has a price. Life becomes a struggle to return to the "normal" person one once
was, before the illness. It is a constant battle to maintain the significance, the competence and
the value of that "normal" person - whilst being ill. Denial might become even more
expensive when it evolves into self-doubt. Then, it deprives the ill person from unconditional
belief and confidence in the Self. The Self becomes the antagonist who cannot be trusted and
relied upon. Consequently, the relationship with the Self suffers. The ill person's sense of
integrity, of wholeness, is threatened, and personal suffering is exacerbated.
Eventually - or perhaps only occasionally - denial gives way to the second phase in the
development of a changing relationship with the Self. This phase comprises an "existential
crisis" (Collinge 1993: 188). This crisis involves the often ominous realisation among the ill
that they are no longer who they once were, and that they never will be again. Consider
Helen's telling account:
At the height of my illness, and for a few years to follow, I felt as though my life had stopped. All that
meant a lot to me and that brought me much enjoyment had been taken away ... I lost my way of life that
was the only way of existence I knew; I lost my sense of security that I found in being goal-orientated and
in achieving; I lost a certain amount of self-confidence in that the person I had portrayed myself to be was
crumbling before my own eyes ...
For Helen, such profound change of the Self was accompanied by an intense awareness of
loss:
ME represented a time of loss in my life and I found myself actively mourning what I felt I'd lost... I lost
my way of life ...
With the onset of ME, Helen's usual, "normal" way of life had come to an abrupt halt.
Everything her life had stood for, for which she had lived, had somehow stopped. Her life was
lost all at once... to an illness.
Natalie related a similar experience of a way of life relinquished to ME:
Op hierdie stadium kon ek basies niks meer doen van my vorige lewe nie; ek kon aan niks meer
meedoen nie... En ek het besef daar was nou iets soos 'n 'ou' lewe wat ek moes verruilom 'n 'nuwe' te
beplan... 'n Tydperk van hartseer het vir my aangebreek, ek moes dit verwerk... Ek het seer gevoeloor
wat ek verloor het en wat ek klaar mis en ek het gesien ... wat om my aangaan, hoe ander mense groei,
en ek het gevoel dat daar 'n klip in my pad gerol is.
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Natalie suffered as she lost her Self in relation to the world of objects, events and relationships
which had constituted her "old life". Such suffering occurs ''because our intactness as persons,
our coherence and integrity, come not only from intactness of the body but from the wholeness
of the web of relationships with Self and others" (Casselll99l: 40). Natalie's "wholeness"
had been disrupted. Hence, she experienced a hurt-filled sensation ofloss.
Naturally, sufferers' realisation of "a life lost", of "an existence relinquished", releases a
turmoil of emotions. Denise expressed an experience of frustration and rebellion:
Jy vra vrae van 'hoekom ek?' en 'hoekom nou?' ... en is desperaat. .. Jy wonder met tye hoekom jy 'n
'oumens lewe' moet leef as jy nog so jonk is. Dit was swaar om op jou bed te lê en droom en te dink
dat jy nou weer kans sien vir die lewe ... net om as jy op jou voete is en langs jou bed staan te besef jy
het net genoeg krag om weer te gaan lê...
A deep sense of frustration and disappointment runs through Denise's account. There are so
many questions that linger without answers, so many hopes and dreams that repeatedly die in
disappointment.
A similar sense of frustration and desperation shines through Cheryl's words:
Basically I see myself as less useful. .. that about sums it up! And on bad days as completely useless!
loved to help my family and friends ... it gave me great pleasure. Now I feel boring ... always talking about
ME or so it seems to me, self-centred and needy. I hate being needy. Do I really? What a strong word.
Well there you are: I want to have myoId life back!
Natalie expressed a still deeper sense of absolute desperation:
... ek is so gefrustreerd en ek ... ek haat dit om die waarheid te sê en ek sukkel om dit te aanvaar ...
She explained ...
Dis 'n baie 'vicious' woord om te gebruik. Ek gebruik daai woord eintlik nooit nie. Okay, anders gestel,
ek hou nie daarvan nie! Maar dit gaan dieper as dit... Ja, dit gaan dieper as dit. Daar is baie emosies
daaraan verbonde. Dit gaan ... nee, dis sterker as 'hou nie', definitief. Ja, ek haat dit. Dit. .. mmm dit
is nie lekker nie, nee... Emosioneel-gesproke is ek partykeer kwaad daarvoor, ja, baie kwaad en ek
hanteer dit nie ... ek hanteer dit nie reg partykeer nie, jy sien, en dan ... dit is dan wanneer wanneer ek
dink dis baie erg ... En ek weet dat daar soveel erger dinge is, maar dan ... dan is ek ... dan dan is daar
oomblikke wat ek dit haat, ja, dan is ek kwaad en ek voel so gefrustreerd. En op daai oomblikke kan ek
nie ... ek weet nie ... ek weet nie waar om positiewe dinge te gaan haal nie. En dit is ... dit is so ...
ongevraagd om sulke oomblikke te hê, want daar is so baie positiewe dinge, maar ... dit kom... Ja, dit
is ... dit is ... ek erken dit, dis oop, ek ... weet dit ook nou, dis waar, ek haat dit partykeer. Definitiefl.
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For Natalie, her intense frustration at being illwith ME at times evolved into sheer hatred. To
hate - truly hate - is not only a very powerful emotion, but also a frank expression of a very,
very deep injury endured by the Self (cf. Cassell 1991: 43-44). Natalie's account of hatred,
indeed, offers a strikingtestimony of the immeasurable suffering which is braved in the face of
ME.
For sufferers such as Natalie, absolute desperation sometimes advanced still one step further. ..
to an almost hopeless despondency. Note the sadness in Natalie's words as she recalled such a
time of intense suffering:
... dit is ... dit is ... miskien die naaste in my lewe wat ek net wou opgee en ... dit is nie die enigste keer
nie, maar ... dit was 'n oomblik wat ek ge ..gedink as daar 'n ... as daar 'n manier is wat ek myself kan
doodkry dan sal ek ... sal ek dalk dit kan probeer ... ek het nog nooit die moed gehad vir so iets nie .
maar, ek bedoel... al is jy heeltemal realisties en rasioneel, is dit nog steeds so 'n emosionele ding .
dis ... dis baie moeilik ...
To suffer from a bewildering illness which challenges every fibre of one's being on every
possible level of existence is indeed extremely difficult to bear, and occasionally completely
unbearable.
Thus, the second phase of the Selfs changing relationship with itself is marked by an
existential crisis, a crisis of being. What has been, no longer is. I no longer am who I was.
The Self has endured deeply felt loss and injury. It is embroiled in a state of disruption. And
it is suffering.
How does the Self respond to its inner disruption and discord? How does it restore its
integrity? Where does the Selfs relationship with itself lead next? The third and last phase
begins to answer these questions. This phase explicitly involves "a turning inward" (Collinge
1993: 192) as the ill person develops a greater receptivity toward what is being heard and felt
by the Self. Helen provided a striking account of such a new-found openness to the Self:
ME was my body's way of telling me I couldn't go on living the way I was and stressing my body to the
extreme... ME made me stop and refocus ... made me question what was important to me and made me
realise that very little could be more important than a healthy body... I came to realise the importance of
balance in my life ... to create a balance between those activities that drained me of intellectual and
emotional energy and those that replenished this energy through relaxation and pleasurable activities. I
realised that my worth was not based so largely on my achievements, but on the person I was... Being
faced with iII-health ... has brought me to be far more appreciative of what I do have and of what I am now
able to do ...
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Indeed:
... what has been remarkable to me, is to know that I had to lose all this in order to regain ... to develop a
better understanding of the type of person I am, to refocus and acknowledge what is important to me and
to accept the need to make changes in my lifestyle ...
Losing her health - and in a sense her life - so suddenly and so severely to ME, changed
Helen's relationship with her Self. She was forced to stop and reconsider, for suddenly the
Selfs primary concern was no longer with attaining perfection in every endeavour. The Selfs
value was no longer determined by what it could accomplish, but simply by the Self it already
was. Its focus had shifted. Hence, new values and purposes needed to be defined. A re-
evaluation of the Self and the relationship of the Self with itself was in progress. And it
revealed that the achievement of balance in life - of utmost integrity - is of paramount
importance. For Helen, maintaining such a balance became the primary focus of self-care, the
real priority of daily living.
Helen's account typifies an approach that Cassell (1991: 61) describes as "flexibility". Cassell
suggests that "suffering is relieved when the threatened or destroyed part of the person is
replaced in importance by another aspect". Helen replaced the over-riding goal of reaching
perfection in all activities she undertook by an emphasis on balance between accomplishment
and replenishment.
Other participants followed similar roads leading to a re-discovery of the Self and are-kindling
of a relationship with the Self. Natalie's account of her journey on this a road is an excellent
example:
Ek het. .. heelwat geleer en gegroei omtrent myself... Ek kan op 'n manier sien wie ek is en myself bekyk
in moeilike omstandighede waar ander mense nie kan nie. Ek kan sien hoe ek optree, ek kan sien dat ek
heelwat deursettingsvermoë toon, ek kan my prioriteite sien ... dat eenvoudige dinge, klein dinge, in die
lewe soms baie meer werd is as die grotes... Ek het gesien dat ek altyd sterk wil staan en my siekte
goed wil hanteer. Ek doen dit nie altyd nie, maar selfs in moeilike tye bly ek veg en hoop ...
She elaborated ...
... dit is wonderlik om as 'n ME-lyer te begin fokus op ... omdat groot goed nie meer vir jou bes ..beskore
is nie, jy kan nie meer vreeslike groot goed doen nie, klein goed raak nou spesiaal ... dis wonderlik, want
'n ME-lyer kan al hierdie goed begin raaksien, soos verhoudinge met mense en ... en so... Dis half asof
hulle tot stilstand gedwing word vir 'n tydperk in hulle lewe, waar ander mense net voortgaan en
hardloop. Jy sien, die klein, wonderlike goed, soos 'n voëltjie in die boom voor jou venster of so, raak
nou vir jou vir die eerste keer baie meer kosbaar ... Ek het 'n baie groot. .. liefde vir die natuur ontwikkel,
want dit is God se skepping, dis vreedsaam en baie terapeuties... Ek het empatie vir mense begin
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ontwikkel... Ek oordeel nie so maklik nie, want ek weet dat wat agter ander se toe deure aangaan weet
'n mens nie ... Ek het besef hoe min ons as mensdom weet en hoe moeilik dit is om dit te erken ... Nou
hierdie is ... dit is baie groot goed, maar baie mense loop verby dit, jy weet. ..
Natalie's re-definition of the Self and the Self's environment is very clearly aimed at the relief
of suffering. Each re-definition represents an attempt to minimise the sense of loss and
bewilderment evoked by the illness (cf. Field 1976: 348-349). Each re-definition marks an
adjustment to accommodate the illness, including the vulnerability and limitations it entails (cf.
Friedberg et al. 2000: 59-65). Moreover, each re-definition signifies an important stride
towards greater self-acceptance (cf. Collinge 1993: 191-193). Where such a sense of self-
acceptance prevails, the sufferer becomes able to pay more attention to the Self, to the inner
guidance of the Self, and to re-learn to trust the Self s inner experience of life. Thus, it is a re-
definition of the Self which brings the realisation that although the sufferer's life has
profoundly and irrevocably changed, it is by no means any less significant.
To re-define the Self and its relationship with itself, as described through Natalie's account,
represents a distinctly reiterative process. It ceaselessly continues throughout every moment of
every day. As Natalie explained:
Ek het geleer dat 'n mens gaan nooit geheel en al so iets aanvaar nie, nie in my ... in my geval nie ... en
dat ek elke liewe dag van voor af moet begin en aan aanvaarding werk ... Dit voel baie dikwels nog vir
my, veral as ek siek voel, asof ek maar elke maalopnuut moet baklei om staande te bly ... mmm ... om tot
'n mate ... die regte, volle, positiewe geaardheid te hê... so jy bly die heel tyd daaraan werk ...
Natalie acknowledged that there had been a change, a transformation, which required
acceptance and accommodation. This acknowledgement found manifestation in a continuous
process; a process starting each day anew, forever striving towards the ultimate wholeness of
the Self - with itself.
Thus, during the final phase of the development which brings change in the relationship of the
Self with itself, the ME sufferer responds to the experience of inner disruption and discord by
becoming more open to the Self's experience of life and living. This new-found receptivity
prompts a reconsideration - a shift in focus - from "doing" to "being" (cf. Collinge 1993: 97).
It is a movement in which a greater acceptance of the Self spills over into a changed
perspective of the Self's natural and human environment. It is a movement in which a delicate
balance within the Self is restored, inner wholeness reinstated, and suffering relieved.
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When faced with an illness that overturns all that has been, how does the sufferer respond?
When the Self who was, no longer is, who is the Self-of-now? Is the Self-of-now any good?
Does the Self-of-now have any value or significance? Can the Self-of-now be trusted and
relied upon? Each of these questions reflects the very real threat posed by a life-changing
illness, such as ME is, to the very being of those afflicted by it. The intactness of their
personhood is profoundly disrupted. Their Self and their relationship with the Self endure
injury, demonstrated by intense, sometimes unbearable emotional turmoil. Their Selftruly and
utterly suffers. They have to respond, and through their response they re-discover the Self.
Hence, instead of withering in the wake of illness, their relationship with the Self grows and
evolves unceasingly, from denial to accommodation, from doing to being, from self-doubt to
self-acceptance, from discord to balance, from fragmentation to intactness, and ultimately,
from suffering to integrity.
A person ... has a body
Every person has a body, a basic sense of corporeality or embodiment (Cassell 1991: 42).
Kotarba (1983: 203) describes this dimension of personhood as that singular sense of "being-
within-the-world" that spearheads all perception, appraisal, exploration and experience of life
as it is lived. Cassell (1991: 42) goes on to suggest that every person not only has a body, but
also enjoys a distinctive relationship with the body. Every illness intrudes into this
relationship.
In a state what Gadow (in Kaufman 1988: 346) calls "primary immediacy", body and Self are
united and not distinguished. They exist together as separate from the world. The "lived
body" can affect the world and in turn be affected by the world. This relationship exists when
we are healthy, when the body is taken for granted and is out of conscious awareness. In
contrast, Gadow (in Kaufman 1988: 346) identifies a second state, that of "disrupted
immediacy". This state is characterised by incapacity. The Self is constrained by the body,
limited by the body's capabilities. Moreover, the body is in conflict with the Self. This
relationship characterises serious illness - including ME.
For all the participants in this study, the grand entrance of ME unquestionably entailed a
fundamental change in their relationship with the body. Natalie indeed spoke for all when she
revealed:
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... daar het definitief veranderinge ingetree in die wyse waarop ek myself sien... Veranderinge het
ingetree ten opsigte van my uiterlike... wat natuurlik 'n mens se siening omtrent jouself beïnvloed...
Participants' accounts showed that a profound change in their relationship with the body
resulted from an inner conflict raging between the Self and the body. This self-conflict
erupted from a number of sources, each one proclaiming not merely that the body is no longer
a friend, but that it has, in fact, turned into the principal enemy of the Self.
The first source of conflict between the Self and the body, as identified in the participants'
experiences, concerned the manifestation of the body as a changed, almost unknowable other.
Natalie, somewhat despondently, related her encounter with her body as the unknown other:
... ek kan met geen rede kan ek verklaar, dit is die beste tyd van my lewe, en skielik loop alles
verkeerd dit was 'n totale allegaars wat... wat om my ontwikkel het, jy weet, ek het nie geweet wat ...
wat gaan aan nie, jy weet...
Considering more specifically the very real changes in her body that had accompanied her
illness experience, she added:
As ek dink aan my eie liggaam... mmm... alhoewel ek met die aanvang van my siekte heelwat gewig
verloor het, het ek omtrent so 18kg gewig opgetel in die afgelope paar jare en ek sukkel werklik
daarmee... Ek het aan die begin van my siekte aan haarverlies gely, dis gelukkig beter... Tot vandag
toe ondervind ek ook steeds probleme met my vel. Tydens akute stadiums en terugvalle het ek
heelwat ernstige veluitslagte gekry wat m..merke... gelaat het. En dan het 'n mens se velkleur ... is... is
ook van 'n ander soort... dis hierdie bleek soort velkleur...
In like manner, Cheryl expressed the sense of profound confusion that had clouded the onset of
her illness and transformed her body into the unknowable other:
... I just. .. I didn't knowwhat was happening to me... It was so weird, I had no idea what was going on.
was quite frightened, in fact... it was quite a it was an enormous shock to become ill over-night like
that... I was -worried and... I was frightened mmm.. 'bewildered' was probably the best word at that
stage... bewildered...
She also very vividly recalled her experience of a changed body:
... I slipped on... a summer dress, which was normally loose on me, I couldn't fit into it, and I couldn't
understand it and... I ... I wore it, but it was very tight and I felt very uncomfortable, I couldn't find
anything else that I felt comfortable in... I literally had nothing to wear ... I went from my usual size 12...
to size 16 and then the size... size 16 became too smail... I mean, I went up to about 90 kilograms,
eventually, but... in in big leaps, from 60 to 70, from 70 to 80, and eventually up to about 90-
something... I looked I didn't look my normal self, I was huge, bloated, unattractive, at least I thought I
was unattractive... I really struggled to cope with this new body image... being a relatively constant 25
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kilograms heavier than I've ever been ... even during pregnancies ... in my adult life makes me feel most
unattractive... And I eat so little! I can't believe that I'm so fat! I eat far less than I did before I got ill. ..
Far less ... which is my only comfort, a vain woman ... that I am, I'm not fat because I'm sitting and eating
all the time. It's terrible. Terrible! Terrible! My whole body shape has changed.
For Natalie and Cheryl, their illness brought a rupture in their relationship with their body.
The physical embodiment of the Self had undergone tremendous change - change which both
sufferers found excruciatingly difficult to bear, let alone accept or assimilate as part of the Self.
How could this changed being be their own body? For them, the profound nature and extent of
the physical changes accompanying ME had effectively rendered the body into an unknown
and apparently unknowable entity. It was now a being that somehow stood apart from the
Self, indeed, in opposition to the Self (cf. Casselll991: 42).
Natalie and Cheryl's accounts tell of truly extensive change and transformation; still, it is but a
small part of the entire story of erupting conflict. The very distinctive influence of their illness
on their experience of the body caused a second source of conflict between Self and body.
Natalie sadly revealed:
Soms sien ek my liggaam... dikwels... as onbetroubaar omdat ek nie kan voorspel hoe my
gesondheidstoestand gaan fluktueer van nou tot 'n uur van nou nie... Alhoewel dit irrasioneel is, sien 'n
mens jouself later as 'n mens waarop 'n mens net nie kan peiltrek nie. Jy kan nie peiltrek op hom nie,
ander mense kan nie peiltrek op hom nie. Jy sukkel om afsprake te maak en dit voel vir jou asof jy 'n
onbetroubare persoon geword het. Dit... breek maar stilweg 'n mens se geloof, jou selfvertroue, af en jy
voel tog tot 'n mate minderwaardig ...
The characteristically unpredictable and variable nature of ME had pervaded Natalie's
experience of her body. For Natalie, her body had indeed become an enemy of the Self. She
could no longer trust or rely upon her own experience of her body as it simply did not offer
any dependable indication of future remission or relapse. In this way, the taken-for-granted
quality of the body and its performance was lost. This is an experience shared by those who
suffer a stroke. Kaufman (1988: 341) shows that a stroke is an assau1t on the "natural" sense
of Self. Though a stroke is a specific physiological event, the resulting impairments may
easily be as diverse and profound as those associated with ME. As a result of these changes,
which bring previously accepted boundaries into doubt, the person's body - and in fact his or
her total sense of being - is affected. For Natalie, this uncertain state of being rendered her
Self vu1nerable to feelings of personal unreliability, ineptitude, failing and inferiority (cf.
Cassell 1991: 42). Natalie's marred relationship with her body had, therefore, disrupted the
wholeness of the Self. It had exacerbated her suffering.
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And Natalie did sufferer. Consider the following particularly expressive description where she
again strongly stressed the utterly disruptive influence of the unpredictable and uncertain
nature of her illness:
... ek weet van die ... die fluktuering ... maar dit is ... dit is vir my 'n skok as dit gebeur ... dis vir my baie
moeilik ... hierdie siekte is so onvoorspelbaar, jy kan hom nie vaspen nie, jy kan hom nie beskryf nie ...
elke dag is anders as die ... as die vorige een... En daarom het ek baie vertroue in myself verloor, want
ek kan nie ... myself half defi. .. definieer nie, ek kan nie sê, dit is nou soos ek is nie... Ek het nie ... ek het
nie elke dag 'n af-been nie, sodat ek weet my been is nou af... want die een dag is daai been dalk daar,
hy's dalk nie so sterk soos hy kon gewees het nie, maar hy is darem daar, en die volgende dag het ek
nie albei my bene nie... So dit is ... dit is ... dis baie moeilik, want jy weet nie hoe jy more gaan wees nie,
jy weet nie oor twee weke hoe jy gaan wees nie ...
Natalie's account carries one central message: she never knows. She never knows when her
illness will destroy an event, a day, a week. She never knows whether she will awaken
debilitated or with enough vigour to conquer the day, let alone how she will feel after an hour
or two. She never knows how to assess the present. She never knows how to plan for the
future. She never knows because her illness has an infinite capacity for cruel and disturbing
surprises. Dyck (1995: 309-310) shows that a similar sense of unpredictability pervades the
experience of women who suffer from multiple sclerosis. In fact, in her study, it was exactly
this unpredictability that led most women to withdraw from activities regarded as central to
their lives prior to the onset of their illness. Thus, when confronted with the terrible
predilection of her illness for untrustworthiness, unreliability, unpredictability and uncertainty,
the ill person's relationship with the body suffers dearly (cf. Cassell 1991: 57; Strauss &
Glaser 1975: 41).
Participants' relationship with the body was further tormented by another source of self-
conflict which flows from the limitations imposed on the Self by a severely ill body. Cheryl
was recently crudely reminded of the very real presence of such limitations through the
startling onset of a particularly severe relapse:
I went on this lovely trip and I came home extremely well-rested So, for about two and a half weeks I
was ... the best. .. mmm the strongest I felt really in years ... and everybody presumed that I was now
back to normal, to the extent that I took up all the invitations that came my way ... and ... mmm ... it was
wonderful, I had a great time. But then ... the crash after that was ... absolutely horrendous... It was
literally two and a half weeks. I remember it, because I had to cancel. .. at the end of the third week I had
to cancel everything that was going to happen... So ... of course, I thought it was just temporary ... rest
up a bit and back to ... but it wasn't, it was a whole year of relapse... So, I. .. I do have physical
limitations ... I mean, as much as I'd like to walk ... on this beautiful autumn day, I know I wouldn't get past
the fence. So, I mean, I'm sensible enough not to go ... but. .. I certainly would have imagined doing it..
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There appear to be two imperatives pressing their claims upon Cheryl. The first, the inner
imperative, demands of Cheryl to take care of her illbody, to be aware of and respect its needs
and limitations. The second imperative, the outer world of activity, desires to maintain what is
perceived as a normal existence (cf. Wiener 1975: 72). In the midst of ME, these become two
opposing imperatives; self-conflict prevails.
Natalie similarly described the dire impact of ME-inflicted limitations on the Self s avid desire
to live as normally as possible:
Dit is baie moeiliklik ... vir my om met my liggaam die kursus te voltooi. .. want elke dag is anders... En
die een dag sou ek opgeklim het en die rolletjie bo afgehaal het en die papier opgerol het in die
fotografie-laboratorium ... en almal sou dit sien, en more sê ek ek kan nie... En dan weet ek voor my siel
daar is geen kans dat ek dit kan doen nie, dan probeer ek, en daar maak ek myself ten minste ... op een
of ander manier seer, as dit nie liggaamlik is nie, tien teen een geestelik of ... sielkundig, want. .. ek dwing
myself ver verby wat ek veronderstel is om te doen... Mmm ... en dan op miskien die derde dag sê ek
net dis ... totaal en al ek kan nie, en dan ... dan is daardie tipe van ... die hele reaksie van die mense om
my ... dit is ... dit is gewoonlik 'n lelike reaksie... Aan die begin het mense mens gehelp, maar as jy dit
eers een keer self gedoen het, hoekom dan nie nou weer nie ...
Natalie, like all people, did not want to find her Self limited. She did not want to see her Self
as unable to achieve what she had set out to accomplish. But she was ill; she was limited.
This awareness of a restricted body significantly threatens the concept of an intact and
autonomous Self - as much for ME sufferers as for others who suffer from serious illness
(Kaufman 1988: 343). As Natalie experienced a very real disagreement on the one hand
between the Selfs expectation to accomplish and achieve and, on the one hand, the body's
downright inability to deliver the goods, self-conflict prevailed (Cassell199l: 60).
From the participants' accounts a fourth source of inner conflict between the Self and the body
can be identified. This source cruelly dictates that to suffer from ME is to risk personal
humiliation and embarrassment. Natalie graphically explained:
Ek baklei nie soseer met die siekte as met elke praktiese probleempie wat. .. wat elke dag opduik nie ...
Byvoorbeeld ... eh ... ek raak kwaad, want hulle het die biblioteek geskuiwe, dis te ver vir my om tot daar
te loop ... en dan as ek daar kom is ek so moeg en ... jy weet, ek is ... jy weet, ek het die bewerasies en
die sweet tap my af ... en dit is nie as gevolg van onfiksheid nie, want ek probeer dit elke dag stap, maar,
ek bedoel, ek is so siek, ek is skoon naar ... Of ... of ... jy weet, jy voel nie altyd jy kan ... jy kan aan jouself
werk nie, fisies nie, soos byvoorbeeld, ek kan nou nie uitgaan gim toe en gaan oefeninge doen om
myself reg te maak nie en ... ek sal dalk in die klas wees dan sal 'n ou vir my sê, jhas, maar, jy's vet!. .."
(lag) ... dan sal ek sê, maar, jis, ek weet, maar wat moet ek nou doen (lag)... So (lag) ... ja ja, 'n
mens vat dit. .. ek vat dit as humor en hulle weet ek is humoristies, maar ... mmm party dae kan dit
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knaag, dit kan seermaak... en ek dink dan, ag, maar ek kan dan nou niks daaraan doen nie, dan voel ek
ongelukkig met wie ek is ...
Natalie's account exposes the body's potential for causing humiliation and embarrassment.
Finding a walk tiring, feeling faint, being a bit over-weight - simple matters of concern to all
of us at some time or another - now dominate her life. The strain and tension caused by these
physical problems were exacerbated by her apparent inability to resolve them (cf. Cassell
1991: 57). They were there and she could do nothing about it. This was a miserable
awareness, one that rendered her deeply unhappy as it disrupted her relationship with her body
and along with it her inner sense of integrity.
The last source of self-conflict is situated in the self s almost boundless frustration with the
body. Cheryl very frankly gave expression to this experience:
I feel so frustrated with my body... I experience the lack of mobility and energy with great frustration. My
room is a mess, my correspondence in disarray and often friends 'phone and say 'thank you for your
letter or card' and I'll have to say 'what letter?'... I have a suitcase full of 'things to read' ... by now more
than two years' collection. Will I ever be able to... All this makes the continued descent into less and
less 'brain power' very distressing. I felt, and still feel, very clearly that my brain and my body were letting
me down ... the loss of cognitive abilities was very sad to me... And now ... now to be seen as forgetful,
unable to assimilate knowledge, clumsy in my thought processes and it becoming more and more
obvious to outsiders ... it is frustrating... I miss my mind!
Cheryl's words reflect a sad and almost desperate frustration. Her once splendid body and
brain have now succumbed to the destructive influence of an illness. Through this submission
to illness - the very real loss ofthe body-that-was - it let the Self down. It has betrayed a pact
of guaranteed unity and wholeness between the Self and the body. For the Self, the body has
turned into an unreliable, even useless entity.
Natalie shared a similar experience of frustration in the face of a ME-weary body:
... alhoewel ek weet dat 'n mens se uiterlike iets is wat jy moet aanvaar, sou ek graag 'n bietjie meer
beheer daaromtrent wou hê... Ek wil graag 'n bietjie gewig verloor en so aan, maar dit is net so moeilik
as 'n mens nog soveel ander goed het... Ag ... dis ... dis ... ek dink dit is keuses wat ander mense kan
maak, wat jy mee sukkel. Ek kan nie gaan oefening doen nie, ek mis dit verskriklik... Ek weet die
grootste probleem wat ek het is ... eh... ek glo dat as ek fisies gesond kan wees dan sou ek al die krag
kan hê om verder te werk aan myself, maar nou om elke liewe aardelike dag op te staan en ... moeg te
wees en seer te wees ... en dit gaan rêrig nie meer weg nie ... en dit is ... dis net vir my ... dis verskriklik
frustrerend ...
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Natalie's deep-felt frustration sprung from her perceived inability to exert any control over her
body. She would dearly like to change her body. She would like to change its appearance and
performance. She would like to change its experience of fatigue and pain. Yet, Natalie
encountered an absence of choice and control. As her ability to exert control declined, so her
level of frustration increased, as did her experience of suffering.
When the body is invaded by illness, the Self's relationship with the body is profoundly
disrupted. The ill person is indeed caught in a fierce conflict between the Self and the body.
The body has undergone such tremendous change that the Self no longer feels as though it
knows this strange entity. Indeed, instead of knowing it as intimately as only a Self can, it
experiences the body as an adversary, an enemy. The body has, after all, proven itself to be
unreliable, untrustworthy and unpredictable. It has inflicted exorbitant restrictions and
limitations on the Self. It has exposed the Self to the ominous risk of embarrassment and
humiliation. And now, to top it all off, the Self is plunged into unending frustration.
Moreover, the rupture between Self and body is exacerbated by the Selfs apparent inability to
exert control, to resolve the conflict, to restore the wholeness. Where such rupture continues
unchecked, inner integrity is threatened and magnified suffering looms.
According to Cassell (1991: 57-58), the disruption of self-conflict introduces the very real
possibility of discord between body and Self. Discord, in turn, threatens the wholeness of the
person, and invites more suffering. Hence, the ill person is forced to respond. Although the ill
person, embroiled in the struggle between Self and body, may not consciously perceive
different possibilities, Cassell (1991: 58) stresses that "there are always alternatives". The ill
person appears to have (or at least to potentially have) access to three options when discord
between Self and body threateningly draws near.
Firstly, the ill person, overwhelmed by the suffering of relentless self-conflict, may simply
give up and choose to die (Cassell 1991: 58). But, as Cassell is quick to acknowledge, dying is
not so easy - "one wants to live, not die". To give up seems cowardly. On the other hand, to
not give up appears to invite further inevitable suffering.
When the ill person is unable to remove the Self from the situation, a second alternative is
called for. Cassell (1991: 60) suggests that the ill person can choose to develop "total
indifference" to the suffering. In other words, the ill person assumes "a stance of absolute
unconcern to the fate of the body... one allows the physical distress to roll over oneself as a
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wave on the beach rolls over a pebble". Cassell argues that this strategy relieves suffering for
two reasons. Firstly, to be indifferent to the existence of the body is to remove the very basis
for suffering, that is, the loss of the person's integrity. If there is no body, there is no reason
for conflict. If there is no conflict, there is no threat to wholeness. If there is no threat to
wholeness, there is no suffering. Secondly, as resistance to suffering always heightens the
distress experienced, suffering would be diminished once the ill person's resistance is
countermanded through total indifference. Still, very few people are able to stop fighting.
Indeed, the more they suffer, the more they struggle.
As most people apparently choose neither to die nor to stop struggling, there must certainly be
a third alternative. Strauss and Glaser (1975: 34) contend that the ill person, especially the
chronically ill person, develops an intense awareness of the body. This means that the ill
person learns, in detail, about the nature, patterns, and consequences of the signs and
symptoms that accompany the particular illness. When do symptoms appear? How long do
they last? Can they be prevented? Can their duration be shortened? Can their intensity be
minimised? What is the nature of their influence? In short, the ill person tunes into the body
and learns to recognise what the body is saying at any particular moment.
The development of a discerning awareness of the body represents the dominant strategy
employed by the participants in this study as they responded to the threatening discord
between Self and body. Consider, for instance, Helen's representative response:
To cope with ME physically ... I was compelled to listen to my body and to become aware of its warning
signs when I was close to a relapse... I have made it my responsibility to look after my body ...
Helen resolved to care for her body by listening more vigilantly and keenly to the sensations
and impressions it emitted. However, all participants realised that to listen but not to react is
simply not sufficient. Instead, achieving genuine alleviation of the conflict between Self and
body boldly demands that all listening be accompanied by action. In choosing a particular
course of action, the ill person is again faced with a number of alternatives.
Firstly, the ill person may listen and act excessively. Wesselyetal. (1998: 277) contend that a
heightened awareness of the body may lead to excessive "body watching". Through such
"body watching" a vicious circle comes into play. As the ill person becomes increasingly
aware of bodily distress, the experience of illness is intensified, perhaps even distorted. In
response to what is being heard, the ill person opts to restrict activity in order to cope with the
perceived (perhaps exaggerated) bodily distress. Yet, the more activity is avoided, the worse
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the symptoms become when activity is attempted once again. This provides further validation
of the accuracy of the person's beliefs about his or her illness and leads to further concern
about the body and bodily distress. Thus, an excessive awareness of the body reinforce illness
beliefs and illness behaviour, leaving the ill person destitute in a vicious circle of an ever
increasing concern about the body, an ever increasing perception of bodily distress, and an
ever increasing restriction of activity. Certainly, this leads to an ever increasing experience of
suffering.
Fortunately the participants' experiences revealed that the ill person may choose a different
course of action. This is to listen and act insufficiently. Cheryl's experience illustrates this
particular course of action very clearly:
... there's ... times ... when I'm just on the verge of coming out of an awful time ... where I'll push myself to
fulfil what I believe was an obligation ... and ... mmm ... will pay the penalty for it. .. and that's typical. .. I. ..
I'll push myself ... with dire consequences... For example ... my Dad was leaving ... and I just had a
feeling that it was important to go to the air-port. The 9 0' clock flight left on time and my exuberant
sister, her family and my two teenagers ... declared the night too young to go home ... and ... we were off
to the Waterfront... I just about burst into tears because I knew I could not cope with any more of a night
out... I handled it badly and ... my husband bore the brunt. That is the sad thing... On the way home I
was cross with him for putting me in that awkward position of feeling I could not join in with the fun and
just really sat looking miserable until I was taken home... My husband, quite understandably, said if I'd
been so near to exhaustion I should have admitted I could not even go to the airport in the first place. He
was quite right of course, but I do this over and over again.
Cheryl's experience clearly reveals the calamitous consequences of follow when the desires of
the heart and mind part company with the abilities of the body. Collinge (1993: 97) observes
that when this happens there is a tendency among the ill to argue with the body. Perhaps the
limitations of illness are seen as a challenge, perhaps as an obstacle in the way of
accommodating significant others, perhaps as a stubborn encumbrance on the road to recapture
a former identity... or worse yet, as a sign of bitter defeat. Unfortunately, the more the ill
attempt to push through the inescapable limitations of ME, the more likely they are to
exacerbate symptoms and trigger even further relapse (cf. Christodoulou et al. 1999: 604-605).
Thus, in an attempt to maintain "normal" activity, the ill person cultivates an "impression of
health". The ill person "passes as normal" - even if just for one occasion (Ware 1999: 318).
Yet, while the absence of obvious physical signs of illness or visible indicators of disability
might make such pretence relatively easy it does, as Cheryl's account suggests, have a price.
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The "payback", the exacerbation of symptoms following episodes of overexertion, IS a
distinguishing feature of ME.
One has to wonder why Cheryl and each of the participants do it when they know what
calamitous results will follow when very real physical limitations are blatantly ignored. Why
do participants continuously strive to maintain "normal" activity despite being quite aware of
the detrimental consequences this might have on their well-being? Why do they listen to their
body, but persistently disregard the message?
Cheryl offered an insightful explanation:
One of my biggest faults is not admitting my limitations ... and it causes more trouble than ... than it's
worth... So ... that's my biggest fault. .. and ... and it's my own fault. But it's also very difficult to
overcome, especially when you are in ... in remission ... the moment I feel I've got a bit of energy, you
know, I rush back into life with all the joy of wanting to do things that I haven't been able to do for a
while... My husband ... has now said, 'slow down, Cheryl, you've been really busy lately ... why don't you
rest. .. '. Actually this doctor ... said to me the same thing, 'when you think you can do a hundred things,
please try and do twenty ... you know, and space them over three weeks' sort of story ... Augh (sigh) ... all
sorts of sensible advise, but I don't. I do everything that I want to do and what I am longing to do and ...
augh, I just love it, I just love it... No, I can't ... I cannot slow down when I'm feeling there is any energy in
me... Ja, this is great common sense talking, hey!
Cheryl succeeded in expressing a sentiment echoed throughout the accounts of all participants:
they want to live life to its fullest, without limits. To do otherwise would be to surrender to the
limitations of ME. To surrender represents an almost unbearable prospect, because that would
mean that the restrictions posed by the illness are acknowledged and accommodated, the Self
is diminished, and suffering is exacerbated. Consequently, whenever ill persons experience
the slightest glimmer of energy, they rush back into life - perhaps, just perhaps, the physical
consequences will be less severe than the diminution caused to the Self when it subjects itself
to enforced restrictions.
In other words, ill persons are at times willing to accept future "payback" as long as they can
continue to take part on equal terms with healthy people in the social world. By deciding to
participate and pay the price, these individuals can function for short periods as if they were
not ill. For them it is a simple choice between having a life and having to pay the price for it,
or having no life at all. They choose the former. They immerse themselves completely in
family outings, recreational activities, house projects, business trips - matching the pace set by
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others and missing nothing. Then they "pay" with increased pain, fatigue and debilitation,
knowing that for them it is "worth the price" (Ware 1999: 318-319).
Clearly it is not advisable to respond insufficiently to what the body says. Although it might
protect the Self from utter diminution, it nevertheless causes great damage to the body. Hence,
from the participant's experiences a third course of action emerges, namely to listen and act
appropriately. Denise explained:
Dit is nog met tye moeilik, jy ... jy wil graag meer hooi op jou vurk laai as wat jy kan behartig ... maar ek
dink jy leer om rustiger te wees ... ja, jy ... ek dink tog ek het rustiger geword ... veral omdat. .. omdat ek
gedwing was om te leer om rustiger te word... Ek dink ... ek dink tog ek leer om ... om balans te kry en te
luister na wat my liggaam sê ...
Although it remained difficult to resist participation in too many activities, Denise had learned
that there was a definite need for balance. This conviction compares very closely to the
normalising strategy described by Wiener (1975: 80) as the "the precarious balancing of
options". He explains that various and often diverse options are constantly presenting
themselves to the ill person: whether to keep up and suffer the increased pain and fatigue;
whether to cover up and risk inability to justify inaction when required to do so, whether to
elicit help and risk loss of normalising. By making a balancing decision, the ill person
establishes an uneasy equilibrium between excessive abnormalisation and insistent super-
normalisation. In terms of ME it is an equilibrium in a constant state of revision because this
illness is notoriously uncertain and unpredictable. ME sufferers are, therefore, unable to rest
easily or for any length of time on previous decisions. In addition, they are inevitably faced by
options which have already been limited by their reduced mobility, strength and energy. Still,
even amid such variability and restriction, sufferers do have options; they do have choices.
Their decision to engage in one activity but not in another is firmly under conscious control.
Whether or not their decisions are appropriate responses to what their body is telling them are
their own responsibility. In short, the balance is in their hands.
Thus, in the face of a seemingly uncontrollable rupture between body and Self, participants
had to respond. They opted to soften the conflict through granting closer attention to the inner
voice of the body and as they listened, they reacted. Their reactions revealed that the desired
course of action involved neither abnormalisation through excessive restriction, nor persistent
super-normalisation at the expense of the body. The desired course of action, instead, led
towards an ultimate balance in which both activity and restriction could be incorporated if, and
only if, personal responsibility for the body was accepted.
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The ME sufferer's relationship with the body has been vastly transformed through the changes
brought about in the body by illness. The body has become a stranger to the Self, a foreign
being that refuses to act and behave as expected and desired by the Self. It fails the Self -
repeatedly, surprisingly, and in obscure ways. Consequently, conflict erupts because the Selfs
expectations and the body's abilities no longer converge. There is disharmony and inner
integrity is threatened. Suffering looms despairingly. The Self must respond to avoid
irrevocable dissent with the body. And through its response, the Selfs relationship with the
body changes still further. The Self resolutely tries to become better acquainted with this
foreign being, the body. As it learns more and more, the Self reacts to what has been learned.
Sometimes, the Self under-estimates the body; often, it over-estimates it. At other times the
Self finds a balance that suits both the Self and the body. It is a precarious balance involving a
deliberate, yet always uncertain, compromise between activity and restriction. Through this
balance a new dimension is introduced into the Self-body relationship: the Self is now
responsible for the body - not simply to listen and act haphazardly - but to make a choice that
reflects the interests, expectations and abilities of Self and body combined. Through personal
responsibility, the Self has now become empowered to lower the tension in the conflict with
the body. It has warded off the threat to inner wholeness and integrity. It has alleviated the
suffering of a disrupted personhood.
A person ... does things
Persons do things: ''they act, create, make, take apart, put together, wind, unwind, cause to be,
cause to vanish" (Cassell 1991: 41). What persons do, what they choose to do, what they
value to do, signify and describe who they are. Cassell (1991: 166), indeed, eloquently asserts
that actions "write the narrative of our lives". It is an intricate narrative, "an aesthetic whole -
a tapestry woven from individual threads to form a coherent pattern that is complete in itself
but that also tells of the weaver" (Cassell 1991: 166-167). Thus, it is through the innumerable
actions, the small and the large, the mundane and the momentous, of a person's life that a
person knows the Self and is known by others. Consequently, when illness intrudes and makes
it impossible for persons to perform those actions, they identify with the very fact of their
being; they are not whole, they are not themselves. In short, when illness impedes action, the
Self is compromised, and suffering ensues.
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The participants m this study were implacably confronted by their own illness-induced
inaction, inability, incapacity. Consider Denise's concise disclosure:
En toe op 'n stadium het ek rêrig begin depressief word, want ek kon nie doen wat ek wou doen nie ... jy
is net plein depressief, want jy kry nie gedoen wat jy wil doen nie ... en jy kry nie gedoen wat jy moet
doen nie en ... jy kan nie doen wat vir jou lekker is om te doen nie ... jy weet, as ek gaan fliek dan raak jy
aan die slaap en as ek pizza's eet dan word ek naar, so wat. .. jy weet. ..
When ME interrupted her life, every action through which Denise had known her Self
suddenly became impossible to perform. As a person knows the Self to be well by the way it
behaves, each in-action, each non-performance, pierced Denise's being with the disheartening
realisation that she was now ill, that she could no longer do. This experience is strongly
echoed in Monks' (1995: 460) study on the illness experience associated with multiple
sclerosis.
When participants could not do, could not act, could not perform, and could not accomplish,
severe frustration followed. In her particularly illustrative account, Cheryl gave a voice to ME
sufferers' experience of such frustration:
... the very real problem of my day/night sleep reversal pattern means ... I can no longer schedule
morning appointments ... and on a Saturday when my husband can drive me somewhere, the afternoons
are useless for doctors, dentists, post offices, my hairdresser, banks and things like appointments with
insurance companies and most businesses... I can so seldom manage outings anyway, that I then try
and fit in too much and ... wheelchair and ail ... there's not much I can accomplish in the two hours I still
have of shopping time... Very frustrating... Also ... I would prefer to shop in quieter areas, but none of
these shops stay open in the afternoons on Saturdays. Then to top it all, I am wide-awake just as the
entire family is getting ready for bed! So I face a very long, lonely night. .. sometimes only getting to
sleep at 6 AM, but generally ... hopefully ... between 3:30 AM and 4:30 AM. This is currently one of ME's
worst influences on my life, aside from the pain and bodily symptoms. I have tried literally everything to
force my sleep pattern back to normal, but even sleeping tablets have no effect in getting me off to sleep
around 10 PM when my busy family collapses.
A distorted sleep pattern is only one symptom of ME, yet for Cheryl it carried a magnitude of
repercussions. Frustration followed upon each repercussion, for regardless of any and all
attempts to rectify the situation, Cheryl was simply unable to do, to behave, to act, as the Self
desired. Each repercussion disfigured her tapestry of Self - and increased her suffering.
Cheryl's graphic experience of not being able to do clearly supports Collinge (1993: 194)
contention that "much of the suffering brought by CFS is ... a result of having to cope with the
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limitations on our ability to do things". When Cheryl could not do, she suffered. So too did
Natalie:
Ek sien myself ook nie prakties genoeg volwasse vir my ouderdom nie. Dit was voor my siekte glad nie
die geval nie... Algemene take wat nou vir my moeilik is, byvoorbeeld, huishoudelike take waartoe jy nie
'n bydrae kan lewer nie laat 'n mens nutteloos voel. Jou vordering ten opsigte van dinge in die lewe,
byvoorbeeld, om 'n huishouding te kan behartig of om te kan bestuur ... mmm ... die feit dat jy nié kan nie
gee jou 'n gevoel dat jy nie so vernuftig is nie en jy word so afhanklik van ander mense... Dis 'n persoon
wat 'n mens nie graag wil wees nie... Ek sien myself as iemand wat bloot net 'n las kan wees vir ander.
Natalie's account reveals that from experiencing the Self as limited in action it was but a short
step to experiencing the Self as limited - period. The Self, the one seemingly unable to
perform even the most trivial and mundane tasks, was now - as a whole - insufficient,
deficient, incompetent. And, perhaps worst of all, the Self was now utterly dependent on
others. For Natalie and the other participants, as for the women in Dyek's (1995: 314) study
on multiple sclerosis and Kaufman's (1988: 344-345) study on stroke sufferers, dependency on
especially family and friends for accomplishing simple household tasks or for mobility outside
the house was something they strongly resisted. Natalie clearly felt that such a dependent Self
could not be anything but an onerous encumbrance to others. Unfortunately, when Natalie's
Self turned into a loathsome, incapacitated entity, it evolved simultaneously into a source of
great distress and suffering (Cassell 1991:42).
For participants such suffering was gravely exacerbated by the almost inevitable experience of
loss in the face of the inability to do things which the illness inflicted upon them. Natalie's
recollection vividly expresses this:
Ek moes geheel en al my buitemuurse aktiwiteite staak. Dit het ingesluit dansopleiding, dramaklasse,
fisiese oefening ... mmm ... ek het geswem en gedraf ... enige iets wat 'n gesonde, sterk liggaam ... wat
beweging benodig en so 'n liggaam benodig moes ek opgee... Ek kon glad nie meer, byvoorbeeld,
kitaarspel beoefen nie - dit was te pynlik vir my vingers, my vingers was te swak. My stembande was
aangetas - dit was pynlik om te sing, om selfs te praat. Boonop het ek nie eens meer na musiek
geluister nie, want my ore was te sensitief... Nie eens 'n eenvoudige belangstelling soos die skryf van
lirieke of gedigte is iets wat ek meer kon beoefen nie... Vandag kan ek steeds nie die meeste van
hierdie aktiwiteite beoefen nie en ek moes die meeste van die dinge wat my belangstellings was en wat
voorheen tog tot 'n mate gevorm het wie ek is, moet ek agterweë laat. ..
Natalie's words reveal a sense of tragic sadness and loss. When ME entered her life it
demanded an incredibly high price: it demanded of Natalie to give up and relinquish every
action that had up until then given purpose and meaning to her life. It propelled her into
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"experiences of surrender" (Schmidt 1999: 22); it corroded her tapestry of Self and it
aggravated her suffering.
Cheryl revealed a similar experience of loss and surrender in the face of ME:
I gradually gave up everything... library duty... all sport obviously and I cancelled my second year of
Bible Study at College. Any thoughts of continuing an English and Latin BA did not even cross my
mind... I miss greatly being able to study, write articles for magazines, read my favourite non-fiction...
And still more loss, more forfeiture, more surrender:
I continued to have to give up more and more... For example, I was well known for entertaining and
good cooking... I have one friend now who invites us over for delicious meals once in a while, but I met
her post-ME and have never been able to cook a meal for her family! One very 'good' day she stopped
by to find me baking... a very rare occurrence... half the ingredients had expired!. .. and was quite
overwhelmed by some very simple coconut biscuits. Now these biscuits, for example, pre-MEwould be
simply standard fare... certainly not an achievement of note in the kitchen! I used to bake superb
creations... I miss this very much...
Those activities that had filled Cheryl's life with direction and significance - involvement in
the community, physical activity, knowledge and learning, entertainment of family and friends
- was lost to the invasion of illness. Such enforced relinquishing of activities did not merely
represent a loss of an assemblage of empirical doings. Rather, ME had vandalised the delicate
tapestry woven by Cheryl's everyday activities. With her tapestry marred, she was no longer
the Self she once was.
When illness pierces the being of a sufferer it inevitably follows that many activities and the
ability to continue doing as usual has to be surrendered. For the sufferer, not being able to do
constitutes a frustration-filled loss of meaning giving activity. It constitutes the bit-by-bit
unravelling of the numerous threads of activity in the tapestry of Self. It constitutes a
corrosion of inner integrity, because the Self-who-does had now irrevocably changed. As all
participants did, Natalie had to recognise the forcible nature of such change in the Self:
Toe die tydperk wel aanbreek dat ek besef dat ek baie siek is... het ek heelwat ontdekkings oor my
situasie begin gemaak... Ek het besef dat wat ek was of dit waarmee ek myself besig gehou het tot. ..
toe en wat myself... mmm... miskien geïdentifiseer het as wie ek was iets van die verlede is. Op hierdie
stadium kon ek basies niks meer doen van my vorige lewe nie; ek kon aan niks meer meedoen nie... En
ek het besef daar was nou iets soos 'n 'ou' lewewat ek moes verruilom 'n 'nuwe' te beplan...
Through the experience of non-performance, through the loss of being able to do as before,
Natalie's Self and self-worth were compromised. Like the participants in Kaufman's (1988:
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344) study on the experience of stroke sufferers, Natalie had lost the ability to perform
activities previously central to her life and which was a fundamental means of self-expression.
Her sense of Self was disrupted to such an extent that it would never again be who and what it
once was. There were now two Selves: the old Self, the has-been, and the new Self, still in the
making. Kaufman's (1988: 345) study of stroke sufferers show that they share this experience
as the loss of physical abilities reverberate deeply in the image of the Self. As these sufferers
tried to resume their prestrake lives, they were faced with profound discrepancies between
how they once functioned and how they managed in their new lives. For these sufferers, as for
the ME participants in this study, their experiences sharply defined the disparity between the
old and the new Self.
The transition from the "old life of doing" to a "new life of doing", as Natalie's account
already intimated, clearly calls for adjustment on the part of the Self (cf. Strauss & Glaser
1975: 35-36). Note Denise's candid reflection in this regard:
Mense met ME het 'n spesifieke lewenstyl wat hulle moes aanleer om met hulle situasie te cape. Terwyl
ek dink mense sonder ME ... gaan aan ... Mmm ... ek dink dis ... dis nogal 'n groot verskil. .. huile ... dinge
wat hulle as normaal beskou is nie vir jou normaal nie en dinge wat jy as normaal beskou is nie vir hulle
normaal nie... Mmm ... so, ek dink dit is half twee aparte wêrelde ...
According to the participants' accounts, the adjustment called for when ME entered their lives
was a matter of choice. When challenged to adjust in the face of illness, they could reject or
they could respect.
Participants' expenences revealed that when they rejected the call for adjustment, they
responded to the change, to the frustration, to the loss, to the threat of inner disruption, by
struggling against adjustment, and in favour of continued activity. Within a struggle marked
by such a strong emphasis on activity, they felt it disreputable, almost immoral, if they were
not able to do.
Natalie's account exposed the manifestation of this struggle in the sufferer's life:
Ek raak baie geïrriteerd met myself, ek ... eh ... waar ek voorheen sou gaan lê het en tevrede wees met
'nou's dit my rustyd', is dit nou van 'daar is nog so baie goed wat ek moet doen', dat ek amper nie tot
ruste kan kom nie en wanneer ek wel rus dan's ek ... voel ek het ek hierdie geweldige skuldgevoelens
van ... (sug) ... ja, jy weet, daar is nog so baie goed om te doen mmm ... is dit 'n goeie besluit om nou te
lê? het ek dit rêrig nodig? jy weet, hoe intens is hierdie moegheid nou? Mmm ... veral as dit op die beter
dae gekom het. .. dan't ek gewonder was dit. .. gister was ek nou rêrig eerlik met myself, jy weet, was ek
nou rêrig gister so moeg soos wat ek gedink het, kon ek nie maar doen wat ek vandag gedoen het nie ...
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The Self was not allowed to simply be, because any moment lost in being was a moment less
of doing. This clearly reflected a perspective in which external accomplishments constituted
the most important dimension of selfhood. The Self was valued by what it could do. The Self
was its actions (cf. Collinge 1993: 194). Hence, the stubborn resistance to any adjustment that
would favour being at the expense of doing.
Despite the struggle to do, the fact remains that participants were ill and simply could not
always do. Still, the struggle demanded doing. Hence, sufferers ceaselessly tried to
compensate for any non-doing. Natalie again expressed the sufferer's overpowering urge to
do:
... 'n mens probeer half op-maak... op 'n manier sê jy vir jouself ... jy is nog steeds gelyk aan wat jy
was... So, as jy 'n dag mis en jy kry 'n beter dag, dan probeer jy twee maal s... dae se werk doen op
daai dag... Ek voel altyd ek probeer aan myself op-maak... Ek het dit nooit besef nie, tot iemand dit
eendag vir my gesê het, iemand het vir my gesê, maar, jy probeer nou... jy probeer elke keer op-maak
vir wat jy ... iemand het vir my gesê, jy doen dit orals, jy doen dit in vriendskappe, jy doen dit orals, as jy
nou 'n week uitgemis het dan probeer jy nou, jy weet, harder werk... En... dit werk eintlik nie baie goed
so nie... want dan... dan is dit 'n kringloop van... dan put jy jouself maar net weer van voor af uit...
It is a vicious cycle. When doing defines the Self but adjustment to new ways of doing is
resisted, the Self is perpetually and relentlessly entangled in attempts to atone for what is not
done. Similar to the experience of multiple sclerosis sufferers (Dyck 1995: 310), it is a
perpetual struggle to comply with the impossible requirement to do, to act, and to perform as
before. It is a struggle that must take its toll on the sufferer's health, and further suffering
becomes virtually inevitable.
In this way illness, through preventing the ill person from doing as usual, changed the Self. It
created an acute discrepancy between the Self who was able to do and the Self who is now not
able to do. In response, participants have at times chosen to pursue continued activity -
maintain everything as before. However, by refusing adjustment, they addressed neither the
lingering discrepancy within the Self nor the intense suffering it provoked.
Fortunately, participants had a different option. The alternative was to "remap" their lives
(Dyck 1995: 308) by respecting and complying with the call to adjust. In other words they
could decide to redesign and restructure their very way of life or, more pertinently, their every
way of doing. Participants' experiences showed that such an endeavour to redesign entailed a
combination of distinctive strategies.
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The first strategy comprised a defmite and deliberate change in perspective. Denise described
her new-found perspective on doing:
... jy leer om dankbaar te wees vir klein dinge ... jy leer om ... dankbaar te wees as jy gaan bad en kan
aantrek en uitgaan of werk toe gaan en nie te bad en 'n uur moet wag om ... voordat jy krag het om
jouself aan te trek en aan te gaan nie... So, dit is sulke dinge waarvoor 'n mens nogal leer om ... om
dankbaar te wees ...
Denise had discovered a novel appreciation of being able to do. To do, regardless of the
significance of what was done, became of value - perhaps for the first time. Denise's account
also attests to are-calibration of personal expectations for performance (cf. Ware 1999: 320).
Her concept of personal achievement has been altered and she was now ready to settle for
doing things "less well" because she had developed an ability to appreciate the very capacity of
doing in itself.
A change in perspective not only entailed a renewed appreciation of doing, but also an altered
view of non-doing. Reflect, for instance, on the following experience related by Natalie:
... ek moes myself ook aanpas by baie dinge ... ek is ... ek is nog steeds 'n baie sensitiewe kyker... Ek
kan goed soos geweld nie verdra nie, ek kan dit nie verdra nie, waar dit voorheen in my lewe vir my niks
beteken het nie, ek het gedink dis vreeslik en ek sal dit nie toelaat in my lewe nie, maar nou is dit vir my
'n probleem, dit is iets wat ek nie wil. .. ek wil. .. dit ontstel my ... baie ... maar in ... in geringe mates ook,
ek bedoel, klein goedjies kan gebeur en ek sal dink dit. .. dit onstel my nou, miskien waar dit nie moes
dalk nie... En ... dit sou mis ..miskien vir my voorheen 'n morele probleem gewees het, nou is dit vir my
meer as moreel, dit is vir my 'n emosionele probleem, ek kan nie ... ek is rêrig 'n sensitiewe kyker ... om
rede dat ek ... ek ervaar nou nog dat dit nie vir my voel asof ek goed so maklik en vinnig kan verwerk nie,
dit. .. dit bly nog 'n bietjie ... it lingers a bit. .. jy weet. .. En daarom, joe ... het ek al baie goeters miskien ...
ja, ek het nie eers tyd daarvoor nie, ek loop sommer net uit ...
For Natalie, to not do no longer necessarily represented an enforced restriction. To not do
could also at times constitute a means of self-elected protection of the Self. In fact, through
non-doing - choosing not to be coerced - the Selfbecame able to side-step negative or hurtful
encounters. Thus, it was an adjustment in the way of doing that encompassed non-doing as a
legitimate choice.
A second strategy employed in response to the call for adjustment involved a deliberate effort
to prioritise. Speaking for all participants, Denise firmly declared:
So dan het jy geleer om prioriteite nou ... vir jou uit te sorteer ...
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Cheryl provided a telling example of such conscious prioritising:
Gradually ... I became quite clever at using a 'once a week' lady who helped in my home, to help me cook
and freeze meals and do laundry. We just let the dust accumulate and all other household tasks lie for
quite awhile. But clean clothes and a full stomach was my priority... And only once my feet actually
stuck to the kitchen floor did I search for paid help to give it a good scrub ...
For Cheryl, declining physical capacity resulted in the development of a new approach to
domestic work. Cheryl recognised that there was a definite need to prioritise since her limited
physical abilities would not allow her to accomplish all she might have preferred to do.
Hence, a decision had to be made, one that would discriminate between activities which were
merely desirable, and activities which were genuinely necessary. The necessary came first; the
desirable only once it had grown into a necessity. In Dyek's (1995: 310) study, women
suffering from multiple sclerosis revealed similar approaches to the execution of everyday
tasks.
Such intentional prioritising as the direct result of illness was often accompanied by a third and
closely related strategy: planning. Denise explained why planning is of such great importance
to an ME sufferer:
'n Mens leer om jou aktiwiteite en verpligtinge te beplan. Vir my werk dit soos 'n bankbalans met
inkomste en uitgawe... Dit help om 'n maand op te deel in weke en dae ... en nie meer as een groot
verpligting plus-minus vier maal 'n week te hê nie... Anders daal jou energie balans in die rooi en is jy in
die moeilikheid.
Denise's expenence interestingly suggests that prioritising is also often accompanied by
"trade-offs" (Ware 1999: 320). The ME sufferer sometimes has to sacrifice one activity in
order to do another.
Natalie clearly supported the sheer necessity of planning:
'n Mens leer baie belangrik nogal om jou tyd te beplan asook jou aksies. AI is jou siekte nou hoe
wisselvallig, 'n mens kan dit nie regtig so vas beplan nie ... maar besef jy dat eike ... goeie minuut is een
wat jy sorgvuldig moet gebruik. Dit is soos druppels water, elkeen is net so ongelooflik kosbaar om 'n
dors te kan les, niks maar niks vermors jy nie... As 'n mens nou op een dag êrens moet gaan ... moet jy
besef dat jy alles op een slag moet doen, sodat jy nie onnodig weer hoef te gaan nie.
For both Denise and Natalie, their illness inevitably imposed restrictions on their ability to do.
But instead of completely negating the possibility of doing, such restrictions prompted them to
plan more carefully and more deliberately. This tendency to organise and to plan activity was
also commented on by several women in Dyek's (1995: 314-316) study on multiple sclerosis.
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For her participants as weil as for mine, planning re-introduced doing into the realm of the
possible and the attainable, despite serious illness.
Lastly, in redesigning their way of doing, participants turned to the creative force of invention.
It is, as Cheryl disclosed, invention borne out of utter necessity:
I spend long spells in bed and have found a good way to lift heavy blankets off my legs ... especially
during severe muscle pain ... We use a cheap plastic outside stoop coffee table ... a square with all four
legs slightly shortened for me. This a recent helpful addition.
Also, note the sparks of invention in Natalie's recollection:
Ook die proses van lê ... het probleme opgelewer as gevolg van die feit dat my liggaam pynlik en sensitief
was ... niks en niemand kon my aanraak nie. Ons moet. .. moes prakties begin eksperimenteer met wat
sal die beste kussings wees, wat is die beste matrasse, wat se kleding kan ek dra, wat se skoene sou
gemakliker wees ...
These are two brilliant examples of inventiveness on the part of ME sufferers. Cheryl and
Natalie experienced a critical need and turned to their own creative resources to meet it. They
inverited and redesigned, and through their innovation they brought relief, ease and comfort
into their world of doing (cf. Strauss & Glaser 1975: 35-36). Dyek's (1995: 313) study of
women with multiple sclerosis shows that these women too follow similar patterns of
innovation to ease the experience of illness - for themselves and for those around them.
Thus, when confronted with the discrepancy between the Self who was able to do and the Self
who now appears incapacitated, the participants often opted to adjust and redesign their ways
of doing. They changed their perspective, they prioritised, they planned, and they invented. In
and through this process, doing as well as non-doing became of value, possible, and even
easier. As these new threads of activity were patterned into the tapestry of their new Selves,
inner integrity was once again restored and suffering receded.
The multitude of things a person does are the threads that combine to define the tapestry of the
person's Self. When illness prevents the person from doing things, the tapestry unravels.
Activities are given up, ways of doing are relinquished, and meaning is lost. Through not
being able to do, through each inaction and non-performance, the person grows increasingly
aware of a changed and somehow diminished Self. Inner wholeness is lost and suffering
ensues. Whether such suffering persists is a matter of choice. The person may persist in
maintaining activity, and forever atone for the inability to do. Alternatively, the person may
choose to redesign a way of life in which doing, as well as non-doing, are not only embraced
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but also consciously converted into the possible. Thus, it is a choice between perpetually
reassembling a ragged tapestry or creating a new pattern that will both define and reflect a new
Self. The choice belongs purely to the sufferer.
A person ... has an awareness of time
According to Cassell (1991: 38-43), a person has an awareness of time. A person has a past, a
history that has taken place over time and in places, involving countless others. A person has a
present, a here and now of immediate, in-this-moment happenings, each shaped by a past and
projected into a future. A person has a perceived future, a life of expectations, hopes and
dreams, forever exerting an influence on the person in the now. For each sufferer the personal
meaning and experience of illness at once arise from all three levels: from the past, from the
here-and-now present, and from the anticipated future.
In Nuttin's (1985: 16) view, "time perspective" consists of a "mental perception" at a certain
moment in time "of events that, in reality, happen in temporal succession and with longer or
shorter time intervals between them". These "events" - which Nuttin (1985: 17) refers to as
''temporal signs" - serve as personal or social "points of reference" to which less important
objects are anchored. In each individual life, there are some key events that function as digits
on a personal or social clock. They help the individual in the relative temporal localisation of
other events. These "reference marks" create "the temporal background against which earlier
experiences or projections of future events take shape" (Nuttin 1985: 19). This means that at a
given moment, an individual's time perspective is not limited to the object that he or she has in
mind, but includes a configuration of temporally localised objects residing within both the past
and the future contexts ofthat moment (Nuttin 1985: 21). This notion closely corresponds to
Cottle's (1976: 85) "spatial conceptualisation of time flow" that is marked by an awareness of
the relatedness of present, past and future. Through this relatedness the past (through
recollection) and the future (through expectation) are contained and reside within the present
(Cottle 1976: 86).
When we regard "time perspective" as filled with events, objects and contexts from the
present, past and future, it is clear that this perspective is not a pre-existing "empty space".
Unlike the very abstract notion of time, time perspective cannot be conceived independently of
its content. Indeed, content is "an essential element of time perspective" (Nuttin 1985: 23).
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And while open to the influence of the anticipation or memory of someone else's action and its
outcomes, the most important contribution to the content of a person's time perspective is
made by the objects of personal experiences and tendencies (Nuttin 1985: 27).
Thus, a person has a unique time perspective that consists of a configuration of temporally
localised objects that resides in the present, past and future and is distinguished by its highly
personal content. In my study the content of the participants' time perspective appeared
strikingly moulded by the distinctive nature and impact of their illness. Two features of ME,
chronicity and unpredictability, stepped forth as exerting a significant influence on sufferers'
awareness of time and, hence, on their illness experience.
Firstly, ME is chronic in nature. It spans over time. It is enduring, lasting, and extending.
Natalie's account offered substantial insight into a ME sufferer's experience of chronicity:
'n Groot probleem by my bly maar ... die tyd. Die chroniese aard van die siekte en die feit dat ek reeds
byna my hele jongmenslewe hieraan spandeer het, laat my soms vir kort rukkies 'n bietjie moedeloos ...
veral met die tydperk van my studies en nou meer onlangs waar ek begin sien wat ander mense om my
vermag ... dan sien ek ook wat ek nie regkry nie... Ek ... ek kan myself ... mmm ... beter ondersoek en
sien hoe siek ek regtig is en dit laat 'n mens ook moedeloos... Ek het nooit daai groeiproses gehad tot
daar nie ... mmm ... daar is 'n groot deel van my jongmenslewe ... dis net. .. dit is net weg, dit het nooit
gebeur nie, ek het nie matriekafskeid toe gegaan nie, ek het nie 'n ou gehad nie... So daai deel is ... is
nie daar nie ... die groeiproses waardeur hulle al is wat ek nog nie gedoen het nie, ek ... en ek weet nie
wanneer ek dit gaan doen nie. So, dit is ook iets wat my affekteer... Ek weet wat ek gemis het, ek
weet... So, dis ... dis maar net. .. dis maar net nou vir my moeilik ... dit is ... daar is definitief 'n verloop
van tyd ... ek bedoel, .. jy sien net soveel dinge wat jy misgeloop het en dan voel jy maar jy het nie al die
beheer wat jy wil hê nie ...
Natalie elaborated:
... om elke dag moeg te wees en energieloos te wees en vir so 'n lang tydperk van jou lewe ... gee vir jou
'n hele ander ... perspektief daaroor en jy voel. .. goed is moeilik om te hanteer, dis hoe jy deurgaans
voel... Dit maak 'n mens bang as jy dink dat jy aL .. vergeet het hoe dit voel om gesond te wees ... ajh
(sug)... Ek het geen idee hoe dit voel nie, dis waar... Ek het geen idee hoe dit voel om nie moeg te
wees nie, ek is altyd moeg. En ek het geen idee hoe dit voelom ... wel, ek het meeste van die tyd pyn,
ten minste êrens, ek het nie altyd orals pyn nie, maar ek het... En ek het geen idee hoe dit voelom .
om daai vryheid te hê van ... jou liggaam hou jou nie terug nie. So ... mmm ... dit affekteer my baie .
mmm ... daar is so 'n tipe van lewensenergie wat net uit jou uitgaan en jy weet nie waar om dit vandaan
te kry nie ... jy probeer, maar dis weg... Dis ... dis moeilik ... want dit is al net so lank... Ek hoop ... ek
hoop dat ek sal nooit moed verloor nie, heeltemal nie. 'n M..mens lewe maar saam met daai vrees dat
daar 'n oomblik gaan kom in jou lewe waar ... dit net te veel vir jou gaan word. Ek hoop dit kom nooit .
maar, ek bedoel, 'n mens dink ... 'n mens dink soms daaroor, want as dit so lank raak dan ... mmm .
sjoe, dan sien jy dis moeilik partykeer om dit te dra, dit word 'n baie swaar las ...
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
341
Natalie's recollection clearly reveals that the chronic nature of her illness and, in particular, the
fact that she has devoted almost her entire youth to it, at times leaves her feeling utterly
despondent. She cannot but acknowledge the enormity of all that she has not experienced, of
the personal development, growth and experience of a young adolescent life she never
enjoyed. While this is a time lost to her forever, Natalie's account shows that the memory of
that time is still vivid and is still able to playa strong (and at this stage unsettling) role in her
present. By recapturing her past experiences and relocating them in the present Natalie's
account clearly reveals that the past (along with its deeply personal content of chronicity) can
indeed reside in the present and there exert a powerful influence on experience in the Here and
Now. Thus, for Natalie, memory of the past represents an integral basis for perceiving time
and, hence, for experiencing illness in the present (Cottle 1976: 13).
The connection between the experience of time in the presence of a chronic illness was even
more pronounced when, speaking after almost ten years of illness, Cheryl candidly revealed:
I'm really, really, really. .. not excited about what I'm learning about the connection between cancer and
ME ... long-term ME because your body has suffered for such a long time, your immune system has
been battered and you yourself has been under par for so long... So, there are worrying things ...
worrying things ahead for people who's ME has lingered for so long... So, if I had to be very honest with
you now, the thought of being ... maybe ... mmm ... you know, ten or fifteen years away from ... from ...
dying of cancer ... is pretty hair-raising... And ... I have confronted the fact that I might have ME for the
rest of my life. And I can't pretend the thought. .. excites me at all. I would ... very much ... like to think
that there was a cure around the corner, but after all I've learned and experienced ... I don't think there's
a cure. I honestly don't think there's a cure... I've remained ... hopeful that I am going to get better ...
I've only, in the last. .. mmm ... two or three weeks that I've felt so very ill, become ... for the first time ever,
I can honestly say to you, become ... disheartened to the point that I wonder if I'm going to get better, it's
happened a few times now ... that I've wondered if I'm going to get better... So at the moment I don't see
the future ... rosily... I'm actually deep down starting to get a little bit frightened that I'm not going to get
well, for the first time... I haven't. .. mmm ... feared for the future before these last two or three weeks ...
but I've just been so ill. .. that I actually ... mmm ... started thinking sad thoughts ...
The chronicity of ME has at times instilled a fear in Cheryl that a body battered by severe
illness for such a long time may be exposed to worse affiiction. What if she stays ill forever?
What if a chronic illness becomes a terminal illness? Indeed, while Cheryl has generally
remained hopeful of getting better, times of acute suffering have affiicted her with a grave
despondency. At such times the hope of recovery elude her and the fear of permanent illness
takes its place. At such times the dread of permanent illness violates the sufferer's perspective
on the future. Yet, the future is 'the primary meaning of existentiality'. It gives meaning and
purpose; it is filled with intention and possibility. Moreover, as Cassell (1991: 42-3) reminds
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us, it is that dimension of existence in which hope dwells. When the future is then lost to
anxiety and extreme uncertainty, intense sadness results for "no one has ever questioned the
suffering that attends the loss of hope" (Cassell 1991: 43). Thus, when Cheryl defines her
future as filled with dread and anxiety, it affects her perspective on the Here and Now as well
as her experience of illness and Self.
In accordance with my participants' experiences, the content of their time perspective was not
only distinguished by the chronicity of their illness. It was also very strongly affected by the
fact that ME is inherently unpredictable. It is variable, unstable, uncertain, even erratic.
Besides knowing that over-exertion will trigger "payback", they are unable to guess when a
relapse will occur, and at a loss to explain it when it does.
Denise's account clearly reveals the relation between unpredictability and time perspective in
the life of a ME sufferer:
Die toekerns is vir my ... dis moeilik om nie rêrig te kan planne maak nie ... mmm ... want dit. .. dit is nie vir
my realisties op hierdie oomblik nie... Jy kan niks beplan nie ... nie kort of langtermyn nie want jy weet
nie of jy dit sal kan bybring nie... Jou aksies en aktiwiteite word rondom jou energievlakke beplan ... wat
kan wissel van oomblik tot oomblik... So, jy kan nie jou lewe rêrig organiseer soos wat jy graag sou wou
nie... En ook, ek dink 'n mens ... mens leer om teleurstelling te hanteer, want daar is dinge waarna jy
uitsien en dan ewe skielik is jy siek en jy kan nie daarby uitkom nie... Dit. .. dit maak jou half skepties in
terme van langtermyn-doelwitte ... mens sou graag wil weet jy ... jy werk na iets toe ... wat 'n mens op
hierdie stadi ... wat ek op hierdie stadium nie het nie, jy weet, op hierdie stadium gaan ek nou maar net
aan ... Ek dink inherent e..ervaar meeste mense dit, ek dink net met ME is dit. .. is dit vir jou 'n baie meer
konkrete komponent. .. van ... gaan jy fisies in staat wees om dit te doen? Dit maak dit soms moeilik ... jy
weet, dis half sleg, 'n mens wil. .. mens wi! weet, maar jy weet nie ...
Historically, only work life was strictly scheduled but, as Ware (1999: 311) points out, "our
cultural penchant for 'scheduledness' is expanding into other domains". Now, leisure is
scheduled. Social life is scheduled. A full calendar has indeed become "a sign of a successful
life". Conversely, a too-empty one is seen as "a source of concern". Yet for the ME sufferer
such "scheduledness" is impossible. In fact, while many of us may live our lives by our
calendars, "persons with CFS can neither commit to nor follow a schedule, since they can
never predict when their fatigue and other symptoms are likely to intensify or recede" (Ware
1999: 305).
For Denise it is simply not a realistic exercise to make any definite plans. After all, her
activities are shaped around her physical energy and as the latter fluctuates without warning, so
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too does her ability to meet whatever plans have been set. The resultant inability to map out
and depend on keeping either short- or long-term plans has rendered her sceptical about the
potential of constructive planning and goal-setting in her own life. Worse yet, when Denise
found herself unable to plan and unable to look forward to her future, she no longer felt in
control. After all, as Nuttin (1985: 40) points out, the future is "an essential dimension of a
person's behaviorial world and his motivated purposive action". Indeed, ''the ability to
construct far-distant personal goals and to work toward their realization is an important
characteristic" of simply being human (Nuttin 1985:9). However, when a person's future time
perspective is severely limited by the impact of an unpredictable illness, this ability to set goals
and make plans and, in effect, to feel in control, becomes jeopardized. This sensation is indeed
strongly reflected in Denise's awareness of simply drifting from one moment to the next,
without clear direction or purpose, without being able to place herself on the trajectory of her
illness, and without being able to anticipate what is to follow (cf. Bury 1997: 114; Dyck 1995:
316; Strauss & Glaser 1975: 47-9).
Similar to Denise's experience, Natalie's account also reveals an austere perspective of time,
and specifically of the future, as disrupted by illness:
So, as 'n mens praat oor die toekoms dan is dit 'n langtermyn-ding ... en dis waar my probleem lê... Die
toekoms is moeilik, want die... die langdurigheid daarvan, die feit dat dit... dat dit nie in 'n moment
geskied nie ... dis moeilik... Ek dink nie ... ek dink nie 'n mens ... enige iemand is eintlik ... huile ... hulle is
nooit rêrig seker nie, so ek ... verbly my nou daarin dat ek nie die enigste een is wat so rigtingloos voel
nie... Ek het net nooit gedink ek sal so rigtingloos wees nie, ek was nog nooit. .. my hele lewe lank was
dit net ... my pad, ek het geweet waar lê my pad en ... ja, nou's dit. .. mmm ... ek sien soms ... mmm ...
ek loop myself vas, ek weet nie waarheen nou nie omdat my lewe so ... moeilik is om vooruit te beplan
en vooruit te kyk ...
The sense of future possibility is, as Cottle (1976: 161) explains, first encountered through the
very act of planning or intending. So, "in working out these plans, following them, and having
them realised, one learns that, to a certain degree, the future can be shaped by one's own
efforts". For Natalie, however, the intrusion of illness left hardly any room for definite
planning. And where planning was so uncertain, so too was the future. For the future
perspective is shaped not only by our specific plans for today and tomorrow, but also by those
we conceive for our life as a whole (Barrett in Cottle 1976: 161). In this way, the
unpredictability of her illness directly affected Natalie's deepest sense of Self and being.
According to Kaufman's (1988: 341) research, this is an experience shared by those who suffer
a stroke and face the unpredictable process towards rehabilitation.
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The utter unpredictability of ME that has so deeply touched Natalie's sense of Self has also
invaded her life of dreams and hopes:
... dan kyk jy in die toekoms en dan sien jy soos byvoorbeeld ... goed soos om 'n verhouding te hê met 'n
man. Dit is moeilik vir my, want. .. omdat ek so wisselvallig is ... mmm is dit moeilik om van iemand
anders te verwag, van enige iemand te verwag om saam met jou ... mmm 'n leefstyL .. in jou leefstyl in
te gaan, want huile ... mmm ... dit verskil net baie van gesonde mense... Ek sien nie ... wel, ek ... ek ... ja,
ek ... ek is baie bang om in 'n verhouding in te gaan en soveel van die persoon te verwag... Ek wil nie
iemand se lewe half van hom wegneem nie, ek wil nie uitgaan met 'n ou en as hy vanaand iets wil doen
vir hom sê, nee, hoor hierso, ek kan nie ... en dit is al die tiende aand in 'n ry wat ek vir hom so sê nie, dit
sal baie onregverdig wees teenoor hom... Maar ... dit is vir my ... mmm ... ek is baie ... ek dink ek is baie
skepties daar ... daaroor ...
Everyperson has a secret life, a life of dreams, fantasies, wishes, hopes, and desires with a real
existence often known to only a few (Casselll991: 42). Atkin and Ahmad (2000: 507) noted
how this life can be invaded by worry and apprehension as their participants, sufferers from
thalassaemia major, feared that their illness would stand in the way of relationships with
potential partners. In much the same way, an important dimension of Natalie's secret life was
her dream of an intimate relationship with a special partner. But ME stands in the way, for
whenever Natalie dares to think of entering such a relationship, she immediately confronts
uncertainty. Natalie's experience indeed corroborates Ware's (1999: 316) fmding that the
unpredictability of this illness represents "a major impediment to social interaction". Because
ME sufferers cannot predict their condition on any given day, they are often forced to cancel
set plans at the last minute. And friends take offence at these unexpected changes. After
repeated instances they may, as Natalie clearly fears, simply decline further overtures and let
the relationship wither away. Indeed, the utter unpredictability of ME has changed Natalie's
life so radically that she can no longer conceive of someone who would be willing to
accommodate such persistent change and disruption within a relationship. Hence, ME has
filled Natalie with the fear of expecting too much and by doing so left her unable to tie the
present to the future through hopeful expectations (Cottle 1976: 149). Indeed, the impact of
Natalie's illness has impaired her vision, her perspective of the future - the very "building site
of constructive behavior and human progress" (Nuttin 1985:40) - with fear and anxiety.
Natalie continued to disclose that as the unpredictability of ME touched her plans and dreams,
it indeed touched and changed her sense of Self:
lets wat ek wel agtergekom het is dat my gevoelens en siening omtrent myself fluktueer en direk
saamgaan met my fisiese. Wanneer ek baie siek voel ervaar ek myself met die minste vertroue en
wanneer ek 'n bietjie sterker is mag ek dalk net met meer ... aanvaarding aan myself dink. Wanneer ek
baie siek en swak is dan is ek negatief ... eh ... baie meer klaerig, ek voel baie meer minderwaardig, en
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as ek sterker is dan is ek meer trots op wat ek vermag ten spyte van die omstandighede ... Ek ... ek kan
miskien vandag vir jou sê ... mmm ... dit is 'n seën in baie opsigte om siek te wees en ek het baie geleer
en so aan ... en dan die volgende dag sê ek vir jou, nee-wat, dit is nie, ek is so gefrustreerd en ek ... ek
haat dit om die waarheid te sê en ek sukkel om dit te aanvaar. So, dit wys jou net dat dit. .. dit hang van
dag tot dag af hoe 'n mens voel en ek glo werklikwaar dat 'n mens se fisiese ... bestaan so groot invloed
het daarop ... hoeveel energie jy het, hoeveel pyn jy het. .. sulke dinge ...
For Natalie, the variable and unpredictable nature of her physical well-being resulted in a
shifting, unstable sense of Self. As her body waxed and waned under the pressure of ME, so
too did her sense of Self. In other words, as "my body is no longer what it was a moment
ago", so too to some extent "I am no longer the I who I was". It is in this way that Natalie's
shifting position on the trajectory of illness profoundly affected her sense of Self, of personal
identity, of stable being (cf. Strauss & Glaser 1975: 52). Unfortunately, where instability and
uncertainty marked the Self, inner integrity faltered, and suffering ensued.
Thus, the participants' experience of illness revealed that through perception they were aware
of the present. But their time perspective was not limited to the Here and Now. Through
memory they recalled and reconstructed their experiential past, while their future came into
existence on the level of representation, expectation, and imagination. While this clearly
shows that for my participants both their past and their future reside within their present, this
was not necessarily ideal. For participants, their past was filled with lived hurts and with the
dread of attenuated illness, their future with the anxiety that comes with anticipated distress,
severe uncertainty and a sense of diminishing control.
Yet, the participants' experiences also showed that they were not entirely delivered unto the
powers of a chronic, unpredictable illness. Cheryl offered us our first insight into an
alternative powerful enough to countermand the disruption and anxiety of severe illness:
This is ... this is a strange thing ... I... I think of it, of a relapse, as an academic possibility and, in fact,
after ten years, if I were to put on the spot, I would know it was a surety. I mean, I'm not I know I'm
not ... I'm not cured. Symptoms are building up rapidly as we speak ... today is not a good day... But ...
but. .. that is an amazing thing! The optimism is ... completely unfounded (laugh)! Completely unfounded
(laugh)! Not based on fact or past experience... I don't live in fear of a ... of a relapse ... at all ... which is
totally, as I say, it's ... it's totally abnormal (laugh) ... based on past experience (laugh)!
Cheryl's approach suggests that an alternative to the severe experience of anxiety and dread
lies right here in the present. In her mind, in this moment, a relapse represented only an
academic possibility. To be sure, based on past experience, she would probably have to
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concede that it is far more likely to happen than not. Still, Cheryl does not dwell on this
knowledge. Instead, she maintains the Self wholly in the present moment of Here and Now.
Here the relapse is not considered a reality, and it is not feared. Thus, to countermand anxiety,
Cheryl deliberately chose no longer to linger in the past of has-been's and could-have-been's.
Similarly she saw no use in dreading a future that has not yet come to pass. Instead, Cheryl
maintained the Self entirely in the present moment, the Here and Now.
According to Cottle (1976: 173), this does not mean that Cheryl is perceiving her present from
the point of view of an "observer of action" for this would imply that the present exists for her
only on a moment-ta-moment basis. This would render "the observer" powerless to change or
influence it. Instead of such an instantaneous perception of time, Cheryl's account suggests
that she perceives the present as "extended". That is, she is an "agent of action"; she can
control the present. In this way, Cheryl discovered and embraced the present as that dimension
of existence most likely to be affected by personal choice and control (cf. Casselll991: 58-9).
Denise's experiences reveals another dimension: to maintain the Self entirely in the present
liberates the sufferer not only from past hurt and impending dread, but also from the rush of
interpretations such memories and prospects are likely to evoke:
... dis aanvanklik baie negatief, maar jy ... elke negatief het sy positief, so jy ... dis 'n negatiewe oms .
situasie, maar jou belewenis daarvan, jou hantering daarvan kan dit omskep in 'n positiewe situasie .
Kyk, jy kan half net die negatiewe kant daarvan raaksien en in 'n hoekie gaan sit en jou aan die slaap
huil, maar dit. .. dit gaan niks daaraan verander nie. So, jy vat die positiewe saam met die negatiewe .
en ek dink ook 'n mens ... mens leer om die negatiewe te erken. Jy ... mens word half groot met die .
met die konsep van dat as iets negatief is dan ignoreer jy dit. .. terwyl uit die negatiewe kom daar welook
die positiewe, so jy het nodig om die negatiewe te erken ... mmm ... maar jy het nie nodig om dit te
koester nie.
Denise's account suggests that while certain adverse qualities may be undeniably present
within a particular experience, there is no need to treasure such qualities. There is neither any
use nor any need to reflect on their counterparts in the past or their potential influence on the
next moment. Instead, a different focus can be deliberately adopted, one that may permit a
more benign experience and interpretation of the present situation, in the present moment.
This approach reminds us of Schutz's concept of "attention to life". This is the basic
regulatory principle of the Self s conscious life, which both defines the realm relevant to the
Self and determines the attention directed by the Self to the given experiences. The Selfs
"attention to life" is, however, no static entity. It is, instead, very much open to modification
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and is capable of showing all sorts of shadings: from actual comprehending, to merely noting,
to hardly noticing, to leaving completely unobserved (Schutz 1967: 73-4). For the Self, every
moment in time - every Here and Now - is constituted by such attentional modifications.
Consequently, the interpretation (or meaning) that the Self imputes to experiences depends on
those attentional modifications marking the very moment of interpretation, that is, the actual
Here and Now from which the Self is looking.
If we follow Denise's approach, it would appear that we should remain consciously aware of
the attentional modifications marking the moment of interpretation. In other words, when a
sufferer holds her personal time still for a moment of perspective, she becomes aware of these
modifications, and so also becomes able to determine the interpretation of actual events. She
is, in fact, able to choose an interpretation, a perspective, from which to view the particular
instant as well as subsequent events. Cassell (1991: 59) agrees that "the person's choice of
interpretation is central to how that person experiences the events - it is the interpretation that
determines whether suffering or merely distress is experienced". Events are, in other words,
not necessarily inherently positive or negative, good or bad. Instead, the nature of events - as
they are experienced - is determined by a personal choice of interpretation.
When the participants held their personal time still, when they lived entirely in the present
moment, their distress was relieved, not only because they were able to (re-)interpret the nature
of experienced events, but also because they were able to (re-)appraise the Self. Helen's
concluding statement to her autobiographical sketch provides persuasive substantiation:
I coped with an illness that has no foreseeable end to it, by trying to stay positive and by trying to
concentrate on the invaluable experiences and lessons I could learn from it... It was a time of suffering
that I would not wish onto anyone else, but at the same time, was a period in my life I would never wish
away either ... it brought with it much pain and heartache, but left with me with a much richer and deeper
understanding of myself that I will cherish forever.
While Helen's illness clearly represented a time of great suffering, it was also a period in her
life that she would not discard because it awarded her with a much deeper understanding of her
Self and of the power that resides within her Self. Indeed, for Helen, suffering was mitigated
by a distinctly revised appraisal of the Self in the present moment. It was an appraisal of the
Self not as powerlessly dictated to by illness, but as powerfully supportive of the Self despite
illness (cf. Collinge 1993: 77-8). In the very act of reflecting on the Self, a new context of
meaning was created to which experiences are referred for interpretation in the extended
present. This process of referral in effect reflects the chosen content of the sufferer's time
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perspective through and from which the Selfs interpretive glance is operating (cf. Schutz
1967: 78-84).
For participants, it became imperative to refrain from reliving past hurts as well as from
continually tumbling into the future of the coming moment. They had to live entirely in the
present, in the moment of now - not in the capacity of an observer, but as an agent actively
taking responsibility for the Self. The extended present therefore represents that expanse of
time that they believe they have shaped or will still shape (Cottle 1976: 173). An essential part
of this "shaping" is taking control over their own interpretation of events. Thus, by positioning
the Self as an active agent in the extended present, as an agent who has the sovereign power to
choose an interpretation, the participants were able to assume greater responsibility for their
experience both of illness and of Self.
Thus, my participants experienced profound change at the onset and during the progress of
their illness. The character and consequence of this change is particularly pronounced in the
case of an illness as notoriously long lasting and variable as ME. The subjective experience of
such an illness can be despairingly disempowering. Where a past filled with insecurity and a
future brooding with anxiety reside within the present, the ill person suffers. In a sense the
content of the sufferer's time perspective - the temporal signs - that govern the interpretation
of new events are sculpted by the suffering caused by severe illness.
Yet, my participants had the option to choose to direct their "attention of life" to the extended
present. There, the sufferer has the power to choose a perspective from which to view events
and appraise the Self. There, the sufferer can make a decision, can consciously choose an
interpretation of actual happenings that is supportive of the Self in this moment. There, in the
extendedpresent, the sufferer assumes responsibility for the Self and its suffering.
While this approach may appear deceptively simple, it is not. It is not simply a matter of
emptying the experience of time in this moment from past and future dimensions. In fact, this
cannot be done. For, to experience the present, we must have the memory of the past and the
expectation of the future. Time perspective is never an empty space. The extended present,
therefore, includes both past and future, but only that portion of past time for which the person
feels responsible and only that portion of future time that they believe they can shape and
control.
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At this point, the experience of illness and Self has become a matter of personal responsibility.
In fact, it is now an act of utter irresponsibility to dwell on a past-gone-by or cast an anxious
glance towards the future-to-come. It is irresponsible exactly because it diverts the person's
focus away from where the gist of personal responsibility is now located: the extended present.
It is, after all, in the extended present that the sufferer must be wholly supportive of the Self-
of-now who confronts the challenges of illness. Personal responsibility is here more distinctly
than anywhere else defined and lived in present tense.
A person ... has a transcendent dimension
Cassell (1991: 43) states that a person "has a transcendent dimension - a life of the spirit,
however expressed or known". This is the timeless dimension of personhood, the quality of
being greater and more lasting than an individual life, of having meaning and purpose that
exceeds the present state of being. This is the final dimension touched by illness.
The transcendent dimension in the lives of the participants in this study was strikingly revealed
through their search for the meaning of their suffering, of human suffering. Having had their
world "unmade" by the onset of a serious and highly disruptive illness created a need to make
sense of the situation - to find a reason, a purpose, or some other form of meaning rvvare
1999: 320). The participants' search for such meaning was resolutely directed towards
assigning a meaning, identifying a purpose, detecting a destination ... all to make sense of an
otherwise incoherent, almost incomprehensible experience of illness. It was a search rendered
all the more important in the face of a Self and society evidently equally bereft of a rational
explanation and remedy for their illness (cf. Williams 1989: 287).
Natalie expressed many of the participants' search for meaning, for transcendence:
Ek ... ek ... ek hoop van harte dat ek in die toekoms eendag met hierdie siekte iets positiefs sal kan doen
en ek hoop ek sal vir iemand iets kan doen en dalk daaroor skryf of iets, ek weet nie... Mmm ... dis nogal
'n geloof ... iets waarin ek ... vorentoe na uitkyk. Ek voel daar moet 'n doel wees, daar moet 'n plan wees
en... mmm ... daar moet 'n plek wees vir jou lewe. So, ek's ... ek ... ek probeer maar ... ek probeer hierdie
idee altyd vashou dat... op een of ander tyd in my lewe sal ek iets goeds vir iemand beteken, ten minste
dit, jy weet, want dit bly maar vir my altyd negatief.
For those confronted by a seriously debilitating illness, meaning is often found in gains in
inner strength or personal growth, in the ability to confront longstanding interpersonal
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problems or in learning to cope with negative emotions - all as a result of being ill (Ware
1999: 320). For instance, in Kelly and Dickinson's (1997: 261) study, a respondent with a
severe chronic condition found meaning in her experience in the greater awareness and
acceptance of the Self that had followed as a result of suffering from ulcerative colitis. In a
similar way, the quest towards transcendence led Natalie to locate the meaning and purpose of
her illness in the greater good. Suffering for the sake of others became the surpassing principle
that defmed the supreme significance of Natalie's experience of illness. By assigning a
greater, a transcendent meaning to the illness, Natalie reduced the suffering associated with it -
it now had a purpose; it was part of a plan. In this way transcendence, which located Natalie in
a landscape of meaning far larger than her individual Self, offered a powerful means through
which to restore her personhood to wholeness (cf. Cassell 1991: 45).
Natalie's account exhibits a further quality of the search for transcendence, namely to fmd a
meaningful interpretation of illness involves narrative reconstruction. Williams (1989: 270)
maintains that the explanations advanced by ill persons act as narrative reconstructions of the
profound suffering in their daily experience of life in the presence of illness. Their illness
becomes part the story of their past as perceived (and construed) in the present. Their story, as
an imaginative reconstruction, is therefore not a simple thread consisting of instances related
as "when that had happened, then this happened". Instead, through the narrative
reconstruction involved in finding transcendence, the past of this present is reconstructed in
such a way that the experience of illness and suffering is better understood and the impression
is reaffirmed that life has a course and the Self has a purpose. Thus, in construing a particular
story, Natalie found significance in the experience of suffering and fortified the belief that
through illness her life was indeed purposefully on course to help others. Natalie's story
allowed her to be and become whole - despite illness.
Through constructing a story that brought meaning and purpose to her experience of illness
and suffering, Natalie assumed the position of author of her own narrative. But this is not
always the case, as Cheryl's account suggests. Cheryl's description indeed identifies a
different author at work:
... I have been opti ... mmm ... not optimistic in the secular sense, I've been optimistic in the Christian
sense in that I'm convinced God has a plan for my life, I really am convinced, I don't just say it as ...
words that I've been taught in Sunday school... I am personally convinced that He has a plan for my life
and that it will be worked out according to His will ... and so that even if that plan includes me not living
very long ... mmm ... it will be according to His wilL.. I can really think back on ... these past ten years and
possibly the next ten years, who knows ... with the thought that it has to be for a reason, it has to be ... it
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has to be. And that's not out of some theological handbook or or textbook, I genuinely believe that. If
life were random ... I think that I would have committed suicide if it we ... if I felt it were random. Or ... if
I felt I'd fallen into the hands of some demonic force ... you know ... and there was no shield of God's love
protecting me ... and that. .. that for some reason, best known to Him ... He decided to step aside and let
the the forces of evil take ... hold of my life ... golly, if I had to believe that I would be petrified... But. ..
I've I have a certainty borne of these last ten year that is unshakeable, that there has to be a reason for
this, it's absolutely, utterly unshakeable.
Cheryl completely believes that God has a plan, a divine reason, for her illness and her
suffering. Where an individual life is so wholly entrusted to God, the idea of a separate,
vulnerable, personal purpose makes little sense. Although God's plan might at times "appear
to us as biological caprice and senseless biographical disruption" (Williams 1989: 285), His
purpose prevails - unconditionally. For individuals such as Cheryl who cherish this
interpretation of life and illness, God is the ultimate author of their narrative. Consequently,
there is nothing, no meaning and no order, for them to reconstruct or explain. In fact, for them,
the course and end of their life are defined outside of their own being. For them, "all analytic
puzzlement and personal doubt evaporate in the glare of God's purpose" (Williams 1989: 286).
Thus, liberated from the burdens of personal narrative reconstruction, Cheryl was able to
experience transcendence through the earnest belief in God as the ultimate source and author
of meaning - in her life, in her illness and in her suffering.
For the participants in this study, the transcendent dimension of their personhood offered
perhaps the most powerful way for them to restore integrity after the injury inflicted by illness.
It gave meaning to their otherwise incomprehensible suffering, purpose and significance far
larger than the Self, than the individual person, and hence it brought relief. Whether they
chose to write their own story of the past to give meaning to the present or whether they
relinquished the rights of authorship to a God, their quest towards transcendence undoubtedly
represented a profoundly spiritual experience. Indeed, through its timeless, transpersonal
quality their quest stretched beyond the limits of person-circumscribed experience and reason.
Their quest reached out and gained supreme transcendency.
Conclusion
When an illness as intense and severe as ME sets in, the personhood of the ill changes
profoundly. It is change so immense that no dimension of personhood is left untouched or
unscathed. When confronted by change so incredibly foreign to the Self-who-was, the Self-of-
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now, the ill Self, experiences a tormenting scourge of insecurity, uncertainty, instability, and
insufficiency. The intactness of the person ruptures. Inner integrity falters, wavers, staggers,
and threatens to deteriorate into complete non-being. This - the very real threat to the
wholeness of personhood, the impending diminution of being - defmes the actual nature of
suffering as endured by the ill in this study.
What then would bring relief to such a dire state of suffering? As suffering very clearly causes
a disrupted personhood, any endeavour to relieve suffering strongly relies on a reconstruction
of personhood that firmly secures inner integrity. Such a "re-constituting response" involves
the ill person as an agent acting directly in and on her social world (cf. Ware 1999: 318).
These actions attest to one of two intentions. On the one hand, the ill person seeks to preserve
the everyday lifeworld as it existed prior to the onset of illness. The participants indeed
desperately wanted to preserve and maintain their former Self, their "old Self'. On the other
hand, the ill person seeks to re-make that world in ways that allow for continued ("normal")
participation in social life. Participants were keenly aware of the need to reassemble the
different dimensions of their personhood to allow the expression of a "new Self'. Yet, the fact
that the latter was only truly possible at the expense of the "old Self' made the struggle to
adjust successfully all the more difficult. To relinquish one intimately known Self
intentionally in favour of another as yet alien entity was no simple matter. As a result, the
inner battle to re-establish integrity raged intensely.
The resolution of this conflict, the ill person's ultimate response to the demand to adjust,
determines the degree of suffering... and the fate of the sufferer.
Suffering continues unabated when adjustment is obstinately resisted. The "old Self'
desperately strives to cling to the "normal" existence enjoyed by the Self-before-illness.
Despite change, despite the very real loss of former abilities and capacities, the Self
desperately tries to hold on to what was at one time certain, secure and known. Unfortunately,
this inevitably futile struggle to give expression to an old Self who can no longer be negates
any possibility for the reconstruction of the person, of a new, whole Self. Hence, as the
struggle persists, inner conflict continues, and so too does the suffering.
Suffering recedes when the sufferer pays heed to the call to adjust. Such adjustment reflects
the sufferer's strategies to live with a medicated body that is spatially and socially positioned
and confined by cultural norms, expectations and responsibilities. Within this context,
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adjustment means embracing a "new Self' - an undertaking that constitutes the desired option
not simply when the need for a reconstructed whole person is acknowledged. Rather, it
becomes the desired option only when this acknowledgement is accompanied by the
realisation that the power to create such wholeness lies within the Self. At this point, suffering
becomes a matter of personal responsibility, a matter of choice.
Within this context, personal responsibility as embraced by the ill assumes a very specific
definition. It is now an act of utter irresponsibility to dwell on the past as this simply invokes
self-blame for becoming so ill, for taking so long to recover, for struggling so badly to cope.
This is irresponsible for it diverts the sufferer's focus from the present where the core of
personal responsibility is now located. Personal responsibility demands the sufferer to be
wholly supportive of the Self who confronts the challenges of illness in this present. In other
words, personal responsibility no longer has a retrospective, punitive focus; instead it is here
and now, defined and experienced in the present tense (cf. Collinge 1993: 126-130; Totman
1990: 117& 171).
Shouldering such personal responsibility involves the deliberate exercise of personal choice.
Indeed, to maintain a focus on the now requires a conscious decision to arrest the flow of time
in this moment. In this moment, the past of this present can be imaginatively reconstructed to
impute meaning to the lived history of the Self-who-was. In this moment, the interpretation of
actual happenings can be determined to support and empower the Self-of-now. In this
moment, the Self-to-come can be judged to be purposefully on course. This moment, this
instant of self-reflection, therefore, both constitutes and permits a conscious decision to
reconstruct and recreate a whole person. It is a conscious decision to alleviate suffering.
The conflict between the old Self and the new Self, between struggle and adjustment, between
past and present, between disruption and wholeness, between suffering and integrity, fills each
moment in time. It is a choice that is made over and over again, every moment anew. Every
time the responsibility for the Self and its suffering weighs down the sufferer. Every time, the
power to choose presents itself. Every time, the decision to accept responsibility and to make
a choice belongs to the sufferer.
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Summary
The human reality of ME sufferers essentially revolves around their subjective experience of
suffering, an experience that is infinitely influenced by those whom they meet on the road to
wellness. As they travel along this road, they reconstruct their world and themselves around
their illness, forever mindful of their supreme desire to live as normally as possible.
To prosper on this road to wellness, ME sufferers yearn to experience a sense of
understanding from those whom they encounter on this journey - the medical practitioner, the
family member, the friend, the acquaintance. They desperately want their illness and their
experience thereof to be understood by those they meet. Jf complete understanding proves too
difficult to muster then a simple, unconditional acceptance of their experience of illness, of
their reality, would suffice. This acceptance should ideally be accompanied by an open
acknowledgement of the fact that human suffering inevitably influences the ill person as a
whole; that with the onset of their illness, their needs, their abilities, their interests, their very
ideals changed. They changed, profoundly.
Yet, along ME sufferers' road to wellness a demon roams wildly. It is the demon notorious for
its huge capacity for ignorance. From the medical specialist to the mere acquaintance, at
each level of human existence, sufferers have been confronted by this demon. As it grumbles
in the darkness of its own ignorance, it reacts to the illness experience of unsuspecting ME
sufferers by denying the existence of their illness. It denies the legitimacy of their illness. It
denies their very experience of reality. Perhaps this demon is a manifestation of society's
failure of knowledge and understanding ... or perhaps it is more truly a failure of simple
humanity itself.
Through its response to ME, the demon of ignorance inspires a cruel stigmatisation of both the
illness and of those who claim to suffer from it. In turn, this reaction adversely affects
sufferers' concept of Self, of identity. Indeed, any humane construction of the Self is effectively
undermined by sufferers' recurrent experience of failing and failure as they become aware -
and are made aware - of their inability to meet their own and society's standards and role
demands in the different contexts of interaction. ME sufferers are, in short, simply too ill to
live up to what society expects from its members. Hence, they eventually begin to feel
deficient, incomplete, and incompetent.
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Therefore, ME sufferers' experience of "deficiency", of a spoiled identity, seems to result from
a conflict raging between society and the sick person. On the one hand, the sick person wants
to be understood and desperately longs to be part of "normal" society - but miserably fails to
be. Society, on the other hand, understands neither the illness nor the ill person and, hence,
opts to distance itselffrom the sick. This conflict is surely dreadfol enough to maim many who
experience illness and suffering. Still, this is not the whole truth.
The ill person, the ME sufferer, is inclined to locate the conflict experienced outside the Self
Doesn't it, after all, lie in the standards and rules determined by society? Isn't the very origin
of the apparent conflict then situated in society itself? Although this might appear to be the
case at first glance, it is not. In fact, the "standards and rules determined by society" that
appear to cause such hardship and anguish among the ill, reside within the ill themselves. In
other words, the social standards that the ill person strives to comply with appear to be
external, but are indeed internal, although they are admittedly continually reinforced and re-
interpreted externally. The social requirements, the rules for behaviour and expectations of
the world of others are, as Cassell (1991: 53-63) explains, contained within verbal categories
such as "patient", or "pain ", or "disability ". The content, the very meaning, of these and
other such verbal categories is contained within the ill person. The fact that they are shared
with others, from the general practitioner to the journalist, creates the illusion that the
standards of daily action, rules for behaviour, requirements and expectations are all external.
This is, however, a fabrication of the mind. Thus, as the ideas and beliefs - indeed, all the
content of social categories - are contained within the person, it follows that the origin of the
conflict cannot possibly lie in society or, for that matter, solely in any disturbance between
society and the sick person.
Instead, conflict for the ill person is very firmly located within the ill person's Self It is an
internal conflict, a self-conflict (cf Casselt 1991: 53-63). It is a conflict that blazes between
two competing needs. On the one hand, sufferers need to feel accepted and valued. They want
to be and forever keep trying to be part of society. They need family, friends, associates and
acquaintances to be a complete Self, to be folly human. On the other hand, in their efforts to
be part of society, they are faced with false accusations, ridicule and judgements, not to
mention their own inability to achieve the standards and expectations entailed in daily living.
Therefore, it is little wonder that they experience a desperate but simultaneously contradictory
need to retreat and protect the Self They want to withdraw to the safety of a private world to
avoid the physical and emotional pain and humiliation which confront them in the public
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world. This is the internal conflict which rages desperately between the desire to live in
society and the need to retreat from it.
What then is the solution to this conflict? Where does the answer lie? Does it perhaps
demand some transformation, an alternation, a shift in society or in the ill?
The solution to the conflict lies where the conflict lies: in the ill person's Self It is the sick
who must learn, above all, to live with themselves and to continue, as normally as possible, on
their journey to wellness. To do this, they are required to rewrite the rules and requirements
of society for themselves, guided by their own interest and capacities. For ME sufferers this
challenge involves the development of a deeper awareness of Self, accompanied by a stronger
belief in the Self and in the authenticity of their own reality as they perceive it. The sufferers
become more self-reliant and assume - or very often re-assume - the right to govern the Self,
to be folly in charge of the Self Even more importantly, this dynamic process also comprises
the discovery of choice as the sufferer re-learns that personal experience and the essence of
interaction do fall under personal control. Furthermore, through the power of personal
choice, sufferers are not only enabled to act on their own behalf and in their own best
interests, but also to folly embrace personal responsibility. Ultimately, despite all the odds, it
is the sufferer's responsibility to protect and take care of the Self, to be the Self to the follest
possible extent possible, there where life is lived.
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Introduction
When we, as social researchers" attempt to do justice to a social reality under study, we offer a
particular way of understanding that reality, we develop and present a theory. The value of
this theory is exclusively defined neither by the science and scientific procedures through
which it has been constituted nor by its compliance with the canons of objectivity governing
so-called rational inquiry. Instead, the value of a theory is also firmly situated in the
opportunity it presents of escaping ignorance through alternative ways of seeing and
perceiving. In following this tradition, I present a description, a theory, of the experiences
related by those ME sufferers who chose to disclose their social reality to me. But wherein lies
the value of this theory, my theory?
Any assessment of the value of my theory must be based on a recognition that my story does
not represent the "closest approximation to the truth n, let alone a direct disclosure (or perfect
mirror image) of it. This would after all, as I have shown, presume the existence of an
absolute point to which all theory can be compared - a presumption I have clearly rejected.
For me, all social science theory - including my story - is better regarded as a human
construction - presented by a particular human researcher who is explicitly present and
identifiable throughout its development. That is, I - the researcher and the thea riser - was
(and still am) directly involved in the entire research process. I am forever contributing to
what is told and how it is presented - also now. The researching I cannot be ignored or
omitted. Hence, just as I am bound to do justice to the social reality under study, so am I
bound to render an accounting of the ways in which I have attempted to do so.
This contention does not mean that any determination of the actual value of my story
necessarily has to assume the form of free (unbridled, undisciplined) indulgence into the
nature of my own presence and existence. Instead, I will aim to present in Part Van exact and
rigorous description of my own presence throughout the research process. You, the reader,
will see me as I was actively involved throughout the research process. You will become
acquainted with me, the human researcher. And as you do, you will (ideally) be able to
identify my contribution, my perspective, in the story that I told (and am still telling now). You
will become familiar with my very acts of understanding, with the grounds of my knowledge.
In post-modern terms, you will become equipped to deconstruct what I have constructed.
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To offer such critical insight into my presence and contribution, I will focus in Part Von the
very acts of research by exploring the implications and repercussions of the methodological
approach I had followed in this study. What was my experience of the methods I had used?
How did my participants experience them? In what ways did it influence our relationship?
How did our encounters influence me? And how did the methods I chose and my relationship
with participants influence the story I was eventually able to tell? Throughout, I will seek to
meet the challenge posed in Part II - to free my knowledge through the disciplined practice of
critical reflection.
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Chapter 17
Dismantling the power relationship
"Research involving people with the diagnosis of an incurable condition offers a particularly
charged scenario for the researcher. When that condition is being lived within a social context
of stigma and marginalisation, we have a responsibility to consider the politics of research"
(Small1998: 127).
Small made this comment in the context ofHIV/AIDS, but his argument is equally applicable
to this study on the subjective illness experience associated with ME. This realisation calls for
a consideration of the ways in which the research process and specific research procedures
impacted on the power differentials within the research context. How far did my approach go
in furthering the ideals of equity and equality in research? Or did it simply work to reproduce
existing power relationships?
In this chapter I will illustrate the difficulties I faced in attempting to realise the ideals
concerning equity and equality when entering social fields structured by competing and
conflicting interests, perspectives and expectations. I explore the extent to which this is
actually possible and suggest that, despite good intentions and the desire to facilitate an equal
relationship, as a researcher I operated in a context where such research contracts are rendered
very hard to realise, if not impossible.
The academic legacy
Heaphy (1998: 31) acknowledges that the academic disciplines in which we operate play a
crucial role in defming the appropriate methodological approach. In this sense, our academic
legacy plays a critical part in defining the research relationships through which we do research.
For the most part, the social sciences are marked by the legacy of positivist thought and
objectivity. Within the positivist canon of belief on objectivity there is, according to Stanley
and Wise (1983: 194), a sanctification of an asymmetrical power relationship between the
researcher and the researched. Positivism sees the researcher as the "expert" - as more
competent because he or she is more "objective" - in understanding other people's lives better
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than are the people who live them. Here, objective knowledge is regarded as consisting of
general mental representations which obtain their meanings exclusively through their capacity
to correspond to the external world. Objective knowledge representing real world events has
priority over personal experience in which representation of inner states cannot be excluded
(Heaphy 1998: 31). Thus, the ability to discern reality "objectively" becomes the prerogative
of "the scientific mind" that is trained and operates within a scientific ethic which "insists on
the scrupulous removal of commitment and value" (Stanley and Wise 1983: 194). And since
research participants - the "objects" of study - cannot equally rid themselves of their own
subjectivity they are regarded as "less competent" in discerning reality objectively. They are
therefore relegated to the subordinate position of "respondents" - a telling name (Oakley 1981:
35).
In recent years, the positivist approach to research relationships has increasingly come under
attack - and perhaps more so (and more directly so) by the feminist tradition than by any other
school of thought. In contrast to the sanctification of unequal power relations, feminism urges
researchers to endeavour to dismantle the power relationship that exists within the research
context. According to the feminist tradition it is after all, as Stanley and Wise (1993: 168)
write, both "obscene" and "morally unjustifiably" to treat people as mere "objects" there for
the so-called "expert" researcher to do research on. Feminism thus poses a direct challenge to
the conventional and characteristically positivist view of the research relationship.
According to Briggs (1996: 10-11) feminist attempts to counter the positivist conception of an
asymmetrical relationship of power within the research context have often coincided with
attempts to unify the researcher and the researched through an emphasis on "a common
humanity". Briggs, for instance, shows that some feminist researchers, such as Oakley (1981),
do not discuss the existence, let alone the influence, of any differences of power or privilege
between them and their participants. For these researchers who ardently attempt to push away
or ignore the reality of power which permeates the research context, the potential influence of
such differences appears to be rendered insignificant in the presence of "a common humanity"
that is usually promoted under the banner of "sisterhood".
In contrast, Bloom (1997: 118-119) writes that while researchers, and perhaps feminist
researchers in particular, may feel or wish to feel some connection of a more or less intimate
nature with their participants, it is crucial not to ''bury the differences of our social relations
under an idealistic facade" of sisterhood. Instead, it is necessary to maintain a realistic attitude
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towards the research relationship, recognising "sisterhood" as a "fortunate outcome of some
projects rather than a precondition of all research relationships" (Reinharz in Bloom 1997:
119). Sisterhood should, therefore, "neither be idealised as nor equated with a state of...
universal sameness" as this will only serve to obscure profound differences of power within
the research context and, hence, leave the power that inevitably positions both the researcher
and the researched invisible, unacknowledged and indeed unchallenged.
Thus, while recognising the need to steer away from the asymmetrical conception of research
relationships as conceived of in the positive tradition, a denial - or disguise - of such power
relations within the research context will not suffice. Rather, "we must", as Wise (in Ribbens
1989: 590) advises, "acknowledge power where it exists and learn to deal with it wisely". We
must recognise the process of research - the very process of knowing - as a political one - the
results of which are directly shaped and influenced by the positioning of both the researcher
and the research participants (Heaphy 1998: 21-25).
Once recognised, it becomes critical to assess and clearly explicate the central part played by
the researcher in constructing the research context and research relationships. In support,
Stanley and Wise (1993: 168) advocate a research approach that will "lay open" and "make
vulnerable the researcher" by rendering the researcher's conduct, reasoning and evidence
available for scrutiny by others. This represents a very serious concern with making explicit
not only what the research understands about the phenomenon of interest, but also how he or
she has achieved this understanding. Because I share this concern I will, in the remainder of
this chapter, reveal my own construction of the relational (political) context as well as the
more (and less) subtle influences of positivist and feminist teachings on both myself and the
research participants.
The "why" behind research
In line with a growing emphasis on the need for more reflexive approaches to research, the
profession is recognising that the results of research are shaped and influenced by the
positioning of the researcher. This positioning, together with the context of research, works to
construct particular truths on any given topic (cf. Heaphy 1998: 21-22). A critical dimension
of this positioning is the researcher's motivation to embark on a specific study.
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Heaphy (1998: 31) notes that, in terms of the motives of research, the notion of the "pure"
researcher who is unaffected by his or her social, cultural and political positioning has been
widely challenged. According to Heaphy (1998: 31), it has been suggested that most research
is generated by a series of circumstances relating to the particular researcher and the economic,
social and political context in which he or she works. In this way, the personal interests and
skills of the researcher meld (often mysteriously) with a broad range of professional and
political motives to determine a particular research topic.
The complexity introduced by such an amalgamation of motives even more strongly
emphasises the need not only to reveal how, but also why, research was conducted. Where we
fail to do this, Heaphy (1998: 31) says, the illusion of objectivity remains intact. For Heaphy
(1998: 32) this is to "become actively involved in the reproduction of knowledge-power
relations in a way that is at odds with the possibilities offered by reflexivity". At its most
radical point, what is at stake here is not simply a reflection on the history of a project, but
rather an attempt to reveal the project as it happened - including the researcher's motives
(Heaphy 1998: 32).
Within the broader context of ME research, it is a1mostas though researchers active in
this field assume - at least to some extent - a common agenda, whereby the personal
impetus behind a project almost goes without saying. Yet, because this is not
necessarily the case, and because others might not necessarily share the assumedly
implicit notion of integrity and worthiness, the motive behind any research project -
this one included - must be clearly explicated. In this study, as is typical in most ME
research, the "why" is answered by reference to the "urgency" of the "crisis" of ME.
Yet, in this study, the contribution to this "common" cause has been articulated
specifically in terms of the importance of developing a better understanding of the
illness to so (perhaps) contribute towards greater recognition of the experiences of
those who suffer fromME.
Heaphy (1998: 32) furthermore maintains that an explication of the researcher's motives
becomes even more critical where we "research ourselves" - that is, where the social world
under investigation hits very close to home. We must then "interrogate and reveal our own
motivations, not least of all in terms of who the research is strategic for" - the individual
researcher or ME sufferers generally (Heaphy 1998: 32).
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With regard to my own work, this instruction has evolved into an exploration of
questions such as: To what extent is the focus on the changes experienced by
participants an indication of my own interest in such changes? Is the focus on the
meanings and personal implications of ME related to my own negotiation of the
meaning of the illness? Does the concernwith personal stories reflect my concern with
my own story? And would this make the research autobiographical to any degree?
It is often implied that researching a topic so close to home, a topic that would put the
researcher entirely centre stage, would nullify all attempts to be "neutral". Such a perspective,
though, plays right into the dynamics related to the notion of objectivity referred to above.
While the motives for researching "ourselves" as ME sufferers do not go without saying, the
position of non-ME sufferers conducting research in this field is (after all) equally problematic.
Following Heaphy (1998: 32), I argue that unlike the claim to be a feminist researcher - which
reveals an alignment to a broader "political" project, even if there is by no means broad
agreement on what that might mean - the label of ME researcher reveals very little. It tells us
very little about the researcher's personal or political project and how it has influenced what,
how and why he or she does what he or she is doing.
Thus, irrespective of our status as ME sufferers, it is in revealing "our Selves" that we as
researchers can begin to demonstrate awareness of our personal involvement in the research
context. In doing so, we may also become able to better comprehend (and reveal) the political
implications of such involvement.
Putting the structure in place
The "expert" status ascribed to social researchers within the positivist tradition represents a
principal foundation of their power in the research context. By accepting a position of superior
expertise (whether consciously or unconsciously), researchers assume the power to define and
take charge of the research process in their own terms and in line with their own values and
norms (Kelman 1972: 991). Mishler (1986: 122), for instance, writes that within the context
of data collection, participants are often presented with a predetermined scheme of relevance.
In other words, the different research questions and related areas of interest are all introduced,
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framed and specified by the researcher. In addition, it is the researcher who assumes the
power to determine the adequacy and appropriateness of participants' responses to inquiries.
This configuration of power in the research context clearly places the research participants at a
disadvantage.
While this argument carnes some merit, it is certainly one-sided. Participants too have
considerable power to structure the research context. The researcher's ability to carry out a
specific study after all ultimately depends upon the participants' cooperation. In this regard
one must acknowledge, as Cotterill (1992: 599) and Kelman (1972: 992) do, that participants
have the option to withdraw from a study or to undermine a project by providing false
information, performing a required task improperly, or engaging in some form of subtle
sabotage. Oakley (1981: 56) even goes so far as to say that participants are "people with
considerable potential for sabotaging the attempt to research them".
Despite this potential for resistance and even sabotage, participants rarely use their power.
According to Kelman (1972: 992), one culprit here is the powerful "expert" status that the
positivist approach confers upon the researcher. This status appears to discourage research
participants from exercising their potential power within the research context. Kelman (1972:
992) explains that participants tend to feel that they lack the capacity to question research
procedures because they do not have the necessary expertise and specialised knowledge to do
so. In tum, the researcher's apparently superior informational base is an important component
of his or her legitimacy in the eyes of the participants. That is, the researcher's expertness
contributes to the participants' view that he or she has the right to set the rules and prescribe
behaviour in the research situation. Kelman (1972: 993) notes that this perception that the
"expert" researcher is legitimately in power is further encouraged by the value that society
accords to "science". This value impels participants to feel obligated to cooperate and
reluctant to question procedures that are presented to them "in the name of science". Thus,
when participants accept the legitimacy of the researcher and the authority of science, they
become reluctant to claim the right to question procedures, let alone the legitimacy of the
researcher's relative power over them.
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In this study my relative position of power was never directly questioned in the research
relationship. Yet, this did not leave me any less vulnerable. While I could never expect
participants to proclaim a similar commitment as my own to the study, the progress of the
study was very much dependent on exactly such a commitment from their side (cf. Cotterill
1992: 602-603). And given their unique circumstances, it often became clear (at least to me)
that my study did not necessarily carry the largest weight in terms of priority. This point was
evident on a number of occasions:
My own sense of vulnerability was emphasised through my experiences with Natalie
and Denise. Once I had secured Natalie's cooperation, we set about scheduling our
first meeting without too much difficulty - that is until a couple of days before our
appointment. Natalie had suddenly become very ill, was bedridden and certainly in no
condition for an interview. Nearly a month later we were still trying to arrange a first
interview. Not only had she still not recovered from the most recent relapse, but her
studies were also demanding what little energy she had left. My study was not at the
I
top of her list. Similarly, on the morning of my first interview with Denise, a friend of
hers called to say that Denise had been admitted to a special clinic that very morning.
Denise only returned to her home (and so once again became available for an
interview) almost two months after our first appointment had initially been scheduled
to take place. My study could obviously not contend with Denise's state of health and
the possibility of treatment in a special clinic.
Thus, even where participants do not intentionally question the researcher's power, their
circumstances might not allow them to remain consistently committed to the study. And
where this happens, the researcher clearly has access to very few sanctions. The relative
powerlessness of the researcher is further reinforced by the etiquette of the interview itself.
This generally forbids even the most self-disclosing interviewer from being openly
judgemental about a participant. There may thus be situations, as Lee (1993: 110) notes, that
the researcher simply has to endure with gritted teeth.
It is furthermore often emphasised that it is entirely up to the researcher to instil and sustain an
adequate level of commitment among participants to ensure that the study develops beyond a
set of unexplored hypotheses (cf. Cotterill 1992: 602-603). However my study shows that
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such control does not always lie in the hands of the researcher. Far from being in control, the
researcher may at times be exceptionally vulnerable:
At the end of the first interview, participants were introduced to the autobiographical
sketch. Each participant left the interview armed with a guideline for the sketch,
promising to complete the sketch within three weeks, give and take a couple of days.
Yet, this task turned out to be far more demanding than I had anticipated. Participants
such as Natalie found it difficult - indeed impossible - to complete the task within a
reasonable period of time. After many telephone conversations and many apologies,
her sketch was only ready three months after the initial request - this despite my best
efforts to be as accommodating and supportive as possible. This situation was
unfortunately not limited to one participant. Cheryl too struggled. While putting in a
tremendous effort, and even deliberately conserving her mental abilities while working
on this task, the sheer effort still took its toll. Physically, it was often just too painful
and toilsome to write for any extended period of time. And mentally, her abilities
quivered under the demands of this task. A struggle it then certainly was - for my
participants and for me.
Circumstances such as these cannot be foreseen. Worse yet, there is very little a researcher
can do to tame the effects it might have (will have) on the progress of the study. Researchers'
very dependence on their participants renders them largely powerless in the face of such
circumstances - and, I would add, particularly in the face of severe human suffering.
Thus, the study of sensitive topics has implications for the power of both the researcher and the
researched. Within this context, power is exerted by both the researcher and the participants in
terms of the structure and procedures of the research setting. And while both parties have, in
theory, access to considerable power, the means through which to exercise this in practice are
not necessarily easily - and certainly not equally - accessible.
Moving towards greater interaction
Stanley and Wise (1993: 168) indicate that feminists have sought to confront the
disproportionate distribution of power within the research relationship by rejecting "research
on" in favour of "research with", thereby indicating a preference for more interactive research
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approaches. For feminist researchers a better way of finding out about people's lives is to
make the research endeavour a more interactive experience.
An interactive research approach, as described by Laslett and Rapoport (1975: 968-973),
attempts to engage both the researcher and the research participants in the research process as a
joint enterprise. The research relationship is accordingly defined as more mutual, less
hierarchical, and decidedly non-manipulative. These characteristics of the research
relationship reflect a strong emphasis on the more active involvement of the research
participants in the research process. Such involvement represents the means through which the
difference of power that permeates the research context can be addressed.
Participatory research, a similar though more comprehensive approach, also stresses the value
of "authentic involvement" (Mouton 1996: 36) on the part of the research participants.
Mouton (1996: 36) shows that, within this approach, research participants are regarded as
"equal partners" and are encouraged to become active members ofthe research team. They are
indeed called upon to participate in both the design and the execution of the research process.
In turn, the researcher is expected to become an active member of the community under study.
The active, committed and ideally equal involvement of both the researcher and the research
participants represents contribution by participatory research towards equalising the balance of
power within the research process.
Both of these approaches attempt to generate a collaborative approach to the research
endeavour that engages both the researcher and the participants in a joint enterprise. These
approaches go some way in rejecting the objectivity-based principal of hierarchical
relationship between interviewer and respondent. And, perhaps more importantly, they also
promote patterns of research that would avoid the misuse - or arbitrary use - of power by
researchers (Kelman 1972: 1003).
Such approaches are typically associated more closely with in-depth qualitative research than
more structured quantitative studies. Both Brannen (1988: 555) and Opie (1992: 64-65)
confirm that, unlike more rigidly specified research projects, in-depth research provides
considerable opportunity for participants to become involved in the research process.
Participants are placed in a position of control over both the nature and content of the research
interaction and the data it generates. Moreover, such research also empowers participants as it
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works from the assumption that these participants can contribute significantly to the
description and analysis of a particular social issue.
In this study interviews were guided by a schedule broadly listing a number of areas I
had hoped to cover during my conversations with participants. However, because I
was aware of the influence of the researcher, I was concerned about the extent to which
these "pre-specified" focus areas would influence what participants said about certain
aspects of their experience - to the exclusion of others. In other words, were the
interviews in some way "set up" by my Self? Or did it allow for the involvement of
participants? It was then with relief that I soon discovered that my conversations with
participants easily turned into a participant-led endeavour. Participants talked about
the issues that were most important to them - not simply as dictated by me or by my
schedule. This gave rise to a great deal of information that had not been anticipated. It
also pointed to the strength of the semi-structured in-depth interview that allows for
more interactive involvement by granting participants more control over the content of
interaction and indeed over the interaction itself.
In this study, then, a more interactive, less structured approach worked towards establishing a
more equal distribution of power within the research relationship. Participants' contributions
were valued as significant - and perhaps especially so as they gave a voice to a silenced and
dearly misunderstood group - a voice that may serve to question directly several established
(mis-)conceptions concerning ME and the ME sufferer. In this way, the more interactive
research experience may, as Opie (1992: 64-65) observes, indeed be a very empowering one.
Thus, where the format of the research is not rigidly specific by prior standardisation, it is
possible to see the exercise of power in the interview as a two way process - as exerted by
both the researcher and the researched. Yet, as it will become evident in the next section, this
exercise of power is limited by participants' expectations of the research process. It is
specifically the extent to which traditional notions of objectivity have influenced both
researchers and the public (that is, the research participants) which should not be
underestimated.
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Disparity in disclosure
Within the research context, the discrepancy in power reflects an asymmetrical distribution of
rights and obligations - and in particular, a disparity of disclosure rights. The researcher may
obtain revelations (and often deeply personal ones) from the participants, but need not reveal
anything in return. Despite admonitions in the literature to establish "rapport" with the
participant, this disparity of rights between researcher and researched gives that rapport a
spurious and ultimately instrumental character. Consequently, social research might be
perceived as operating in an oppressive way which mirrors (or even promotes) wider patterns
of social inequality (Lee 1993: 108).
For these reasons writers like Oakley (1981: 49) insist - as a matter of ethical commitment-
on a style of research based on reciprocity and a process of mutual self-revelation. Oakley
(1981: 41) indeed believes that the goal of finding out about people is best achieved when the
researcher is prepared to invest his or her own personal identity into the research relationship.
For Oakley (1981: 49) such an investment is best achieved through (and supported by) the rule
of "no intimacy without reciprocity". In other words, contrary to traditional teaching which
emphasise research by the objective external scientific mind, Oakley places the focus directly
on the quality of the research relationship itself. She acknowledges that gaining and
maintaining satisfactory participation within the research context is never the primary
objective. Yet, it is so intimately related to the quality of the information sought that the
researcher is urged to always maintain a dual concern: not only for the quality of the
information sought, but also for the quality of the participant's experience.
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By early 2000, my study had suffered a number of delays. I had been very ill and it
had taken much longer than expected to receive participants' autobiographical
sketches. All of this prevented me from proceeding as planned and as agreed initially
with all participants. Given this, and bearing Oakley's advice in mind, I felt it
necessary to contact each participant to explain the situation and to re-affirm their
participation in this study. My first call was to Cheryl. During our conversation I
found it difficult to explain my situation to her. Time and again her response to my
attempts at explanation (let alone elaboration) served to highlight my role as the
researcher-who-listens. This reminded me of the "unspoken research contract"
according to which the researcher is bound to listen, while the respondent can expect to
be listened to (almost unconditionally and certainly without any obligation to listen to
the researcher). The second - and very different - call was to Denise. Denise gave me
the opportunity to explain the situation and while this left me feeling rather exposed,
the honesty of doing so had somehow given Denise the confidence to share her own
experiences more openly as well. That is, the open and expressive way in which I had
related my situation may very well have positively influenced Denise to feel freer and
more confident to discuss her personal situationwith me.
Oakley's rule of "no intimacy without reciprocity" is typically associated with the researcher's
response to direct questions put by the participants. Yet, in the example above, reciprocity has
much more to do with the extent to which the researcher should (is allowed to) take the
initiative in sharing personal information with the participant without waiting to be asked. It is
in fact a question of whether the researcher is (should be) expected to undertake the same risks
of self-exposure as asked of the participants (Ribbens 1989: 584).
Guidance on this question is as varied as the studies conducted by social researchers. Ribbens
(1989: 583-584), for instance, warns researchers not to carry out good-intentioned and
seemingly harmless offers of reciprocity uncritically. In this regard Bloom's (1997: 112-116)
study is a good example. Despite direct offers to tell participants more about herself, such
reciprocity was not accepted universally. As some participants viewed the research encounter
as an "obligation" or an "assignment", they had very little interest in any personal information
the good-intentioned researcher was willing to share. In this sense, Bloom's experience is
similar to my encounter with Cheryl. Yet, others such as Smaling (1995: 27-28) employ the
phrase "openness of heart" to suggest that by being openly expressive about his or her own
situation, the researcher can inspire participants to be more confident and forthcoming in
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discussing their own personal experiences. This is then what appeared to have transpired in
my conversation with Denise.
The responses to my attempts at reciprocity appear contradictory and even confusing. Yet,
upon closer investigation, my experience appears to confirm Ribbens' (1989: 584) advice to
researchers to take their cue from the person on the other side of the research encounter. In
other words, when questions of a personal nature are posed to the researcher, the researcher
should be prepared to answer such questions. Yet, if no questions are asked it is doubtful
whether the researcher should nevertheless volunteer personal information. And where it
seems necessary to do so, the researcher should remain sensitive to the participant's response
and refrain from imposing such "reciprocity" where clearly unwelcome. The participant may
after all see such an act as a breach of the "research contract" which gives the respondent the
right to talk at length about his or her own life - without being obliged to get to know the
listener any better at all.
Based on this understanding it is evident that reciprocity and mutual self-revelation is not, as
Oakley and other feminist researchers appear to believe, necessarily the ideal means of
equalising research relationships. Cheryl's response in particular makes it clear that this
approach might indeed be very limited. Here it appears to be the claim to objectivity that
limits the extent to which the research relationship can be (become) an equal one - if only in
terms of self-disclosure. In research, the claim to objectivity can work to silence researchers in
a way that is at odds with the empowering possibilities of a more "equal" exchange of
information. This, as Heaphy (1998: 33) explains, has to do with the extent to which
traditional notions of objectivity are publicly represented as the defining element of science
and good scholarship. As such, they inform not only the researcher's notions of acceptable
practice, but also those of research participants. That is, in the research encounter, both the
discipline and the participants may expect that the researcher's objectivity be manifest in his or
her silence.
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During the field work phase of my research I experienced that the concept of
"objectivity" made it difficult for me to establish the extent to which I could acceptably
engage "as an equal" with participants. Inparticular, tensions arose with regard to ME
treatment stories. Some participants showed an uncritical faith in the effectiveness of
particular treatment strategies. Very often, such strategies were challenged in other
participants' accounts, and in my own experience. For me, reliance on specific
treatments seemed based on a false image of the medical profession and its capabilities.
Yet, while I strongly disagreed with this, the imperative not to influence participants'
stories by interjecting (or worse yet imposing) my personal experience and convictions
worked powerfully to silence me. In addition, problematising a participant's faith in
specific treatments (on which she may rely both medically and psychologically)
seemed ethically highly questionable. This tension between disclosing my own
opinions and experiences and the (instilled) impulse to remain silent marked much of
my interaction with participants.
My research experience shows that it is important to remain aware that when participants such
as the ME sufferers in this study agree to be researched, they rarely expect an "equal"
conversation or dialogue. While researchers may conceptualise the research process as a
chance for "equal" exchange, participants' expectations of the process may, for instance, not
include their own accounts being questioned. Here, "we are dealing not only with the extent to
which researchers intemalise the requirements of objectivity, the question for knowledge, and
the assumptions about the necessity of disparities in power between researchers and the
researched and the ways in which this is used to justify silence and non-intervention. We must
also", Heaphy (1998: 33) urges, "recognise the importance of respondents' assumptions about
researchers' silences and what these reveal" with regard to their own decisions and practices.
Thus, while we as researchers and academics might have deconstructed traditional notions of
objectivity, this is not necessarily the case for participants. Participants may indeed still retain
and value the publicly portrayed ideal of objectivity along with the image it conjures of the
sufficiently distanced scientifically minded researcher. The extent to which research
participants still value such notions represents important limitations to the ideal of equality in
disclosure within the research context.
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Power over product
Cotterill (1992: 904) and Ribbens (1989: 587-589) conclude that the final shift in power
between researcher and researched is balanced in favour of the researcher exactly because it is
the researcher who eventually leaves the interview to assume sole responsibility for the final
analysis and interpretation of the data. From this point onwards, research participants are
vulnerable.
Bourne's (1998: 98) discussion emphasises the magnitude of the researcher's responsibility in
terms of the research product. This author explains that confidentiality - at least within the
context of a one-to-one interview - is negotiated with individuals, and "by virtue of our data
gathering, we become keepers of 'secrets' and private feelings of an anonymised group or
collectivity. We also thus assume responsibility with respect of divulging these 'aggregated
secrets' in public arenas". Indeed, the feeding back of such anonymised findings to relevant
decision-makers may form part of our negotiated research bargains with participants. Still,
deciding which aspects of participants' "secrets" to present is, as Bourne (1998: 98)
emphasises, far from straightforward.
Bourne's view of the researcher's responsibility is echoed in Small's (1998: 128) conception
of the research participants' contribution as a "gift". By giving their story to the researcher it
in a sense transforms the researcher into "a conduit" to pass on what this gift had taught him or
her to the world outside the immediate research context. It is a gift "given in good faith" in
which the giver - and this is important - is "in no real position to evaluate the potential gains,
or to consider possible losses, to themselves or to others". It is solely based on "trust in the
judgement of the researcher" (Small 1998: 128). In other words, the researcher is endowed
with the (almost exclusive) power (and the burden) to use the gift - the story - to the benefit of
others - as he or she sees fit.
The responsibility conferred upon the researcher, when seen in this light, is clearly problematic
as it situates the research participants in a highly vulnerable position. The researcher has
power over the individual participant by possessing deeply personal and even potentially
damaging information which was revealed during the research process. Where such
information is revealed in ways contrary to their best interests it might leave participants open
to further harm and exploitation (Brannen 198: 555 & 561). Participants may furthermore also
be vulnerable collectively since they have very little control over the ways in which the data is
interpreted by the researcher. The researcher is after all telling a story from a specific
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perspective - a perspective that can quite radically influence the interpretation presented to the
world (cf. Small 1998: 139). For instance, a researcher who clearly seeks to promote the
interest of (or writes in sympathy with) the researched, may put the research enterprise itself at
risk. Such an approach would after all risk romanticising a group of people, or favouring the
voices of some at the expense of others. In other words, who is to say that the researcher is a
worthy and reliable conduit of the "gift" given to him or her "in good faith" by the research
participants? In those cases where researchers tum out not to be a reliable conduit, they almost
invariably become a disappointment - or worse yet, a menace - to the people they are
studying.
The vulnerability - or relative powerlessness - of research participants in terms of the product
of research has been enforced through the legacy of objectivity referred to above. Stanley and
Wise (1993: 115) explains that the product or interpretation produced by the researcher in
terms of this legacy frequently purports to discover "the" truth - as though saying, "what is
really going on here (though the participants but only dimly appreciate it) is this ... ". Stanley
and Wise suggest that this occurs because ''the researcher's account" and "the participants'
account" are seen as competing attempts to get at "the" truth of the situation - that is, at the one
true reality. As the evaluation of these competing accounts often rests solely with the
researcher, "deviant" views of "reality" may be easily explained away by being treated as
eminently refutable simply because those who hold such views - the participants - do not have
the power to dispute the researcher's interpretations. The implications of this could be far-
reaching because what the "powerful" researcher chooses to represent (perhaps despite the
"deviant" views of participants) might explore only one possibility - thereby silencing other
equally or even more important stories (Heaphy 1998: 34-35).
There is still a further important aspect of the research process which leaves participants
particularly vulnerable: the researcher has limited control over the interpretation of research
products. The researcher operates in complex and shifting political contexts - contexts in
which he or she seldom has full control over the interpretation and use of the research
products. This means that "the possibility is always before us that our carefully negotiated
research relationships mutate from intimacy and equality" into the exploitation of those "who
may be affected by the revelations which we make" (Small 1998: 136). Finch (in Lee 1993:
Ill) records for example her worry that the data she had collected from women on the basis of
trust could, given a particular interpretation, be used against their interests. For Finch, the
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dilemma here was not simply an ethical one, but ultimately involved a political choice of the
"whose side are we on?" kind.
To re-align the rather unequal distribution of power within the research relationship,
researchers have often reverted to what Barbour (1998: 189) calls "member validation
techniques". These techniques, which involve participants in "validating" the product of the
research process, appear to vary considerably in the extent to which participants indeed
become involved and are able to exert any meaningful influence on the final product produced
by the researcher.
A common attempt towards a realignment of the balance of power within the research
relationship is that of giving a draft of a research report (or part thereof) to research
participants and asking them to comment on its validity. This practice, Opie (1992: 62-63)
explains, represents a direct attempt to avoid misrepresentation and to expand the researcher's
appreciation of the particular phenomenon as a result of discussing and reworking the text with
the participants. It also involves participants more directly by giving them a greater say in the
final interpretation. It is however not clear how exactly this approach is to play out in the
actual research context - and more importantly, how agreement over the final version is to be
reached.
Acker et al's (1983: 428) research experience shows that an attempt to involve research
participants in the production of the final product is not entirely straightforward. In an attempt
to reduce the power differential between the researcher and the researched, Acker et al were
initially willing to share and discuss their interpretation of the research data with all their
participants. However, their intention to do so was restrained by a growing awareness of the
possibility that their interpretation of participant's lives may, in some instances, be radically
different from participants' own interpretations. Hence, while they did present most of their
interpretations to those participants with whom they shared a particular world view, they only
reluctantly offered material to those who they expected would experience the product not only
as different, but possibly even as threatening and disruptive to their own view of the world.
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The tension between the goal of producing a more equal research relationship and the
difficulties of carrying this out when there is a lack of agreement on the meaning of
experiences and the construction of realities, was echoed in this study:
Towards the end of the first interview, participants were requested to complete the
TSCS. Desiring not to leave them entirely empty-handed after their dedicated
cooperation - and hoping that it would open further avenues of inquiry - I offered to
share the interpretation of this instrument with them during the second interview. This
was however far more difficult than I had anticipated. Far from working towards a less
skewed relationship, this "validating technique" placed me in an awkwardly powerful
position. I - the superior researcher - was presenting results to them - the "but dimly
aware of their own circumstances" participants. This distressful situation was
worsened in cases where the participants were likely to find the interpretation that I
presented disturbing. In one case, I had to tell a participant (as tactfully as possible)
that her scores revealed that she was unwilling to commit to any specific standpoints
and that the picture of her self-concept gained through the TSCS questionnaire could
consequently only be regarded as tentative. Transcripts of the interview clearly show
how uncomfortable I was doing so. I hesitated, procrastinated, rephrased... and
rephrased some more. The tension involved in sharing my interpretations with
participants was exacerbated by the kinds of findings I needed to share. Worse yet, the
very act of doing so appeared to entirely defy its true purpose: to establish more equal
research relationships.
My experience substantiates Barbour's (1998: 190-191) contention that researchers should not
underestimate the impact of exposing emergent (and often hard-won) embryonic insights to
others who are unlikely to share their exact world view - let alone their disciplinary and
theoretical concerns. And this impact touches both the participants and the researcher.
Requests to comment on analysis may represent something of an imposition on participants.
Asking those who have taken part in our research interviews to listen to (or worse yet, read
through) our construction of their reality makes considerable demands on time (and energy) -
demands that might reinforce rather than abolish the power discrepancy in the research
relationship. It also raises very important ethical issues. It is after all one thing to provide an
account in a one-to-one setting, but another thing altogether to hear one's own reality
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graphically included in another's version of that reality (Barbour 1998: 190-191). This was
clearly a critical concern following my experiences described above.
Opening analysis to participants also makes it possible that, as Bloor (in Barbour 1998: 190)
observes, "aspects of the research which the researcher feels to be of relatively little
importance may be dragged centre-stage by the member, while the researcher's supposes
central topic is disregarded". This suggests that, "when recruited to comment on our
transcripts or emergent analysis, respondents may be equally selective and may react to
inferences which exist only in the eye of the beholder - and an individual beholder at that"
(Barbour 1998: 190). Participants may, in other words, disagree with our interpretation and
may choose to focus on areas not even covered in our analyses. This again raises the issue of
how exactly researchers and the researched are to reach agreement on contentious issues that
may impact on the final interpretation. If researchers only pursue "validation" from
participants in order to make their objections more "manageable", participants may very well
have reason to mistrust our motives (Barbour 1998: 190-191).
Thus, although we aspire to the ideal of an equal partnership in the interpretation of research
data, approaches such as those described above do not necessarily represent the best way of
reaching it. These approaches appear to assume that participants will necessarily share our
views, that they will unavoidably be interested in producing an account of the research data
with us, and that this will somehow inevitably bring us closer to an equal distribution of power
to the benefit of all involved. Yet this is clearly not the case. Participants might disagree with
our interpretations, they might not be interested in meeting the demands of interpretation, and
they might in fact (as my study shows) be harmed in the process of doing so. Approaches such
as these, when uncritically applied, might indeed defy their very purpose. This of course does
not suggest that we might as well deny the power we hold to "define" another's reality for
them and for a wider audience. What it does mean is that while seeking to share this power
with participants, no single approach can finally guarantee a fully equal distribution.
Conclusion
In sensitive research such as was undertaken in this study, the researcher recognises both
implicitly and explicitly that he or she is actively involved in various sets of power relations
and, to some extent, in research as a political endeavour. With this in mind, the ultimate ideal
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
382
becomes one of egalitarianism - of shared power and a greater awareness of power
inequalities. As such, the stated ideal is very attractive. Research can now be conceptualised
as a "political strategy" that aims to challenge the way expert or professional knowledge is
privileged over local or personal knowledge. Yet, an awareness of power also brings to the
fore contradictions and paradoxes.
When we recognise ourselves as powerful agents in the research process, we might choose to
challenge this position on the basis of a common humanity we share with our participants.
Yet, this might simply serve to disguise power inequalities under the guise of "sisterhood" and
so leave such inequalities unchallenged. We might recognise the power participants are able to
yield - yet at the same time acknowledge that they rarely do so because of the respect they
have for the expert status of the researcher and the superiority of science in general. We might
discover that we too are vulnerable, yet find ourselves silenced and effectively paralysed by
the etiquette of the research interview itself. We might seek to promote more equal patterns of
research through interactive research approaches, but discover that these are limited by notions
of "objectivity" permeating the public arena. While we might like to establish an equal
exchange of information, our participants might, under the impression that objectivity calls for
silence, resist such attempts. Similarly, our attempts to involve participants in the production
of a fair interpretation might be nullified by the erroneous assumption that they actually want
to become more involved.
So we earnestly seek to locate - and re-locate - power within the research relationship, yet
without the desired effect. We have recognised ourselves as part of a political endeavour, but
seem unable to negotiate the conflicting interests and expectations to work towards a fairer
distribution. Thus, the attempt to locate power when it confronts us in the research context
becomes one of the most critical paradoxes - and tensions - in modern social research. It is a
paradox that serves to transform the ideal of equal research relationships into something we
strive towards and agonise over, but never seem fully capable of reaching.
The virtual inevitability of inequality of power within the research relationship, underlines the
importance of presenting a construction of the relational context through which a particular
understanding was developed. In this way, the influence of the researcher and the researched,
and the paradoxes and tensions that mark their interaction, become open to scrutiny. In this
way the political strategies that serve to empower - or conspire to dis empower - become part
of the understanding of research as an opportunity to dismantle the power relationship.
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Chapter 18
The practical implications of emotion
Lofland and Lofland (1995: 14) wam that an excess of self-reflexivity can lead reports to be
viewed as "narcissistic and exhibitionist, and simply dismissed as uninteresting". In addition,
like Burton (in Masters 1998: 80), I too believe that it is in reality impossible for researchers to
be aware of all their assumptions and characteristics that may impact on the research. And
perhaps like Johnson (in Masters 1998: 80), I too am sceptical of attempts by researchers to
"let the reader know that they cried twice, made love fifteen times and changed their socks
once a week while in the field". However, while heeding this advice, I agree with Masters
(1998: 80) that it should be acknowledged that the researcher's own experiences will to some
extent affect the priorities given to certain topics in the collection, interpretation and
representation of the data. And a critical part of such experiences - and the focus of this
chapter - is the researcher's emotions.
Traditionally, little attention has been paid to the place of emotions in research. Bourne (1998:
90) holds that "much scholastic work never discusses the emotional dimension or impact
which the research has or had on researchers, and most methods chapters are bereft of
discussion on this subject". Yet, recently, this has begun to change. A focus on "the
researcher's self-reflexivity and the power of emotion in the research process has emerged"
(Gillbert in Bourne 1998: 90).
In line with this shift, this chapter will place the academic taboo on emotion within the broader
context of objectivity, present an argument against such a taboo, and explore the ways in
which emotion did impact on the researcher and the research process in the study of the
subjective illness experience of ME sufferers.
Emotion and the ideal of objectivity
In terms of traditional academic conventions, it is the participants' emotions which are
regarded as "data" - not the researcher's. The researcher's emotions are rather regarded as
"incidental" to the research enterprise at hand, as external (Bourne 1998: 92). The
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construction of "emotion" as irrelevant to the research process is closely associated with the
ideal of objectivity.
Acker et al. (1983: 427) observe that the methods directed towards the ideal of objectivity "are
designed to separate the knower from the object of study". Where such a separation is
achieved and maintained within the context of a particular study, such a study could claim to
provide objective knowledge - as ''the'' truth - independent of the potential bias which
accompanies the subjective (emotional) experience of the researcher (Mouton 1996: 24). It is
then only the sufficiently detached researcher who would possess the necessary objectivity and
emotional distance to conduct truly valid research.
This line of argument furthermore urges the researcher to resist the "pull toward ever greater
inclusion and involvement" (Adler & Adler 1987: 15). This "pull" might stem from the
research participants or even more strongly from within the researcher. Yet, the researcher
must resist involvement for warnings against "going native" and "over-rapport" abound. At
the extreme, involvement may lead the researcher to entirely abandon the task of analysis in
favour of the joys of participation, or the researcher may identify with participants'
perspectives to such an extent that it becomes impossible to see these as problematic (Adler &
Adler 1987: 17; Hammersley & Atkinson 1995: 111). More subtle perhaps is the danger that
"over-involvement" might in some way influence or change both the researcher and the
researched. This would, it is held, almost inevitably introduce "bias". Such bias would clearly
invalidate the scientific claims of the study, since it would be impossible to discern which
information might be coloured by the researcher and researched's response to each other and
which information is independent of such "contamination". As a result, the study will be
dismissed as slanted and will not be taken seriously within the scientific community. Personal
(emotional) involvement by the researcher thus becomes condemned as doubly bad: not only
does it (apparently) point to some form of personal degeneracy (into bias); it also places into
jeopardy the hard-won status of sociology as an (objective) science (Oakley 1981: 41).
To avoid such offensive consequences, researchers are encouraged to assume an "attitude of
objectifying" (Mouton 1996: 24): the research participant is to be transformed into an "object
of study" to so create (and maintain) a distinct (and emotionally neutral) distance between the
participant and the researcher. Yet, the ideal distance that can be established between the
subject (researcher) and the object (researched) is limited. The fact is that any "manipulation"
of the objects of study - simply regarded as sources of data - "can only be achieved via a
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certain amount of humane treatment (Oakley 1981: 33). In other words, if the research
participants or the objects do not believe that they are being treated kindly and sympathetically
by the researcher, they will not consent to be studied and will not provide the desired
information. A balance must therefore be struck between "the warmth required to generate
'rapport' and the detachment necessary to see the interviewee as an object under surveillance"
(Oakley 1981: 33).
Oakley (1981: 35) argues that, within the context of "objective" research, "rapport" does not
refer to a "sympathetic and harmonious relationship" as the dictionary defines it. Instead,
rapport refers to the "acceptance by the interviewee of the interviewer's research goals and the
interviewee's active search to help the interviewer in providing the relevant information"
necessary to realise these goals. By defining and implementing the concept of "rapport" as
such, researchers actively and continually construct the research relationship in a way that
what becomes "known" is clearly separated from the subjectivity (or emotion) of the
researcher.
In practice, this construction of the research relationship requires the researcher to occupy a
"marginal position" (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995: 112). In keeping to this role, the
researcher must be simultaneously part of yet also distant from the research setting, neither
remaining a stranger nor becoming a friend. Lingering in this way between "familiarity" and
"strangeness", the researcher is to observe the essence of ongoing activity and obtain intimate
details on participants' experiences, while inconspicuously fading into the background and not
volunteering the same information in return (Adler & Adler 1987: 19).
Conventional textbooks provide researchers with numerous strategies to avoid having to
contribute anything personal to the research context. Oakley (1981: 36) for instance notes that
such texts clearly instruct the interviewer to inform interviewees that they are there to learn,
not to pass judgement or deliver any comment on the situation. Researchers should laugh off
requests for their opinion or say something like "I guess I haven't thought enough about it to
give a good answer right now", or "well, right now, your opinions are more important than
mine", or "if you really want to know, we can talk about it after the interview". Alternatively,
the researcher can only respond with "oh, that's a hard one", and continue with the interview.
By pretending in this way not to have any opinions or not to possess any information that the
respondent might want, the researcher avoids the danger of introducing bias in any form
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(including emotion) into the research setting. That is, the research setting - and the data it
delivers - remains sufficiently "separated".
Thus, in the interest of objective (read: unemotional) science, researchers are encouraged to
establish and maintain a distance sufficient enough to separate them from the objects of their
study. Such an (enforced) separation is endorsed as a safeguard against the dangers of over-
involvement and emotional distortion. Yet, given the need for rapport to ensure participants'
cooperation, the ideal distance remains limited. As a result, researchers must carefully
negotiate their position on the fringes of the research situation - moving close enough to
secure the data, yet not slipping too close to contaminate it in the process.
Exposing the illusion of separation
According to Stanley and Wise (1993: 161; 1983: 194-195), feminism asserts that the
researcher who is subjectively involved in the research process stands embedded within a
definite social relationship with the research participants. Contrary to the view of the research
relationship expressed above, it contends that "the knower and the known are of the same
universe, they are not separable" (Du Bois 1983: 111).
In rejecting "the illusion" (Acker et al. 1983: 427) of a separation between the researcher and
the research participants, feminism negates the possibility of any division according to which
the researcher is posited as "an abstract being" and the research participants as "the other" who
cannot reflect back on or affect the researcher. In other words, the researcher is no longer
regarded as an agent of research who is exempt from influencing and being influenced by the
research process and its participants. Similarly, the active nature of the research participants is
not simply dismissed or its implications buried by "controlling for bias". Feminism indeed
challenges research practices such as these by striving to openly acknowledge the thinking,
deciding, reacting, interacting, and interpreting nature of both the researcher and the research
participants' involvement within the research process (Stanley&Wise 1993: 114).
In accordance with the feminist perspective, the dynamic nature of the researcher's subjective
involvement within the research context needs to be directly confronted. Laslett and Rapoport
(1975: 970-971), caution that such an explicit recognition of the researcher's subjective
response to the research situation and its participants is often accompanied by a tendency (as
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we have seen above) to "throw the baby out with the bath water" by labelling the study,
however systematic, as "impressionistic". Such a study is, in other words, regarded as
seriously biased by the researcher's own experienceswithin the research context.
In contrast, Berg (1984: 226) claims that the researcher's subjective experience of the research
process is not merely a source of bias or reactivity. Instead, it indicates the very context in
which research takes place. In the light of this, Berg encourages researchers to examine more
closely the nature and effects of their subjective and emotional responses to the research
process and to the participants it involves. Such an examination is likely to support Snow,
Benford and Anderson's (1986: 387) view of the researcher's direct experience and
involvement as a critical source of information. Researchers are after all not simply recording
instruments through which participants are able to make visible their personal experiences.
Researchers - and their personal experiences - are integral to the research process (Edwards
1993: 184-185).
Collins (1986: S29-S30) confirms the importance of the researcher's personal biography as a
significant source of knowledge. In contrast to approaches that require submerging this
dimension of Self in the process of becoming supposedly unbiased, objective social scientists,
Collins urges researchers to bring this way of knowing back into the research process. By
doing so, researchers can employ - and benefit from - a powerful balance between the
strengths of their scientific training and the offerings of their personal and emotional
experiences. Neither is subordinate to the other. Instead, experienced reality is used as a valid
source of knowledge for critiquing scientific facts and theories, while scientific thought offers
new ways of seeing that experienced reality.
Against this background, it becomes possible to join other authors (Adler & Adler 1987: 84-
86; Devault 1990: 102-104; Opie 1992: 59) in arguing in favour of researchers drawing more
deliberately on their complex and multifaceted human Selves. Such a disciplined and sensitive
employment of personal involvement and experience is believed to support the researcher in
achieving the closest possible understanding of the social world being studied.
I agree with Wilkins (in Bourne 1998: 93) who says that the researcher's emotional response to
the research experience "can foster a sophisticated sensibility in the research setting and
enhance sociological understanding". Bourne (1998: 95-96) also specifically suggests that
emotional responses may aid such "a sophisticated sensibility" in at least two important ways.
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Firstly, "an awareness of our own feelings can have a 'sensitising, cognitive function which
alerts us to the meanings and behaviours of others'''. Secondly, our responses "have an
important 'interpretive function', acting as 'a medium through which intuitive insight and
inchoate knowledge arise"'. In short, the researcher's emotional responses, once admitted into
the realm of social research, can powerfully aid the development of insight and understanding.
There is still a further spin-offto openly recognising the importance of emotion in the research
context. When considering the practical implications of the strategies mentioned above,
researchers would have to respond to serious and important questions from participants by a
head shaking gesture suggesting "that's a hard one" or simply laugh it off while remarking that
their job is to get opinions, not to have them (Oakley 1981: 48). Far from supporting research,
such responses quite reasonably may alienate participants from the researcher - and worse yet,
to instil a sense of being exploited as a mere source of data. In contrast, when the researcher is
allowed to admit his or her emotional experience into the research encounter, such personal
involvement becomes an important condition for preventing research participants from feeling
exploited or objectified (Maharaj 1997:210).
Thus, instead of insisting on a perfect separation, it is clear that social research requires a
recognition of the dynamic ways in which the researcher and the researched interact and
influence one another. As part of such a recognition, it becomes possible to see the
researcher's personal experience of the research process as an important way of knowing. This
dimension no longer needs to be excluded at all costs or even considered as a limitation or a
weakness. Rather, it should be incorporated as an integral part of the data available to the
researcher. Once admitted in this way, the researcher's personal involvement (and emotional
response specifically) becomes a powerful resource in the development of amicable research
relationships and sensitive understanding.
Emotionally charged research
In response to the stories constructed by participants I experienced, like other researchers (cf.
Bourne 1998: 91-92), a range of emotions during the course of the research process -laughter
and tears, happiness and grief, love and anger, longing and fear. During the course of a single
interview, the range of emotions expressed and experienced shifted and merged, some more
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intense, others carefree. Sad memories loomed like black clouds overshadowing the research
encounter. Happy memories recalled as treasured moments were brought back to life.
For many ofthe participants, especially where the research ventured into very sensitive areas,
this experience was one where intensely personal feelings and private emotions found
expression in the public arena of the research interview - often for the first time. Despite the
deeply emotional state related during and experienced within the interview situation, the
personal emotion of the researcher is typically expected to remain intact. That is, while
eliciting emotionally intense accounts from participants, I was expected to keep my emotions
firmly under control- almost as though I was untouched by the experience itself.
Yet, during the present study, a number of instances revealed the very real impact of the
research experience on my Self. These occasions not only evoked responses such as
confusion, anger and distress (which are not conventionally considered appropriate for the
researcher to display in an interview setting), but more importantly, they also highlighted my
own position and responses, my presence and my influence, within the study.
The occasion described below affirms the importance of critical reflection (cf. Chapter 7)
where the researcher's experiences appear to be very similar to those of the researched. Such
similarity creates the potential for close identification with participants - an awareness noted in
this study as well as shared by Reay's (1996: 65) research experience. For Reay, the
affirmation of finding her Self at the core of some of her participants' accounts contained
"enormous power". In these accounts, she was able to read her own centrality "where so often
there has only been partiality".
This experience is echoed in the deeply emotional sense of identification described below:
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After several conversations with Natalie as well as after working through her
autobiographical sketch, 1noted in my field diary that 1had found great consolation in
hearing about another's person's suffering, fears, uncertainties and experiences. More
significantly, I had also found my self in Natalie's experiences. 1had seen my self in
her recollections. And 1longed to say, "I know, I've been there, 1understand exactly".
I was utterly amazed by the degree of agreement and similarity between our
experiences. We appeared to share so much. Yet, comforting as this experience might
have been, 1also suddenly found myself fully centre stage - and it was disconcerting.
How should 1 respond to this emotional awareness of identification? Should 1retreat
into the wings? Or should 1 linger on centre stage and enjoy the view it makes
possible?
The entries in my field diary tell of a struggle to place my Self amidst the very strong
emotional experience of identification. I cherished each encounter with Natalie, yet each one
brought uncertainty. On the one hand, I wished to linger in the experience of identification,
counting on the unique insight it might offer. Yet, was such identification in any sense "real"?
Could I really say, "I understand"? I after all knew well enough that something like empathy
or fellow-feeling was not possible in the sense of reliving her experiences, least of all through
my own. On the other hand, I had the option to retreat into the wings, reasoning that greater
distance would bring greater perspective. How far to retreat was of course a different question.
The emotional experience of identification with the participant clearly introduced tremendous
uncertainty. Yet, contrary to what might appear obvious, the solution to this dilemma
eventually did not lie in finding the perfect position to place myself. Rather, like for Wilkins
(in Bourne 1998: 96), the more productive approach appeared to lie in using the emotional
experience itself. By analytically exploring this emotional response, I could work with and
beyond it towards analytical insight. I could recognise (as Reay did) that being centre stage "is
no less a position of limited vision than standing in the wings" (Reay 1996: 65). And what
was critical (and far more interesting) was not the limitations but the unique analytical
opportunities these positions made (make) possible.
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When placing my Self - and my emotional responses - under the analytical spotlight, I became
able to identify the "triggers" that provoked a strong emotional reaction on my side. What
bored me to tears? What captured my attention instantly? The incident described below
identifies a trigger that evinced in me one of the most prominent and vehement emotional
reactions:
Already at an early stage of the research process, I noted in my field diary that I tended
to react very strongly to the injustice endured by .MEsufferers simply because they had
the misfortune of suffering from an illness very few people understand. By "injustice"
I referred to the acts of doctors and others based on their own blatant ignorance - acts
that hurt the.ME sufferer emotionally, mentally and physically. I reacted very strongly
to such acts, becoming deeply frustrated in the face of such ignorance and hurtful
behaviour. This response was especially triggered during interviews when participants
recounted one hurtful encounter after another. During one such an interview Cheryl
recalled a "dreadful" Friday morning in hospital. She was desperately ill and in
unbearable pain. Yet, despite this, the doctor simply accused her of suffering from
"primadispomania" - which upon looking it up in the dictionary at home she
discovered refers to "an uncontrollable urge for alcohol". He also emphasised that she
must not expect any pain relief from him. When she responded that she only ever
received strong relief in hospital and could therefore hardly become addicted to it, he
looked her straight in the eye and said "you know where to buy it on the street, don't
you" . He finally left her bedside saying that if she did not see a psychiatrist
immediately, she should find herself another doctor. Cheryl was stunned. Another
ghastly experience in hospital. Again all hope of relief destroyed. I was horrified -
and incredibly sad.
Such cruel injustice. I could not but respond emotionally.
My response reveals more than compassion and shared sadness. It also testifies to the
presence of certain presuppositions on my side. My reaction does after all clearly suggest my
belief that to behave in such a way towards a desperately ill patient is simply wrong. This
judgement clearly shows that I am no blank slate, no tabula rasa. I am not a simple recording
instrument that remains wholly unaffected by the research experience. On the contrary, I not
only have certain qualities and characteristics that influence me, but I am also the owner of a
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set of presuppositions, beliefs, and prejudices - in fact, an entire conceptual framework of
personal meaning that is at work during every moment of research.
This assertion needs clarification. When I declare that I have a definite conceptual framework,
all seems to be in order. Yet, when I admit that I hold certain prejudices, the reader might
assume that this is unfortunate for, if not out-right detrimental to, the study. However, I do not
necessarily believe this to be the case. I rather choose to follow the line of thought set out by
Gadamer (in Maso 1995: 13-14). For Gadamer, "prejudice" does not coincide with unfair and
unfavourable feelings or opinions not based on reason or enough knowledge, nor does it result
from fear or distrust of ideas different from one's own. Gadamer sees "prejudice" more like
something one would call a "pre-understanding", that is, "a judgement that is given before all
the elements that determine a situation have been fully examined". When regarded as such,
my prejudices - my pre-understandings - become the very conditions through which I
experience something, through which I encounter an Other. Prejudices become, then, the pre-
condition, the very basis, for all (my) human knowing and understanding.
At the very foundation of my way of knowing, I can never escape from my prejudices. I can
never entirely bracket them. I can never simply hold them in abeyance. Nor do I really want
to, for as long as I want to experience and understand the social (human) world, I cannot do
without my prejudices. Their adamant presence and influence, however, does not mean that
my prejudices are entirely closed to doubt or modification. Instead, it is far more likely that
when I bring the experiences of an Other into the spotlight of research, I will also be required
to bring my own prejudices into a state of indeterminacy. In this state, they may be
questioned, adjusted, or fused with new insights (Thomas 1995: 112). Of course, I can only
risk them as such, and thereby apply my prejudices to the benefit of my Self and the research I
conduct, when I am openly aware of them. And for me such an awareness followed from the
recognition and analytical exploration of my emotional experience within the research context.
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As I responded to instances of injustice, so too I responded (often with similar intensity) to the
severe physical suffering experienced by my participants. In the process, my research
experience directly challenged the idea that emotion - and specifically the researcher's
emotional experience - could somehow be "irrelevant". In many research encounters I could
not but recognise my emotion as a significant rather than a trivial aspect of the research
enterprise - and more directly of the research relationship. Consider the following revealing
instance:
In my field diary I recalled a conversation with Cheryl. She was dreadfully ill - and
had been so for almost three long months. She had just spent a week in hospital with
no relief, and was feeling even more wretched than before. Her body was showing
signs of severe swelling. Her eyes were swollen almost shut, she found it difficult to
breath (and to talk), and she could hardly hold a tablet between her fmgers. Worse
still, there was no medical help at hand. Listening to Cheryl, literally hearing her
suffering, corning to grips with the magnitude of her desperate situation, I could not
but offer to help. How could I not? I referred her to a doctor I knew who would at
least listen to her, if nothing else. And still this seemed so feeble. Similarly so the
vague offer, "If there is anything I can do... ".
This account might very well be used as a prime example of "over-involvement" - when the
researcher disregards conventions about distance and separation, and intervenes in the research
process in a way that inevitably changes (biases) the understanding it might yield. Yet, I ask,
could the emotional response which prompted such personal involvement not be integrated as
part of the emerging understanding about the subjective illness experience associated with
ME? My deeply emotional experience of compassion, I argue, should not be considered a
source of bias, but rather as a rich vein which can provide important insights (cf. Bourne 1998:
96). It can point my investigation towards the theme of isolation in severe illness. It can lead
me to investigate the lack of adequate medical care for the severely ill ME patient. In other
words, my own experience (and involvement) becomes a springboard for asking more
informed questions, for pursuing more relevant areas of inquiry, and for listening to my
participants in new ways. In short, it becomes a way of knowing.
In addition, my emotional response (and the offers of help and assistance it evoked) was
experienced as kind and considerate by the participant. Even if she decided not to take up the
395
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offer, my response still conveyed the clear message that I did not consider her as a mere source
of data, as the "object" of my study. In contrast, an emotionally neutral response such as "Oh,
that's a hard one" would certainly have served to alienate the participant. It would have
trivialised her experience. And it might very well have marred the research relationship. By
this I do not suggest that researchers should become excessively involved in the research
context. Neither do I maintain that researchers should proceed to intervene without hesitation.
In fact, researchers should never be encouraged uncritically to carry out any acts, however
good-intentioned or seemingly harmless. Experiences by numerous researchers attest to this
(e.g. Bloom 1997: 112-116; Acker et al. 1983: 428). Yet, what is clear is that an awareness of
emotion guards against inhumane and insensitive strategies and approaches. In this way,
emotion contributes not only on a methodological level, but also operates and supports the
researcher at a more normative-ethical level.
By inviting participants to share their stories, I was asking them to give expression to
emotionally intense experiences. These stories elicited an emotional response - a response I
believe allowed for the collection of richer data and the production of more subtle analyses. In
this, I affirm Wilkins' (in Bourne 1998: 96) view that, when combined with analytical rigour,
the researcher's emotional response to the research experience can foster "a sophisticated
sensibility" in terms of both the research relationship and the development of sociological
insight. Thus, instead of being regarded as a mere weakness that should be ignored, I viewed
emotion as a powerful resource in this study.
Emotion and responsibility
The conclusion reached above strongly encourages researchers to examine more closely the
nature and effects of their subjective (emotional) responses to the research process and the
participants it involves. Such an examination is, according to Peshkin (1988: 20), likely to
attune the researcher "to where Self and subject are intertwined". And as the researcher and
the research participants are indeed inseparably "intertwined", an examination of the
researcher's experience of the research should, as Laslett and Rapoport (1975: 970)
recommend, be accompanied by a similar investigation into the active and reactive nature of
the research participants' involvement in the research.
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Laslett and Rapoport's position appears particularly applicable in sensitive research where
powerful and emotionally charged responses are elicited from participants. The researcher has
a critical responsibility in terms of the impact of such research on the participants (Bourne
1998: 96). Comments from some of the participants in my study on how drained and
exhausted they felt - both physically and emotionally - after our interviews not only
concerned me, but also impressed upon me the enormity of the responsibility I had undertaken
in asking people to discuss issues of such intense sensitivity with me.
In an attempt to give due attention to the researcher's responsibility, I subsequently consider
and place into perspective the main risks and benefits associated with participation in sensitive
research, with specific reference to the participant's emotional experience of such
participation.
Research is a "social act" that involves far more than the exchange of data. It can indeed be
experienced as "therapeutic or cathartic" (Bourne 1998: 185). That is, during a research
encounter, there is the possibility that participants will view the interview which gives them
the opportunity to voice their concerns and share their experiences as a therapeutic session
(Small 1998: 134). Participants might describe the study itself as positive in terms of allowing
them to talk to an interested listener about their experiences - at length, without censure or
criticism. This in turn gives them the opportunity to validate their life, to discover its
significance, and to develop a fuller understanding of their situation (McBeth in Bourne 1998:
185).
In this study Cheryl expressed an awareness of the therapeutic qualities of the research
process:
... it has not been anything other than cathartic to have someone prepared to listen to you... I mean, I
can force friends to sit down and listen to me... but you actually wanted to. That's good... that's
excellent, be it emotional, physical, whatever... it's very good to have somebody who wants to listen to
you... So, I think, generally... that's the best thing... is to have had a chance to talk endlessly on this
incredibly boring subject, boring to everyone but the sufferers...
For Cheryl and the other participants in the study, taking part in the research gave them space
- or even ceremonial permission - to talk about and make sense of their "reality". Using
Parkes' phrase, Bourne (1998: 97) strikingly describes this experience as the "quiet catharsis
of comprehension". Unfortunately, it is not clear how long such research induced insights last,
or how easily they are translated into change for the participant.
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While sharing one's expenences and concerns may in itself be therapeutic, serendipitous
positive outcomes are not necessarily assured within the context of sensitive research. Small
(1998: 134) points out that interviewing people about sensitive topics may expose emotional
problems whose interpretation and handling may ideally require the interviewer to possess
therapeutic skills. Thus, the interview inadvertently becomes something that neither party felt
they were contracted for and neither may be ready or able to pursue satisfactorily.
This possibility - of exposing emotional trauma without being equipped to deal with it -
suggests that it is imperative that the research interview is differentiated from a counselling
session. Stark (1998: 206) explains that counselling suggests a relationship to which parties
bring certain expectations and where they enter into a type of "contract" to ensure that these
expectations will be realised. However, an interview seeks out information, and an interview
for the purposes of research does not have the overt goal of helping the participant. If some
good does come out of a research encounter then this is an added bonus, but still purely
secondary to the interview's primary purpose. Thus, the role of an interview itself is to gather
information in order to develop a better understanding of the phenomenon of interest. It is not
to help, change or council.
While the distinction between counselling and research are described here as complete
opposites, in practice it is not always easy to maintain this separation. Where boundaries
become unclear, the researcher's best intentions might not be sufficient to ward off all possible
adverse outcomes. "In our efforts as social scientists to gain insight into the world of others",
Bourne (1998: 97) explains, "we sometimes forget that no matter how skilful and careful we
are - or believe we have been - we sometimes can (and do) inadvertently cause distress to the
respondents themselves". This is a possibility we cannot escape, especially not within the
context of sensitive research.
Given the potential for unforeseen - and unwanted - outcomes within the research encounter,
careful management and critical reflection to ensure sufficient sensitivity to the needs and
expectations of all parties become imperative. Laslett and Rapoport (1975: 970) support this
view, maintaining that the research encounter can only benefit from a stronger awareness and
more deliberate management of the nature and implications of participants' involvement in a
research study. This is exactly where the researcher's responsibility becomes most critical. ..
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The management of research participants' responses to the research and the research situation
may, according to Laslett & Rapoport (1975: 970), be facilitated by a direct attempt to work
with participants through their personal and emotional experience of the research process.
This practice is exemplified in Cannon's (1989: 67-69) study of women suffering from breast
cancer. Cannon strongly encouraged her participants to regularly discuss their personal and
emotional experience of the research encounters. This practice evolved differently with
individual women. With some, lengthy discussions occurred on almost every occasion. With
others it was simply a case of their saying if they thought the encounter had "gone well", or if
any part had been difficult for them. As a result of these discussions, Cannon came to view the
research encounters as a collaborative effort that offered critical insight into the interpersonal
dynamics of the research process.
In following Laslett and Rapoport's advice and learning from Cannon's expenence, I
deliberately endeavoured to not only remain sensitive to participants' responses, but also to
make them aware of the opportunity to collaboratively shape the research encounter. And as
in Cannon's study, this approach evolved differently for each participant. In some cases,' I
became attuned to participants' reactions to those aspects most likely to cause them distress.
In response, I left the broaching of such subjects largely to the specific participants.
Throughout, I needed participants to know without a shred of doubt that the opportunities to
direct the extent of openness in our dialogue was also in their hands.
In other cases, participants chose to share their experiences of the research process only after
the last interview, which was not entirely ideal. On one such occasion Natalie described her
experience of the research relationship:
Dis 'n baie moeilike proses vir my om ... soveel van myself vir jou te gee en te sê ... soveel diepte ...
dinge ... daar's dinge wat ek vir jou nou moes sê wat ek ... byvoorbeeld oor my ... jy weet. .. dis nie iets
wat ek met enige iet. .. enige iemand wil bespreek nie, dis baie persoonlik ... mmm ... daar's omtrent nie
iemand wat daarvan weet nie. So, ek het nou aan jou goed verduidelik en gesê en tog het ek niks van
jou geweet nie en niks van jou gehoor nie. En ... mmm ... daar bly die heeltyd 'n gevoel by my dat. .. ek
weet jy's ook siek en ek weet dat jy ook probleme het en ek wou so graag iets terug gekry het, iets van
jou gehoor het... Nou, ek het besef... ek het daaroor gedink... en ek het besef ... jy's besig om nou
hierdie studie te doen en jy kan my onder geen omstandighede lei in 'n rigting nie, jy mag nie. So, jy mag
nie eintlik vir my enigsins iets sê van jouself nie, maar dit was vir my baie moeilik ...
While she is apparently a "properly socialised" participant who politely refrains from asking
questions back (cf. Oakley 1981: 36), this "unnatural" situation introduced a considerable
degree of strain for Natalie. For the point is exactly that the research interview is an unnatural
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situation. One very rarely finds oneself in a situation where so much is expected to be said by
one party, while virtually nothing (or then at least nothing of great significance) is divulged by
the other. In this sense, Natalie's comment is especially insightful as it highlights the potential
for strain and distress - however unintentional - and thereby the need to manage participants'
experiences even more directly than was the case in this study.
Emotions in the writing
Analysis and writing up, as Bourne (1998: 99) puts it, "tend to be time-consuming and
somewhat lonely pursuits", even where the topic involved is less emotive than the one under
discussion here. My own reluctance to embark on this process was however related to far
more than the demanding nature of the task that lay ahead.
To analyse the data I had gathered I needed to reread transcripts from the interviews. When
doing so, the emotional charge in them literally leapt of the page. At times, it felt as though
suffering was everywhere, on almost every page, in all the stories, in so many paragraphs. The
data appeared almost consumed by the emotions it carries. Occasionally I also had to listen
again to the recordings made during the interviews. This led to an even more detailed recall of
the different interview settings. I heard the tones of voice and the significant silences. I
remembered the body language. And I remembered the tears.
Time and again, revisiting the data in this way brought the interview back to life for me - and
with it the emotions encountered in it, be it positive or negative. For me, the emotional
experience evoked during this process of recall and analysis was incredibly (and perhaps
surprisingly) intense.
To deal with this effectively, I found it imperative to externalise my emotions in some way.
And, much like Bourne (1998: 99), I turned to my field diary. In this field diary, as I explained
in Chapter 8, I attempted to disclose my Self as a significant source of both insight and
knowing. I explicated the reasoning behind the procedures I employed. I reflected upon the
multitude of encounters I had experienced. I noted and examined my own assumptions, beliefs
and presuppositions in terms of their effect upon the research process. And I detailed my
emotional responses as part of my very personal experience of this research enterprise. The
notes recorded in this format - specifically in terms of my personal responses - served as a
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form of therapeutic writing as I attempted to come to grips with the emotions emanating from
both the research encounter and my own personal biography. However, even after having
done this, I was left with very little guidance from the literature with respect to ways of
integrating such emotional "off-loading" into my emergent theoretical analysis.
This awareness of limited professional guidance and support in dealing with the emotional
impact of the research process is echoed in Bourne's (1998: 99) research experience. Bourne
refers to the concept of "emotional exile" to describe her experience - or rather lack of
experience - of emotional support during the research process. She argues that it is the lone
researcher - and then specifically the research student - who may be most vulnerable to such
"emotional exile". This, Bourne (1998: 99) speculates, "may be partly because of their
reluctance to admit to significant others that they are becoming emotionally embroiled and
drained by the research they are undertaking". The profession after all strongly discourages a
discussion ofthe emotional aspects connected to (let alone impacting upon) a research project
in the public area. More importantly, "as trainee researchers, we are taught and encouraged to
perceive our research as 'data"'. And "data are often portrayed in the abstract, to be
interpreted and analysed, with no room for emotional entanglement" (Bourne 1998: 99). The
researcher, in other words, is expected to keep a controlled state - not only in the research
setting, but also when doing the analysis and when interacting with professional others. Only
then (it seems) will the work conducted be recognised as undertaken with visible competence
and will it enjoy credence in the scientific community.
Given this perception, it is hardly surprising that I found little direct guidance in dealing with
the personal and emotional responses evoked by and experienced within the research process.
This, however, does not appear to be the case in other professions. Prior to initiating the
fieldwork phase of this study, I enjoyed a brief conversation with a researcher who had been
engaged in similarly sensitive research. She explained how emotionally draining she had
found her encounters with participants, and that she had used the services of a counsellor to
off-load. This researcher was active in the field of psychology - a field in which the need for
"debriefing" is well recognised and the practice of mentorship for younger researchers well
established. Unfortunately, this is not the case in sociology - not even where intensely
sensitive research is undertaken. The researcher suggested that I might wish to consider
making similar arrangements for "off-loading" some of the more distressing aspects of my
research. Looking back, I wish I had heeded her advice more closely.
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For me, this experience points to the need for a forum of some kind where at least the most
disturbing aspects of sensitive research can be raised. Such a forum can assume the form of a
counselling-like, one-to-one relationship, or even a "support group" for researchers engaged in
sensitive or potentially emotionally draining research. Bourne (1998: 100) substantiates this
by making the important point that such support can be very productively combined with
analysis. In other words, a forum for support need not exist separately from the process of
analysis. Rather, a combination of support and analysis can extend the latter in important ways
and lead to a highly sophisticated understanding of the social world under study.
However, Bourne (1998: 100) cautions researchers against gomg too far, against using
"support" to merely "intellectualise" - and thereby justify - emotions as part of the research
process. This would after all only testify to (or worse, exacerbate) the academic community's
discomfort with the notions of emotion and support as integral to scientific research. Instead,
any recognition of emotion in research - be it individually or in the company of fellow
scientists - should reassure and empower researchers to confront the academic taboo on the
topic of emotion.
Conclusion
The school of objectivity, with its emphasis on distance and neutrality and its warnings against
over-involvement and emotional distortion, requires researchers to tread a very fine line of
keeping an interpretive distance from those under study, while simultaneously remaining close
enough to understand experiences from their perspective. The practical and conceptual
limitations of the obligation to remain emotionally detached - virtually at all costs - is thrown
into particularly sharp focus by research involving people in severely distressing situations.
My study directly challenged the notion of objectivity and the concurrent embargo on
emotional involvement. It became clear that objectivity does not necessarily represent the
ideal- let alone the only - approach to scientific research. The position offered by objectivity,
although once carrying great authority, is arguably neither more nor less valid than the position
taken by a social researcher who is more engaged but equally perceptive. This recognition
makes it possible to openly acknowledge and incorporate our own emotional experiences into
the research process.
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Indeed, we cannot - and should not - separate our sociology from our own emotions. An
awareness of our own emotions should never be far away, because emotions are critical
ingredients in the construction of a social reality. Any denial of them would only serve to
blunt our sensitivity to their input throughout the research process. On the other hand, to be
simply overwhelmed by our emotional experience is also not an option. This would leave us
similarly stumped. Hence, to recognise and deal with emotions we need to create a (analytical)
space where we can consider the full implications and potential of our emotional reactions.
Once given the space to do so, our own experiences can become a powerful resource in our
academic endeavour. They can help us to enhance our perceptiveness and analytical
engagement. They can help us to capture the true subtlety of the social reality under study.
They can help us to produce work which is visibly connected to lived experience - our own
and others' .
Thus, like Kleinman and Copp (in Bourne 1998: 91), I conclude: "We can learn a good deal
more from the field by treating our feelings as aids to analysis rather than hindrances".
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Chapter 19
Research ethics in practice
When Sartre's student came to him for help in resolving a difficult moral dilemma, Sartre had
but one reply: "you are free, therefore choose - that is to say, invent. No rule of general
morality can show you what you ought to do: no signs are vouchsafed in this world" (in
Cunningham 1970: 8).
Since Sartre's time, much effort has gone into the development of such "rules of general
morality" or "moral principles'" to help us guide our actions in the face of moral dilemmas.
The great number of ethical guides, codes, and definitions bear testimony to these efforts.
There indeed appears to be as many definitions of ethics as there are users of ethics. One such
definition that merits attention is that of the philosopher Louis P. Pojman (in Tong 1993: 13):
'''Ethics' (or 'moral philosophy,' as it is sometimes called) will be used to designate the
systematic endeavor to understand moral concepts and justify moral principles and theories. It
undertakes to analyze such concepts as 'right,' 'wrong,' 'permissible,' 'ought,' 'good,' and
'evil' in their moral contexts. Ethics seeks to establish principles of right behavior that may
serve as action guides for individuals and groups. It investigates which values and virtues are
paramount to the worthwhile life or to society".
Thus, as Pojman's definition suggests, ethicists have traditionally been concerned with the
development of ethical systems that aim to discover, articulate, and interpret the ultimate moral
principles that should guide our actions.
In accord with this definition, an ethical system in the domain of research should then be able
to guide (or even "govern") our research actions. That is, it should be able to help us (perhaps
more than Sartre helped his student) in making morally difficult choices within the research
context. During my study I repeatedly confronted problematic incidents which eluded an easy
solution through the application of "ultimate" moral principles of right behaviour. These
incidents specifically demanded critical reflection in order to arrive at a better understanding of
the relevance of ethics in a critical research interview situation where the participant's
precarious state of health imperils the actual progress of the interview.
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While a number of different approaches were considered, I limit the present discussion to those
four approaches that influenced my reflection most directly. The first two of these ethical
approaches - utilitarianism and deontology - have literally dominated the moral landscape for
centuries through their emphasis on general laws or values that guide moral decision-making.
In response to their dominance, alternative schools of ethical thought have developed. In
particular, I consider situation ethics and relational ethics that demand that the unique
situation, as well as the individuals involved in it, should be taken into account in the face of
any given moral dilemma.
I will now explore the four ethical approaches, at first in the abstract, and then as they in
practice influenced my actions in the research context. The chapter will conclude by calling
attention to some of the most important implications of my research experience and to how
these, at least for me, point the way towards an alternative practice of ethics in social research
in general, and in sensitive research in particular.
Utilitarian ethics
Utilitarian ethics is based on the principle of "utility" or, as first described by Mill (1991: 137),
"the Greatest Happiness Principle". It can be defined as "the doctrine that the rightness and
wrongness of actions is determined by the goodness and badness of their consequences for all
concerned" (Cunningham 1970: 36). In general, this means that when deciding what would be
the moral thing to do, a utilitarian would insist that one should choose that action which
promises to produce the maximum of good for all concerned. The directive to make decisions
based on their consequences is supported by our ordinary expectation that all moral agents will
(and should) take the consequences of their actions into consideration when deciding how they
should act. Within the research context, utilitarian ethics require that the researcher should
weigh the consequences of each alternative action in terms of its desirability (that is, its
capacity to produce "happiness") and then select that action which will do the maximum good
(Kolnai 1970: 247; Mill1991: 137).
However, this approach assumes that the moral agent is "properly equipped with intellectual
power, relevant information, and experience concerning various similar models of practice,
enabling him to perform such a calculus of foreseeable consequences pertinently, with a high
degree of objective probability" (Kolnai 1970: 247). We can reasonably assume that to
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competent apply such a practice of extensively calculating all foreseeable consequences of a
single research encounter (let alone an entire study) lies beyond the reach of many an
otherwise proficient researcher. What is more, what if the researcher is confronted by a choice
between two equally appealing alternatives through which to produce "happiness"? How
should she decide which course to follow? In such an event, Mill (1991: 139) advises the
moral agent that "if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a
decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more
desirable pleasure". Yet, is it not unreasonable (if not wholly impracticable) to expect the
researcher to first embark upon a sophisticated analysis of the impressions of "all or almost all
who have experience of both" before making a decision in the immediate research situation?
Furthermore, the utilitarian emphasis on "the greatest good for the greatest number" reveals an
apparent willingness to sacrifice the rights of one or a few individuals (such as the participants
in my study) in order to secure the greatest good of many other individuals (say, of society as a
whole). In this, utilitarianism clearly assumes that people will always be induced to promote
the general interest of the greatest number. This assumption, says Tong (1993: 15), weakens
the moral credibility of utilitarian ethics, because most people - including many researchers -
do not believe that morality requires extreme levels of (self-)sacrifice. Consequently,
utilitarianism may be perceived, perhaps rightfully so, as too demanding (Tong 1993: 15-6).
A last criticism that may be levelled against the utilitarian approach concerns its emphasis on
impartiality. Mill (1991: 148) clearly states that when it comes to a choice between the
"happiness" of the moral agent and the "happiness" of others, utilitarianism requires the moral
agent "to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator". According to
Mill's moral reasoning, all persons must be treated as persons. Consequently, when it comes
to responding to the needs of another person, "his/her relationship to me is irrelevant. It does
not matter whether s/he is my best friend or my worst enemy" (Tong 1993: 68). Such "moral
impartiality" clearly requires us to detach ourselves from the other (in fact, from all others).
Yet, such detachment is neither feasible nor desirable. For in requiring researchers to manifest
attitudes "such as detachment from personal concerns and loyalties, disinterest, dispassion, and
a regard for the generalized moral equality of all persons" (Friedman in Tong 1993: 68),
utilitarian-based impartiality may force researchers to jeopardise those very relationships upon
which research rests. These are relationships that demand attachment, that demand something
qualitatively different from the general "goodness" directed toward strangers (Tong 1993: 68).
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Utilitarians (and other moral impartialists) may respond to this objection by arguing that to be
solely concerned with the interests of those who immediately surround us as opposed to those
of our region, nation and the world, is to be (or become) "parochial" (Tong 1993: 69). Hence,
they would insist that the proximity of relationships carries "no moral weight and that moral
responsibilities extend equally to all members of the global village" (Friedman in Tong 1993:
69). There is clearly some truth in this argument: "Our desire to attend to the needs of our
loved ones should not become an excuse for the kind of moral laziness that impedes our ability
to expand our conception of Selves to include more persons than those who immediately
surrounds us" (Tong 1993: 69). Still, as Tong (1993: 69) continues, the researcher must
confess that her "moral energy is limited". That is, while it is important for her to work
against tendencies to be parochial, the researcher cannot expand herself into infinity. She will
collapse. So, unless morality permits researchers "to be somewhat partial", and to so take full
account of our relationships with our participants, "we will go stark raving mad" (Tong 1993:
70).
Thus, utilitarianism insists that the researcher as a moral agent should choose that action which
promises to produce the greatest good for the greatest number. While this approach may
almost inevitably be consonant with the interests of society (as "the greatest number"), it is
clearly not unproblematic. It is plagued in particular by problems concerning the evaluation of
"good". Here, utilitarianism appears to expect too much of the moral agent in terms of
intellectual capacities as well as in terms of a willingness to sacrifice both the individual and
individual relationships.
Deontology
Unlike utilitarianism, deontology is, according to Tong (1993: 19), "a nonconsequentialist
ethical theory. Whereas utilitarians insist that an action's moral worth depends on its utility-
maximizing consequences, deontologists maintain that it depends on some feature inherent in
the action itself'. In fact, in the deontologist's world, "it does not matter how much or how
little utility (good, pleasure, or happiness) one produces as the result of one's actions. Instead,
what matters is whether one's actions are motivated by the intent to do one's duty because it is
one's duty" (Tong 1993: 19).
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This is not to say that deontology discards the "good" that is so important to utilitarians.
"Good" remains something that one should promote, but for the deontolagist "goodness" is
contingent upon the "moral rightness" of the action in question. The "moral rightness"
depends in turn, as Warren (1997: 96-7) explains, entirely upon "the good will of the agent".
And to have a "good will" is 'to be motivated to do one's moral duty and to do it simply
because it is one's duty'. While this does not mean that in order to act from a "good will" one
must suppress all kind and benevolent feelings, the deontolagist insists that "such emotions
must not be what directs the will towards the performance of duty" (Warren 1997: 96-7).
Thus, an act can only be morally worthy when one performs it simply because one knows it is
required, because it is one's duty to do so.
As "doing one's duty because it is one's duty" is so important to deontologists, they have taken
great care to establish the most fundamental moral principles through which to guide action in
any given situation. To this end, Kant has made the most notable contribution by proposing a
single universal principle - the "Categorical Imperative" - from which all other moral
principles may be derived (cf. Warren 1997: 97-8). According to Warren (1997: 98), Kant
offered several formulations of the Categorical Imperative. Of these, the most pertinent to the
present discussion is known as the "Formula of the End in Itself'. InKant's (inWarren 1997:
98) words, "man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as
a means for arbitrary use by this or that will. He must in all his actions, whether they are
directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end".
To treat persons as ends in themselves is to treat them as having "dignity" or "intrinsic value".
This is a value "which is exalted above all price and so admits no equivalent". Thus, because
persons are ends in themselves, their autonomy must be respected, not just as one component
of utility, but as something that imposes strict constraints upon the ways in which they may be
treated by others.
In view of Warren's (1997: 98) discussion it is important to note that Kant's "Formula of the
End in Itself' principle does not condemn those who treat persons as means to ends that they
have accepted. We do this in all co-operative human activities - including social research. It
is, however, not permissible (it is even plainly wrong) to treat persons as if they were mere
means, as things that we are entitled to use towards ends that are not their own. This condition
would appear to place a limit on the extent to which a researcher (as a moral agent) can
manipulate participants for the purpose of research alone.
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Deontology is, however, vulnerable to several lines of attack; the first of which may be
launched against its tendency towards abstraction. It asks of us, Tong (1993: 63-4) observes,
"to submit all of our moral experiences to a single, overreaching behavioral index such as the
categorical imperative". Consequently, it may be easier for the researcher to resolve never to
cause detriment - not even for a good reason - than to focus on the exact ways in which
certain individuals may be either harmed or benefited as a result of causing (or refraining from
causing) detriment in a particular instance. When applied in this manner, the otherwise
estimable moral rule "to respect and therefore not to cause detriment" turns into a "moral
convenience" (Tong 1993: 64). For when armed with a categorical imperative, the researcher
is apparently under no obligation to consider difficult questions. The researcher may simply-
automatically and unquestioningly - apply the categorical imperative as a prescription for
action (cf. Glen 2000: 21). Yet, a prescription that so directly eliminates the need for
reflection must produce a "morally lazy" (Tong 1993:65) researcher.
A deontological researcher is, furthermore, likely to confront differentials of power and not
know what to do with it. Baier (in Tong 1993: 97) feels that the reason for this is that
traditional ethical approaches - including deontology - have been primarily concerned with
the regulation of relations "between equals or those who are deemed equal in some important
sense". Relations between "those who are clearly unequal in power", such as parents and
children, states and citizens, doctors and patients, the well and the ill, "have had to be shunted
to the bottom of the agenda, and then dealt with by some sort of 'promotion' of the weaker so
that an appearance of virtual equality is achieved". This represents a rather problematic
approach within the research context (let alone outside it). The researcher cannot simply
assumethat all participants occupy a position of strength similar to his or her own. In fact, it is
more often the case that the researcher (regardless of whatever efforts are made to the
contrary) remains in a position of power throughout the research process. After all, it is the
researcher who usually determines the agenda of topics to be discussed as well as the course
and progress of the interview. There is indeed nothing abstract about the practice of research;
"it must grapple with the way in which power operates... in a concrete and particular way"
(Hekman in Usher 2000: 31). The "operation" of power within the research context cannot be
ignored. For Baier (in Tong 1993: 97), any ethical approach which attempts to do so - which
endeavours to discard or to downplay the differences of power between moral agents -
amounts to a form of deception, even of self-deception. Unfortunately, as a result of such a
case of "deception", deontology appears incapable of offering any sufficient help in the face of
a moral dilemma caused by very real discrepancies of power.
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The last criticism against deontology concerns emotions: Kantian deontology claims that "our
feelings neither add to nor subtract from the moral worth of our actions" (Tong 1993: 22). For
Tong (1993: 22), it is this point, more than any other, that weakens the credibility of
deontology. "Doing the right thing", Tong (1993: 22) says, "counts for a lot but not as much
as doing the right thing with the right feelings". Indeed, "a sense of duty devoid of emotion
may be worse than no sense of duty at all" (Tong 1993: 23). Thus, while duty is important, it
tells only a chapter of the moral story, the bulk of which is, in Blum's (in Tong 1993: 68)
words, about "being responsive to the weal and woe of others". To be sure, this persuasion
that the emotions underlying a particular action may contribute (either positively or negatively)
to the moral worth of the action does not imply that duty should be ignored. But it does mean
that duty or obligation should not necessarily take precedence over concern for the person
before us. Perhaps it need not even be a case of either duty or concern, but rather of a desire
or will to follow sound moral principles in combination with empathetic concern for others.
Such a more encompassing approach may very well provide a particularly strong moral basis
for the solution of many a moral dilemma (cf. Warren 1997: 143 & 158).
Thus, to adopt a deontological approach to ethical decision-making means to know what is
right or wrong by the application of the categorical imperative and then to act accordingly
because it is one's duty to do so. As important as the imperative is to respect the moral rights
of the other person, it cannot be applied unreflectively. Such a mechanistic approach is likely
to blind the moral agent to other important dimensions of a moral dilemma, including the
possibility of truly conflicting courses of action, the presence of power differentials, and the
salience of human emotion in human interaction. Far from being peripheral, these dimensions,
together with mutual respect, are very much part of the solution to pertinent moral dilemmas
within the research context.
Situation ethics
Fletcher (1970a: 56) says that there are essentially three lines of approach to ethical decision-
making. One of them, perhaps the least followed, is the antinomian or non-principled (or even
law-less) approach. Antinomians operate without the help of any moral principles. Instead,
they spontaneously make their moral decisions wholly within the situation. The resultant
unpredictability of such decisions stems from the fact that they believe that one "moment" of
existence is so entirely discontinuous from others that we cannot generalise about our decision-
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making. At the opposite end of the spectrum is legalism. Fletcher (1970a: 56) explains that
this ethical strategy does take into account the "situational variables", but maintains that the
circumstances are always subordinate to predetermined general "laws" of morality. In this
sense, "legalistic ethics treats many of its rules idolatrously by making them into absolutes".
Correspondingly, "obedience to prefabricated 'rules of conduct' is more important than
freedom to make responsible decisions" (Fletcher 1970a: 56). Somewhere in the middle of
these two extreme positions lies situation ethics.
According to Fletcher (1970a: 58), moral agents do not have to be either antinomians who
make decisions without any principles at all, or legalists who absolutise ethical principles.
Instead, moral agents can choose to be situationists who (like the legalists) acknowledge the
heritage of civil principles of right and wrong, but who (like the antinomians) remain free to
decide in all situations which principles are to be followed, or rejected, in order to secure more
good than evil.
What is "good" for the situationist? For Fletcher (1970a: 58) there is only one intrinsic good:
"the good of people". Fletcher calls this good "love" or "agape' which, for him, denotes "a
personalist devotion to people, not to things or abstractions such as 'laws' or general
principles. Personal interests come first, before the natural or scriptural or theoretical or
general or logical or anything else". For the situationist, then, the "moral goodness" of an act
does not lie in its adherence to any general moral principle. This does not mean that
situationism rejects all moral principles (Simons & Usher 2000: 2-3). Instead, it means that
when it comes down to doing the "most loving thing", the situationist researcher is "prepared
to bypass the rule" (Fletcher 1970b: 279). In fact, what matters more than any specific rule is
whether the researcher's chosen action helps or hurts people; that is, whether it serves the
purposes of agapéic love and so reveals a personal concern for the other person, the
participant, in this situation (Fletcher 1970a: 59). Thus, what determines the "moral goodness"
of an action, far from any strict adherence to a set of general principles, is the intent with
which it is done and the consequences that it is likely to produce (Fletcher 1970b: 278).
It is exactly this conception of "moral goodness" that weakens the credibility of situation
ethics. Situationists evidently sees that "moral goodness" follows from the practice of
"agapéic love" - that demand to which all other moral obligations are subordinate and of
which they are mere applications, proper to some situations but unsuited to others (cf. Kolnai
1970: 93). This conception clearly devalues the importance of general moral standards. But
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does it go too far? Dupré (1970: 93) and Kolnai (1970: 233) feel that it does. These authors
argue that in their attempts to emphasise the implications of this situation, situationists indeed
become short-sighted. They can no longer see the more general, the abstract. They become
unable to properly consider those universal moral standards that actually may have bearing on
that situation. This "reckless lack of regard" (Kolnai 1970: 239) for general moral principles
leaves the situationist vulnerable to many problems.
These problems stem from the fact that, besides lacking appreciation of the potential
importance of general moral principles, the moral agent must seek and find moral guidance
somewhere else. It would appear that "somewhere else" could only be one of two places: in
the situation itself or in the demand for "agapéic love".
Dupré (1970: 93) maintains that to assume that a situation alone could offer worthy moral
guidance would leave the moral agent with little but the meagre option to either face
"perplexed inactivity" or engage in "self-deceiving rationalisations" of his or her "emotional
inclinations". Such a potential welter of muddled reactions stems from the simple fact that
"from the situation as such, from it alone, absolutely nothing - no moral imperative or
direction, nor even a practical incentive or counsel- follows" (Kolnai 1970: 239). Situations
do not - cannot - mysteriously "produce" moral motives to act (or to refrain from acting).
Thus, the researcher cannot from the situation alone deduce what to do. Hence, while granting
that the circumstances of a particular situation may influence the rightness or wrongness of an
action, the researcher cannot presume that the situation alone is capable of providing the
necessary standards through which to choose a morally worthy course of action (cf. Dupré
1970: 93; Kolnai 1970: 266). It would in fact be entirely misguided to hold a situation
responsible for producing some course of moral action for the researcher to simply follow.
Rather, to act morally requires a moral guideline. Such a moral guideline could then be
applied with reference to the situation in question. Indeed, a moral guideline would have no
meaning except by reference to an actual or at least a conceivable situation. Thus, contrary to
an exclusive reliance on the situation for moral guidance, what appears more reasonable is an
attitude that equally does justice to the concrete situation and to the abstract moral principles
which apply to it (cf. Dupré 1970: 94).
Should the devoted situationist then revert to depending upon the incentive "to love" in order
to gain sufficient moral guidance (and justification), a further dilemma seems bound to creep
in. This dilemma directly involves the concept of responsibility. Kolnai (1970: 252) explains
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that "what we ordinarily mean by responsibility is precisely the testability, 'checkability',
appraisability, judgeability, or shall we say the ethical intelligibility of an agent's conduct in
terms of recognised (though not, in general, strictly definable or exhaustively enumerable)
moral norms and standards of value". Yet, it is exactly "against this concept of moral
discourse and arguable appraisal that situationism is directed, placing as it does - reservation
made for 'love' - all emphasis on the agent's 'freedom', not in the sense of free-will or of
'freedom under the Law' but in the sense of a sort of moral 'sovereignty', i.e. freedom to
'decide' in actu whatfor him is here and now right or wrong to do". Clearly, the problem here
is that, short of certain very simple and blatant cases of good-doing or evil-doing, nobody
could on such presuppositions form a reasoned judgement on the behaviour of a fellow moral
agent. A researcher, as a moral agent, would then be "above moral judgement", so to speak.
And this is a problem, because how is a researcher's actions then to be evaluated and how,
more importantly, is the researcher to be held accountable for such actions? Indeed, in
accordance with situationism, any fellow moral agent is basically precluded from analysing the
moral integrity of another's actions. There is simply no way of applying categorically tangible
properties such as right and wrong to another agent's actions, since in the name of love
"almost everything can be 'justified'" in this situation (Kolnai 1970: 252). Situation ethics
thus offers only an impaired concept of responsibility that fails to provide any valid way of
judging the moral content of an agent's chosen course of action. Worse yet, the agent may be
deprived of a "seriously applicable moral orientation and make havoc of the conceptual
scaffolding of his conscience" (Kolnai 1970: 254). Thus, the agent who lingers beyond
judgeability in terms of moral categories may also simultaneously find him- or herself in a
void of moral orientation.
In sum, situation ethics emphasises the undeniable fact that moral dilemmas are rooted in the
complexity of the situations in which they occur. Hence, as these dilemmas often refuse any
easy solution, there is a temptation to apply a set of ready-at-hand moral principles or to
simply discard all such principles. Situationism wants to remedy this imperfection and
attempts to do so by inflating the moral agent into a seemingly godlike creature who is capable
of such extraordinary love that categories of judgement become superfluous. To promote such
imaginary perfection is, for Kolnai (1970: 270), an approach "which is indefensible on all
counts and has nothing to commend itself'. This severe conclusion clearly shows that the
strongest virtue of situation ethics - its recognition of the situational context of moral
dilemmas - is sadly corrupted by the naive ideals it harbours for the ordinary moral agent.
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Relational ethics
Feminine ethicists such as Gilligan and Noddings as well as their feminist colleagues Baier
and Sherwin have advanced the relevance of social and emotional relationships to questions of
morality (cf. Tong 1993). While each ethicist calls attention to a different dimension of such
relationships, they essentially address a similar theme which I will discuss here under the
heading of "relational ethics".
Relational ethics is fundamentally based upon the understanding that the moral agent is a
social being constituted, in essence, by his or her relationships with others (Fontinell 1970:
211; Usher 2000: 24). Noddings (in Tong 1993: 115) frames this belief by saying, "It is not
just that I as a preformed continuous individual enter into relations; rather, the I of which we
speak so easily is itself a relational entity. I really am defined by the set of relations into which
my physical self has been thrown". The relational ethics would thus concur with Smits (in
Fontinell 1970: 208) that the moral agent, in fact, is relation.
Within relational ethics this fact - that the moral agent is constituted by relation - has crucial
bearing on the moral decision-making process (FontinellI970: 212). In this process, it is the
moral agent's human (that is, emotional or caring) relationships that give rise to all moral
obligations. In accordance with such obligations, the moral agent should seek to preserve
relationships and avoid harm to those cared about (cf. Noddings in Warren 1997: 137; Usher
2000: 29). While such an orientation should take precedence over adherence to abstract moral
principles, it does not necessarily demand an abandonment of all moral principles. Instead, it
suggests that "we give equal time to the other moral 'voice', which speaks not of principles,
but of caring" (Warren 1997: 75). In other words, while the relational ethicists would be
willing to consult moral principles, he or she would do so for the purpose of determining the
best means of meeting the needs of those for whom he or she cares. Clearly, the primary
motivation here would not be obedience to moral law, but rather to care, to remain related
(Glen 2000: 18-19;Warren 1997: 138).
Through such a clear emphasis on the carmg quality of relationship, relational ethics
introduces into the moral realm the dimension of emotion. This evidently represents a reaction
against the more traditional ethical approach that declares that the rights and wrongs in a
situation can only be discerned once the agent has distanced his or her Selves from all personal
emotions. Supposedly, emotions would not only fail to help the agent in moral decisions, but
would also prevent him or her from finding the "right" moral path to follow (cf. Tong 1993:
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73; Warren 1997: 138). So, for instance, utilitarianism would demand of moral agents to
objectively weigh the interests of those they care about against the interests of those they do
not know or do not like. No differentiation should be made about those cared about and those
not cared about. No emotion or personal involvement is allowed to enter moral deliberation.
Admittedly, there is something very appealing about the thought that a certain blindness to
personal emotions can bar moral agents frompractising unjust favouritism. Still, for Blum and
others (cf. Tong 1993: 74), traditional approaches have gone too far in condemning emotions.
Moral obligations and decisions cannot be understood in isolation from the human feelings of
moral agents. The simple fact is that moral agents (including researchers) do have stronger
ties with certain Others (such as family and friends) than with all people in general. For
Warren (1997: 76), "this psychological fact does not suggest that our moral concern should
extend only to beings with whom we have close social relationships. But it does suggest that it
is not always irrational for human beings to show special concern for members of their social
communities".
Yet, while highlighting the important contribution of emotional engagement to moral
deliberation, relational ethics appears to be plagued by a number of troubling questions.
Firstly, according to Tong (1993: 124), Hoagland finds a relational ethic based on care
particularly problematic when it involves unequal relationships marked by a measure of
dependency. Can it be permissible for the "one-caring" to control the relationship with the
"cared-for"? Is the researcher entitled to exert full control over the relationship, or the
participant? After all, the researcher, as the "one-caring", certainly does not always know
what is best for the participant, the "cared-for". In fact, very often, the participant is the best
judge of her own good (cf. Tong 1993: 124). Hoagland reasons that as long as we choose such
unequal relationships - that is, relationships in which one party controls its dynamics - as the
paradigm for an ethical system, we propagate, rather than overcome, problems of power.
Hoagland (in Tong 1993: 124) comments that "we live in a society premised on dominance
and subordination, and oppression emerges in may forms - from parental all the way to
colonial relationships - when decisions are made 'for another's own good"'. Any ethics based
on the powerful "helping" the powerless is an ethics rooted in some people telling other people
what to do and how to do it. Can such an approach to ethics be acceptable? Hoagland
believes it is not. To the contrary, ethics that would be seen as moral must be able to challenge
(rather than endorse) those hierarchical ways of being, thinking and acting that leave others
vulnerableto arbitrary uses of power (cf. Tong 1993: 124-5).
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Secondly, Tong (1993: 94) shows that relational ethics is vulnerable to the accusation that it
demands too much of the (caring) moral agent. It seems to almost deliberately instruct persons
to give until they can give no more - that is, to sacrifice the Selves in the name of care until all
physical, psychological, and spiritual resources have been depleted. Can this be morally
acceptable? Is the participant indeed entitled to unconditional, unfailing attention from the
researcher? Or is the researcher also entitled to some care? Can a relationship so askew in
terms of "giving" be morally good? And can it constitute the basis for a sound ethical
approach? What is more, if relational ethicists, in their ardour to promote caring relationships
as a morally ideal grounding for action, venture so far as to forbid all forms of distancing, they
are bound to invite even more serious problems. Such a state of obligatory emotional
engagement with all others wou1d not only impose severe demands on the entire being of
moral agents. It would also threaten to render them unfit for decision or action of any sort (cf.
Tong 1993: 65). Thus, an excessive commitment to caring engagement may, in effect,
compromise the ability of moral agents to indeed act morally.
Thirdly, Tong (1993: 94) is of the opinion that a further common objection to relational ethics
is that it supports a certain set of "psychological traits" or "values". That is, it appears to put a
premium on possessing a certain type of personality, in particular, a kind and caring one. But
what about the less empathic personality? Should such a person be excused from moral
obligations? Surely not. In addition, what happens where empathic capacities fail the moral
agent or have no opportunity to come into play? What if a researcher finds a participant so
obnoxious that genuine care is out of the question? Or what if the research relationship is of
such a brief duration that care has no chance to develop? Would the researcher be excused
from moral obligations? And the participant? Indeed, without the moral guidance offered
under the auspices of "caring", where should moral agents turn? Warren (1997: 145) points to
the work of Manning who suggests that to be morally sound any relational ethic of care must
provide some "standard" moral guidelines as a minimum below which behaviour should be
morally condemned. Such guidelines, Manning (in Warren 1997: 145) argues, offers the
necessary guidance in cases where empathic capacities flag for whatever reason. In Manning's
view, such minimum guidance would also enable moral agents to extend their caring in
important ways. For instance, minimum guidelines can be used to deliberate how best to care
about others with whom moral agents do not share direct contact. Under such circumstances,
"our actions cannot be guided by the expressed or observed desires of those cared for... In
these cases we must make assumptions about their desires, and we can assume that they do not
wish to fall below some minimum standard" (Manning in Warren 1997: 145). That is, should
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a researcher fail to develop genuine care towards a participant, it would not spell the end to
morally responsible action. The researcher would still have a minimum standard, a
fundamental moral standard, to depend on. Of course, "in an ideal world, we might be so
strongly responsive to the needs of other beings that we would have no use for minimummoral
standards. But the world is imperfect, and so are we" (Warren 1997: 146). In the light of this,
respect for certain moral standards does not become a substitute for active caring, but, given
our deficiencies as "perfect" carers, "the world would be worse without these minimum
standards" (Warren 1997: 146).
Thus, the human capacity (and perhaps the need) to care about others helps to both explain and
justify many of the judgements that moral agents commonly make about their responsibility in
the face of a moral dilemma. Yet, in fully conceptualising this responsibility, moral agents
should not be bound by the limits of their empathetic capacities or by the boundaries of their
immediate social communities. Social relationships do shape their moral obligations towards
others, yet not to the exclusion of sound moral principles. It is rather more likely that empathic
concern for others as a complement to the desire to follow sound principles will be able to
provide morally good reasons for responsible action (cf. Glen 2000: 19;Warren 1997: 143-7).
Discussion
Throughout my study, I found that the interview - the direct personal encounter between
researcher and researched - presented that area of interaction in which the researcher most
directly confronted troubling moral dilemmas. During these interviews, participants were
strongly encouraged to recount their stories about what it is like for them to have ME in terms
of their situations, relationships, actions and meanings. However, the interviews not only
presented a situation through which a story about severe illness was constructed, but also
through which the actual nature of this illness became apparent. At times, participants indeed
found the interview so strenuous and exhausting that the termination of our interaction became
a very real possibility. It is on this critical interview situation that the following illustration
and reflection on the different ethical approaches are based:
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At the time of my first interview with Cheryl, she was extremely ill. So, while I settled
into a chair, Cheryl was painfully manoeuvring into bed right next to me. Despite her
obvious discomfort, Cheryl insisted that we should continue. But the result of her
brave insistence soon followed. Cheryl's arms and legs grew stiff in one position,
forcing her to painfully move them into another. The bed covers irritated her skin,
leading her to lift them ever so often from one or another part of her body. Sometimes,
she lost her track of thought. Often, she lost words. Throughout, I was plagued by the
obvious concern: should we continue or would it be better to call it a day? Based on
the participant's insistence, the interview did continue. By the end of our session
Cheryl could only move very slowly and was complaining of a pounding headache.
She had literally willed her way through the interview, yet now had to bear the
consequences. I, in turn, was left with the nagging question: was the decision to
continue the interview the most morally worthy course of action to take?
Cheryl's strong-willed determination to continue at all odds also marked our second
interview and its consequences. Cheryl suffered gravely, so much so that by the end of
our last session, she was hardly able to move, complaining that she had stiff and
painful 'knots' in her muscles. Her voice was on the verge of shaking when she spoke
and, she confessed, her eyes had stopped focussing quite a while earlier and she could
only see me as a blur. We slowly made our way to the front door, where her husband
joined us. There, she clutched his ann with both her hands to steady her increasingly
unsteady body. It had by then become (disturbingly) obvious that our session had
provoked a serious relapse. As I drove home, I was again plagued by the nagging
question: was the decision to continue the interview the most morally worthy course of
action to follow? Or was there a different - better - way to complete my research
interviews?
This was the pattern that emerged during many of these research interviews: participants
insisted in persevering despite their own suffering and resisted numerous offers to postpone
our meeting. Each time I yielded to their determination, only to see them suffer the
consequences of their brave effort. And while their suffering and their insistence spoke of the
several critical themes in the study (such as their inability or unwillingness to admit to obvious
physical limitations), this realisation did not make it any less difficult to bear, either for them
or for me. After all, the point of my study was to help ME sufferers, not to induce another
421
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week in bed! Given this turmoil, I sought to find answers among those traditions which claim
to have them ...
In a situation such as described above, having assumed a utilitarian perspective, I should have
asked: would the "harm" endured by Cheryl be outweighed by the "good" to follow from a
more in-depth understanding of the illness experience? Or would the "good" procured in the
process not be sufficient to justify the "harm" endured by her? Up to a certain point a
utilitarian perspective resolved my moral dilemma. I could, after all, recognise that moral
conduct, at least in one sense, would imply a course of action conducive to the (most
beneficial) interests of the greatest number (cf. Kolnai 1970: 248). Armed with this
recognition, I could decide that as "the greatest number" - that is, society in general as well as
the ME community itself - would benefit from a better understanding of ME, the interview
(which is directed to this end) should continue.
Still, I had a problem, even several: on the "harm" side of the ledger sheet it was difficult to
calculate whether any human suffering would occur, how severe it would be, and what relative
significance it would have. For instance, was the harm endured by Cheryl's family as a result
of the prolonged interview truly less significant than the potential good procured by means of a
better understanding for society as a whole? By what scale was I - not the participants -
supposed to weigh the good of a few against the good of many? Moreover, how certain could
I be that any "good" would actually be realised?
These questions are particularly pertinent in such an incredibly sensitive area of research, with
a topic charged with emotion, loaded with moral meanings and carrying a burden of stigma.
What exactly would constitute a benefit within this context is not clear and consensus on it is
unlikely. In support of continuing the research interview some might argue that in many
instances, particularly in sensitive areas, research participants desire catharsis rather than
sanctuary. And as catharsis can only happen through the medium of the interview, the latter
should continue. In this way, the interview may produce not only gains in knowledge, but also
effects that are directly beneficial to the research participant. In contrast, others might argue
that academic research of this kind is severely exploitative - taking advantage of the
participant's need to talk to the detriment of her physical well-being. Under such conditions of
violation, there can be no question of sanctuary. Hence, the interview should be terminated.
While perhaps aware of such different arguments, the fmal decision still remains the
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researcher's. And with very little guidance on how to differentiate between the applicability
and credibility of such arguments, the researcher is no closer to an adequate response.
There is still a further problematic repercussion of utilitarianism which Tong (1993: 64) calls
"failures of moral imagination". Wheatly refers to a "flexibility of mind" (in Usher 2000: 34)
that seeks to actively explicate the conditions and contexts that frame a specific context.
Where it is lacking, the moral agent fails to focus on the implications of this situation and the
plight of this person. In other words, I would ignore or not notice the pain in Cheryl's eyes or
the tremble in her voice. This would make it easier for me to "sacrifice" the well-being of one
person for the sake of "the common good". Yet, to so readily "sacrifice" a flesh and blood
person in the name of a "large-scale goal" that will somehow benefit "the greater good" is, at
best, a morally dubious tendency, and at worst, an altogether morally blind one.
With utilitarianism then offering little help in resolving my moral dilemma, I may have turned
to deontology. A deontological approach would have demanded that I terminate the interview.
I would do so, firstly, out of respect for the participant and, in particular, for her state of health,
and secondly, in view of the deontological commitment not to treat another person as a mere
means to some greater end. In short, because it would be my duty to respect Cheryl as a
person, I would summarily call a halt.
To provide the individual - in this case, the participant - with strong moral rights which must
not be violated may be one of the most important contributions of aKantian deontological
approach to ethics. Indeed, for Warren (1997: 101), a moral theory that demands categorical
respect for the moral rights of the individual is "truer to the convictions that most of us hold
than one that permits those rights to be sacrificed to the goal of maximizing utility". It is also,
Warren adds, "truer to the spirit of the Golden rule, which speaks not of maximizing total
happiness, but of treating other persons as we would like to be treated". Thus, instead of
advancing maximum good by developing a greater understanding of ME to the detriment of a
participant I, as a deontological researcher, could have ended the session and so safely avoided
any further morally compromising repercussions.
Yet, while the strong emphasis on mutual respect for moral rights that such a course of action
reveals is highly commendable, the deontological approach is, as we have seen above, clearly
not without its problems. Here the possibility of becoming a "morally lazy" researcher is of
particular concern. Tong (1993: 22) for instance, notes that, because deontologists stress so
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
424
strongly the abstract and absolute character of moral rules, they "struggle to adjudicate so-
called 'conflicts of duty"'. To be sure, deontologists could argue that one or the other of
seemingly conflicting rules "is not really absolute; or that God would never permit two really
absolute moral rules to conflict; or that a moral rule is absolute only in the 'abstract' and not in
the context of certain concrete circumstances" (Tong 1993:22). Clearly, these strategies do not
truly offer any solution. For instance, what if I could not but notice how Cheryl's suffering
appeared to escalate as the interview continued but insisted on proceeding? What would the
deontologist do? What would I, the deontological researcher, do? I could choose to respect
the integrity of the participant's body in order to prevent (further) damage. But would this not
verge on the paternalistic - making a decision for the participant about the participant's own
body? Alternatively, I could choose to respect the intrinsic value of personal autonomy and
not question the participant's personal decision. This would assume that the immediate illness
experience has left the participant's decision-making capacity untouched. This is something I
could neither know with any certainty nor judge without a sense of paternalism. After all, is
respecting the participant's capacity for self-determination not in true Kantian terms a way of
expressing respect for her dignity as a morally autonomous being? The deontological
approach appears to have little answer to concerns of this kind as it clearly does not enable the
researcher to prioritise either genuinely absolute, or conflicting moral rules.
Both of these approaches - utilitarianism and deontology - appear to be based upon an
assumption that, since it is not possible to consider all the factors involved in any situation, the
only way to avoid destructive relativism and scepticism is to isolate some general laws or
values which remain basically untouched by the context in which they enter. As a result, these
traditional approaches to ethics and ethical decision-making reveal a rather unsatisfactory
tendency (even temptation) to resolve ethical questions in the abstract or in terms of
(universal) absolutes (cf. Fontinell1970: 209).
More recently, these two traditional approaches to ethics and, in particular, their abstract and
universalising tendencies, have increasingly come under attack (Usher 2000: 29; Warren 1997:
138). The voices of situationists as well as feminine and feminist ethicists appear to be the
most influential in this context. Both situation and relational ethics demand that, above and
beyond any set of abstract moral principles, it is the unique situation as well as the individuals
in it that should take precedence in the face of any given moral dilemma (Simons & Usher
2000: 2-3). It is exactly this bold (and, in a sense, balancing) critique of more traditional
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ethical theories which brought the potential contribution of situation and relational ethics to my
attention and so required their incorporation into my ongoing ethical reflection.
In the situation described above, I would - in terms of situation ethics - not be bound by any
specified rule or standard about the kinds of action that would be obligatory or forbidden,
commendable or condemnable. I would simply be encouraged to focus on the concrete as
opposed to the abstract, that is, to openly recognise the unique or particular features of those
persons or situations about which a moral decision needs to be made. I would thus be free, for
instance, to terminate the interview session provisionally and to first discuss the implications
of continuing with the participant. In situationist terms, such a course of action would tell of
no strict adherence to any 'ready-made' universally applicable moral guidelines; yet, it would
be equally fitted both to this unique situation and to the interests of this particular participant.
But what would determine the "moral good" of the action taken? The dedicated situationist
would presumably seek guidance in the demand to "love". It would indeed appear that, in
essence, the situationist approach boils down to a notion that whenever an act is done in social
attitude of "love" such an act is "good" (cf. McCabe 1970: 68-70). This then would be the
extent of moral guidance offered under the auspices of "agapéic love". But would such
guidance not imply that human acts receive all their "moral goodness" solely from the
intention with which they are done? Could every action done in love be labelled morally
good? If I had, out of sheer concern, insisted that Cheryl stop talking immediately, would it be
morally good? Would it not perhaps be erosive of Cheryl's autonomy? What is more, are
there not some things one should never do, not even in the name of love? Had I, again out of
sheer concern, insisted that the participant should there and then plot her own suicide as this
would surely put an end to her misery, would that be morally good? Or would it rather be
malicious and evil? While these examples may appear to verge on the ridiculous they do serve
to make the point: aiming towards the highest and most fundamental 'motivation' - that is,
agapéic love - does not exempt the ethical thinker (nor of course the researcher) from the task
of closely probing the meanings of morality and of differentiating the praiseworthy from the
morally mediocre and, more urgently, the permissible from the wrong (Kolnai 1970: 256).
Finally, in the instance described above, what would the relational ethicist have asked me to
do? The caring relationship with Cheryl should have motivated me to respond to the perceived
need and to show "special concern" for the well-being of the participant. Cheryl is, after all,
not some abstract Other; she is a concrete human being - someone I have come to know and
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care about. Under such circumstances, it may very well be inappropriate to demand that I
should assess the moral dilemma independently of my feelings for those who are affected by
my actions. Moral deliberation does fall under the influence of emotion. To ignore the
concrete reality of this influence in favour of some abstraction such as absolute equality (of
say, all participants) may be not only impossible, but also undesirable (Gruen in Warren 1997:
76-7).
Acknowledging such a relationship of care within the research context, I could have opted to
discontinue the interview session. This would have served as an expression of care, showing
that I only have the participant's best interests at heart. However, it is also possible that such a
course of action might reveal more about my own sense of "being in debt" than of any true
sense of care for the participant. That is, by focusing exclusively on "care", a researcher
could, almost inadvertently, allow him- or herself to be burdened by a never-ending feeling of
'being in debt' towards participants (the "cared-for") who so unselfishly gave of themselves
for the purpose of research. Under such circumstances, the researcher would be held captive
by a misplaced feeling of debt from which he or she somehow cannot be delivered and in the
name of which he or she should comply with every reflex to "return the favour".
Furthermore, while based on sheer concern for Cheryl's well-being, such a course of action
may well have supported an unequal relationship between researcher and researched. Indeed,
would I not in this rather paternalistic way assume full control over the course of interaction,
over Cheryl and her participation? And how was I, as the "caring" researcher, to discern when
exactly her interaction was truly becoming too taxing for her? Even if Cheryl did signal
exertion, I might not necessarily have been sufficiently sensitive (or even receptive) to this
message. Clearly, morally responsible action cannot rely on emphatic concern alone. Rather,
a more complete interpretation of the I as a relational entity suggests that such concern should
be supported through ongoing interaction between the researcher and the participant to foster a
sense of shared responsibility for the ethical character of the interview situation.
Thus, my study served to reinforce an awareness perhaps common among but not often enough
explicitly stated by fellow social researchers: that no single moral principle can help us resolve
our moral dilemmas. I recognised that no single approach that emphasises a dominant moral
principle - be it utility, duty, situation or relation - could account for the immense range of
elements involved within any given moral dilemma. Given the limited scope of such single-
criteria approaches, I identified the need to consider a more integrated, more encompassing
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approach to ethical decision-making. This now leads me to argue in favour of a kind of
"ethical eclecticism" (Warren 1997: 242) which I perceive as far more likely than any of the
other single-criteria approaches to help us deal competently with the moral dilemmas
encountered in social research.
Conclusion
Like Sartre (and eventually perhaps also like Sartre's student), I too have realised through the
course of my study that solutions to the ethical problems of life and of research are in no sense
given. They cannot be found at the back of the book like the answers to mathematical
questions. In fact, any blind belief in given resolutions will only serve to conceal the extent to
which we must engage in conscious deliberation and reflection if we are to reach any
satisfactory solution to vexing moral dilemmas.
The need for - or necessity of - such reflection was clear throughout my study during which I
consulted many traditions of ethical thought. Each of these traditions has endeavoured to
identify those ultimate moral principles that will be able to guide our actions. In their efforts
to advance their own moral rationale, these traditions have presented moral principles which
emphasise such values as utility, duty, situation, and relation so forcefully that they (at least at
first) seem to be wholly irreducible, even absolute. Yet, such principles and their values are
not somehow "given" or "imposed" upon human life (or for that matter upon the researcher)
from without. Instead, as Dewey (in FontinellI970: 210) suggests, they have developed out of
the very operations and needs of human life itself. Hence, inasmuch as human life is
continuously open to change and modification, so too are the principles and values to which it
gives existence. This means that while a framework of moral concepts may be as permanent
as human life itself, the moral concepts which it contains carry in themselves no absolute
certainty. Such moral concepts do not have "a privileged position of being beyond review and
criticism. No values are protected from critical scrutiny and reinterpretation on the basis of
developing thought and experience. All values must continually be capable of being not
merely asserted, butjustifi.ed in the human community" (FontinellI970: 210).
Thus, far from mechanically accepting the principles and values of any handed-down morality,
I set out to reflectively engage with and critically scrutinise those principles advanced by a
collection of pertinent ethical traditions. In my efforts to do so, I (re-)discovered that no single
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moral principle can provide any real guarantee of ease in the resolution of practical moral
dilemmas. No ethical theory dominated by a single moral principle can present all the relevant
considerations to the moral agent. In fact, an exclusive focus on one principle of moral
responsibility is likely to result in a tendency to confine the moral outlook to what is easier (or
more convenient) to notice, to codify, and to apply. While allowing the moral agent to act
without indecision, such an approach is not truly helpful. On the contrary, the "single-
mindedness" of one presiding persuasion all too often transforms into an uncomplicated
"simple-mindedness" (Glen 2000: 21) where the moral agent's deliberation fails "to match the
world as it really is" (Williams in Glen 2000: 21). Such a state of mind easily becomes tinged
with an air of comfortable self-righteousness and can only be conducive to an all too mediocre,
trivial and inadequate conception of morality (cf. Glen 2000: 14-5; Kolnai 1970: 241).
I therefore am of the opinion that any attempt to make valid judgements about moral activity
based solely on a single principle is bound to distort my sense of moral responsibility.
However, rejecting the use of a single principle does not necessarily leave me stranded, for I
agree with Warren (1997: 22-3) that an account of moral responsibility which accommodates a
greater diversity of insights drawn from a number of ethical traditions is likely to prove far
more useful in research practice than one that appears to pursue theoretical simplicity at all
costs. Only such a multi-criterial account of our moral responsibility can incorporate the
sound ethical considerations that underlie each of the single-criterial theories, while avoiding
. the obvious distortions they may individually introduce (cf. Usher 2000: 37; Warren 1997:
177).
An approach that permits us to integrate those diverse factors that shape our moral
responsibility represents a step towards what Warren (1997: 242) calls "ethical eclecticism".
This approach does not centre on anyone aspect of a moral dilemma in isolation from other
aspects. Rather, it acknowledges and engages with the values of both the abstract and the
concrete, the universal and the particular, the impartial and the emotional, the individual and
the relationship. While not all these properties that constitute the totality of a moral dilemma
will always be equally important, not one of them need to be elevated to the exclusion of the
others. On the contrary, what would determine the most morally sensible course of action in
the face of a practical moral dilemma is the conscious and critically reflective weighing and
evaluation of the diversity of pertinent properties and principles that may have a bearing on the
particular situation (cf. Glen 2000: 14-5). In the process of doing so, of taking a step towards
an ethical eclecticism, we as researchers become able to avoid the aura of certainty (and the
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concurrent demand for unyielding commitment) that surrounds seemingly absolute principles.
We instead attend to the diversity of properties and principles in a particular situation, evaluate
their relative weight and importance, and then act decisively. At the same time, we remain
open to the discovery of new features, and willing to review our assessment of the situation in
the light of ongoing experience (cf. Fontinell 1970:213).
While I may speculate that to so take account of the astounding complexity of a moral
situation represents a preferred way to advance from appreciating the good to actually doing it,
I must concede that it is not an easy task, neither to describe nor to perform. Still, its
demanding character does not excuse us from taking a stand, let alone permit us to simply
follow our whims. Thus, despite the fact that we can have no absolute certainty, we must
reflect, decide and act (cf. Usher 2000: 36). In so doing, even the most exhaustive listing of
relevant properties and principles will not in itself result in an ethical decision. After all, there
can be no question of moral responsibility if ethical decision-making simply involved a kind of
deduction derived from premises pre-given by society (cf. Cunningham 1970: 11; Simons
2000: 39-40). There is obviously no substitute for personal deliberation and reflection, albeit
of the sort that will almost invariably be tinged with a certain tentativeness, even
"undecidability" (Usher 2000: 36). In this sense, Fletcher (1970b: 276) may very well be
correct in asserting that "in the last analysis, one's ethics comes down to a decision, not a
conclusion; it is a matter of faith posited, not of fact verifiable empirically".
In the light of its timidity, the multi-criterial approach suggested here may appear to many as
too tepid and hesitant. To a degree this perception is true for I certainly do not confidently
claim to offer a perfect (let alone instant) resolution to every vexing moral dilemma. In fact, a
controlling presupposition for me, as for Sartre, is that there are no absolutely definitive
resolutions for life's most troubling moral dilemmas. Yet, I do believe that a step towards
ethical eclecticism may well enable us to deal more constructively with such dilemmas, even if
only by leading us to recast them in such a way that certain blind alley resolutions are once and
for all avoided. What is more, a step towards ethical eclecticism may also put us on the way to
more fully re-conceptualising our approach to ethical decision-making within the social
research context. Such are-conceptualisation - mediated by a commitment to practical
relevance - must be undertaken to provide research ethics with a workable, defensible model
of ethical decision-making in challenging research situations. I submit that it would be fruitful
to start this process with ethical eclecticism as a point of departure.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
430
References
Cunningham, R.L. 1970. Introduction, in Cunningham, RL. (ed.) Situationism and the new
morality. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Dupré, L. 1970. Situation ethics and objective morality, in Cunningham, RL. (ed.)
Situationism and the new morality. NewYork: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Fletcher, 1. 1970a. Love is the only measure, in Cunningham, RL. (ed.) Situationism and
the new morality. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Fletcher, J. 1970b. A situationist's feedback, in Cunningham, RL. (ed.) Situationism and
the new morality. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Fontinell, E. 1970. Towards an ethics of relationships, in Cunningham, RL. (ed.)
Situationism and the new morality. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Glen, S. 2000. The dark side of purity or the virtues of double-mindedness? in Simons, H. &
Usher, R (eds.) Situated ethics in educational research. London: Routledge Falmer.
Kolnai, A. 1970. A defence of intrinsicalism against 'situation ethics', in Cunningham, RL.
(ed.) Situationism and the new morality. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
McCabe, H. 1970. The validity of absolutes, in Cunningham, RL. (ed.) Situationism and
the new morality. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Simons, H. 2000. Damned if you do, damned if you don't: Ethical and political dilemmas in
evaluation; in Simons, H. & Usher, R. (eds.) Situated ethics in educational research.
London: Routledge Falmer.
Simons, H. & Usher, R 2000. Introduction: Ethics in the practice of research; in Simons, H.
& Usher, R (eds.) Situated ethics in educational research. London: Routledge
Falmer.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
431
Tong, R. 1993. Feminine and feminist ethics. Belmont: Wadsworth.
Usher, P. 2000. Feminist approaches to situated ethics; in Simons, H. & Usher, R. (eds.)
Situated ethics in educational research. London: Routledge Fa1mer.
Warren, M.A. 1997. Moral status: Obligations to persons and other living things.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
432
Chapter 20
Research description: "What went on here"
For Tait (in Stark 1998: 212) "what all of us who write produce simply stands as the version of
'what went on here'''. Within the context of social research, the production of such a
"version" - as the researcher's final description - represents a complex process that involves
the transformation ofparticipants' stories into the pages of written research findings.
In this study this process of transformation was very deliberately not based on a conception of
participants' stories as some "internal representation" (Pollio et al. 1997: 28) contained in the
mind of a participant just waiting to be externalised and represented by the researcher. I did
not seek to "externalise" anything for that would imply that I was looking for one (more or
most) truthful version to be captured without adding too much bias in the process. I did not
regard the ways through which my participants chose to describe their experiences as
distorting, nor did I consider myself an intrinsic source of error. Had I proceeded otherwise
(more "conventionally" perhaps), I would have chased in vain after the unrealisable fiction of
"absolute truth". What is more, I would have taken the risk of wholly missing the very focus
of my study in the presentation of its findings: concrete human experience.
For me, as for other researchers like Pollio et al. (1997: 31), there is no question of retrieving
some "internal representation" which could somehow be directly reflected on the pages of the
researcher's text. Internal representation is but a chimerical entity. As an alternative I choose
to regard all understanding as constructed through social discourse. In this way, I can
recognise the participants as the "producers", as the ones who tell or perform their personal
stories. And I could recognise my own role as "coaxer" of stories, as the one who persuades
and invites these personal performances (cf. Barbour & Huby 1998: 12). It is through the
relationship between the producer and the coaxer that a life story becomes constructed around
specific events and happenings. It is this relationship which harbours the meaning the coaxer
wishes to pin down in words in the written research text.
The description constructed through the research relationship is, very much unlike any rigid
internal representation, no dull static entity. It is a dynamic story in which the social and the
personal fuses in complex and multiple ways - and in which the researcher's self plays a
critical role. Here, the researcher not only serves as the "protagonist in the exchange of tales"
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(Barbour & Huby 1998: 12). The researcher also reflects, and reflects upon, and actively
contributes to the production of the final description - of the version of "what went on here".
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to the development of a better understanding of this
social process of interaction and construction through which the research description is
produced. In doing so, I hope to explore and lay open the specific ways in and through which I
came to interpret and describe the unique human experience that I studied.
Establishing "out-there-ness"
Heaphy (1998: 31) acknowledges that the academic disciplines in which we operate playa
crucial role in defining the appropriate methodological approach. For the most part, the social
sciences are marked by the legacy of "objectivity" that is central to scientific claims of
expertise and the "privileged position" of the knower. Here, objective knowledge is regarded
as consisting of general mental representations which obtain their meanings exclusively
through their capacity to correspond to the external world. Objective knowledge representing
real world events has priority over personal experience in which representation of inner states
cannot be excluded. Thus, it is not what I feel or what I experience that counts, but rather "how
things are".
A perspective that stands firmly in line with this positivist legacy is contained within the
position of a "disinterested observer" (Schutz 1962: 137). For Schutz (1962: 63), the
researcher wishing to adopt the perspective of a disinterested observer is never present in his or
her private capacity and should in no way become involved as such in the research situation.
After all, this situation is, for the truly disinterested observer, "merely of cognitive interest".
In effect this approach implies that all aspects of the researcher's very being undergo a
fundamental modification (Schutz 1962: 63; 248). The researcher as disinterested observer
replaces a personal (practical) structure of relevance with the more theoretical interest of the
research question. The selected scientific problem alone determines what is relevant for the
researcher as well as the conceptual frame of reference guiding the researcher. What is more,
the researcher as disinterested observer also endeavours to replace the personally constituted
biographical situation with what might be called a "scientific situation". The researcher has
now abandoned all "essentially actual" experiences that have been characteristic of life within
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the naïve ("non-scientific") "natural attitude". To complete this transformation into the
ultimate manifestation of detachment, the researcher attempts to bracket the entire
conglomerate of social and physical experience. Indeed, every part of the researcher's
existence, of the self, is to be bracketed - suspended, placed "outside". This is what Husserl
(in Schutz 1962: 104) advocated as the "phenomenological reduction" of all possible sources
of conceptual bias that may distort the researcher's interpretive vision.
So the researcher striving to attain the status of "disinterested observer" becomes a theoretical
thinker with no physical environment, as there is no longer any section of the world within
immediate reach. More importantly, the theorising self is also a solitary unit, standing outside
all social relationships (Schutz 1962: 253). What remains after the performance of such
"transcendental reduction is", according to Schutz (1962: 105), "nothing less than the universe
of our conscious life, the stream of thought in its integrity". This, the pure stream of thought,
is then regarded as the "ideal" (read: the least biased) perspective from which the researcher
can proceed to interpret.
There is, however, a problem (possibly several) with the approach personified by the
"disinterested observer". For, as Pollio et al. (1997: 47) recognise, complete bracketing is
simply impossible to achieve. The researcher (as any other human being) simply does not
know the self well enough to bracket every possible presupposition, belief, and preconception,
not to mention emotion, passion, impression and affection. The demands made of the
researcher by this type of bracketing clearly goes far beyond what is humanly attainable.
Despite this researchers, still striving (knowingly or unknowingly) to realise the positivist ideal
of the disinterested knower, have ingeniously learned to portray themselves as privileged
knowers in the constructions and presentations they offer. Hence, when researchers present
the research process in a reconstructed form they (are encouraged to) do so in a way that will
strip their "self' from their descriptions or describe their involvement in ways that will testify
to the necessary distance between their "self' and the social world they claim to present.
One of the most basic ways through which to put the social reality that is being studied outside
all human agency - and certainly outside the researcher's influence - is by employing a
grammatical device that excises the producer from the description - rather use "it was found
that ... " instead of "I found that ... ". Another way of creating the illusion of sufficient
detachment involves the deliberate construction of consensus and corroboration by presenting
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a conclusion as a shared one ("we argue... "), instead of being unique to one ("I argue... ").
Descriptive passages of this kind certainly prevent attempts to discount them as the product of
one particular person. Another familiar form of constructing "disinterest" and "detachment"
works in a rather different, almost contradictory way. This involves detail and narrative that
fashions a story or a scene so "real" and so remarkably vivid that the reader feels as if he or
she had "observed directly". The reader is, as it were, pulled into the scene and put there in
the place of the researcher.
Together, these "externalising" approaches fall under the banner of "out-there-ness" (Potter
1996: 150). These procedures deliberately draw emphasis away from the nature of the
producer by constructing the description as independent of the agent doing the production. It
is in this sense that Latour and Woolgar (in Hacking 1999: 81) make the interesting point that
"out-there-ness" is "the consequence of scientific work rather than its cause". While this is not
to say that there is no "reality", it does serve to emphasise that what we say about it is in a
sense made, constructed, so as to appear independent of the constructor.
Traditionally, this very effect of "out-there-ness", as engendered through the use of
externalising approaches such as those described above, have been a significant source of
power behind researchers' voices. Through presenting themselves as truly disinterested
observers in the descriptions they produce, researchers have indeed been able to write about
the experiences of others as though these are directly available to them. However, in doing so,
the powerful position (or illusion) of "disinterested observer" also deceives the reader because
it obscures the fact that these very experiences are inevitably transformed by the researcher's
very construction of them. As a result of this obstruction, the reader does not know and,
hence, cannot question how or why the researcher, who remains hidden, claims to know what
he or she does (Stanley and Wise 1993: 155). For Heaphy (1998: 31), the danger involved in
the construction of "out-there-ness" goes further than deceiving the reader. He argues that
when we so eagerly "edit out" our own voice, we may very well easily become silenced in
other respects of the research endeavour as well. And we may not even be aware of it.
Based on this view, Stanley and Wise (1983: 195; 1993: 166) strongly urge researchers to
avoid the perspective afforded by the position of "disinterested observer". Researchers are,
instead, encouraged to present comprehensive analytical accounts of how and why they think
they know what they do about the research situation and the participants involved in it.
Researchers should, in other words, be particularly concerned "with presenting ourselves and
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our understanding of what is going on". "We must make ourselves vulnerable", Stanley and
Wise (1993: 166) say, and "not hide behind what 'they' are supposed to think and feel, say and
do". For Stanley andWise, this approach re-introduces an appropriate (and perhaps long over-
due) emphasis on the researcher's responsibility for the description produced. In addition, it
also ideally enables researchers to reveal in their descriptions the truly contextualised nature of
human experience and understanding that so often succumbs under the legacy of objectivity.
Many researchers have hesitated in embracing this direction which places such a deliberate
emphasis on the role and influence of the researcher's self in the production of a written
research description. Rosaldo (in Stark 1998: 210), for instance, wished to avoid introducing
the self into the research account for fear of simply adding to a collection of "essays laced with
trendy amalgams of continental philosophy and autobiographical snippets". Yet, according to
Stark (1998: 210-211), Rosaldo himself found it necessary to introduce his own experience of
grief to explain how the rage in grief compelled the Ilongot men to headhunt. Before losing
his wife, he could not fully understand the force of anger possible in bereavement. The death
of his wife however released in him feelings which he then came to recognise as those
experienced by the Ilongot. He then felt in a position to revise his earlier understanding of
Ilongot headhunting to include a focus on the anger and rage that grief provokes.
Rosaldo's personal expenence was clearly extremely pertinent to his study of Ilongot
headhunting. In a similar sense, my own personal biography is important in order to
understand how the particular understanding I presented was produced. An undeniable part of
my biography was (and is) my own illness experience. The awareness of a shared experience
with my participants was almost always present - and specifically in the interpretation and
description of the research data. This recognition confirms that "interpretation cannot begin
from a tabula rasa" (Cohen in Stark 1998: 211). Hence, far from denying our presence and
influence in interpretation and description, we must use all the resources of sense making that
are available to us. Each researcher's "sense making" will therefore be different and very
much dependent on his or her own set of personal experiences.
Seeing from a perspective
An acceptance of the researcher's self as fully part of the interpretation that is developed, at
once demands a recognition that the way in which the researcher looks an Other's experience
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would undoubtedly bear the mark of the knowing mind - the researcher's mind. Thus, what
the researcher is able to see depends on how the researcher looks at what is given.
This fact - that the researcher interprets and describes an Other's experience from a particular
perspective which is inevitably limited - stood out clearly in this study. During one particular
interview with Helen, for a brief moment of rare insight, I suddenly just knew that I would
never be able to fully comprehend what exactly had transpired during Helen (or anyone else's)
experience of illness. I could perhaps (re-)construct glimpses of this experience, but I would
never be able to grasp the full force, the impact, and the repercussions, of her illness. I would,
in other words, never be able to see into her experience, into her being, as though I was simply
looking through a pane of glass into somebody else's home. I would never be able to live
through all the conscious states and meaning-endowing acts which constituted her experiences
for her in a particular way. In short, I could never be the Other; I could never be Helen. What
I saw would always be partial, incomplete and limited. This moment of insight sharply (and
almost painfully) outlined the shortcomings of my own understanding.
Yet, recognising the limitations of my own comprehension of an Other's experiences should
not necessarily entirely negate the possibility of ever understanding an Other's experience.
Here, I choose to agree with Schutz (1967:99) when he argues that "we are asserting neither
that your lived experiences remain in principle inaccessible to me nor that they are
meaningless to me. Rather, the point is that the meaning I give to your experiences cannot be
precisely the same as the meaning you give to them when you proceed to interpret them". So,
as the Other's world is not given to me in a direct fashion, I cannot share the exact point of
view from which the Other has conferred meaning onto the lived experiences in question. We
are looking at these lived experiences from two different points of view; our perspectives
differ.
Schutz (1962: 210; 1967: 69) explains that, within the world under the researcher's reflective
gaze, the meaning of experiences is not an inherent quality of the experiences. Meaning does
not lie in the experience itself. Instead, meaning is situated in the way in which the researcher
reflectively regards the experience. In this sense the researcher, as the knowing mind,
constitutes the very source of meaning. In Schutz's (1967: 73) phraseology, the researcher
becomes the "Ego-ray" emanating its light - its meaning - over every given experience.
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When the researcher turns a reflective glance to the experiences of Others to ask for their
meaning, what is discerned depends very specifically on what Schutz (1962: 212) calls the
researcher's "attention to life" .. This is the basic regulative principle of the researcher's
conscious life, which both defines the realm relevant to the researcher and determines the
attention directed by the researcher to the given experiences. The researcher's "attention to
life" is, however, not a static entity. It is, instead, very open to modification and is capable of
showing all sorts of shadings: from actual comprehending to merely noting to hardly noticing
to leaving completely unobserved (Schutz 1967: 73-74). For the researcher, every moment in
time - every Here and Now - is constituted by such attentional modifications. Consequently,
the interpretation (or meaning) the researcher imputes to an Other's experiences depends on
those attentional modifications marking the very moment of interpretation, that is, the actual
Here and Now from which the researcher is looking.
Within the moment of interpretation, the meaning of a lived experience consists in the ordering
of this experience within the total configuration of the researcher's experiences that is present-
at-hand (Schutz 1967: 78-83). So the researcher's "schemes of experience" present in the Here
and Now become the meaning-context to which all new experiences, once apprehended in the
glance of attention, are referred. Schutz (1967: 83) refers to this process of referral as a
"synthesis of recognition". For Schutz (1967: 84), this process of ordering lived experience by
means of synthetic recognition represents the very gist of interpretation. Hence, the schemes
of experience (the known) to which every newly apprehended experience (the unknown) is
referred, in effect, become the researcher's "interpretive schemes" (Schutz 1967: 84). Again,
these schemes cannot but bear the mark of the actual Here and Now through and from which
the researcher's interpretive glance is operating.
An important component of the researcher's interpretive schemes, of the configuration of
meaning that guide interpretation, is the researcher's presuppositions, prejudices, and
preunderstandings. There is indeed no such thing as "pre-suppositionless" interpretation
(Douglas 1970: 21). After all, as Heidegger (in Pollio et al. 1997: 349) points out, "any
interpretation which is to contribute to understanding must already have understood what is to
be interpreted". Moreover, any interpretation of lived experience requires the interpreter to
bring to bear a particular frame of reference, a pre-understanding of the world. In this way, an
interpretation is very much contextualised by the pre-understanding manifest in the interpretive
situation (Pollio et al. 1997: 46). The active presence of pre-understanding certainly need not
be regarded as a mere inevitable imperfection simply to be tolerated in the act of interpretation.
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Neither need it be applied in a dogmatic or blinding manner (Pollio et al. 1997: 46). Instead,
what it contains is the promise of a certain way of knowing, of making sense, of interpreting.
And all that is asked of the researcher is to commit to a thorough explication of every pre-
understanding operative within the interpretive context (Douglas 1970: 22). While such an
explication can, of course, never be complete, it can nevertheless advance the researcher's
interpretive scheme ... and hence also the interpretation presented.
In fact, the researcher's interpretation changes through the explication of all pre-understanding,
and through becoming more aware of the background that influences the researcher's
perspective. In turn, as the researcher's interpretation changes, so the researcher's pre-
understanding is modified by the (new) understanding gained (Potter 1996: 49). There exists,
then, a continuous process of going back and forth, with "earlier" and "later" parts
continuously being modified in the light of the unfolding understanding (Pollio et al. 1997:
51). The aim of this continuous process of revision and renewal is certainly not to establish
some kind of "generalis ability" . Rather, it is to improve the researcher's interpretive vision.
Aside from personal pre-understanding per se, there is one more important - though often-
neglected - component shaping the researcher's interpretive schemes and, hence, the
interpretation presented. This component is highlighted by Harding (1986: 158-161) when she
explains that the researcher's interpretive perspective has very much to do with the "bigger
picture", with the greater historical influences operative at the time of interpretation.
According to Harding's discussion, the researcher's interpretive schemes incorporate and
reflect the shifts in social life that make a particular way - perhaps a new way - of
understanding possible. In effect, these social changes serve as the preconditions for
interpreting in a particular way, for producing a particular construction. And these social
changes need to be located, because only then can the researcher's interpretation be fully
regarded as an expression of the ways in which social life can be understood by a new kind of
historical person.
Clearly, what follows from the active process of interpretation can never be regarded as a
static, decontextualised, a-historical "thing-in-itself' somehow simply reflecting how things
"really" are. Neither can it be reckoned as intrinsic to the experiences interpreted nor as a pure
projection of the researcher's own world. Rather, as Pollio et al. (1997: 52) suggest, the
researcher's interpretation seems better construed as a perceptual entity, a complex pattern
afforded by the given experiences as well as by the researcher's interpretive schemes operative
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in the actual Here and Now of interpretation. Also, as the researcher's interpretive schemes
(and all their constitutive elements) are forever (in every different Here and Now) open to
elaboration and modification, it can never be entirely exhaustive. This means, as Schutz
(1967: 85) puts it, that "no lived experience can be exhausted by a single interpretive scheme.
Rather, every lived experience is open to numerous interpretations".
Thus, the involvement of the self in the interpretive process demands a recognition that what I
saw was very much a function of my self - of how I looked, of what I attended to, of the
moment from which I looked, of my own sedimented experiences, of my own pre-
understandings, and of my own socio-historical position. In short, I acknowledge that my
interpretation and description followed from who I was in my own Here and Now. The self
through which I had engaged with participants and through which I was now developing a
description was socially and historically contingent. As a result of this recognition, I was in a
better position to practically engage with the forces that had shaped my interpretation and fmal
version of "what went on here".
Telling it like a story
The description I had produced (and am producing even now) can in no way be regarded as a
neutral, transparent description of "reality". Description in social research, as Potter (1996:
218) suggests, can rarely (if ever) be regarded as a simple inconsequential aggregation of
"facts". Rather, it is often very much like a story, a narrative marked by the conventions and
limitations of the literary domain.
A critical part of the art of story telling lies in the way in which the story captivates (and
convinces) its audience. To achieve this, researchers often opt for those quotations which,
although typical in some respects, make the point more vividly, succinctly or humorously than
do others in their store (Barbour 1998: 193). As Edmondson (in Barbour 1998: 193) explains,
if "we regard such citations as rhetorical devices for enabling and encouraging readers to
perceive the force of general remarks, we can expect examples to exhibit particularly
concentrated cases of what happens generally but, perhaps, less remarkably". We thus use the
"atypical to highlight the typical" (Barbour 1998: 193).
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Here, as Barbour (1993: 193) notes, fine judgement is required. And we do not always get it
right. In selecting quotes for presentation to one's peer group, one is perhaps on firmer
ground. Steeped in a common literature, involved in similar theoretical debates, and familiar
with the particular form of work, one is likely to better anticipate what would work for this
audience. However, it is much harder to select appropriate examples, excerpts or quotes for
other audiences, who may be unsympathetic to both the form (viewing our enterprise as
"anecdotal" or "journalistic") and content (seeing our examples as sensationalist, unkind or
indicative of an detrimental interest) of our work
Indeed, despite a plethora of methods texts bursting with advice on coding and analysis, there
is, as Barbour (1998: 194) observes, "little practical guidance available on choosing examples
for our oral and written presentations". In many cases, the selection of such material for
presentation appears to be a matter of "taste", with all the graduations and subtleties which this
implies. Given that this is hardly ever acknowledged, our writing may obscure far more than it
reveals. For as Richardson (in Barbour 1998: 194) argues, the researcher often "writes the
body of the text as though the quotations and document snippets are naturally there, genuine
evidence for the case being made, rather than selected, pruned and spruced up for their textual
appearance".
Following Barbour's (1998: 194) discussion, it is interesting to note that we as researchers are
"unlikely to devote as much time or energy to 'sprucing up' quotes from our respondents as we
do to perfecting our own prose". That is, in our published texts "we strive for cogent
arguments and elegant structure; however, by contrast, we generally take pride in leaving the
utterances of our respondents untouched, quoting them verbatim, frozen forever in the
inarticulacy brought about by our imperfect questions and need for on-the-spot answers". As a
result of such attempts to make the voice of "the other" heard by quoting directly, "we may in
fact open ourselves to more criticism than when we embed what particular respondents tell us
in generalities" (Brettell in Barbour 1998: 194).
There is no easy answer to dilemmas such as these. In this study this was definitely true.
When reading the written version of my interviews with the participants, I have the feeling that
they somehow seem halted, drifting even, with tangents and interruptions, with floods of
words and sudden silences. The flow of the interviews - once captured on paper - seem
awkward, even clumsy at times. Yet this has to be understood as a result of the participants'
state of health at the time of the interviews, combined with the experience that they were trying
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to describe. Participants were severely ill, some more so than others. This meant that their
energies - especially their mental energy - were not constant throughout our conversations.
Because of the illness - and the fatigue brought on by the interview itself - participants often
lost track of their thoughts, even lost words. And once word and thoughts were recalled,
instances forming part of an earlier part of the conversation were often interjected again -
before floating off again into the fogginess that was their memory. Also, participants were
trying to put into words an experience that eluded easy description. In some cases, participants
had rarely thought about it in any depth and now took the time to do so in the interview.
Hence, as ideas emerged, these were shared, not necessarily in any coherent order, but rather
as they explored and uncovered their own experiences in and through our relationship. While
this was exactly the purpose of the interview and ofthe research itself, it did not make for easy
reading once transcribed.
Faced by the "awkwardness" of interviews translated into static text, I needed to establish the
extent to which I was willing to change - or edit - participants' quotations for presentation as
part of my story. While in a small nagging way I was afraid that the outcome of our
conversations could lead readers to doubt the integrity of the research process, or worse yet of
the participants, I could not bring myself to completely "edit out" the pauses or even the
incoherency. For me it was not only part of the research experience - it was part of the illness
experience. It was not a mere hindrance - it was data.
Regardless of the extent of the editing undertaken, researchers typically use participants'
narratives to make a specific point (Barbour 1998: 195). This may be done by using their
stories in a relatively straightforward way to describe their experience. However, it may also
involve a search for significance in the seemingly unproblematic, imputing meaning to an
experience as an example of a phenomenon in which we are interested. We should however,
as Barbour (1998: 195) cautions, be wary of the impact that this approach might have. The
participants may not necessarily receive it kindly when their experiences are treated not simply
as interesting in their own right, but as examples of something else. They may be offended or
feel that "we have breached the contract they believe us to have made with them whereby we
have promised to "tell their story"; for now, what we are telling is our own story". The
implication of this is harsh: for regardless of how much we seek to involve our participants,
when we use their experiences to make statements about matters of our own (academic)
interest, we ultimately subordinate them to "the uses of the discipline" (Strathem in Barbour
1998: 195).
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Thus, for me as for other researchers such as Potter (1996: 94), the production of the final
research text was very much like story telling. In other words, I made use of those procedures,
so extensively refined in the art of story telling, to paint a scene to make it seem vivid and
alive, to talk of a participant as though I have known her for a lifetime, to explore emotions in
a way that makes them palpable, even tangible, to the reader. In doing so, I heavily depended
on the use of participant statements. And while persistently seeking to do justice to the social
world under study, my story was inevitably limited. As the storyteller (with an academic)
purpose), I was necessarily selective, emphasising certain details or themes at the expense of
others (Barbour & Huby 1998: 12). In other words, I selected for interpretation and
presentation a particular range of participant statements while ignoring or backgrounding
others. As a result only apart of participants' experiences became "constituted" through my
description, while another part was (almost inadvertently) "avoided".
Pawluch (in Potter 1996: 184) refers to this practice as "ontological gerrymandering". Potter
(1996: 184-187) explains that, given the infinite number of dimensions comprised within the
social reality investigated, any single production would inevitably fall short of including it all.
This practice clearly introduces the possibility of producing a description that may differ - in
vast degree - from another description concerned with the very same phenomena in. In fact,
highly contrasting "versions" of the "same thing" could so be produced without ever reverting
to inaccuracy, falsehood or active confabulation. In this sense, then, "ontological
gerrymandering" - as the way in which the boundaries of a story is drawn - becomes one of
the most powerful devices through which a researcher can (and in this case did) manage the
description produced.
Categorising experiences - and people
When observations - any observation - enter the currency of science, they do so in terms of
utterances or some form of written discourse. Potter (1996: 167-177) points out that this
always - even in its simplest form - involves some form of categorisation. It is therefore not
just a matter of seeing; it is seeing it as something. By implication, then, categorisation can
never be understood as a rather banal naming process through which the right word is assigned
to the thing that shows the appropriate properties (as though the word simply mirrors the
thing!). On the contrary, it is through categorisation that the specific sense, the meaning and
qualities, of something is constructed.
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Thus, the categories through which I had chosen to disclose my story can never be regarded as
a neutral or abstract set of descriptive pigeon-holes. Throughout the study, I chose to avoid
imposing excessive theoretical meanings onto the story told by rendering the description as far
as possible in the terms used by the participants themselves. Although I did not go out of my
way to avoid the more abstract language so common to the social sciences, I did find that
descriptive terms were often most "experience-near" when they were based on what Pollio et
al. (1907: 49) call "body words", that is, terms that relate to the very corporeality of the human
experiences under study. Still, despite this approach, the categories through which my
description was produced undeniably both reflected and interacted with a broader (theoretical
and material) context (cf. Potter 1996: 218). This implies that the repercussions of the chosen
descriptive categories may reach far beyond the immediate written research text. It may
indeed, as Hacking (1999: 31) suggests, touch the very people and the experiences it seeks to
describe.
Hacking (1999: 31) points to a number of repercussions that may follow from categorising
experiences - and people - in a particular way. Hacking believes that "ways of classifying
human beings interact with the human beings who are classified". There may be a number of
reasons for this. People think of themselves "as of a kind", rejecting certain classifications
while accepting others. In addition, all our acts are "under descriptions, and the acts that are
open to us, depend, in a purely formal way, on the descriptions available to us". This means
that the courses of action we choose, and indeed our ways of being, are by no means
independent of the available descriptions under which we act. Moreover, "classifications do
not exist only in the empty space of language, but in institutions, practices, material
interactions with things and other people". In other words, the ME sufferer and her
experiences - as constructed in my description - is not only "a kind of' person. She is also a
human being, a living entity, who is likely to interact, to a greater or lesser extent, with the
categories (or classifications) constructed around her and her experience.
Hacking (1999: 31) maintains that such interactions "do not just happen". Being such self-
aware creatures, people are aware of what is said about them, thought about them, done to
them. They think about and conceptualise themselves. So, an ME sufferer may learn through
my construction that she is a certain kind of person - and act accordingly. That is, they may
become not only people who suffer from a specific illness, but, in their own self-
consciousness, ME sufferers as I have constructed them. They may "make tacit or even
explicit choices, adapt or adopt ways of living" so as to fit into or get way from the very
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classification that may be applied (have been applied) to them. These very choices,
adaptations or adoption have consequences for the very group, "for the kind of people that is
invoked". The result may be "particularly strong interactions". What was known about people
of a kind may become false because people of that kind may have changed because of what
they believe about themselves, or because of how they have been treated or classified.
Hacking (1999: 34) calls this phenomenon "the looping effect of human kinds".
Looping effects are, as Hacking (1999: 34) notes, everywhere: "Think what the category of
genius did to those Romantics who saw themselves as geniuses, and what their behavior did in
turn to the category of genius itself. Think about the transformations effected by the notions of
fat, overweight, anorexic". Now think about the construction presented in Part IV and how
this might affect the ME sufferer and her experience of illness. Like Hacking (1999: 32), I do
not wish to overemphasise the (self-)awareness of an individual. The more important point
rather lies in the observation that the categorisations of the social sciences - of this study - are
(intentionally or unintentionally) interactive. An awareness of this interaction should (and did)
sensitise the researcher throughout the construction of a story about the human reality that was
studied.
Here my concern was specifically with those classifications that, when known by people or by
those around them, and especially when put to work in institutions, are likely to change the
ways in which individuals experience themselves - and may even lead people to evolve their
feelings and behaviour in part because they are so classified. In other words, I was attentive to
the ways in which a classification and the individuals so classified may interact, with the ways
in which individuals may become self-aware of being of (classified as) a particular kind, even
if only because they are treated as being of that kind, and so come to experience themselves in
that way.
Recognising the possibility of such dynamic interaction, Hacking (1999: 162) raises a pertinent
concern about the ways in which individuals classified in a particular way must now deal with
the difficult question of personal reality. For instance, what would happen to the woman who
now comes to see herself as an ME sufferer? In the case of a woman who has been aware for
some time that she was suffering from some or other disease, labelled by whatever name, her
consciousness has simply been raised. However, where this applies to a woman who was used
to ascribing her "symptoms" to work or stress or other circumstances, consciousness has been
raised and changed. I am here referring to a new world in which a person gains knowledge she
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did not have before. She now sees herself as an ME sufferer, because she has a new concept
in terms of which to understand herself and her experiences. This scenario emphasises that, in
"worlds... constituted by kinds" (Hacking 1999: 162), the experience of ME - as presented in
my description - is now a new "kind" that may change people, change their very sense of who
they are and what their future might hold.
This effect might not only hold specific (if unintentional) consequences for the individuals
involved in and touched by the story I present, but also for the story itself. What my story
describes may in effect be (become) a moving target exactly because of the looping effect
where responsive, self-aware human beings are involved. That is, my story about the illness
experiences of ME sufferers may become known to the people classified, change the ways
these individuals behave, and loop back to force changes in the classifications - and the story -
about them (cf. Hacking 1999: 108-109). Because the targets of the social sciences are on the
move, my story may (almost inevitably) end up having a rather short-lived spell on centre
stage.
This recognition points to the contingent nature of classifications. Take ME, variously
described as the Icelandic Disease, Tapani Flu, the Royal Free Disease, Epidemic
Neuromyesthena, the Chronic Epstein Barr Virus, Post Viral Fatigue Syndrome, Chronic
Fatigue and Immune Dysfunction Syndrome (CFIDS), Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME),
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS), or even simply "yuppie flu" (cf. Part I). Each of these
classifications had a moment of glory. Each one has been associated with a regimen of
treatment and a system of exclusion or inclusion. And most of them were thought of as
classifications that improved the previous ones. These labels surely affected (or interacted
with) the experience both of those so classified and of their families, friends and communities.
At the time a particular classification was in use, it seemed a perfectly natural way to classify
people by using a particular combination of signs and symptoms. Yet when we review the
parade of ungainly labels, we quickly realise that these classifications are highly uncertain.
Each reflects the medical and social attitude of the epoch. And each changed - not necessarily
because a better way of classification became available - but perhaps exactly because looping
effects demanded re-classification (cf. Hacking 1999: 108-114).
In short, in the production of a description, researchers use categories to classify and describe
the experiences being studied. Yet these categories are not inevitable. Like the labels used to
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
447
classify those suffering from a specific set of symptoms, these categories are always
constructed in a specific period and for a specific purpose. And they could have been
different.
Constructing a possible world
Blum (1970: 304-305), referring to the work of Austin (1965), offers substantial insight by
describing the conceptualisation of a researcher's story (or "theory") as "a performative", that
is, as doing an activity. This means that the story I had told was not constructed for the sake of
description alone. It was constructed to perform.
Very much akin to Blum's conception, Potter (1996: 47) too draws attention to the fact that
"descriptions are not just about something but they are also doing something". This means
that my description was not only representing some facet of the social world and, hence,
cannot now simply be treated as some disembodied abstract representation of the social world
or of some part of it. No, my description was rather involved in the events of the social world
it was trying to describe. My description was a "constitutive" part of these events. That is, the
sense or the meaning of the events was, at least in part, constituted by my description. It is in
this sense then that, far from simply representing, my story was performing.
Once we accept the view that a description not only describes but also actively constructs, it
makes sense to ask: Of what events or actions is a description part? What is it doing? What
activity is being achieved through it? What is it constructing? Is it simply describing? Is it
reporting "the facts"? Is it making predictions? Is it instructing? Is it informing? Is it
warning? Blum (1970: 304-305) says that a researcher's description does none of these.
Instead, Blum (1970: 313) thinks, a researcher's story should be understood as a method for
creating an environment, a possible world. That is, the researcher's story is a "method for
transforming an object into a horizon of possibility and this into one possible possibility". The
possible possibility - "the possible society" - is what the social reality under investigation
means to and for the researcher. In accordance with this view, my description of the human
experiences of Others can then be seen as the construction of a "possible society" in a mould
that was meaningful to me.
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Blum (1970: 313) goes still further and explains that the "possible society" produced by the
researcher can be (should be?) regarded as "the theorist's methods for reforming his
knowledge of society. Since the theorist is engaged in re-forming his knowledge of society, he
can be seen as re-forming his knowledge. One who is re-forming his knowledge is re-forming
his self'. In other words, in creating and re-creating knowledge of society, I was presenting a
possible way of seeing society in a meaningful way. And I was doing so out of my own life,
out of my own history and biography. In this sense, then, my story had become - in terms of
what it had accomplished - an expression of self, even a re-formulation of self. My story had
(re-)constructedme.
Thus, far from a passive representation of the social reality in question, my story constituted a
dynamic performance. It was a performance that actively constructed the very world it was
attempting to describe. Itwas a performance that constructed how this world had meaning for
its producer. It was a performance that constructedme.
Constructing a possible world - with a purpose
Following from Blum's discussion, it is clear that my description is not only a (second-order)
construction, created upon the constructs of actors in the social setting under investigation. It
is also constructive. That is, it is actively constructing a particular version of the social reality
under study (as one "possible society"). The fact that I present this version - and not any other
- not only testifies to the fact that the story that I tell follows directly from my own
subjectivity as Blum's conception suggests. Very importantly, it also hints at a purpose - an
objective - that the researcher wishes to achieve by presenting this particular construction. For
Hacking (1999: 20), this makes my description intentionally constructive.
According to Hacking (1999: 20) a researcher may achieve a number of different purposes
when developing a particular construction of the social reality under study. A researcher may
wish to expose particular truth claims (in this case about the illness experience of ME
sufferers) as not necessarily (as is commonly assumed) inevitable. A researcher may go
further, showing that these claims are detrimental and should hence be modified or changed in
some way. One way of achieving this objective is by what Mannheim (in Hacking 1999: 20)
calls "the unmasking turn of mind". This approach does not seek to refute ideas, but to
undermine them by exposing the function they serve. The notion is that once one sees the
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"extra-theoretical function" of an idea, it will lose its "practical effectiveness". That is, the
researcher unmasks an idea not so much to "disintegrate" it as to strip it of a false appeal or
authority. Hacking (1999: 20) labels this approach as "unmasking constructionism". As an
"unrnasker" in this study I have, in presenting a (alternative) "possible society", endeavoured
to expose the ideologies that underlie the (public) idea afME and the suffering it causes and to
show what extra-theoretical functions and interests these ideologies reflect and serve.
"Unmasking", as Hacking (1999: 53) notes, has an overtone of "exposing something that was
deliberately covered, in order to conceal its true nature". The "unmasking turn of mind",
Mannheim wrote (in Hacking 1999: 53-54), is:
"a turn of mind which does not seek to refute, negate or call in doubt certain ideas, but rather
to disintegrate them ... We must pay attention, at this point, to the phemenological distinction
between 'denying the truth' of an idea, and 'determining the function' it exercises. In
denying the truth of an idea, I still presuppose it as 'thesis' and thus put myself upon the
same theoretical (and nothing but theoretical) basis as the one on which the idea is
constituted. In casting doubt upon the 'idea', I still think within the same categorical pattern
as the one in which it has its being. But when I do not even raise the question (or at least
when Ido not make this question the burden of my argument) whether what the idea asserts
is true, but consider it merely in terms of the extra-theoretical junctions it serves, then, and
only then, do I achieve an "unmasking" which in fact represents no theoretical refutation but
the destruction of the practical effectiveness of these ideas" (Mannheim's emphasis).
Mannheim reveals that intentionally constructive descriptions often tend to be concerned with
undermining the authority of knowledge claims and specific categorisations exposing the
practical (and detrimental) function they serves. In this study, I sought to achieve such an
unmasking by, for instance, showing that society's particular conception of ME provides it
with a way of distancing itself from those who suffer from it, thereby creating a secure sense
of being outside its reach. This conception also, very importantly, leaves intact (and
unchallenged) society's inability to deal with the unknown and the unpredictable. By
revealing these underlying functions, the description constructed in this text hopes to unmask
(if not wholly undermine) the authority associated with many of society's knowledge claims
about ME and ME sufferers.
The intentionally constructive nature ofthe research description presented here also speaks of
a concern about power, often siding with the sufferers as those without or at least with very
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little power. This appears to confirm Hacking's (1999: 58) observation that unmasking social
construction is often primarily concerned with questions of power and control. The very point
of unmasking is, after all, to "liberate the oppressed, to show how categories of knowledge are
used in power relationships". While this appears reminiscent of feminist standpoint theory
(discussed in Chapter 5), it differs sharply from this approach by taking for granted that power
is not simply exercised from above (or in feminist terms, from the surface layer). Seemingly
oppressed groupings (even ME sufferers) also participate and even assist in the power structure
(Hacking 1999: 58). And perhaps, Hacking speculates, they do so exactly by owning the very
categories that are applied to them.
Thus, a description produced in written research findings not only serves to construct a
particular version of the social world being studied, but also does so with a particular purpose.
That is, it is marked by an objective that the researcher wishes to achieve by presenting this
particular construction. Given another objective the intentionally constructive nature of the
descriptionmight change -leading to a wholly different description of the same social world.
Escaping the take-over
As I was writing my story (and, in the process, constructing the world and my self), I was, as
Potter (1996: 90) rightly suggests, drawing on and influenced by several different "primary
narratives" or what Clarke (1996: 34) calls "meta-paradigms" or "Great Stories". In my story
these meta-narratives, in particular, included the belief in the Power of Knowledge, the belief
in Science, the belief in Progress and Development, the belief in the Perfectibility of
Humanity, the belief in Healing, the belief in the Transcendence of History through
Perseverance, even the legitimating belief in Social Research itself. These are the only ones
that I was more or less aware of. There could have been many more meta-narratives
contributing surreptitiously to my way of thinking ... and writing.
Yet, I was not only drawing on these meta-narratives, I was also resisting their temptations.
Why temptations? Because, as Clarke (1996: 34) explains, every meta-narrative represents the
"last court of appeal" that pronounces on what is legitimate or illegitimate, on what is seen and
not seen, on what counts as truth or what does not. Every meta-narrative claims that it is in
itself absolute and certainly not in need of any further justification. As a result, every meta-
narrative risks taking over the description (my story) and turning it into One True Story - a
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version of itself - taking on "the mantle oftimeless and unimpeachable fact" (Potter 1996: 90).
This I certainly did not want. Not only did I reject the subversive domination of anyone meta-
narrative in my story; I indeed rejected the very idea that there should even be such self-
authenticating schemes of thought undermining researchers' descriptions, let alone mine.
Still, even though I did not want meta-narratives meddling in my story, I could not deny their
presence and influence in my study and hence could not, in the process of writing, completely
hide their influence. I could merely accept the tensions they had created and attempt to make
these known as I went along, telling my story - and not turning it into The Story.
My chosen approach bears close resemblance to Potter's (1996: 93) discussion of the work of
Hutcheon (1989) on the "double property" of "both telling a story and undermining the basis
of what is told". Hutcheon (in Potter 1996: 93) explains that "it is rather like saying something
whilst at the same time putting inverted commas around what is being said. The effect is to
highlight, or 'highlight', or to subvert, or 'subvert', and the mode is therefore a 'knowing' and
an ironic - or even 'ironic' one". The advantage I gained in making this "double property"
mine was that I could at once both disclose and question the ways in which I made sense of the
social world being studied.
Thus, knowingly and unknowingly, I was confronted by meta-narratives seeking not only to
influence but even to co-opt my story into their own versions of ''the truth". While I resisted,
even rejected, these attempts, I could never deny their influence. What I could do was to
expose the strain induced by these meta-narratives by laying open to scrutiny and question the
very basis of my description. However, in doing so, I had exposed my story; I had made it
vulnerable to its own demise.
Conclusion
"I am trying to find ways to communicate what you know and have experienced so that others
may understand" (Barbour 1998: 184).
At first glance, this seems a relatively straightforward and suitably humble explanation of the
research enterprise. The simplicity and sincerity of the language, however, belie the enormity
and complexity of the task involved. The "knowledge" that I had derived from this study is
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the result of a process of social construction in which I, the researcher, played an active role.
The sharing of such "knowledge" is also a social act. This aspect of the research endeavour,
as the question of representation and presentation, has not, however, been subjected to the
same amount of critically reflexive examination as has, for instance, the interviewing process.
Indeed, as students in qualitative research, we are trained to observe, listen, question and
participate. Yet, rarely are we trained to conceptualise the writing process - the process of
producing a description - as more than simply "writing up" the research (Barbour 1998: 184).
In qualitative research the act of writing is certainly not a mechanistic exercise of simply
''translating'' the actual research (a multifaceted experience in time) into writing. It is rather,
as this chapter has shown, a process (a method) of discovery in which the descriptions that we
researchers produce are not only the products of the research process, but are indeed part of the
research process itself (Barbour 1998: 184). As the research develops, and we explore new
avenues and identify new findings, so too does our description develop. And by writing it in a
particular way, it in turn makes possible the discovery of other aspects of the social world
under study. In this way, our descriptions - our stories - become "a way of 'knowing' - a
method of discovery and analysis" throughout the research endeavour (Richardson in Barbour
1998: 184).
The unique contribution of the individual researcher in the production of a research description
cannot be denied. Unlike a truly disinterested observer, I was personally involved throughout
the production of this description. My unique perspective and frame of relevance determined
the areas on which I focused and the meanings I chose to explore and represent. As such, my
description was inevitably limited. This recognition demanded an analytical engagement with
the assumptions and conventions that structure my written work, as well as with the
implications and repercussion of this work outside the immediate text. Throughout, this
practice of critical reflection afforded valuable insights into the social and political processes
through which the final product of research was constructed.
The recognition of my own contribution to the research description furthermore - and almost
more importantly - pointed to the fact that the constructions we as researchers produce are
dynamic. Not only do they remain open to modification throughout the research process - but
also after the process. Our stories remain open to re-interpretation (Huby 1998: 171). Given
this, we must realise (and accept) that it will never be possible to say that a researcher has
reached "the truth" about something, simply because the truth of one researcher will differ
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from the truth of another. That in turn will differ from the participant's experience and the
interpretation that the reader attaches to the account (Stark 1998: 212). This myriad of
possible interpretations and descriptions permitted by the social world being studied should
however not discourage us - it should merely make and keep us aware of the status of our own
description, as merely "one version of 'what went on here'" (Stark 1998: 212).
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Summary
The question can - and has been - raised regarding the actual truth-value of the story
produced through this study. Is this story merely the coincidental outcome of an encounter
between one particular researcher and a set of willing participants? Or is it the product of
more than pure coincidence? Can my story be regarded as a truthful construction? Can it
said to be true?
By now it is clear that there exists an objectivist way of answering any question concerning the
truth-value of my story. Schutz (1967: 4) captures the essence of this approach when he states
that "to see the world of social facts with an unbiased eye, to classify these facts under
concepts in an honest and logical way ... this must be the guiding aim of every piece of social
research worthy of the name of science ". Accordingly, he defines the task of social science as
"the simple and accurate description of life in society". Thus, for my story to be regarded as
"true ", as "worthy of the name of science ", it must correspond with a simply and accurate
description of the social facts of the reality being studied as discerned through my unbiased
eye.
While I certainly share a commitment to the development of an understanding of the social
world as experienced by the human beings who live in it, I do not agree with the objectivist
way of realising this commitment. I cannot concede that the telling of a truth is simply a
matter of "accurate" description, of simply reflecting through the right choice of wording and
phrasing the "reality" as it "really" is. Taken to its logical conclusion, this would after all
imply that the better our choice of words and phrases, the closer our description would be to
"the truth ". Yet, like Kuhn (in Hacking 1999: 90), I simply find it difficult to imagine "what
the phrase 'closer to the truth' can mean ". For me, all social science theory - my story
included - does not represent the "closest approximation to the truth ", let alone a direct
disclosure of it. This would after all presume the existence of an absolute point to which all
theory could be compared - a presumption I have repeatedly rejected. For me, all social
science theory should rather be regarded as a human construction.
The last emphasis serves to highlight the contribution of the researcher to theory presented.
Recognising the "passionate contribution of the person knowing what is known" (polanyi in
Moustakas 1981: 211) in no way implies that I contemplated my own navel. Rather, through
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rigor, precision and responsibility, such a recognition alerted me to the fact that whatever
understanding I did develop of the Other was the direct result of my Self, that is, of my own
experience of the Other constructed within my Self (and not within the Other). In other
words, the understanding constructed represented the outcome of my own distinctly human
(and, hence, inevitably limited) way of looking and knowing (Maso 1995: 18). Because what
was constructed took its form by virtue of my own contribution, by virtue of my Self I alone
was responsible for the understanding presented, for the social reality created ... for what
would be taken as "knowledge ". In this sense, my construction of a particular understanding
certainly does not reflect some pre-existing truth. It rather more closely represents an act of
bringing a truth into being ... through my Self (cf Merleau-Ponty 1962: xx).
So, the truth I constructed does not - and never can - represent the truth. The truth does not
exist. Instead, my truth of the participants' experiences is better regarded as a story that was
deliberately put together (that is, brought into being) for the purpose of the present text. It was
designed to convey a certain point, to make a particular argument, to create a particular
possible society. With this aim in mind, each and every feature of my story was chosen - for
good (though never absolutely compelling) reasons. That is not to say that the story is wrong
or inaccurate or even "untrue ". For such judgements to be made one would have to
presuppose the existence of a definitive participant named Cheryl, a definitive social theory,
and a definitive social actuality, to which my story could be compared. And, as we have seen,
this is undoubtedly not the case. Consequently, this - my truth - is simply a story that works
here.
Thus, I cannot claim that what I have produced is the only story - nor for that matter the best
one. It is, after all, quite conceivable that a different researcher, operating with a different
aim in mind, would have made different choices (for equally good reasons) and, hence, would
have produced a different story. What is more, my story is open to re-interpretation, to forther
development, and to the discovery of new meanings. It is, after all, concerned with a dynamic
totality - the world of ongoing human experience - which it can never folly comprehend but
toward which it is continually directed. This acknowledgement firmly places my story in the
realm of human practice where absolute certainty is neither a required nor even an attainable
outcome. It is an acknowledgement that clearly declares that no matter how fine-spun,
dazzling and iridescent my story, I find myselfin a human world to which I pay the substantial
tribute of involuntary recognition. It is the very ground beneath my feet: I cannot so much
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understand it (let alone understand it any better) without depending upon its aid (Fullerton
1912: 3).
Given this, the truth-value of my story can no longer be determined by asking, "how close does
it get to the truth?" It no longer makes sense to ask, "how can I be certain that this story
describes the social reality as it really is?" Instead, the more pertinent question now is, "Is
there convincing evidence for believing that the story told indeed affords insight into the world
of the participants?" (cf Pollio et al. 1997: 53). This question suggests that an evaluation of
the evidential support of the story told presents an appropriate way of determining its truth.
As we already saw, one way of evaluating the evidential support of a story is through
recapitulating all that was done in order to construct the particular tale. To this end, I
rendered the procedural structure of the present study open to scrutiny. I freed my way of
knowing, as it were, the very grounds of all my knowledge. This "freeing" was not only
concerned with the rigour and appropriateness of the methods employed,' but also very much
with my own contribution. In this way, those areas of research and truth construction, marked
by a fusion between my Self and the social reality under study, were exposed. In the process it
was possible to reveal that the methods of this study were employed with a conscious and
deliberate awareness of their implications for and appropriateness to the understanding
claimed.
Still, to show that I have paid my dues to the scientific practice of my discipline is not enough.
It offers only part of the evidential support that determines the value of my story ...
What supplements method, or perhaps even surpasses it, is insight The important question
here is whether the evidential support contained within my story allows the reality under study
to be regarded in a different way, a new way? Does it provide an alternative way of knowing?
Does it broaden our understanding? Moreover, does it offer a possibility of improving this
reality? This, the offering of new perspectives, of new ways of looking, of new possibilities,
represents the very purpose of all social research (Maso 1995: 19).
For a story - my story - to be judged as a truth (or at the very least as truthful) requires full
marks on both accounts: method and insight. Neither functions separately. Indeed, there can
be no "truth" without either one or the other as there is a strong reciprocal relation between
the two: the more adequate the methodology, the more insightful the results are likely to be.
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Conversely, if a study generates an insightful story, the more disposed the reader will be to
judge the method as adequate. What I propose here, then, is that concerns of both method and
insight are relevant to the evidential support and, hence, the truthfulness of a story. Well-
executed procedures that do not generate meaningful results are technique without soul.
Brilliant interpretation may have value, but one needs to be convinced of the evidence serving
as the foundation of such findings in lived experience. Only when both criteria are met does a
story attain the rigour and insight that it aspires to attain ... and that are likely to convince
others of its significance (cf Pollio et al. 1995: 55). Stated differently, only to the extent that
the standards of both method and insight have been satisfactorily accomplished is it possible
for my story to carry any "truth" ... for my "possible society" to have any right to existence.
What, then, can be said about my story?
While my story is not the truth, it is without doubt truthful. It describes a world of human
experience in a way that is methodologically sound as well as conceptually attuned to the utter
complexity of the reality it dealt with. What is more, it describes this reality in such a way that
it permits the development of new insight, accompanied by the added promise of improvement.
So my story has constructed a truthful claim about one world of human experience in all its
follness.
Moreover, the value of my story is not only confined to the truth it holds. Its potential indeed
reaches forther than truth ... and touches on hope. Without fail, my story brings back the foil
humanity of the social researcher to the field of social research and, correspondingly,
reinstates social science as undeniably part of the distinctly human world of social life. My
story inspires hope for the pursuit of an understanding of the human world in a humanely
responsible way so that social research will not only to be a folly human enterprise, but indeed
a humane one too.
To the extent that you, the reader, find this to be the case, it is possible for you to accept my
story as the product of an endeavour that ceaselessly aspired to do justice to the human reality
in question.
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Chapter 21
Conclusion
Plummer (in Heaphy 1998: 23) observes that "the ceaseless nature of story telling in all its
forms in all societies has come to be increasingly recognised... Society itself may be seen as a
textured but seamless web of stories, emerging everywhere through interaction: holding people
together, pulling people apart, making societies work".
Because of its significant role in constituting the very fabric of society, the value of the story
and its telling have also been recognised in the world of social research. Here, the story is
recognised as one of the central routes we as social researchers have "into the continuing quest
for understanding human meaning" (Plummer in Heaphy 1998: 23).
This was particularly true in this study. It was indeed all about stories. Throughout, the
research focus was directed at the stories that participants told of the personal meaning of
having ME. And it was about my story - the one burgeoning from the participants' stories, yet
never telling quite the same story as theirs. The entire text indeed represents a story - a
traveller's tale - about a research journey undertaken in a world of illness experience.
So, as my research journey concludes, it is perhaps the most appropriate time to reflect upon
this story and its implications for the world of illness and the world of social research.
The story about having ME
Against the background of Part I, Part IV of this study was dedicated to the discoveries made
in pursuit of an answer to one question: What is the subjective illness experience of those who
suffer from ME? Each discovery was known and knowable only through the stories recounted
by those who endure the suffering of ME.
Their stories first and foremost told of the physical reality of ME. This reality is marked by
tremendous change encompassing virtually every level of physical functioning. On the reverse
side lies the human reality of ME. Each participant's story revealed that the human reality -
the experiential, subjective experience of extensive physical disorder - involves the person as a
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whole. The person's interaction with and within the social world, as well as the person's
relationship with the Self, braves change, disruption and turbulence of a profound and
encompassing nature that leaves no dimension of existence untouched. This then represents
the double jeopardy of ME: an illness so intensely severe and disruptive that it not only
impairs the physical being but intrusively claws deeply into the human actuality as well. It is
not simply an impairment of the body. It invades the total person.
This double jeopardy is exacerbated by the influence of the demon of ignorance. This demon
fills the sufferer's experience of bodily disorder with confusion in the face of a bewildering
and largely inexplicable array of signs and symptoms. It turns the physical being into an
unreliable adversary. Within the world of social interaction, ignorance also wreaks havoc.
Because of ignorance, ME has become widely misunderstood and mishandled in virtually each
and every circle of social interaction. Because of ignorance, the social world not only lacks
any true understanding of ME, it has also actively distanced itself from the ill. This has left the
ill misunderstood, and wholly deserted in their suffering. In addition, the demon of ignorance
has invaded the ill person's experience of the Self. When the personal experience of Self
appears to be so foreign to what was once known and secure, the ill person not only
experiences hurt-filled loss and surrender, but also begins to doubt and fear the Self. There is
conflict with the Self, within the Self.
Thus, based on the stories related by those who suffer from ME, their subjective experience of
illness was one characterised by physical disorder so extensive and severe that it spilled over
into the disruption of their human actuality. By so profoundly altering the previously taken-
for-granted, in ways that seemingly defied explanation, the illness experience not only left the
participants feeling limited and compromised, but also very much stigmatised and
marginalized. For participants, then, the threat posed by ME to the body and the Self was not
confined to the disease alone, but also reached into an existential awareness of disruption, loss,
and fear. Perhaps, in the end, this was the more direct threat - the one that stemmed from
culturally informed understandings - or stories - of what it means to be "normal",
autonomous, and in control - and the poignant realisation of no longer being able to meet the
standards and expectations they imply.
This recognition clearly suggests that the ME sufferer's response to and experience of illness
are formed by more than the purely physical disorder imposed by the specific disease. Rather,
their attempt to make sense of - and give voice to - their illness experience is also very much
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formed by the broader social and cultural stories that permeate their time. After all, in
sustaining and revising their sense of Self in the face of illness, the ME sufferers in this study
were faced with a multiplicity of stories regarding the "true" meaning of their symptoms.
These included accounts from doctors, psychiatrists, councillors, as well as accounts provided
by those who either suffer from a (seemingly) similar condition or profess to know someone
who does. However, Heaphy (1998: 23) reminds us that our thinking is typically dominated
by medical and scientific narratives. These then represent the master narratives or stories
through which ME has been given meaning - to the ME sufferer and in society.
Such "medico-scientific discourses and narratives on the meaning of illness and disease are",
Heaphy (1998: 23) argues, "far from neutral accounts of the 'truth'. Rather, they are bound up
with strategies of power, and have a crucial role to play in a disciplinary society". To explain
this role, Heaphy refers to theorists such as Foucault (1979) who have characterised power as
it is productive, and partly operates in a disciplinary society through an incitement to self-
regulation. According to this view, power also operates in line with binary divisions between
"mad/sane", "normal/abnormal" and "healthy/sick". Following this, medico-scientific
discourses around ME playa crucial role in investing people with ME with a distinct sense of
place, function and attribution, and in positioning them within these binary oppositions. Thus,
just as ME can produce a physical reality marked by chronicity and disability, the social
experience of suffering from ME can produce self-knowledge of one's "difference",
"abnormality" and "otherness". In this way, it becomes possible to understand the self-
knowledge of ME sufferers as being wholly bound up with medical and scientific
constructions of the nature of this syndrome - and with the power relations which these
constructions are both based on and give effect to.
Participants' stories furthermore revealed that the dominant ME narratives produced by the
medical and scientific worlds were closely interwoven with broader social and cultural
accounts of what it means to be rational, sane and normal. In a Western cultural setting
specifically, a unitary body and autonomy combined with adequate involvement in culturally
marked social relationships, are profoundly bound up with notions of "Self' and what it is to
have a "normal life" (Monks 1995: 471). When sufferers divert from the norm, from what is
accepted, they "stand out". When it then becomes apparent that the reason for this deviation is
an illness that seems completely impervious to the powers of modern medicine, society
somehow becomes vulnerable. The illness then becomes a symbolic marker on which society
hangs some of its most important fears, hopes, prejudices and beliefs about itself and the world
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it lives in. The symbolic status of the illness also becomes a reason enough to blame the
"victims", to stigmatise them, and to shun them (cf. Barbour& Huby 1998: 6).
Thus, the stories and constructions that pervade the medical and scientific world, as well as
society itself, label the ME sufferer as deviant and identifies her with a medical enigma which
borders on evil itself. In the face of these stories of what they ought to be - and what they are
obviously not - participants in this study needed to achieve a "reconstruction of Self' (Conrad
in Monks 1995: 471). They achieved this.
Participants' stories revealed that the very real onslaught of ME on all dimensions of actuality
inspired them - perhaps even demanded - to a greater awareness of Self. To become able to
live with a changed Self, the participants needed to reflect on the Self and its states, understand
the Self and its responses, and appreciate the Self and its interpretations. Such a deeper state
of self-awareness made it possible to again believe in the Self and in the reality of their own
experiences. In turn, the renewed belief in the Self empowered them to realise that they
themselves have the power of choice. Through the power of choice, they regained personal
control over their own experience of illness. Thus, while participants could not necessarily
change the physical state and course of the illness itself, they could rework their own
experience of it.
By structuring the Self in a particular way, the participants in this study no longer needed to
feel like powerless victims. Rather, they could firmly return their experience of body, Self and
social to the realm of personal control and in this way "generate" a new empowered Self. This
understanding hints at the human ability to (re)construct a Self by thinking (and talking) about
the Self in a particular way (Kelly & Dickinson 1997: 276). This ability, however, also leads
to an uneasy sense of suspicion: could a story about the Self, and told in a particular way, not
perhaps be false, or only partly true?
Kelly and Dickinson (1997: 276) recognises this concern, but for them it does not present a
serious problem. As the Self, the story produced about the Self is "orderly". And even if this
order is only linguistic in so far as it is imposed after the event, it remains important, for it is
the order that gives shape and meaning to past life and helps render the unknown future
slightly less frightening. It is in the transient moment of now, where past and future is so
simultaneously juxtaposed and intertwined, that the Self is experienced and constructed. It is
this construction which "sustains the continuities of the Self and also accounts for and
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refashions discontinuities of the Self through time" (Kelly & Dickinson 1997: 275). Very
importantly, this suggests that the Self is no static entity. It is an (emerging) configuration of
personal events into an experienced unity which includes what is, what was and what will be.
What does this mean for this study? The stories on which it is based - the participants' stories
about the Self and its experience of ME - were not conceptualised as merely reflecting or
describing a world already made. Rather, each participant's story is understood as an active
lived process, inseparable from the Self at the moment of telling. The account given of an
autobiographical experience is then "not an entity external to the person giving the account"; it
"is the experience" lived in that moment (Kelly & Dickinson 1997: 254-255, emphasis added).
This understanding of participants' stories - as a lived process - not only informed my
evaluation of the data - the stories - with which I worked. It also informed my concept of the
very experience under study. In telling their stories, participants moved back and forth,
reflecting on the past, anticipating the future. So too in living their lives with ME. Here they
also moved back and forth, further and closer to the world created by master narratives and the
world of severe illness. Cultural expectations were juxtaposed against patterns of distress.
Marginalization was followed by acts of resistance. In this way, a life lived with illness
became regarded as "a continually developing trajectory" (Ware 1999: 323). Illness
experience could no longer be narrowly defined as subjective feelings of distress related to
illness-focused acts. The illness experience of the participants in this study was concerned
with far more than acts directed at defining symptoms, attributing cause, seeking help and
complying with treatment. For them, illness happened to the whole person.
It is for this reason, and because it seems to reflect human experience more directly, that the
continually developing trajectory of a life lived with illness, as a way of thinking about illness
experience, merits further exploration in future studies. Such an exploration would not only
apply to the area of ME, but is likely to prove equally useful for understanding experience in
other types of illnesses that are unquestionably physical but at the same time also highly
controversial. In this way, medical sociology will transcend any lingering mechanistic
understandings of disease through experience-near analysis that creates a legitimate space for
the social and personal dimensions of the illness experience (cf. Krie11997: 187).
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The stOry about my story
To a very significant extent much of this text can be read as a travel report about my journey
into the ME world of illness experience. It has outlined the route followed through the stages
from an original idea to this, the final report. Conversations taking place along the way have
been recounted and reflections on the events that were encountered have been provided. And
still one question lingers: what can really be said about this text, about my traveller's tale,
about my story itself?
Dey's (1993: 242) statement that "our 'facts' are produced through our conceptualisations is
very important. Bohm (1983) notes that the root of the word 'fact' is "that which has been
made' as in manufacture - our 'facts' therefore depend on how our perceptions are shaped by
our thinking". What holds true for "our facts" similarly holds true for the story constructed
throughout this text. In other words, this story represents a product that has been
"manufactured" or, if you will, a house that has been "built".
A house consists of many bricks put together in a particular way. In the case of this story, the
stories constructed by participants through our relationship represent the bricks. These stories
were constructed within a particular context (the research relationship). and for a particular
purpose (the development of a better understanding of their illness experience).
Does this imply the possibility that constructions of the same experiences made in different
conversations bear little - or worse yet, no - resemblance to one another? And what would
this mean for the house to be built?
Admittedly, no guarantee exists that a set of different purposes and different contexts will yield
similar constructions of experience. After all, Collingwood (in Williams 1989: 270) suggests
that what has been constructed by participants - their experiences - is the distinct product of
one particular moment in time. That is, "every present has a past of its own, and any
imaginative reconstruction of the past aims at reconstructing the past of this present, the
present in which the act of imagination is going on as here and now perceived". Thus, the past
of illness experiences constructed within our research relationship is the past of that present in
which our relationship was situated. What was constructed was constructed from that
particular present with its own particular past. This implies that a different present (or context)
perhaps ruled by a different purpose, might yield different constructions of the past, that is, of
the participants' experiences. In this sense, then, there exists no way for me to present
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evidence for or against the proposition that a substantially different construction of
participants' experiences (their past) may arise within a different context governed by a
different purpose.
Still, like Pallia et al. (1997: 34), I believe there to be an air of intercontextual coherence
surrounding the constructions of experience underlying my story.
One basis for the belief in intercontextual coherence of expenence is that a person's
experiential field is, as suggested earlier, organized rather than chaotic. That is, "in the day-to-
day flow of experience, change is experienced against the stability of one's social
surroundings, activities, and self-awarenesses. The relative stability of the personal field
provides one basis for expecting personal meanings to bear coherent, if not identical,
intercontextual relations. While specific meanings may change across contexts, such changes
are likely to bear systematic relations that can be understood within a holistic framework"
(Pollio et al. 1997: 34). In other words, I have reason to believe that the experiences
constructed by participants do not merely represent some volatile or erratic flight of thought.
Instead, such constructions are much rather likely to reflect the coherent stability that typifies a
participant's field of personal meaning.
A further reason for believing in the intercontextual coherence of experience concerns "the
temporal dialectic between a person's history and the present-centred nature of remembering.
In the conventional sense, a person remembers something from his/her own personal history
even though the act of remembering always occurs in an ongoing, present situation. The
meaning of one's past is shaped by the present context, although the past that is remembered is
not totally mutable. A person's history has a certain facticity that serves as background for his
or her day-ta-day functioning. That is, the historical certainty of one's past is seldom
questioned: We know the ways in which events of our past relate to the meanings of present
dialogue. A dialogic view of remembering does not imply that reflections will necessarily be
radically transformed in individual settings so as to be contextually idiosyncratic, although
such a state of affairs is not precluded. Rather, the usual situation is that the act of
remembering brings about a temporal fusion of the present and past in which a personal
historical understanding is revised to accommodate a present perspective, and in which the
present perspective is contextualized by one's history" (Pollio et al. 1997: 34). Thus, unlike
Collingwood's view, Pollio et al. 's perspective on remembering is that what is remembered in
a particular present is neither entirely governed nor wholly transformed by the nature (context
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and purpose included) of that present. Instead of such a one-way influence, there is a
"dialogic" interplay between present and past when the latter becomes the subject of
construction within the former. What is then constructed is not a pure reflection in words of
what "really" happened, of some "internal representation" of the past. Rather, as I suggested
earlier, what is constructed, for the research and in the research relationship, is the experience.
In combination, these two reasons for believing in the intercontextual coherence of experience
supports the view that reflections emerging in one conversation - that is, in one research
relationship - will not be wholly different from those emerging in another context directed by a
different purpose. There may even be no difference at all.
Up to this point I have established that the building material I used - the participants' stories -
were produced within a particular context, for a particular purpose. This fact appears to shed
some doubt on the "solidity" of the building material. Yet, it does so only if we insist on
believing in one true reality to be purely reflected in participants' words. Ifwe instead believe
that the experiences constructed in the research relationship are the experiences as lived by
participants, then we accept that our building material is the best they can be: the very personal
constructions of experience by the participants themselves. And as the participants' field of
personal experience is neither chaotic nor completely subject to the present context of
remembering, we cannot but have confidence in the highest quality of the bricks I had chosen
to use.
However, the quality of the bricks does not necessarily guarantee a well-built house because
bricks alone do not simply "make" a house. They have to be put together in a systematic and
orderly manner by the builder who follows a design and adds the cement. Similarly, in this
study the researcher, I, built a house. It is my house.
Much has already been said, in this study and elsewhere (cf. Huby 1998: 164-165), about the
way the researcher's Self - as the researching I - shape the research process and its outcome.
Warnings have been issued that many researchers have gone too far in this direction and are
loosing sight of the research encounter as a social rather than private event. Stated differently,
this means that we researchers have started contemplating our own navels and, having been
caught up in the intricacies of our own experiences, failed to move on. The danger here is that
researchers may, as Potter (1996: 232) puts it, become so "bewitched by reflexivity", so
concerned with an exploration of their own navels, that the human world, with all its interests
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and problems in need of greater understanding, will simply flitter by them, unnoticed,
unchanged, unaccounted for. This is not to deny that the researcher's navel may yield
excellent insights towards greater understanding, but it is certainly not where our quest
towards such understanding should end.
While acknowledging the possibility of overly enthusiastic reflexivity and the danger it holds,
I argue that there are still areas of research practice that can benefit positively from critical
reflection. Here I suggest that we must direct our critical gaze to the space that exists between
the world under study and the theories - the stories - we develop about it. When we assume
such a position, we become able to both comprehend and reveal the mediating practices and
processes of science at work within this critical space (Huby 1998: 165).
In this study the practice of critical reflection made it possible to recognise that in building a
particular construction - a story - I had to add cement, that is, my own interpretations. Yet, I
have to recognise that different (alternative) interpretations were (and still are) possible. The
bricks could have been put together in a multitude of different ways; each way leading to new
possibilities, each way introducing new potentialities of meaning, each way unfolding a
uniquely different construction of the world in question. In fact, there was for me no sure way
- and certainly no absolute way - of reaching an understanding of the participants' human
experiences. There was only my way, which was pervaded by my own humanness. Indeed,
my contribution to the construction of the story about a human world of experience cannot be
separated from my subjective experience of the occurrences through which I came to know
that world. I cannot but recognise my own human Self - the very presence and influence of
the researching I - in every act of knowing.
This recognition was furthermore accompanied by my identifying the conditions which
structured my gaze and its transformations as time passed. This becomes remarkably clear in
the final text. In Part IV, for instance, is part of the work I wrote shortly after completing the
interview cycle of my research. The interviews with the participants and the experiences they
conveyed were still extremely vivid in my mind. I had had hardly any time to distance my Self
from the field. Hence, my interpretation and construction were both enabled and constrained
by my own involvement. In contrast, Part V, which was written more recently, shows a far
greater distance from the research setting. Emotional responses have become more vague, less
explicit. I, the researcher, have become more detached. Yet, through this very detachment I
might have, I fear, also lost some of the intensity that made this study such a powerful one.
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The significance of this experience lies in highlighting the importance of not leaving critical
reflection too late. It should (and can) take place before we distance ourselves completely
from the actual research setting, and should continue until the final report has been produced.
In this way, the very act of critical reflection can become an analytical tool that informs the
study throughout its course.
Critical reflection can still go further... the story that I was able to tell was, after all, framed
by more than just the immediate research setting. It was influenced by prevailing concerns
that stretch well beyond the immediate research context. This implies that our reflective gaze
must extend beyond the research interaction to encompass the wider (and shifting) context in
which this encounter takes place (cf. Small1998: 141).
In this study, extending my gaze beyond the Self and the participant, leads to greater attention
to the master narratives that have shaped my participants' stories - and my own. The present
construction can after all be seen as an attempt to unmask the present day understandings
surrounding the illness experience of ME sufferers. Thus, an awareness of such (mis-)
understandings have shaped my own. Furthermore, the construction presented can also be
seen as an effort to unmask an ideology of science which I believe is no longer meaningful. It
is an ideology that appears, as I have shown, to produce pious reverence for scientific truths
about the world that come to us in a neatly pre-packaged structure. Again, my response to this
ideology has - very strongly - influenced my own construction.
Thus, the story produced and presented through the present text is undeniably a product of my
own doing and reflects a very particular period in time. But does this recognition, this
confession of my personal involvement, not cast a murky shadow over the truth-value of my
story?
My story, as I have argued throughout, must be regarded (and evaluated) strictly in terms of
what it is (or what it at least proposes to be): a story that set out to describe a world of human
experience in a sensitive and appropriate way so as to allow new insight and even the hope of
improvement. It does not in any manner represent the truth about the world in question. It
makes no claim to an enduring status of unquestionable truth. It is a truth about one world of
human experience in all its fullness and complexity. It is a story that works here.
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And while this is indeed a story that I have produced through my Self, I see no reason to
believe that it should necessarily be regarded as any less "truthful" than a story produced
through a different researching I. If I feel brave enough I might even venture so far as to insist
that - exactly because of my personal involvement and my critical awareness of it - my story
might just be better.
Moreover, far from questioning its truth-value, a recognition of the undeniable human
involvement in the construction of a story about one human world, very importantly, places
my research neatly within the realm of human practice. Indeed, this is not only where my
research belongs, it is also where my science resides ... or at least, should reside. For it is in
this world, where there is no absolute certainty, where knowledge becomes a fantastic risk. It
is in this world where potentialities abound, with the prospect of converting the human practice
of social research into a distinctly humane one certainly not the least of these.
Still, after arguing so valiantly to establish that my story contained a truth of great potential, I
must ask: Could it perhaps have been better in any way?
Perhaps yes. .. The practice of critical reflection I proposed and employed in this study opened
several avenues of investigation that might otherwise have remained closed. It indeed enabled
a very particular (and, I hope, compelling) story to be told about a world of lived experience.
Yet, this practice - and hence my story as its product - will benefit greatly from sufficient
supervision and support structures for individual researchers. In the absence of such
structures, the emotional well-being of the individual researcher may be compromised. And
while much damage limitation may take place in informal encounters where confessions are
exchanged, supported provided and blame apportioned, these sessions rarely go beyond the
private and informal. It often seems as if it is only the most secure and arrogant of us who dare
treat their own experience as data in public. And even where they do, the balance is not
always successfully achieved between intellectualising painful and conflicting experiences on
the one hand, and making practical and liveable sense of it all on the other hand.
We must, therefore, rather bring these private deliberations among researchers into the open so
that we fully realise the opportunity to enrich both practice and theory through our shared
experiences. And we must do so in a way that extends a kind of support that will encourage
fellow researchers to take this risk too.
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Final words
The products of our science, the theories we produce, the stories we tell are, so to speak,
always "made", always under construction. And they always express a particular human
understanding, a perspectival insight. To be regarded as valid knowledge claims, these
products need not perfectly correspond to some social reality "out there". To assume that they
should, would be to conform to what Putman (in Hacking 1999: 101) calls the "common
philosophical error" of "supposing that 'reality' must refer to a single super thing". Instead, in
evaluating our science and its products we should look at "the ways in which we endlessly
renegotiate - and are forced to renegotiate - our notion of reality as our language and our life
develops" (Putman in Hacking 1999: 101).
From this, it follows that one of the reasons why we tend to become so confused in debates
about whether something is "real" or not is that we fail to attend carefully enough to the
language that we use. So, when I say in this study that the illness experience of my
participants were "socially constructed" through their stories, and their stories in turn by mine,
I do not mean that it does not exist, that it is not "real". Rather, I mean that the idea afthis
illness experience is open to social influence, to the ways in which it is conceived by the
participants, by my Self, and by the network of milieus in which we live. That is, it has been
"made" or formed within a larger matrix of practices and institutions that surround this
particular type of experience (Hacking 1999: 10 I).
In a similar way, the story presented here should be regarded as "socially constructed". It
expresses a particular understanding attained within a particular context - or matrix - of
practices and institutions that surround and influence the social research enterprise. Given
then a different context and constructor, the stories on which my understanding is based might
very well be understood differently, and, in the process, yield new meanings (Pollio et al.
1997: 350). Indeed, the very real possibility that some might question or disagree with my text
serves as a strong indication of its potential to be re-constructed, re-worked. And, with each
reworking of my understanding, new resources for future renditions are produced (Monks
1995: 454). This too essentially captures the nature of human understanding as "an ongoing
dialogue" (Pollio et al. 1997: 350) in which new meanings may always be constructed, and
reconstructed.
Such new meanings are exactly what we should be looking for as it is in these meanings that
the richness of perspective and interpretation so characteristic of the human world is situated.
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Yet, in creating such meanings (and their renditions), we must remain wary of the fact that as
we do so, we are creating particular "boundaries" (Hacking 1999: 167). In this study, the
meaning-bearing constructions created around one illness not only affect the state of our
knowledge about it. It also impacts on the possibilities and opportunities that remain available,
on the very nature of the (ideal) world in which we live - and where ME sufferers live. In
creating these boundaries of knowledge, we are indeed assuming an immense responsibility for
we are creating a possible society that might influence - if not become - our actual society.
This recognition of the responsibility that accompanies the construction of our stories should
not, however, overwhelm us into a state of inaction. For if it renders us incapable of saying
anything significant for fear of creating a disjointed world, how could we ever justify the right
to ask for the stories that make social research possible in the first place? How would I ever be
able to justify the stories provided in good faith by the participants in this study? After all, if
their experiences were important enough to document initially, they are still important enough
to write now. Hence, while appreciating the responsibility that we as researchers carry, I must
conclude with Stark (1998: 216) that "it is important to take the risk and say something, rather
then err on the side of caution and end up saying nothing".
Writing our stories, then, is a risk we must take.
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Appendix A
Introductory communication with potential participants
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[Address]
Stellenbosch
7600
August 1999
Dear [Participant's Name]
Thank you so much for responding to the appeal to participate in this study. I truly do
appreciate it - especially as it serves to encourage my belief that with the help from people like
you this study will be able to make a difference within the field of ME.
I have, as promised, included a brief outline concerning the motivation and design underlying
this study. Ideally, this outline should facilitate your final decision about participation in this
study. If you should have any further questions left unanswered by this outline, you are of
course more than welcome to contact me at the above stated postal address or at the below
stated e-mail address or telephone number.
Also, please find enclosed a letter written by my supervisor, Prof. J. Mouton, indicating the
University of Stellenbosch's official endorsement of and support for this study. Set against the
background of this letter, I can also assure you that this study will proceed under the
guarantee of complete confidentiality. In addition, I would also like to emphasise that it will
indeed be possible to accommodate your own unique circumstances in the way in which this
study will be conducted.
Once again, thank you for the interest you have shown in my study. I will then be sure to
contact you in the very near future to confirm your participation and to possibly make further
arrangements in this regard.
Yours truly,
Ansie Carstens
Tel. 021 - 883 4567
E-mail: 12345678@maties.sun.ac.za
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THE ME RESEARCH PROJECT
Why a study about ME?
Through this study, I would like to contribute towards a greater understanding of the personal experience of those who
suffer from ME (also known as CFS and CFIDS). As such, I will attempt to stimulate the emergence of a more
informed social and medical understanding and recognition of ME as a real and extremely disabling disease.
I am aware that some may argue that any public recognition of ME as a real disease is very unlikely without the
unambiguous recognition of ME within the medical profession. However, I do believe that a greater social awareness
within society as a whole will filter through to the medical establishment where it may trigger greater interest in further
research within the field of ME.
Who will qualify as participants for this study?
I have, for various reasons, decided to select only a small number of ME sufferers as participants for my study. Each
of these participants must at least fulfil the following four criteria:
Participants must be female.
Participants must be between the ages of 20 and 50.
Participants must reside within the Western Cape region.
Participants must be medically diagnosed as suffering from ME.
As such, those ME sufferers that are finally selected for my study will not only share a similar demographic profile, but
will also be representative of the group most targeted by ME.
What will be expected of participants?
Each participant will be expected to grant at least two in-depth interviews during which you will be asked to describe
your personal experience of ME. These interviews, which will be conducted under the guarantee of complete
confidentiality, may later be supplemented with further discussions during which I will be able to clear up any
uncertainty on my side and during which you will have the opportunity to correct any errors concerning quotation or
interpretation. In addition, each participant will also be asked to compile a short autobiographical sketch through
which I will be able to gain even greater insight into your personal life world.
This structure is, however, very flexible and can be readily adapted to each participant's state of health and well-being.
If it would, for instance, better suit you to conduct four shorter interviews instead of two longer ones, then this can be
arranged. It is thus important that you should know that the way in which this study is going to be conducted can be
readily adapted to your own circumstances.
In light of this flexibility, it is difficult to give an accurate estimation of how much of your time this study will consume. A
usual in-depth interview can, in accordance with the degree to which you are willing to participate and share your
experiences, last anything from one to two to even four hours. This will completely depend on you and how you feel.
Each participant will similarly be able to determine how much time you will invest in the compilation of the
autobiographical text.
I can, however, mention that the interviews will commence from mid-August onwards. After the first set of interviews,
participants will have roundabout three weeks during which to compose the autobiographical sketch. This will be
followed by further interviews. The entire process may, again depending on you, the participant, last between one and
two months.
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Appendix B
Guide to first interview
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CHRONOLOGICAL FOCUS AREAS EXPERIENCE
1st time became ill Self Reaction?
Diagnosis Medical attention Feelings about it?
How the illness proceeded Family & friends Thoughts about it?
In In
terms
--------
terms
--------Times of feeling better
---. ~ Occupational context of Influence?
of
Times of relapse Acquaintances & others Understand & experience ME?
To be chronically ill Media How cope?
A future perspective
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AppendixC
Guide to second interview
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Medical
The self
How experienced?
How felt?
How thought?
How influenced?
Family & Friends
483
Society
Specific questions:
Tailored to each
participant's experience
constructed
so far
Focus:
Ignorance
&
Choice
The future:
Hopes I fears / dreams / suggestions / expectations
/ prospects / possibilities / obstacles
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Appendix D
Approaching the research topic
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At the onset of our first interview, I introduced and explained the research topic:
I would like to start by explaining how I hope our conversation will proceed ...
In our conversation today, I'd like you to tell me your story about having ME, to describe to me what it
has been like and what it is like to have ME, from the time it first started up to now, how the illness
proceeded, how you experienced it, how you've felt and what you've thought about it, and also how you
have managed to cope with ME throughout. You can also tell me about other people's reactions (such
as family, friends, doctors, co-workers and acquaintances) to ME and to you personally as a ME sufferer
and how you have experienced and responded to such reactions.
As this will essentially be your story about having ME, about your own experiences of this illness, I'd
like to emphasise that our conversation will not assume a simple question-answer format. .. instead I
almost want to say: 'the floor is yours'. This is your opportunity to tell me and perhaps a number of other
people what it is like for you to have ME, how you have experienced this illness as you live with it day
after day...
Now, I suspect that the easiest way for you to tell me about your own experiences of ME, to tell me your
story, may be to approach it in a more or less chronological way. You may, for instance, begin by
telling me about the very first time when you became aware that something was wrong, then on to when
you were diagnosed, how your illness proceeded, and how it is to have ME now, how you experience it,
understand it, and cope with it.
I'll appreciate it so much if you could tell me your story in as much detail as possible and also with
the use of very concrete examples wherever possible ... this will help me to make sure that I truly
understand what you have in mind and what having ME has been like for you. This will also help me not
to confuse your experience of this illness with my own background, with my own set of experiences
related to having ME. I do after all want to understand what ME has been like for you, how you have
experienced it. And as I hope that your story will contain so much detail, I'll use this compact cassette
recorder to ensure that I don't forget anything you say, your words, your experiences, your examples.
Now, from what I've said and from what I've explained, is there anything that's not clear, do you have any
questions?
Fine, then, when you are ready, you can start off by taking me back to the very, very first time when
you became aware that something was wrong in your body, what happened then, what were the
circumstances, what did you think and feel, and what did you do... the very first time you became aware
that something wasn't right?
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At the end of our last interview, I asked for participants' impressions of the research process:
Now, just before we conclude... I have one last thing to ask ...
It would truly mean very much to me if you could honestly describe to me your personal experience of
our interaction throughout the entire research process and then especially within the context of our two
interviews.
Was it, for instance, very difficult for you to talk about yourself, to share your experiences with me?
Did you sometimes struggle to find the words to describe your experiences? Did you at times experience
it as uncomfortable or difficult? Were there perhaps any parts that were more difficult than others to
share? Were you ever concerned about the issues such as confidentiality and trust?
Did our conversations have any influence on you outside of the specific interview situation? Did what
you said during the interviews or the questions that I asked prompt you to think more about some aspects
or perhaps to think differently about others than you had before? Did you perhaps discover something
about yourself or about your own situation which you had previously not been so aware off?
Can you think of any 'mistakes' that were made or any problems that might have been avoided? Do
you have any suggestions through which a study such as this one could be planned and conducted
more effectively in the future?
Is there here anything else you would like to add or ask?
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Towards the end of our first interview, I introduced and explained the TSCS:
Just before we conclude for today, I would like you to complete this very short questionnaire - it will not
take any longer than about 20 minutes to complete. It is called the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale and
consists of a number of statements that can help you to describe yourself and how you feel about
yourself.
This little book contains all the statements. Each statement describes how a person can feel about him-
or herself. You can then decide how accurately each statement describes the way you feel about
yourself. This you can do using the 5-point scale that appears at the top of each page. In other words,
if the statement describes your view of yourself perfectly, you can encircle a 5 on the answer sheet, while
a 1 will show that you certainly do not think that the particular statement represents the way you feel
about yourself. As there are of course no right or wrong answers, please feel free to describe yourself as
honestly as you can.
Also, please notice that the numbers on each page in the booklet correspond with every second box on
the answer sheet. In other words, on the first page, you will answer each question by encircling a
number from 1 to 5 in every second box on the answer sheet. If you do have any questions about this,
please do not hesitate to ask as you go along. As it may be easy to become confused with the numbers,
it may be a good idea to check every now and then that the number of the question in the book
corresponds with the number next to your answer on the answer sheet. If you do make a mistake, there
is no need to worry. Simply cross out the wrong answer and encircle the right own. Do try to respond to
all the statements.
Do you have any questions?
Fine, then, when you are ready... you can start to respond to each of the statements in the booklet by
encircling the chosen number on the answer sheet.
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At the end of our first interview, I introduced and explained the autobiographical sketch:
So we have come to the end of our first interview. Before we meet again for the second interview, I
would very much like you to compose a short autobiographical sketch for me.
[Present guideline for the autobiographical sketch.)
As a guide, I have stated here five very broad questions that you can answer in as much detail as
possible, again using concrete examples wherever you can. This sketch can be hand-written or typed
using a type writer or a computer - whichever way you find the easiest or with whichever way you feel
the most comfortable. You can also choose how much you'd like to write about each question. You
can, for instance, choose to write half a page about one question, and two about another, or simply one
or two or three pages about each question - the choice is yours, it is completely up to you.
I will also, as I have indicated there, towards the end, appreciate it if you could post the sketch to me as
soon as you've completed it, that is, when you have written everything you wanted to, just drop it off in
the mail to me. When I receive it, I will contact you to arrange our second interview at a time that will
best suit you.
Perhaps you'd like to take some time now to read through the questions... If any questions come to
mind, please do not hesitate to ask.
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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
As in the case of the interviews, your contribution in the form of a short autobiographical
sketch is of great value to this study. I would, therefore, truly appreciate it if you could answer
the following questions in as much detail as possible, using concrete examples where
applicable:
1. Can you describe the very practical ways in which having ME has influenced
and currently influences your life?
2. Can you describe how you have experienced those encounters with the medical
profession that have concerned ME?
3. Can you describe if there has been any changes in the way in which you see and
experience yourself since contracting ME, and if there has been any such
changes, can you describe it?
4. Can you describe your experience of family, friends, co-workers and
acquaintances' reactions to and impressions of ME and of you as a ME sufferer?
5. Can you describe how you have managed to cope with ME during the entire
course of this illness?
If you have any enquiries concerning the autobiographical sketch, you are very welcome to
contact me at the below-stated telephone number or e-mail address.
When the autobiographical sketch has been completed to your satisfaction, I would greatly
appreciate it if you could send it to me through the post. I will contact you as soon as I have
received it in order to schedule our second interview at a time that will best suit you.
Thank you very, very much!
Ansie Carstens
Tel.
E-mail:
021 - 883 4567
12345678@maties.sun.ac.za
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